More effective social services – draft report by New Zealand Productivity Commission
More effective social 
services 
Draft Report 
April 2015 
  
ii More effective social services 
 
The New Zealand Productivity Commission – Te Kömihana Whai Hua o Aotearoa1 
Date:  April 2015 
The Commission – an independent Crown entity – completes in-depth inquiry reports on topics selected by 
the Government, carries out productivity-related research, and promotes understanding of productivity 
issues. The Commission aims to provide insightful, well-informed and accessible advice that leads to the 
best possible improvement in the wellbeing of New Zealanders. The Commission is bound and guided by 
the New Zealand Productivity Commission Act 2010. 
To find out more about the Commission, visit www.productivity.govt.nz, or call +64 4 903 5150. 
ISBN: 978-0-478-44012-6 (print)  ISBN: 978-0-478-44013-3 (online) 
Inquiry contacts 
Administration Robyn Sadlier 
 T: (04) 903 5167 
 E: info@productivity.govt.nz  
 
Other matters Geoff Lewis 
 Inquiry Director 
 T: (04) 903 5157  
 E: geoff.lewis@productivity.govt.nz  
Website www.productivity.govt.nz 
Twitter  @nzprocom 
LinkedIn  NZ Productivity Commission 
1 The Commission that pursues abundance for New Zealand. 
Disclaimer 
The contents of this report must not be construed as legal advice. The Commission does not accept 
any responsibility or liability for an action taken as a result of reading, or reliance placed because of 
having read any part, or all, of the information in this report. The Commission does not accept any 
responsibility or liability for any error, inadequacy, deficiency, flaw in or omission from this report. 
                                                     
 Terms of reference iii 
Terms of reference 
NEW ZEALAND PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION INQUIRY INTO ENHANCING 
PRODUCTIVITY AND VALUE IN PUBLIC SERVICES 
Issued by the Minister of Finance, the Minister of State Services (the “referring Ministers”).  
Pursuant to sections 9 and 11 of the New Zealand Productivity Commission Act 2010, we hereby request 
that the New Zealand Productivity Commission (“the Commission”) undertake an inquiry into enhancing 
productivity and value in the state sector (focusing on the purchasing of social sector services). 
Context 
1. The Government is trying to bring greater clarity about results from public services (such as the 10 
Better Public Services results), and develop smarter strategies and deeper capability to achieve 
desirable outcomes. Government agencies need to know what actually drives poor outcomes and what 
concrete actions can prevent or alleviate harm. They need to become more intelligent and effective 
purchasers that can identify who their most exposed clients are, and better understand what goes on at 
the frontline. The agencies can then start making decisions to improve services and, thereby, outcomes 
for people and their communities. 
2. There are significant gains to be made by challenging and improving the way in which social sector 
agencies identify need and purchase services. In particular, this will involve a more intelligent system 
that understands what impacts it is having and incentivises and enables innovation. 
3. The Government has already taken some important steps – its world-first Welfare Investment Approach 
is a shift towards a smarter system. The new governance structures and ways of purchasing services in 
the Social Sector Trials and Whänau Ora are examples of innovations in commissioning services. 
4. There is growing international awareness that difficult social problems are no longer just the domain of 
governments and that tackling them in new and innovative ways to get better results will involve 
combining the expertise of public, social and private sectors. 
5. Internationally, governments are demonstrating a much stronger focus on understanding outcomes and 
measuring value for money from social-service investment. New Zealand can benefit from the 
experiences of countries such as the UK – for example in implementing payment-by-results contracts in 
social services. 
Purpose and Scope 
6. Having regard to the context outlined above, the referring Ministers request the Commission to carry 
out an investigation into improving outcomes for New Zealanders as a result of services resourced by 
the New Zealand state sector. In keeping with Better Public Services, the investigation will focus on the 
performance and potential improvement of social-sector purchasing/commissioning of services 
(including services currently delivered by the state sector). The focus should be on the institutional 
arrangements and contracting mechanisms that can assist improved outcomes, rather than commenting 
on specific policies (such as benefit settings or early childhood education subsidies). 
7. Two broad questions should guide the investigation. These focus on the way that state sector agencies 
select and organise their functions, and the tools they employ to achieve results:  
What institutional arrangements would support smarter purchasing/commissioning? 
- The Inquiry should provide an overview of emerging new commissioning arrangements both 
internationally and within New Zealand, focusing on one or two representative agencies. How are 
population analytics, policy, purchasing, evaluation, different forms of relationships and other 
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relevant functions organised and incentivised? How effective are these arrangements at targeting 
services at particular clients, combining efforts with other agencies and achieving desired outcomes 
across the social sector? 
- What lessons are there from the Government’s initiatives to date (e.g. BPS results and the welfare 
investment model) and from other national or international innovations for bringing a greater 
performance focus to purchasing? What organisational features (e.g. internal purchase centres, 
external challenge) are most effective? How can agencies build and maintain better commissioning 
capability (skills and systems)?  
What market arrangements, new technologies and contracting or commissioning tools would help 
achieve results?  
- Provide an overview and assessment of the range of contracting mechanisms, purchase vehicles and 
new technologies that have been employed in New Zealand or internationally to enable innovation 
and better results. Examples include outcome-based contracts, joint ventures, local devolution and 
the use of ICT to facilitate greater client focus and participation. What are the key themes of the 
innovations? What have been the general features of successful and unsuccessful approaches? What 
is the role of the community in innovation and/or ensuring that the new purchase arrangements 
work? How important is contestability or other performance mechanisms for ongoing improvement 
of outcomes? 
- Looking at two to three specific outcome or service areas, what lessons are there for applying new 
purchase mechanisms in New Zealand? How can any risks be managed? What are the barriers to 
adoption? 
- Consideration should be given to the characteristics of the New Zealand provider market, and how 
it differs from regular commercial markets and how the role of the community impacts on it. In 
particular, the inquiry should examine the openness, capacity and capability of current providers to 
manage new purchase models (e.g. financially-linked, results-based contracts), and how the Crown 
could influence the shape and long-term sustainability of the market in the future.  
Analysis and Recommendations 
8. The inquiry should explore academic research and international experience related to both questions. 
However, the focus should be on practical applications relevant to New Zealand circumstances.  
9. The Commission should work with a couple of departments and/or Crown entities, reviewing current 
approaches and ongoing changes to draw lessons and identify opportunities for change. It is expected 
that analysis and recommendations will provide useful guidance to Ministers and State Sector Chief 
Executives about how to improve the way services are commissioned. 
Consultation  
The Commission will also consult with non-government organisations and other providers, academics and 
international agencies as required. 
Timeframes 
The Commission must publish a draft report and/or discussion document, for public comment, followed by 
a final report that must be presented to referring Ministers by 30 June 20152. 
Referring Ministers 
Hon Bill English, Minister of Finance 
Hon Dr Jonathan Coleman, Minister of State Services 
2 Note: The inquiry timeframe has been extended to 31 August 2015. 
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About the draft report 
This draft report aims to assist individuals and organisations to participate in the inquiry. It outlines the 
background to the inquiry, the Commission’s intended approach, and the matters about which the 
Commission is seeking comment and information. 
This draft report contains the Commission’s draft findings and recommendations. It also contains a limited 
number of questions to which responses are invited but not required. The Commission welcomes 
information and comment on all issues that participants consider relevant to the inquiry’s terms of 
reference. 
Key inquiry dates 
Receipt of terms of reference: 26 June 2014 
Release of issues paper: 7 October 2014 
Release of draft report: 28 April 2015 
Draft report submissions due: 24 June 2015 
Final report to the Government 31 August 2015 
Contacts 
Administrative matters: T: +64 4 903 5167 
E: info@productivity.govt.nz  
Other matters: Geoff Lewis 
Inquiry Director 
T: +64 4 903 5157 
E: geoff.lewis@productivity.govt.nz 
Postal address for submissions:  More effective social services inquiry 
New Zealand Productivity Commission 
PO Box 8036 
The Terrace 
WELLINGTON 6143 
Website: www.productivity.govt.nz 
 
Why make a submission? 
The Commission aims to provide insightful, well-informed and accessible advice that leads to the best 
possible improvement in the wellbeing of New Zealanders. Submissions help the Commission to gather 
ideas, opinions and information to ensure that inquiries are well-informed and relevant, and that its advice is 
relevant, credible and workable. 
Submissions will help shape the nature and focus of this inquiry. Inquiry reports may cite or directly 
incorporate relevant information from submissions.  
How to make a submission 
Anyone can make a submission. It may be in written, electronic or audio format. A submission can range 
from a short letter on a single issue to a more substantial document covering many issues. Please provide 
supporting facts, figures, data, examples and documentation where possible. Every submission is 
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welcomed; however, identical submissions will not carry any more weight than the merits of the arguments 
presented. Submissions may incorporate relevant material provided to other reviews or inquiries. 
Submissions may be lodged at www.productivity.govt.nz or emailed to info@productivity.govt.nz. Word or 
searchable PDF format is preferred. Submissions may also be posted. Please email an electronic copy as 
well, if possible.  
Submissions should include the submitter’s name and contact details, and the details of any organisation 
represented. The Commission will not accept submissions that, in its opinion, contain inappropriate or 
defamatory content. The Commission has no power or jurisdiction to influence individual cases or disputes 
between parties. 
What the Commission will do with the submissions 
The Commission seeks to have as much information as possible on the public record. Submissions will 
become publicly available documents on the Commission’s website shortly after receipt, unless 
accompanied by a request to delay release for a short period of time.  
The Commission is subject to the Official Information Act 1982, and can accept material in confidence only 
under special circumstances. Please contact the Commission before submitting such material. 
Other ways to participate 
The Commission welcomes engagement on its inquiries. It anticipates holding regional meetings and/or 
roundtables on the draft report in June 2015. Details of these will be notified to all those on the inquiry’s 
interested-parties list. Please telephone or send an email if you are not already on this list and would like to 
be added.  
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 Commonly used terms xi 
Commonly used terms 
Term  Description 
allocative efficiency Maximum allocative efficiency requires the production, from a given amount of 
resources, of a set of goods and services that people most value. 
client-directed budget A service model where the government allocates clients a “service budget” and 
permits them to choose the services they receive up to the value of the budget. 
Government funding follows the choices made by providers.  
client-directed service models The client-directed budget and voucher service models. 
commissioning A set of interrelated tasks that need to be undertaken to turn policy objectives 
into effective social services. Commissioning organisations should consider 
objectives, needs, funding, pricing, risk management, quality, eligibility, 
performance measurement, information flows, provider market sustainability and 
interactions with other services; and choose an appropriate service model. (See 
Chapter 6) 
competition for the market An approach to contracting whereby providers compete for contracts through a 
tendering process, and their service volume or market share is fixed for the 
duration of the contract. 
competition in the market An approach to contracting whereby providers compete alongside each other to 
attract clients. 
contestability The characteristic of a market where the opportunity to supply the good or 
service is open to all qualified providers. 
contracting for outcomes Contacts that specify desired outcomes, and there is a risk of losing the contract if 
those outcomes are not achieved. 
contracting for outputs Contacts that specify the outputs, and there is a risk of losing the contract if those 
outputs are not delivered. 
contracting out A service model where the Government contracts a third party to provide specific 
social services.  
decentralisation The transfer of substantial decision-making power to semi-autonomous 
organisations with separate governance. 
demand-side Market activity, influences or conditions related to consumers of goods and 
services. 
diffusion The process by which a new idea, technology or product is adopted across a 
society or economy. 
dynamic efficiency Dynamic efficiency is achieved when optimal decisions are made on investment, 
innovation and market entry and exit, to create productive and allocative 
efficiency in the longer term. 
economic profit The difference between revenue and costs, where all inputs (including capital) are 
valued at their opportunity cost (ie, what they could earn in their next most valued 
use). 
economies of scale Reduction of cost per unit as the volume of production increases, due to large up-
front or fixed costs being spread across more units. 
for profit (FP) An organisation that earns profits for its owners. 
government agency  A broad set of government departments, Crown entities and other organisations 
(eg, the Police) involved in the delivery of social services. 
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Term  Description 
incumbent In economics, an incumbent firm is an established business with a strong position 
in the market. 
information and 
communications technology 
(ICT) 
Telecommunications, broadcast media and information technology (IT). ICT is a 
more encompassing term than IT, and stresses the innovative role of unified 
communications and integrated digital networks in economic activity.  
innovation The process of translating an idea or an invention into a good or service that has 
value. 
institutional architecture The design of institutions that govern the operation of the social services system. 
It includes the roles and responsibilities of different organisations and rules 
around their interaction. Chapter 5 discusses three broad architectures: top-down 
control, decentralisation and social insurance. The main distinction between these 
architectures is who has the responsibility to design and commission services.  
intervention Services that intervene in a situation in order to alter the likely course of future 
events.  
managed market A “market” with more than one provider, where market share and prices are 
determined administratively. 
market for social services A market is a setting in which parties voluntarily undertake exchanges. In the 
context of this inquiry, the market for social services refers to the provision of 
social services in exchange for payment. Funding could come from a government 
agency or another organisation (eg, a philanthropic trust). In some cases, clients 
partly or fully fund the service. The provision and purchase of social services 
meets the economic definition of a market, yet it has complex and distinctive 
features that make it different from simple markets. The term is used in the inquiry 
terms of reference. 
monopoly A situation where one provider is the only supplier of a service. A monopoly is 
characterised by an absence of competition. 
monopsony A market that has only one buyer and many would be sellers. 
non-government organisation 
(NGO) 
Any organisation involved in the social services system other than a government 
agency. 
not for profit (NFP) An organisation that does not earn profits for its owners. Money earned by or 
donated to a NFP is used to pursue the organisations mission and objectives. 
outcome-focused contracting Contracting for outputs, in the context of clear intervention logic, outcome 
measurement and a clear and upfront statement of the purpose of the contract. 
The purpose statement should be used as a basis for discussion aimed at 
improvement. 
outcomes The longer-term consequences of an intervention or programme in terms of the 
ends sought (eg, better health or reduced re-offending).  
outputs The amount of social services provided. Examples include hours of counselling, 
number of patients seen and the number of people attending training courses. 
payment for outcomes Contracting for outcomes, plus payments that vary according to performance 
measures specified in terms of outcomes achieved. 
payment for outputs Contracting for outputs, plus payments that vary according to performance 
measures specified in terms of outputs delivered. 
productive efficiency Maximum productive efficiency requires that goods and services are produced at 
the lowest possible cost. This requires maximum output for the volume of specific 
inputs used, plus optimum use of inputs given their relative prices. 
 Commonly used terms xiii 
Term  Description 
purchasing The purchasing process identifies and selects non-government providers and 
agrees terms of supply though a contract. It includes calling for expressions of 
interest to supply social services, evaluating proposals from potential providers, 
completing due diligence, negotiating the terms of the contract and awarding the 
contract. 
quality shading A situation where cost savings are achieved by reducing the quality of a services. 
Quality shading is a particular problem when it is difficult to observe or measure 
the quality of services being provided. 
service model A way of conceptualising different approaches to services delivery. Chapter 6 
explores seven different service models and their strengths and weaknesses. 
social insurance An insurance scheme organised by the state with compulsory membership, and in 
which premiums are related to the ability to pay. 
social services Services dedicated to enhancing people’s economic and social wellbeing by 
helping them lead more stable, healthy, self-sufficient and fulfilling lives. This 
inquiry is primarily concerned with social services that government provides, 
funds or otherwise supports. 
system stewardship An overarching responsibility for the monitoring, planning and management of 
resources in such a way as to maintain and improve system performance. Relevant 
activities include monitoring system performance, identifying barriers to and 
opportunities for beneficial change, and leading the wider conversations required 
to achieve that change. 
service stewardship The ongoing monitoring of service performance, and re-visiting design choices as 
necessary to improve performance. 
social service agencies Government agencies that deliver social services. Often abbreviated to agencies 
in this report. 
social service providers Non-government organisations that provide social services. 
social services system The system of organisations, institutions and relationships through which social 
services are funded, coordinated and delivered. 
social insurance  Assigns both decision-making power and liability for future costs to an insurer. 
supply-side Market activity, influences or conditions related to producers of goods and 
services. 
transaction costs Costs incurred by the parties making an economic exchange, other than the 
amount paid directly for the good or service purchased. Transaction costs can 
include search costs such as the cost of tendering processes, bargaining costs 
such as the legal fees associated with drawing up a contract, and enforcement 
costs such as the cost of performance reporting and monitoring. 
top-down control Primary decision-making power sits with the relevant minister or department 
head. 
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Box 1 Te Reo Mäori used in the report 
Te Reo Mäori is one of New Zealand’s three official languages – along with New Zealand English and 
New Zealand Sign Language. This draft report uses some terms that may be unfamiliar to international 
readers. 
 hui – literally a gathering or meeting. As used in this draft report, hui refers to a community 
meeting conducted according to tikanga Mäori (Mäori protocol). 
 iwi – often translated as “tribe”. Iwi are a collection of hapü (clans) that are composed of whänau 
(defined below). The link between the three groupings is genealogical. 
 kaupapa – purpose, mission, or approach. 
 kawanatanga – the features and actions of governing. 
 koha – gift or donation. 
 köhanga reo – literally “language nests” – are pre-school Mäori culture and language immersion 
programmes. 
 körero kanohi ki te kanohi – conversing face to face. 
 kura kaupapa Mäori – Mäori-medium schools.  
 manaakitanga – the process of showing respect, generosity and care for others. It has an overtone 
of hospitality towards those outside a group you identify with. In its simplest definition (hospitality), 
all Mäori groups or whänau will exercise manaakitanga at some time.  
 mana motuhake – a political concept, emphasising autonomy and self-government (see Box 13.1). 
 mana whenua − the iwi or hapü who are recognised as deriving mana (authority/status) from their 
ancestral connection to that particular stretch of land or coast. 
 mataawaka − refers to the Mäori population in one area that is connected to an iwi or hapü who 
holds mana whenua somewhere outside that area. 
 rangatiratanga – a contested term in the context of Te Tiriti o Waitangi (see below). It can refer to 
chieftainship or chiefly authority and leadership. Other interpretations include “sovereignty” and 
“autonomy”. 
 rohe – area. 
 rünanga – a governing body associated with an iwi.  
 Te Puni Kökiri – the Ministry of Mäori Development. 
 Te Tiriti o Waitangi – The Treaty of Waitangi. The treaty signed by representatives of the British 
Crown and various Mäori chiefs at Waitangi on 6 February 1840. The Treaty is one of New 
Zealand’s founding documents. The Treaty has English and Mäori versions. The translations do not 
strictly align. 
 tangata whenua – literally “the people of the land”. 
 täonga – that which is precious or treasured. 
 Te Ao Mäori – literally “the Mäori world”. 
 Te Ika a Mäui – literally “the fish of Mäui” – the North Island of New Zealand. 
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 Te Hiku o Te Ika – the part of the Far North District that is north of the Hokianga. 
 Te Waipounamu – the South Island. 
 te mana whakahaere – translated variously as the “power to manage”, “governance” or 
“authority”. 
 tikanga – literally “the things that are correct”. Sometimes translated as “protocol” or “customary 
practice,” tikanga is concerned with ways of correct action. 
 wänanga – publicly owned tertiary institutions that provide education in a Mäori cultural context. 
 whakapapa – to make connection to place, and through that to people. 
 whänau – typically translated as “families”. Whänau may refer to nuclear or extended families.  
 Whänau Ora – a government initiative emphasising the empowerment of whänau to become self-
managing. More broadly, Whänau Ora is an approach to delivering social services based on a 
Mäori concept of wellbeing, which aims to have the various needs of a whänau met holistically. 
 whänaungatanga – a broad kinship concept that acknowledges inter-connectedness between 
people and the environment, through whakapapa. It is from this inter-connectedness that specific 
obligations of care arise. Importantly, these duties are not just to direct kin; they can arise also 
through the inter-connectedness of all people in Mäori cosmology. 
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Overview 
Social services help New Zealanders to live healthy, safe and fulfilling lives. They provide access to health 
services and education opportunities, and protect and support the most vulnerable. The quality of these 
services and their accessibility for those in need are crucial to the ongoing wellbeing of New Zealanders. 
Social services cover a wide variety of different activities. The Government funds them with the aim of 
improving a set of outcomes that people value, such as better health, less crime, and more and better jobs.  
Social services are only one influence among many that determine people’s outcomes. The relationships 
between all the influences and the outcomes are complex and often not fully understood. Other important 
influences include family, friends and community, work and colleagues, and early physical and social 
experiences.  
Figure 0.1 Elements of the social services system 
 
This inquiry is about how to make New Zealand’s government-funded social services more effective so as to 
improve people’s lives and raise social wellbeing.  
The inquiry has examined (among other things): 
 the strengths and weaknesses of current approaches to commissioning and purchasing social services;  
 the lessons learnt from recent initiatives and new approaches, in New Zealand and overseas; 
 how social services can best target and help those with high needs and at risk of poor outcomes; 
 how to improve outcomes through better coordination of services within and between government 
agencies and service providers; 
Friends and social 
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 how to take advantage of emerging opportunities offered by existing and new datasets, new 
information technologies and data analytics to learn about the effectiveness of different services for 
different groups, and to ensure that this learning spreads and is taken up widely by service providers; 
and 
 the institutional arrangements that would support smarter commissioning, purchasing and contracting 
of social services. 
In the course of conducting this inquiry the Commission has been impressed with the hard work, perceptive 
thinking and commitment of the many people and organisations, both outside and within government, who 
help deliver social services to those in need. 
The inquiry’s purpose is not to critique the performance of government agencies and service providers, but 
rather to make recommendations that will improve the system that all parties work within. Getting the 
system to function effectively will free up time, energy and resources to improve outcomes. 
The Commission has drawn evidence from many sources including: 
 academic research, commissioned pieces of research, government reports and data; 
 134 submissions from different organisations and individuals including government agencies, not-for-
profit (NFP) providers, for-profit (FP) providers and client groups; 
 more than 100 face-to-face meetings with a wide cross-section of interested parties; and 
 close engagement with the Ministry of Social Development (MSD) and the Ministry of Health to draw 
lessons from existing programmes. 
The Commission has made 81 draft findings and 47 draft recommendations. Recommendations range from 
modest ways to improve commissioning and contracting to bold suggestions for changes in roles and 
responsibilities. At a time when the Government is strongly focused on more effective social services, the 
Commission believes this draft report will generate significant interest and welcomes submissions on it. 
Social services in New Zealand 
Central government spends around $34 billion a year on health, education and other social services. Most 
of this spending goes to universities, hospitals, schools and frontline departments, with the rest used to 
contract out services. For example, MSD is planning to spend 20% of its total expenditure on social services 
in 2014/2015 to pay for services that are contracted out.3  
Social services are delivered by a mix of government, FP and NFP providers. History, population mix and 
geography have all influenced the landscape of service providers and funding arrangements under which 
they operate.  
There have been numerous government reviews over the past 20 years that have identified remarkably 
consistent lists of issues, and proposed rather similar solutions. In light of this, the Commission has made a 
particular effort to identify the causes of problems rather than make proposals that simply tackle symptoms. 
The sheer size and complexity of the social services system makes generalisations difficult. Even so, the 
Commission’s broad observations are that the social services system has a number of positive attributes 
including: 
 social services workers, including a significant number of volunteers, are highly committed to improving 
the lives of clients and are driven by a sense of civic responsibility; 
 Governments, past and present, have shown a strong commitment to improving public services; 
3 This excludes income support and benefit payments. 
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 pockets of successful innovation exist in the use of data management and analytics; 
 government agencies widely acknowledge the importance of integrating services and the need to do 
better; and 
 government agencies are generally willing to launch trials and experiments.  
The Commission has also observed a number of weaknesses in the social services system: 
 existing institutions are not well placed to deal with the multiple and inter-dependent problems 
experienced by many of New Zealand’s most vulnerable individuals and families; 
 government agencies generally know too little about the services (or interventions) that work well and 
those that do not; 
 evaluation of many social services is currently absent or of poor quality, or not given enough weight in 
subsequent decision making.  
 providers face poor incentives to experiment, and to share and adopt innovations; 
 clients often perceive government processes as confusing, overly directive, and unhelpful. For 
providers, government processes can appear wasteful and disconnected from the real-world problems 
that providers struggle with; 
 services delivered by government agencies are often poorly coordinated; 
 opportunities are missed for early intervention to avoid the escalation of problems; 
 government agencies often tightly prescribe the activities of providers, making it difficult for providers 
to innovate or tailor services to the individual needs of clients; and  
 clients are often feel disempowered by the manner in which social services are commissioned and 
delivered. 
The Commission has also observed a large “stock” of existing social services that continue to be funded 
and run in much the same way over decades, with little improvement in performance. A flow of new 
initiatives attracts much attention but has little effect on the existing stock or on outcomes. This suggests 
the system is not good at evaluating programmes, or expanding those that offer high effectiveness and 
removing those that do not.  
Diagnosing the causes of system weaknesses and finding ways to overcome them is crucial in view of 
pressures on the system such as population ageing, the increasing demand for services, rising social 
expectations and the rising costs of delivering some services.  
New Zealand is not the only country facing these pressures. Governments around the world are grappling 
with ways of improving the outcomes from their large expenditures on social services. There is also much to 
be learnt from innovative approaches to social services being applied in New Zealand and elsewhere. 
New ideas in New Zealand and elsewhere 
New approaches in New Zealand and elsewhere have sought to improve social services. They are instructive 
because they tackle some of the issues and problems described above. 
Some schemes use data in sophisticated ways to test the effectiveness of different services for different 
types of clients. This can lead to large gains in effectiveness. MSD’s Investment approach is a good 
example. 
Other schemes seek to empower clients and give them greater choice over which bundle of services best 
meets their needs, and who provides them. The new Australian National Disability Insurance Scheme allows 
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people with disabilities to choose a range of support to achieve their goals, within budgets determined by 
their level of need. 
The Whänau Ora programme aims to empower families (whänau) to determine their own goals and choose 
a set of services and support to help achieve them. “Navigators” assist whänau to find the services and 
support they need. 
Other new approaches emphasise sharpening incentives and stimulating innovation through some form of 
payment by results. Examples include social bonds and “contracting for outcomes”, which leave the means 
of achieving the results up to the provider. 
One lesson from these initiatives is that social service programmes that give clients an entitlement to a level 
of support and a choice over how to spend it prompt providers to be responsive and to innovate. Yet such 
programmes also create pressures to expand entitlements, increasing programme costs. Programme 
designers need to carefully consider how to control cost pressures in such initiatives. 
Other broad lessons for successful implementation of substantial, new social service programmes are the 
need for a well-articulated vision of the destination, careful staging and trials, meaningful engagement with 
affected parties, and independent evaluation to guide future design and build support. 
Assessing system performance and diagnosing its causes  
Focusing on the social services system (rather than specific services, programmes or providers) allows a 
broader understanding of the institutions and processes that shape the outcomes achieved from 
government-funded services. 
As noted, while there are positive aspects of performance, many weaknesses exist. Diagnosing the causes 
of these weaknesses is an important and necessary step towards improving the system. 
The Commission considers a well-functioning social services system would: 
 target public funds towards areas with the highest net benefits to society; 
 match the services provided to the needs of clients; 
 align incentives to improve the wellbeing of clients and those affected by their actions; 
 ensure decision makers (at all levels) have adequate information to make choices; 
 respond to changes in client needs and the external environment; 
 meet public expectations of fairness and equity; 
 be responsive to the aspirations and needs of Mäori and Pasifika; and 
 foster continuous experimentation, learning and improvement.  
While many individual services succeed on one or more of these criteria, the system as a whole is under-
performing.  
No single factor can be pinpointed as the underlying cause of the system weaknesses observed by the 
Commission. Rather, these weaknesses are due to a combination of factors. 
 Many agencies and providers lack clarity about the objectives of the system and their part in it.  
 Few mechanisms exist to capture and analyse information on the impact and cost effectiveness of 
services.  
 Many government institutions were created in a different era of public administration and are not set up 
to deal with the complexity of modern demands on government-funded social services.  
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 Previous attempts to reform the system have failed to address the underlying (institutional) causes of 
problems.  
 Those with decision rights often lack the required information, incentive and capability to make 
decisions consistent with efficient and effective social services.  
 Many contracts for social services are highly prescriptive, owing to traditional government accountability 
and delivery arrangements and aversion to political risk. This prescription works against innovation and 
responsiveness to client needs.  
 Heavy reliance on letting contracts to a single successful provider (competition “for the market” as 
opposed to several providers competing to attract clients “in the market”) disempowers clients by not 
giving them a choice of provider. 
 Ambiguity often exists around whether government agencies are purchasing services that they wish to 
fully specify, or contributing to programmes originated by non-government providers. 
 There is plenty of room to improve the purchasing and contracting of social services. But there are limits 
to the gains the government can achieve using the contracting-out model. 
 Government agencies have been largely unsuccessful in recognising and spreading the lessons from 
existing services and new initiatives.  
 Government agencies have overlooked their potential to shape and manage the market for social 
services contracts. Consequently, the market is not performing as well as it could.  
 The organisational cultures of providers and government agencies are often resistant to change.  
 Political pressures make it difficult for agencies to re-allocate funding away from under-performing 
programmes and initiatives.  
An understanding of these causes is essential to improve the effectiveness of social services. The challenge 
is to design a well-performing system that takes them into account. Two design areas of great importance 
are the institutional architecture of the system and how to commission social services.  
Designing the institutional architecture 
Governments have paid considerable attention over the years to developing programmes and initiatives 
aimed at specific social services or client groups. Relatively little attention has been paid to the design of 
the overall system within which social services are delivered. Current arrangements contribute to many of 
the observed weaknesses. 
Institutional architecture refers to the government’s high-level choices about the design of the social 
services system. The government organisations involved, their roles and authority, and the basis of their 
relationships with other system participants are all important design choices that can be varied. The onus is 
on the Government - acting on behalf of its citizens – to make these choices, and make them well.  
Taking responsibility for institutional architecture is part of what the Commission is calling system 
stewardship. Government has a unique role in the social services system. It is the major funder of social 
services, and has statutory and regulatory powers unavailable to other participants. This is why the role of 
system steward falls to it. Other parts of the role include setting standards, investing in data infrastructure, 
monitoring overall system performance, improving capability, and prompting change when it under-
performs. 
Two broad architectural designs apply to social services. These relate to who has the responsibility to 
design and commission services. A crucial consideration in choosing who is which party has the authority, 
information, capability and incentives to make and implement decisions that maximise social returns. The 
Two broad designs are: 
6 DRAFT | More effective social services 
 Top-down control means that primary decision-making power sits with the relevant minister or 
department head. 
 Decentralisation transfers substantial decision-making power to semi-autonomous organisations with 
separate governance. It is used to varying degrees, particularly in health and education (eg, District 
Health Boards, school boards, university councils). Social insurance is a special case of decentralisation. 
It assigns both decision-making power and liability for future costs to an insurer. (The Accident 
Compensation Corporation (ACC) is perhaps the only New Zealand example.) 
Top-down control of social services is common in New Zealand. To control risks, hold others accountable 
and maximise options to respond, governments often favour prescriptive service specifications and close, 
top-down control. 
 This approach is a good match to some clients and some services, but a poor match where clients have 
multiple, complex service needs. 
 Top-down control tends to dampen innovation, reduce coordination between agencies and limit 
flexible adaptation to client needs and local circumstances. 
 In some cases, top-down control will be the appropriate option – largely for those services where state 
coercion is required (eg, statutory child protection). Where it remains the best option, the 
implementation of top-down control could be improved. 
Decentralisation should improve on top-down control where delegated decision makers have better 
information and incentives to maximise overall social returns. Well-designed organisations at arm’s length 
from ministers should face less intense political pressure to micro-manage for political reasons.  
 Governments have recognised situations – both inside and outside social services – where top-down 
control leads to poor societal outcomes and delegated decision making to organisations with varying 
levels of independence. A powerful example is the Reserve Bank. 
 Social services would be improved by greater and smarter use of delegation and devolution. Four 
variants exist based on geography, service area, community of interest and co-governance. Respective 
examples include District Health Boards (DHBs), Pharmac, Whänau Ora and the Te Hiku Social Accord. 
Ideally, subsidiary organisations should face strong incentives to intervene early to reduce future costs, and 
so deliver better long-term outcomes for clients. Delegating to social insurance organisations could fulfil 
this ideal. Liability for future costs better aligns the interests of insurers and insured, which should improve 
resource allocation across time. 
A one-size-fits-all architecture across social services is not a viable proposition. The need to accommodate 
services with highly varied characteristics serving clients with wide variation in needs means that a social 
services system is likely to comprise several different architectures.  
As the system steward, government has responsibility for the “enabling environment” for the social services 
system. Government is the major funder of social services, and only Parliament, led by the government of 
the day, can legislate and assign regulatory powers.  
Budget appropriations can be broadly specified and in principle this allows efficient cross-service allocation 
and service integration. However, Governments typically do not take advantage of this opportunity and 
instead make narrowly specified budget appropriations for social services, using a variety of bases, 
including departmental portfolio, issue, population group, geographical location and eligibility. This is one 
reason that attempts to devolve budget-allocation decisions within a top-down control architecture have 
had limited success.  
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Better commissioning of services 
Commissioning is a set of inter-related tasks that need to be undertaken to turn policy objectives into 
effective social services. This report uses the term commissioning to emphasise that a wider range of skills 
and capabilities are required than suggested by the more commonly used terms procurement and 
purchasing, and that a wider range of options are available to commissioning organisations than contracting 
out and in-house delivery.  
Examples of social service commissioning organisations are government departments such as MSD and the 
Ministry of Health, crown entities such as DHBs, and non-government bodies such as the Whänau Ora 
commissioning agencies. 
Effective commissioning is fundamental to well-functioning social services. Commissioning organisations 
need to make informed, deliberate choices. They should consider objectives, needs, cost effectiveness, 
funding, pricing, risk management, quality, eligibility, performance measurement, information flows, 
provider market sustainability and interactions with other services.  
The commissioning of social services is a challenging task. It is not generally undertaken in New Zealand in 
a structured, consistent and effective way. Commissioning organisations should actively build the required 
skills, capability and knowledge base. 
A key commissioning task is choosing an appropriate service model. The model should be chosen to match 
policy objectives, and the characteristics of the service and its intended clients. Considering a wide range of 
models increases the likelihood of a better match, and better service outcomes as a consequence. 
This report explores seven conceptual service models. Each has strengths and weaknesses, and some 
models may only be applicable to relatively limited circumstances.  
 In-house provision is useful when statutory powers are required, or the service is most efficiently 
bundled with services that require statutory powers. 
 Contracting out is useful when providers offer specialised skills or capabilities, including access to 
difficult-to-reach clients. 
 Managed markets allow multiple providers to compete for market share. They can encourage 
investment and innovation, which are difficult to achieve in non-contestable systems. 
 Trust models capitalise on the intrinsic motivation of provider employees and organisations. They 
require careful design to ensure quality is adequately monitored through peer monitoring or regulatory 
oversight. 
 Shared-goals models appeal to intrinsic motivation of players and also pursue common ownership of 
problems and goals, and so encourage constructive and integrated problem solving and creative 
solutions. Shared goals models can be challenging to replicate. 
 Client-directed-budgets models offer much when the client (or their representative) is best placed to 
make service consumption decisions. These models motivate providers to offer good value to clients, 
encourage innovation and empower service clients. 
 Voucher models work by clients choosing among providers offering a bundle of services (such as a 
university or an early childhood education centre). Government funding flows to providers according to 
those choices. 
Many of these models require a mental shift for commissioning organisations, from being in direct control 
to overseeing a set of services and enabling them to function well. This oversight includes ongoing 
monitoring of service performance, and re-visiting commissioning choices as necessary to improve 
performance.  
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Commissioning services on a service-by-service basis might be optimal for the specific services, but runs the 
risk of an inefficient and ineffective overall system. Important commissioning tasks include considering the 
needs of clients who require multiple services, and the appropriate grouping of services. 
Funding practices 
Government needs to clarify its objectives in funding services, and match the type of funding to those 
objectives. Legitimate options for funding include full funding, contributory funding, tied and untied grants, 
and no funding. 
Government should always be explicit about the type of funding, the appropriate level of control that this 
funding brings, and the likely consequences of its funding decisions. Government should fully fund those 
services where it desires full control over service specification. 
Government appears to under-fund some contracts with non-government providers for the delivery of fully 
specified social services. Long-term under-funding has undesirable consequences. Payments should be set 
at a level that allows an efficient provider to make sustainable return on resources deployed, encouraging 
investment by existing providers and entry by new providers. 
Creating a system that learns and innovates 
Social services deal with many problems that are complex and are not susceptible to one-off, all-time 
solutions. The complexity and uncertainty about solutions place a premium on a system that learns, that 
finds solutions to problems and finds new ways to improve the return on investment in social services. 
Key features of a system that learns are: 
 trying a variety of new ways of doing things; 
 tolerating trials that fail;  
 dealing with failure quickly;  
 identifying and selecting the variants that perform better; and  
 spreading the uptake of these more successful variants. 
Different institutional architectures and service models have different strengths and weaknesses in trying 
and selecting new approaches. A centralised top-down architecture tends to generate fixed decisions about 
what works with too little tailoring to particular circumstances, and not enough bottom-up experimentation. 
A totally decentralised approach permits a lot of local experiments. But, in the absence of an effective 
selection mechanism across them, little pressure exists to select successful ones. New Zealand social 
services have examples of both problems.  
A system that learns needs to have: 
 clear goals around improving the effectiveness of social services in terms of better outcomes for both 
clients and taxpayers;  
 strong incentives to find, and the flexibility to try, new ways of doing things;  
 information flows that provide ongoing feedback to service users, providers, commissioning 
organisations and citizens about what is working; and 
 the flexibility to take up successful innovations. 
Choosing system architectures and service models that incorporate these features will increase learning and 
innovation in the social services system. 
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Figure 0.2 A system that learns 
 
The role of government as the system steward importantly includes responsibility for ensuring that the 
social services system is an effective learning system. Government agencies are more likely to meet this 
challenge if they step back from being providers and procurers of services and focus on system-stewardship 
tasks: including clearly defining desired outcomes, promoting diverse approaches, monitoring them, and 
encouraging the spread of successful ones. 
An effective learning system results in innovation – the introduction of new or significantly improved 
services or business processes, for the purposes of getting better outcomes from available resources. 
The social services, with some exceptions, lag far behind many other services in adopting innovative 
productivity-enhancing business models. Modern information and communications technology (ICT) often 
plays an essential role in such models. 
Innovation in social services is often small scale, local, dependent on a few committed individuals and 
incremental; but there are some examples of disruptive innovation that have dramatically changed 
prevailing business models. One example is the Canterbury DHB’s development of its HealthPathways 
model which has now been adopted in several other healthcare systems in New Zealand and Australia.  
Risk aversion in government agencies and in NFPs, overly prescriptive contracts, capital constraints and 
“bare-bones” funding partly explain low levels of innovation in the social services. 
Improved commissioning and contracting have the potential to reduce some of the current barriers to 
innovation. 
The current evidence-base for system-wide learning is weak and needs to be strengthened. In practice, 
conventional evaluation of many social services is absent, of poor quality or not given enough weight in 
subsequent decision making. Effort should focus on making available timely, shared evidence on what is 
working, for whom and through which service providers. 
Initiatives under way may improve the quality of evaluation. These are to be welcomed, but new 
approaches are needed alongside that enable cost-effective monitoring and evaluation in real time across 
the system, using a wider range of information than is typically used in evaluations. 
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Leveraging data to improve social services 
In an era of ICT and “big data”, exciting opportunities exist to use data and data analytics to create a 
learning system that increases the effectiveness of social services. A client-centred data infrastructure and 
analytics could support a range of decentralised service models and provide better information to support 
decisions made by both commissioning organisations and the users and providers of social services. 
Developments in data technology and analytics have transformed many service industries including 
banking, music, and publishing to name a few. The same developments have the potential to support new 
business models in social services that will bring substantial improvements in effectiveness.  
A system that learns needs timely client-centred data and analytics to be available to decision makers at all 
points in the system. Cost-effectively collecting, sharing and analysing data across the social services system 
will greatly increase the capacity to design and commission effective services, and to target resources to 
where they have the strongest effect on improving outcomes.  
The Social Sector Board (the chief executives of the main government departments responsible for social 
services) has started a project to integrate social sector data, including setting common standards. In the 
Commission’s view this work should include the design of institutions and processes to develop a 
comprehensive, wide-access, client-centred data infrastructure accessible to commissioning organisations, 
providers, users and researchers of social services. Better use of linked, cross-agency data could increase 
the scope, power and accuracy of the Government’s investment approach to targeting social services as 
well as supporting better-integrated and tailored services for clients. 
The New Zealand Data Futures Forum (NZDFF) has recommended a way to realise the potential benefits 
and mitigate the risks of sharing, linking and using data. The NZDFF recommended that the Government 
should establish an independent data council to act as the guardian of good practice in the sharing, linking 
and use of data in New Zealand. 
The Government, and social services providers and users, should use the NZDFF recommendations to 
underpin their efforts to explore innovative approaches to social problems.  
Government agencies should require providers that they contract with to capture information on their 
services in a consistent way. This will allow the patterns of individuals’ use of services to be tracked across 
time, and for service outcomes and provider performance to be identified. Commissioning organisations, 
purchasers and providers of social services should use this information to continuously improve their 
decisions.  
Sharing government-held data with third-party providers would support innovative services to solve social 
problems. Statistics New Zealand currently allows researchers access to de-identified personal data in its 
Integrated Data Infrastructure. This is desirable, but should be taken further. Subject to individual consent, 
government agencies should provide access to identifiable personal data to trusted third parties.  
Social investment and insurance 
“Prepare rather than repair.” This simple and catchy idea is that well designed and targeted early 
interventions can reduce or eliminate adverse consequences at a later date. Ideally, individuals, their 
families and the social services system should act whenever they expect the resulting future benefits to 
exceed costs. But that will only happen if the relevant parties have the information and resources required, 
and face the right incentives. 
The Government’s Investment Approach is an attempt to increase the effectiveness of social services 
through better investment and targeting of investment. It is also about providing information and incentives 
to support early intervention, rather than waiting for a crisis. 
The Investment Approach adopts investment and insurance tools to prioritise clients and services and 
selects interventions based on expected reduction in future welfare liability (FWL). This liability is a proxy 
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measure for future net social benefits. While the proxy is imperfect, the Investment Approach is a significant 
improvement on traditional approaches. 
FWL identifies the people for whom the gains might be greatest, but provides no guidance on effective 
interventions. Reliable information on interventions, including their cost and effectiveness, is also essential 
when applying an Investment Approach. 
There is scope to refine the Investment Approach and to apply it more widely within and across different 
government-funded social service areas. 
A further extension is to assign the financial risks associated with poor social outcomes to organisations that 
are better placed than government to manage and reduce those risks, including by making timely 
investments. Such an “insurance approach” might offer strong incentives for timely and value-adding 
interventions. 
Social insurance is an insurance scheme organised by the state, with compulsory membership and in which 
premiums are usually related to the ability to pay. The interests of social insurers such as the ACC can align 
better with the long-term wellbeing of individual New Zealanders than traditionally structured social service 
agencies. Social insurers have incentives to make timely and value-adding investments. For example, the 
ACC invests in a falls prevention programme to reduce the number of injuries and claims due to falls. 
A system with national insurers, each responsible for a narrow service area (or condition type), could offer 
these benefits, but limits the potential for improved service integration and resource allocation across 
service areas.  
A bolder approach would be to have competition between multiple insurers, each with a wide focus. All 
citizens would be enrolled with one of these insurers, which would receive premium payments from the 
government based on the characteristics of their enrolled members. Insurers would face the actual costs of 
future social services delivery for their members. A multiple-insurer system could be attractive to existing 
health and life insurers, or possibly to iwi. 
Some significant challenges face the designers of such a system, including how to determine premiums and 
rules for moving between insurers.  
Some non-government organisations have the potential to become social insurers for enrolled populations. 
A social insurance approach is worthy of further consideration. 
Integrating services for better outcomes 
A key challenge in delivering social services to people with multiple and inter-related needs is making sure 
the services are combined and tailored to best address those needs. Integrated services offer clients a 
coordinated mix of services that tackle multiple needs in a timely, convenient and effective way. 
The fragmentation of social services to the detriment of clients with complex needs is a long-standing issue 
that has proved difficult to resolve, despite many attempts. Fragmented delivery is usually a symptom of 
problems in the way social services are commissioned and contracted for. 
A key question is the optimal extent and form of integration. It is possible to have too much integration, or 
the wrong kind of integration. The risk is that integrating on one dimension opens gaps in another. For 
example, improving the integration between mental-health and employment services could come at the 
cost of making it more difficult to have good links between mental-health and domestic-violence services. 
Organisations need to weigh up costs and benefits when deciding the extent and type of integration. The 
government should seek the combination of integrated and single-focused services with the highest net 
benefit. 
Institutional arrangements and service models can support integration in different ways. 
 Provided it is done judiciously, government agencies exercising top-down control over services can 
merge government agencies, link contracting or service teams, or merge multiple contracts.  
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 When government devolves commissioning responsibilities to an organisation closer to the front-line, 
that organisation has greater scope to lead on integration by, for example, establishing multi-service 
teams and encouraging alliances. 
 The “shared goals” service model empowers and facilitates providers to coordinate service delivery 
because they are working collaboratively and to agreed goals.  
 Client-directed service models allow clients to select the best package of services for them. Essentially 
the client is the service integrator. 
The Government should improve service integration by adopting a range of approaches, initiatives and 
strategies. 
 Empower clients and families to have an effective influence on the way services are packaged. 
 Pursue integration through changes to institutional and commissioning arrangements, rather than 
through ad-hoc integration initiatives. A common experience is governments undertaking multiple and 
overlapping integration initiatives, resulting in confusion, frustration and strain on scarce resources.  
 Harness local motivations and local knowledge. Where clients, navigators or service providers have the 
information and incentives to integrate well, the Government should devolve responsibility to them on 
the extent and form of integration. 
 Shift organisational culture across the social services system to be more client-centred and open to 
beneficial service-integration opportunities.  
 Provide wider access to data, encourage (safe) data sharing, and use operational data to improve 
service integration. 
 Make use of flexible budget processes to support integrated services. 
Empowering clients and giving them more choice 
As noted, commissioning organisations need to consider carefully the service model best suited to the 
characteristics of their intended clients and the services in question. In every model, choices are made 
about: 
 what services to deliver;  
 who will deliver the services; 
 when the service will be delivered; 
 where the service will be delivered; and  
 how the service will be delivered. 
Depending on the model, clients may have relatively little or relatively more control over these core 
choices. 
The social services system will work best when people with the information, incentive, capability and 
authority make these decisions. In many cases, this will be the client or their representative.  
There is good evidence that, for some types of social services, empowering clients to make core choices 
significantly improves their wellbeing. Yet such empowerment is rare in New Zealand. 
Changes are needed if clients are to be empowered to make core choices and if the choices of clients are 
to influence service quality and the efficiency of the system.  
Shifting the power balance from the organisations that commission and deliver social services to clients 
would achieve better outcomes. For this to occur, client choices need to influence the allocation of public 
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money to providers. Government departments must let go of the reins of central control to allow the 
necessary power shift. 
Client choice is not an appropriate model for some services. These include services involving the coercive 
power of the state and where people experiencing psychological trauma or acute physical trauma receive 
services. 
Where choice is appropriate, government agencies need to invest time and resources into designing and 
implementing mechanisms that will enable choice to operate effectively. In particular, clients must be able 
to make informed choices, and government agencies must give providers the flexibility to meet the diverse 
needs of clients. 
Designing and implementing a practical and efficient choice mechanism requires a deep understanding of 
alternative design options. For example, to avoid providers picking off “easy” clients and avoiding more 
difficult cases, the Government-funded entitlement for each client should reflect the complexity of their 
individual needs. A particular instance is a more disabled person having a larger entitlement than a less 
disabled person because it is more costly to meet their needs. 
Shifting to a client-directed service model will require a significant change in mindset for many officials and 
providers. Evidence shows it takes time (and resources) to learn how to work under new systems and to 
develop structures and processes that fit new ways of working. 
Better purchasing and contracting 
Government agencies have several thousand contracts for delivering social services with thousands of 
providers – both NFPs and FPs. Purchasing and contracting relate primarily to the contracting-out service 
model, and to an important but lesser extent to other models. The Commission anticipates that contracting 
out will continue to be an important service model, and sees significant scope for improvement. 
Contracts involve a principal (in this case usually the government) and an agent who delivers an objective 
on behalf of the principal. Contracts cannot cover every contingency, the principal has incomplete 
information about the agent’s performance, and there are incentives to shift risk and for other opportunistic 
behaviour. Because of these challenges, designing and managing contracts are not straightforward. 
Varying sources of official guidance exist about how to design and administer contracts. Official guidance 
should be brought up-to-date in a single document. The Government should take steps to encourage use 
of the guidelines, including training relevant agencies and providers in their use. 
Submitters to the inquiry (dominated by service providers) consider that contract design and administration 
need to improve. Reviews that preceded this inquiry reached the same conclusion. 
To improve contracting practice, agencies should face new requirements to: 
 undertake reasonable consultation with providers and clients during the pre-contract phase;  
 report whether they have met tendering timelines; 
 look for further opportunities to standardise contracts; 
 develop a risk-management framework, in consultation with providers, that identifies risks and how best 
to allocate them; 
 set the length of contracts with an eye to efficiency and risk management, and explain publicly how they 
did this; 
 adopt a risk-based approach to monitoring contracts; and 
 explore the potential for contracting for outcomes, but only apply it in suitable circumstances. 
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Government should help agencies to improve their capabilities to contract for outcomes, ideally with 
meaningful payments or other incentives conditional on results achieved. 
The Mäori dimension 
The objectives Mäori as a client group have for social services are broader than just effectiveness and 
efficiency – social services have an important role to play in “Mäori succeeding as Mäori”. In this context, it 
includes Mäori being able to exercise duties of care that arise from tikanga.  
Mäori are disproportionately represented in the client base of services that target and aim to help those at 
risk of poor outcomes. Although some other groups also have poor outcomes, the Treaty of Waitangi 
dimension adds weight to empowering Mäori groups.  
The development aspirations of Mäori, the desire to improve the outcomes of whänau, and the tikanga 
around manaakitanga, whanaungatanga, and rangatiratanga mean that iwi and other Mäori groups are 
obvious candidates for active participation in devolved commissioning and the delivery of social services. 
Enabling greater rangatiratanga within social services inherently requires the Crown to step back from 
“deciding for” and often “doing for” Mäori. Yet if the Crown steps back too far, or in the wrong way, then it 
risks leaving iwi to deliver the Crown’s Article Three Treaty duties and this would be inappropriate. What 
matters is not so much whether any given activity is a kawanatanga or rangatiratanga responsibility, but 
instead who should hold mana whakahaere over that activity (translated variously as the power to manage, 
governance or authority) to achieve the objectives of both parties. 
There are a number of steps involved in commissioning social services. In the examples considered by this 
inquiry, Mäori groups differed in their wishes to be involved in some steps but not others. Although Mäori 
are interested, in practice it may take some time for partnership models of commissioning to be fully 
realised. It is appropriate that Mäori determine the pace and extent of this evolution. 
The process of determining which Mäori groups the Crown should partner with in social services should be 
an open one. It needs to allow for various claims to representation and influence from Mäori organisations 
to be heard and considered fairly.  
The process most commonly used to involve Mäori groups in social services has been the Treaty settlement 
process. Yet the Treaty settlement process is too inflexible and too narrow to realise the potential for 
devolving commissioning to Mäori effectively. A better process for social services should feature: 
 the Government providing a standing opportunity to Mäori groups to propose how they might like to 
be involved in commissioning; 
 the nature of the proposed process coming from Mäori, rather than being a model that Mäori groups 
are co-opted into, or have imposed on them; and 
 the Government placing reasonable constraints on what is possible. 
Data development and analytics may hold some appeal for Mäori to achieve greater involvement in 
commissioning, because reducing future welfare liability, though an unpalatable language for some, opens 
up new possibilities for negotiating funding transfers. 
In common with other models that feature devolved commissioning and delivery of social services, 
challenging issues must be worked through to determine how to fund devolved organisations. 
Implementing change 
The Commission is recommending significant change: its proposed reforms are big. They include new roles 
and responsibilities, better commissioning, the use of client-directed and other devolved approaches, an 
expanded investment approach, and improved contracting. If implemented, they will disrupt current 
arrangements and interests. So it will be necessary to proceed with care, with strong and wise leadership, at 
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the right pace, the right degree of consultation, and the right sequencing. It will be important to learn 
about what works along the way and make appropriate adjustments. 
The Commission recommends a shift from the current predominantly top-down approach to commissioning 
social services to more decentralised models. Government agencies would step back, yet still perform the 
vital role of system stewardship: setting system goals and standards, developing the data infrastructure, 
monitoring performance and overall progress against outcomes, overseeing evaluation, and prompting 
action when evidence indicates that performance is weak and new approaches would be more effective.  
Responsibility for service design and delivery would increasingly shift towards the frontline and in some 
cases to the ultimate “customers”. An important first step to bring about such a shift is for the Government 
to develop a credible reform strategy. 
Implementation will require ministerial responsibility to set strategic direction and adjust it as needed in the 
light of experience. The Government should draw on advice and participation from both inside and outside 
the public sector to help develop and implement this major reform of social services. 
To focus the effort of its agencies and to support ministers, the Government should establish an “Office of 
Social Services” within the government central agencies. The Office would need clear terms of reference 
that steer it towards favouring a strong customer focus. Its responsibilities would include: 
 providing a strong, influential centre of thought leadership with a committed whole-of-system 
orientation; 
 helping ministers to develop the overall reform strategy, and oversee its implementation; 
 developing whole-of-system data and analysis; 
 undertaking research on system-wide issues and providing advice to the Social Sector Board of chief 
executives and to the relevant ministers; 
 evaluating the performance of the social services system; 
 providing advice and design guidance for agencies engaged in commissioning; and 
 promoting continuous improvement and capability development across the system. 
Further measures that would help sustain reform and build in incentives for continuous improvement 
include: 
 independent review of the implementation of the reform programme; 
 rolling evaluations of existing social services programmes against specified criteria; and 
 international benchmarking of social services, including their cost effectiveness. 
Strategic themes  
Organising the Commission’s recommendations into themes provides a starting point for an 
implementation strategy. Seven themes provide an organising framework for sequencing reforms and 
setting priorities. 
Theme 1: Improve system stewardship 
The social services system as a whole currently lacks conscious oversight. Government is the only participant 
that can take on responsibility for system stewardship and for making considered decisions that shape the 
system. 
Theme 2: Improve capability and tool development  
Capability gaps cause systems to underperform. Transforming the delivery of social services will require new 
capabilities in areas such as commissioning and managing contracts, and data-analysis skills.  
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Theme 3: Make better use of data 
Developments in data technology and analytics have transformed many private-sector service industries. 
They also have the ability to transform social services including by lowering the barriers to more devolved, 
yet more integrated, ways to deliver them. The report supports more and better use of data to measure and 
monitor the effectiveness of services for different types of clients, and the development of a 
comprehensive, wide-access, client-centred data infrastructure accessible to commissioning organisations, 
providers, service users and researchers.  
Theme 4: Shape incentives through choice and transparency 
Placing the power of choice in the hands of the consumers of social services would strengthen incentives on 
providers to continuously improve their services. Aided by a new wide-access and comprehensive data 
infrastructure, providers would have opportunities and incentives to work directly with clients and 
government agencies to come up with innovative, integrated and effective service packages.  
Theme 5: Reshape roles and responsibilities  
The Government should plan and implement new arrangements to enable a shift to more devolved 
commissioning, client empowerment, and the centre’s uptake of conscious system stewardship. The new 
arrangements will involve big changes in roles and responsibilities, new funding mechanisms, and changes 
in laws and regulations. 
Theme 6: Embed continuous improvement 
Social services are complex and dynamic. Continued experimentation and learning is needed. Government 
agencies should explore initiatives to encourage innovation in social services. These could include 
innovation funds, prizes and in-house innovation labs. A shift to more contracts for outcomes could also 
encourage innovation by giving providers the freedom to experiment with different approaches. 
Evaluation is important for continual improvement in the design and delivery of social services. Superu 
should develop and adopt a set of principles for good evaluation and provide guidance on them.  
Theme 7: Encourage consultation 
Consultation between the users and providers of government services, and between government agencies 
and non-government providers, is an essential feature of change programmes. Genuine consultation may 
require involving a range of parties in strategic planning or in governance. Iwi, providers, local interests 
such as local government, and businesses and private funders have told the inquiry that they see 
opportunities for change, and have ideas about how that can happen. These allies should be consulted 
about, and enrolled in, change. 
The size of the prize 
The Commission believes that substantial benefits would result from achieving the changes in social 
services described in this report. These benefits are at five levels. 
Benefits to individual clients 
The reforms set out in this report would improve the value that clients derive from the system by: 
 providing them with pathways to help turn their lives around through well-evidenced effects on life 
satisfaction including from employment, good physical and psychological health, and more and better 
social connections; 
 providing them access to services that are better matched to their individual circumstances; and 
 empowering them through better information on, and choice of, services and service providers. 
Benefits to service providers 
For service providers, moving closer to a well-functioning system would mean greater clarity and certainty 
around government funding. It would mean less money spent on government processes and greater 
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flexibility to tailor services to meet the needs of clients. And it would mean more scope for innovation and 
greater rewards for innovation. 
Benefits to government 
For government social services agencies, moving closer to a well-functioning system would mean a better 
understanding of their role as system stewards, and greater ability to demonstrate the value that services 
are creating, to know the interventions that work and those that do not. For the Government, it would mean 
demonstrable achievements, reduced political risk from under-performing services, and more transparency 
around the relative returns from different uses of public money. 
Benefits to the economy 
Effective social services will not only improve the wellbeing of clients, but also reduce the likelihood that 
clients will remain on benefits for a prolonged period. This can amount to a significant fiscal saving in future 
years, which is important in light of increasing expectations of service quality and availability. 
Policy and operational changes associated with the Government’s Investment Approach in the 2013/2014 
year resulted in an estimated reduction of $2.2 billion in future welfare liability. Further improvements of this 
substantial magnitude in other service areas are likely to be possible.  
Many social services have a direct impact on the accumulation of human capital. Evidence shows that long-
run human capital is an important driver of labour productivity, which in turn in is a key driver of long-run 
economic growth and incomes. Lifting overall student achievement to that of the top performers in the 
OECD would yield significant economic gains. 
Benefits to wider society 
Benefits to clients commonly spill over into society. For example, studies have repeatedly shown a strong 
correlation between education levels and lower crime rates and better health. Services that are effective in 
reducing mental illnesses, addictions and addictive behaviour, family violence and child abuse, and re-
offending clearly have wider benefits in the form of a safer, healthier and happier society. By reducing 
New Zealand’s “fat tail” of disadvantage and under-achievement, effective social services can promote a 
society that is both more egalitarian and more prosperous.  
Overall 
The reforms outlined in this report have the potential to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
New Zealand’s social services system, in turn raising the wellbeing of users of social services and of citizens 
more generally. The complex nature of social services makes estimating the magnitude of these benefits 
difficult. Yet, the Commission’s judgement, supported by New Zealand and international research, is that 
there are substantial economic and social gains to be had. Achieving reform will require political 
commitment and strong leadership, and a willingness of government to take on greater responsibility as a 
steward of the social services system.  
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1 About this inquiry 
Key points 
 Social services help New Zealanders to live healthy, safe and fulfilling lives. They provide access to 
health services and education opportunities, and protect and support the most vulnerable. The 
quality of these services and access to them are crucial to the ongoing wellbeing of 
New Zealanders. 
 The government funds social services with the aim of improving outcomes that people value, such 
as better health, less crime, and more and better jobs.  
 Social services are only one influence among many that determine outcomes. Other important 
influences include family, friends and community, work and colleagues, early physical and social 
experiences, and economic deprivation. 
 This inquiry is about finding ways to improve individual and social wellbeing through more 
effective social services.  
 The inquiry has examined (among other things): 
- the strengths and weaknesses of current approaches to commissioning and purchasing social 
services; 
- the lessons learnt from recent initiatives and new approaches, in New Zealand and overseas; 
- how social services can best target and help those with high needs and at high risk of poor 
outcomes; 
- how to improve outcomes through better coordination of services, within and between 
government agencies and service providers; 
- how to take advantage of emerging opportunities offered by existing and new datasets, new 
information technologies and data analytics to learn about the effectiveness of different 
services for different groups, and to spread this learning; and 
- the institutional arrangements that would support smarter commissioning, purchasing and 
contracting of social services. 
 The Commission has been impressed with the hard work, perceptive thinking and commitment of 
the many people and organisations, outside and within government, who help deliver social 
services to those in need. 
 The role of this inquiry is not to critique the performance of government agencies and service 
providers. Rather, its role is to make recommendations that will improve the system.  
 In developing its draft findings and recommendations the Commission has drawn evidence from 
many sources, including research papers and extensive consultation. It received 134 submissions 
on its issues paper and has held more than 100 face-to-face meetings. 
 The Commission has made 81 draft findings and 47 draft recommendations, and posed 8 
questions. Recommendations range from modest ways to improve commissioning and contracting 
to bold suggestions for changes to roles and responsibilities. The Commission believes this draft 
report will generate plenty of interest and welcomes submissions.  
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1.1 What has the Commission been asked to do? 
The Government has asked the Commission to carry out an inquiry into how to improve outcomes for 
New Zealanders from social services funded or otherwise supported by government. The inquiry’s terms of 
reference instruct the Commission to focus on potential improvements in the ways that government 
agencies commission and purchase social services (see Box 1.1 for definitions). The inquiry aims to help 
agencies recognise how commissioning and purchasing influence the quality and effectiveness of social 
services, and to suggest measures agencies could take to promote better outcomes.  
This inquiry investigates both who is best suited to make commissioning decisions and how to do a good 
job of commissioning. The latter includes the use by government agencies (both Crown entities and 
government departments) of contracts with non-government providers to deliver social services and how to 
choose among contracting, direct government provision and other service models. The key question is what 
Box 1.1 Definitions of terms used in the inquiry’s terms of reference 
The Commission has adopted the following definitions of terms used in the inquiry’s terms of 
reference. 
Social services: Services dedicated to enhancing people’s economic and social wellbeing by helping 
them lead more stable, healthy, self-sufficient and fulfilling lives. This inquiry is primarily concerned 
with social services that government provides, funds or otherwise supports. 
Commissioning: A set of interrelated tasks that need to be undertaken to turn policy objectives into 
effective social services. Commissioning organisations should consider objectives, needs, funding, 
pricing, risk management, quality, eligibility, performance measurement, information flows, provider 
market sustainability and interactions with other services; and choose an appropriate service model. 
(See Chapter 6). 
Contestability: The characteristic of a market where the opportunity to supply the good or service is 
open to all qualified providers.  
Purchasing: The purchasing process identifies and selects non-government providers and agrees terms 
of supply through a contract. It includes calling for expressions of interest to supply social services, 
evaluating proposals from potential providers, completing due diligence, negotiating the terms of the 
contract and awarding the contract. 
Market for social services: A market is a setting in which parties voluntarily undertake exchanges. In the 
context of this inquiry, the market for social services refers to the provision of social services in 
exchange for payment. Funding could come from a government agency or another organisation (eg, a 
philanthropic trust). In some cases, clients partly or fully fund the service. The provision and purchase 
of social services meets the economic definition of a market, yet it has complex and distinctive features 
that make it different from simple markets. 
Shape of the market: Shape includes the number, size, capability and geographic distribution of 
providers, and the mix of provider organisational forms (eg, commercial enterprises, not-for-profit 
organisations and charities).  
Long-term sustainability of the market: The continued availability of providers with the capacity and 
capability to supply the level and quality of services required. 
Outcome: The longer-term consequences of an intervention or programme in terms of the ends 
sought (eg, better health or reduced re-offending).  
Result or intermediate outcome: an intermediate step contributing to an outcome, generally more 
easily measured in the short term than the outcome. 
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institutions and service models promote good outcomes for individuals, communities and the population as 
a whole?  
The full terms of reference are at the front of this report. 
What this inquiry includes 
The inquiry examines (among other things): 
 the strengths and weaknesses of current approaches to commissioning and purchasing social services; 
 the lessons learnt from recent initiatives and new approaches, in New Zealand and overseas; 
 how social services can best target and help those with high needs and at high risk of poor outcomes; 
 how to improve outcomes through better coordination of services, within and between government 
agencies and service providers; 
 how to take advantage of the emerging opportunities offered by big data and data analytics to learn 
about the effectiveness of different services for different groups, and to ensure that this learning 
spreads and is taken up widely by service providers; and 
 the institutional arrangements that would support smarter commissioning, purchasing and contracting 
of social services. 
What this inquiry does not include 
The inquiry is about how to improve the effectiveness of social services through changes to institutional 
arrangements in the commissioning and purchasing of social services. It is not: 
 an evaluation of specific social policies; 
 a review of the level of public funds allocated to specific social services or to specific service providers; 
 an assessment of the level at which welfare benefits are set; 
 a quantitative assessment of the productivity of the New Zealand public sector; or 
 an investigation of appropriate levels of public-sector expenditure or employment. 
The Commission will not make recommendations on these matters as part of this inquiry. 
1.2 What are social services? 
Social services is a somewhat ambiguous term. Indeed, much government activity could be broadly termed 
a social service. Social services assist New Zealanders to live healthy, safe and fulfilling lives. They provide 
access to health services and education opportunities, and protect and support the most vulnerable. The 
quality of these services and their accessibility for those in need are crucial to the ongoing wellbeing of 
New Zealanders. 
The reasons that the government funds many social services in New Zealand include political preferences, 
history, and economic benefits. The government funds social services to improve the wellbeing of 
New Zealanders and to fulfil expectations that are deeply rooted in New Zealand society. Social services 
contribute to these aims by providing: 
 assistance to those with current or persistent needs; 
 a safety net (or “insurance”) for circumstances largely beyond a person’s control; 
 opportunities for individual development that enable people to achieve their potential; and 
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 protection of New Zealanders from, or at least minimising, the consequences of the anti-social 
behaviour of others. 
A significant quantity of social services are not funded by the government but by charities, philanthropic 
donors and clients themselves. Of course, family members, friends and neighbours provide much care and 
support to individuals in need. It is important to remember that government-funded social services are only 
one influence among many that determine outcomes. The relationships between all these influences and 
outcomes are complex and often not fully understood. Powerful influences include family and friends, work 
and colleagues, early physical and social experiences, and economic deprivation. 
Social services vary significantly 
The Commission has taken a broad view of social services, because of the obvious interrelationships 
between health, education, social development, and indeed justice services. This places the Commission in 
a relatively unique position to look across those services. However, not all submitters were comfortable with 
such a broad definition that reaches well beyond the social services aimed at supporting the poor and 
vulnerable (Community Networks Aotearoa, sub. 31, p. 3) 
The social services within the inquiry’s scope vary widely. For example, specialised medical services differ 
markedly to services that support a released prisoner and help reduce re-offending rates. Also a critical 
distinction exists between services that are willingly consumed because the client wants the outcome (such 
as finding a job or receiving help in the home), and services where there is an element of coercion with an 
unwilling subject (such as a court-ordered programme to combat an addiction). 
More broadly, social services could also be interpreted to include wider services that benefit 
New Zealanders through enhancing their participation in areas such as the arts, sport, recreation and the 
environment. Such services fall outside the scope of the inquiry. 
Figure 1.1 depicts the wide variety of social services in New Zealand and some high-level outcomes that 
they contribute towards. Most of these services are fully or partly funded by the government and fall within 
the inquiry’s scope.  
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Figure 1.1 The diversity of social services and the outcomes they support  
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 commissioned research; 
 a survey of social-service workers; 
 previous inquiries into, and reviews of, social services; 
 relevant academic and other research; and 
 eight conferences on aspects of social service provision in New Zealand. 
In addition, the Commission developed four case studies (presented as appendices B through E) to assist 
with the inquiry: 
 employment services; 
 Whänau Ora; 
 services for people with disabilities; and 
 home-based support of older people. 
In the course of conducting this inquiry, the Commission has been impressed with the hard work, 
perceptive thinking and commitment of the many people and organisations, outside and within 
government, who help deliver social services to those in need. 
The role of this inquiry is not to critique the performance of government agencies and service providers. 
Rather, the role is to make recommendations to improve the system that all parties work within. Ultimately, 
everyone has the same objective of improving the wellbeing of New Zealanders. 
The Commission has taken a high-level systems approach. This of necessity has meant that many terms and 
concepts used in the chapters may seem remote from the front-line, daily experiences of providers and 
clients. This is not to imply that front-line realities are unimportant. Rather the high-level approach is taken 
in the belief that standing back is the best way to gain perspective and see what could be, and needs to be, 
changed. Ultimately this is in the interests of improving what happens at the frontline and, above all, 
improving individual-client and wider social outcomes. 
The inquiry is not taking place in a vacuum – the Government is actively pursuing a range of programmes 
and initiatives to improve social services in line with its Better Public Services priority. The initiative to trial 
social bonds and the recently-announced modernising review of Child, Youth and Family are two examples. 
The Commission recognises this changing landscape and that social services is an area of great interest. It 
hopes that the results of its inquiry will make a significant and worthwhile contribution to public debate and 
policy thinking inside and outside of government.     
The Commission has made 81 draft findings and 47 draft recommendations. It has also asked eight 
questions. Recommendations range from modest ways to improve commissioning and contracting to bold 
suggestions for institutional and role changes. The Commission believes this draft report will generate 
plenty of interest. The Commission welcomes submissions on this draft report. 
1.4 Responses to the issues paper 
The Commission received many and varied responses to the inquiry. A selection of these responses 
illustrates this range (Box 1.2). 
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1.5 A well-functioning social services system 
The goal of this inquiry is to find and recommend measures that will lead to a well-functioning social 
services system. But what does such a system look like? 
The resources available for social services are finite. It is not possible for a society to provide every service 
at the maximum level of quality for any person who might request it. So allocating resources towards where 
they will have greatest effect (and away from where they are having minimal or even negative effects) 
increases effectiveness, and better promotes overall wellbeing. 
Social services are funded and delivered by a complex system with many participants. A system that 
delivers expanded or improved services at the same cost (or, equivalently, the same services at lower cost) 
will promote wellbeing, all else being equal. The term productivity captures such efficiency improvements. 
Importantly, these improvements are about being more effective rather than working harder or accepting 
lower wages. 
As Box 1.2 indicates, there are different, and sometimes competing, views about social services. In the 
interests of attempting to build as much common ground as possible about what a well-functioning social 
services system looks like, the following sections describe the salient features from the perspectives of 
different participants.  
Box 1.2 Differing views on the inquiry issues paper 
…we welcome and endorse the generous description by the Productivity Commission of the 
goals and values of social policy in New Zealand in Chapter 1 of the Issues Paper. We welcome 
the acknowledgement that there is a broad consensus on what government funded social services 
should be providing… (Carers NZ, sub. 71, p. 1) 
I am concerned that the assumption underlying this issues paper is that wellbeing is an isolated 
matter that can be achieved via a market economy. (Charlie Devenish, sub. 26, p. 1) 
Pages 44 – 47 of the Issues Paper contain a very interesting and well written section in relation to 
social service providers, devolving decisions, and the tension between accountability and 
flexibility. The issues are accurately presented here and we are very pleased that the authors of 
the document have presented a balanced view of these tensions. (Hokianga Health Enterprise 
Trust, sub. 44, p. 2) 
Generally there was dissatisfaction with the title [More effective social services]. There was an 
assumption that the title inferred that most social services were not effective. It was not clear that 
the efficiency mentioned was also about how Government worked in this space. There was a 
feeling that the title implied inefficiency in the sector as a broad issue. (Community Networks 
Aotearoa, sub. 31, p. 2) 
MSD supports the goals and objectives of the Productivity Commission’s Inquiry into More 
Effective Social Services and consider that the Issues paper does a good job portraying the social 
services landscape. (Ministry of Social Development, sub. 72, p. 6) 
We believe that a number of the basic premises of this issues paper are flawed. Most importantly 
describing the sector as a “market” exposes the ideological framework which drives the 
underlying assumptions of this issues paper. We are concerned that this review is in reality 
another step towards creating opportunities for making profit from vulnerable people, rather than 
actually addressing the underlying causes of the problems being faced by 
individuals/families/whanau and communities. (Homebuilders Family Services North Rodney Inc., 
sub. 38, p. 1) 
Reading the issues detailed in Chapter 5, Issues for the Inquiry, resonated with our experiences 
and concerns in regards to the changing contracting landscape. We hear similar concerns raised 
by our networks nationally and locally in both the disability and wider social service sector. 
(Community Care Trust, sub. 96, p. 1) 
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New Zealanders 
New Zealand individuals and their families have multiple stakes in the social services system. As taxpayers, 
they want the system to deliver value from the tens of billions of dollars that the government spends each 
year. 
They want social services to be available to meet their current or future needs. They want the services to 
provide effective care of the most vulnerable. Further, they want a system that protects them from, or at 
least minimises, the consequences of the anti-social behaviour of others. 
Lastly, most if not all New Zealanders wish to participate in a cohesive society that provides opportunities, a 
sense of belonging, and protection for all its members. 
Current clients of social services 
Most of all, clients of social services want the services they require to be effective in dealing with their 
specific circumstances, and to assist them towards a healthy, safe, self-sufficient and fulfilling life. 
In general, they want those services to be available in the place they live. They want clear information about 
the services available to them, and ideally a choice between providers of those services. They want a stable 
relationship with their provider. They want minimal bureaucracy in their dealings with social service 
providers and government agencies.  
Clients want providers and agencies to cooperate and to deliver services seamlessly. However, many clients 
are wary of the degree of information-sharing that might better enable such cooperation. 
Clients are often vulnerable, and want assurance that service providers are acting in their best interests. 
Social service providers 
Social service providers want to get on with the job of helping their clients. Some are driven by a desire to 
assist their fellow New Zealanders, some by a profit motive, and others by a mix of both. In any case, they 
want sufficient funding, and for it to be stable and predictable. They often see contestable funding as 
creating financial risk for their organisation and the risk of service disruption for their clients. 
Providers often resent time and money spent on what they see as unnecessary bureaucracy in their dealings 
with government. They want government to do a good job of coordinating its own agencies and activities. 
Many social service providers feel that they are closer to their clients and the communities in which they 
operate, and that they have a better understanding of their clients’ needs than their funders. They want the 
flexibility to adapt their services to the specific needs of their clients and to better reflect the overall mission 
of their organisation. 
Social service providers often draw on volunteers driven by a desire to help their fellow New Zealanders. 
Volunteers want their efforts to be valued and effective. 
Government social service agencies 
Government agencies directly provide and purchase social services. Agencies recognise that in many cases 
they lack the information, relationships and capability to directly deliver services, and so seek to purchase at 
least some services from providers. 
Agencies want to understand which types of interventions are effective, and which types are less effective. 
They want to use this information to improve overall outcomes from the social services for which they are 
responsible. 
Agencies want their commissioning and purchasing processes to be cost effective. They want to understand 
the performance of their contracted providers. Over time, they want to encourage the development and 
expansion of the better providers, and encourage the reform or exit of poor performers. 
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Agencies want to be good stewards of the resources under their control, and be able to account for their 
performance to ministers and to Parliament. 
The government 
The government is the agent of all New Zealanders collectively, and the closest thing to an institution 
representing “society” or “community” at the national level. It is accountable through Parliament for 
ensuring that public funds are used appropriately, and in an efficient and effective manner. 
The government has specific responsibilities to every citizen and seeks to fulfil those responsibilities. 
Further, it seeks an efficient and effective social services system, reflecting in part other legitimate demands 
on its budget (eg, conservation management and transport infrastructure). 
Recognising that the needs of social service clients span the boundaries of its agencies, the government 
seeks a high degree of inter-agency cooperation. 
Specific ministers, and the government in general, are often blamed for the consequences of poor delivery 
of social services. So government seeks a system that minimises its political risk. This aim may at times 
conflict with the ability of the government to pursue efficiency and effectiveness in the social services 
system. 
1.6 Guide to this report 
This report is divided into three parts: 
 what the Commission has observed – describes the social services landscape in New Zealand, its 
performance and the drivers of that performance; and also covers some new approaches tried 
internationally and within New Zealand; 
 what is needed for improvement – gives the Commission’s reasoning and conclusions on what needs to 
change to achieve a well-functioning social services system; and 
 making it happen – suggests a path to implement the changes that the Commission recommends, and 
discusses the types and sizes of the achievable net benefits. 
Figure 1.2 briefly describes the individual chapters and appendices in this report. 
Figure 1.2 Guide to individual chapters and appendices   
 
3. New ideas in 
New Zealand 
and elsewhere
2. Social services in 
New Zealand
4. An assessment 
of the social 
services system
Part One – What the Commission has observed
Overviews and illustrates emerging new approaches to social services 
commissioning and delivery both internationally and within New Zealand.
Describes the social services landscape that the Commission has observed, paying 
particular attention to problem areas, historical influences and current pressures 
and trends.
Analyses social services as a system and the institutional arrangements that shape 
outcomes. The chapter provides the Commission’s assessment of the underlying 
causes of the observed performance of the system.
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5. Institutional 
architecture
7. A system that 
learns and 
innovates
6. Commissioning 
8. Leveraging data 
and analytics
Part Two – What is needed for improvement
9. Social 
investment and 
insurance
11. Choice and 
empowerment
10. Service 
integration
12. Better 
purchasing and 
contracting
Sets out and explores the strengths and weaknesses of two broad institutional 
architectures that can be used to commission and deliver social services.
Makes the case that improving social services requires a system that learns over 
time (including by trying a variety of new innovative approaches), selects what 
works, ditches what does not and expands successful approaches. 
Explains and explores commissioning – the set of important interrelated tasks that 
need to be undertaken to turn policy objectives into effective social services.
Describes the opportunities increasingly offered by expanded data sets, new 
information technologies and data analytics to track the value add of services for 
different types of clients, and how this can greatly improve the return on 
investment. It explores ways to expand data sharing safely in order to increase 
innovation and effectiveness.
Explains the Government’s Investment Approach, and argues for it to be 
extended. It explains social insurance, using Australia’s National Disability 
Insurance Scheme and ACC as examples.
Makes the case that greater devolution of choice and control to individual service 
users will produce better outcomes in many situations. The chapter explores the 
mechanisms and models that could empower service users, increase choice and 
spark innovation.
Explains how different types of service integration affect outcomes for clients, and 
why lack of integration is a common problem. Cites evidence of positive effects 
from efforts to integrate. Devolved, bottom-up approaches offer the most 
promise.
Proposes ways to improve purchasing practices and the design and management 
of contracts between government agencies and non-government providers of 
social services.
13. The Mäori 
dimension
Explores the inquiry’s themes and findings from a Mäori perspective including 
Mäori concepts of respect and caring, Treaty obligations and what the Treaty 
means for partnership and devolution in social services. Also describes several 
current governance models of Mäori-Crown collaboration on social services. 
14. Implementation
15. The size of the 
prize
Part Three – Making it happen
Describes a way forward to implement the significant changes that the Commission 
is recommending in institutional design, commissioning, the use of client-directed 
and other devolved approaches, an expanded investment approach, and improved 
contracting.
Supports the case for change by providing indications of the size of the economic 
and social benefits achievable with system reform.
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Appendices B-F are available online at: www.productivity.govt.nz/inquiry-content/social-services  
1.7 Next steps 
Table 1.1 sets out the proposed timeline for the rest of the inquiry. The Commission, with the agreement of 
the Government, has deferred the original date for delivering the final report by two months to the end of 
August 2015. The expanded timeframe allows more time in light of the large interest in the inquiry. 
Table 1.1 Inquiry timeline   
The Commission anticipates holding regional meetings and/or roundtables during June 2015. 
A. Public 
consultation
C. Whänau Ora
B. Employment 
services 
D. Services for 
people with 
disabilities
Appendices
E. Home-based 
support for 
older people
F. The economics 
of social services
Lists the people and organisations who met with the Commission or provided 
submissions to the inquiry’s issues paper.
Case study of Whänau Ora as a relatively new approach to the commissioning and 
delivery of services, particularly to Mäori and Pasifika families. Of interest is the 
emphasis on families determining their own goals and the means to achieve them, 
assisted by “navigators”. Another feature is the use of non-government 
commissioning agencies. 
Case study of New Zealand and Australian systems for delivering employment 
services.  The systems differ: in New Zealand a government in-house provider 
delivers them; the Australian Government out-sources them using a managed 
market.  New Zealand uses data and analytics in a sophisticated way to improve 
service effectiveness.  
Case study of the ways that the government commissions and delivers services for 
people with disabilities. The study examines the Enabling Good Lives trial and the 
Ministry of Health’s Individualised Funding initiative as examples of client-directed 
budgets. 
Case study of services and support for home-based care of the aged, how well 
they work, the issue of service integration, and the lessons that can be drawn (eg, 
how home-based services can reduce the need for hospital admissions and 
residential care). 
Reviews the microeconomics literature and picks out those parts that throw light 
on the economics of social services. The parts include contracting under 
uncertainty and how different types of incentives affect service performance. While 
drawing on various perspectives and frameworks, the inquiry aims to be grounded 
in sound microeconomics. 
Date Milestone 
28 April 2015 Release of draft report 
May-June Engagement on draft report 
24 June Due date for submissions on draft report 
31 August Final report to the Government 
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Part One: What the 
Commission has observed 
Part One of this draft inquiry report documents the Commission’s observations of the social services 
landscape in New Zealand and how it has been performing (Chapter 2); describes some new approaches 
that have been tried internationally and within New Zealand (Chapter 3); and diagnoses the causes of the 
observed areas of under-performance (Chapter 4). 
All three chapters may be of interest in their own right. Yet they are also important preparation for Part Two. 
The purpose of Part Two is to develop reform options for the social services system that are soundly based 
on the Part One findings about how the system currently works and the experience of the new approaches. 
30 DRAFT | More effective social services 
2 Social services in New Zealand  
Key points 
 Central government spends around $34 billion a year on health, education and other social 
services. Most of this spending goes to universities, hospitals, schools and frontline departments, 
with the rest used to purchase services from non-government. For example, 20% of the Ministry of 
Social Development’s (MSD) 2014/15 social services budget is for contracted-out services.4 
 A mix of government, for-profit and not-for-profit providers, delivers social services. History, 
population mix and geography have all influenced the landscape of service providers and the 
arrangements under which government funds services.  
 Numerous government reviews over the past 20 years have identified remarkably consistent lists of 
issues, and proposed similarly consistent solutions. 
 The Commission’s broad observations are that the social services system has a number of positive 
attributes. These include a willingness in government agencies to improve the system, a highly 
committed workforce, pockets of successful innovation in the use of data management and 
analytics, and the wide acknowledgement within government of the need to improve agency 
coordination. 
 Improving social outcomes will require that the following weaknesses in the current system be 
addressed: 
- existing institutions are not well placed to deal with multiple and inter-dependent problems 
encountered by many of New Zealand’s most vulnerable individuals and families; 
- government agencies have little reliable information about which services and interventions 
work well, and those that do not; 
- transaction costs are generally higher than necessary; 
- government agencies delivering social services are often poorly coordinated; 
- tailoring services to the individual needs of clients is made difficult by tight central control; 
- non-government providers face poor incentives to innovate; and 
- there are missed opportunities for early intervention to avoid the escalation of problems. 
 The Commission has observed that a large stock of existing social services continue to be funded 
and run in much the same way as in past decades, with little evaluation of their impact or cost 
effectiveness. A flow of new initiatives attracts much attention, but has little effect on the existing 
stock or on outcomes. 
 Addressing weaknesses in the system is important in view of persistent poor social outcomes, 
increasing demand for services, and the rising costs of delivering services. New Zealand is not the 
only country facing these pressures, and there is much to learn from new approaches, domestically 
and abroad.  
 
This chapter provides an overview of the social services system in New Zealand. It gives a brief history of 
government involvement in the provision of social services before presenting data on current levels of 
expenditure in the area. The chapter then looks more closely at the processes and institutions that shape 
4 Excluding income support and benefit payments. 
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the way government agencies deliver and fund social services, before outlining the Commission’s 
observations on the strengths and weaknesses of the system.5 
2.1 Improving wellbeing through social services 
Social services aim to improve the wellbeing of clients by broadening access to the things in life they value 
(or by removing barriers to accessing these things). For example, a person may value having steady 
employment, living independently, being part of a close family unit and being free from prejudice and 
violence. Yet they experience barriers to obtaining these things. Barriers include, for example, poverty, ill 
health, disability, dysfunctional family arrangements, or poor access to education.  
Some social services help people overcome (or reduce) these barriers and widen the set of possibilities 
open to them. For example, training services give people the skills needed to gain steady employment. 
Home-help services assist people to live independently. And family-support services help parents get 
through difficult times. 
Other services seek to protect people from the actions of others. For example, women’s refuges strive to 
protect women from domestic violence. And child-protection services aim to protect children from abuse 
and neglect. When actions cause harm to others, social services tend to require a coercive component as 
far as the perpetrator is concerned.  
2.2 A brief history of social services in New Zealand 
This section provides a brief overview of the evolving role of the state in providing and funding of social 
services in New Zealand from the time of intense European settlement.  
Britain in the 19th century relied on a lively voluntary sector and mutual aid societies to fund and provide 
education, health, income support, and child support services. Parents and churches met most of the cost 
of education (West, 1996). The central bureaucracy of the state was small and there was “no question … of 
the state funding the voluntary sector” (Lewis, 1999, p. 15). Service availability, access and quality were 
patchy.  
In contrast to Britain, New Zealand had limited philanthropic resources, and many settlers had no family 
networks to draw on for support (Easton, 2011). Church organisations provided some assistance to the poor 
during the early years of settlement, but, in general, assisted migration involved an implicit undertaking 
from the authorities (the New Zealand Company or the government) to help migrants during periods of 
need. As a result, New Zealand was an early adopter of state funded, state provided, social services.  
Land acquired from Mäori provided settlers with both a means of subsistence and a lure to migrate (Garlick, 
2012; Easton, 2011). Yet, land was also central to the social fabric of whänau, hapü and iwi, and so the loss 
of land had an immediate and continuing harmful impact on Mäori society.  
The privations of the economic depression in the late 19th century, the First World War, and the Great 
Depression of the 1930s saw voluntary organisations provide more social services. Patriotic societies formed 
to support returned soldiers and their dependants. Charitable organisations also emerged to help the influx 
of refugees from Europe. And church groups expanded their services to support the unemployed and 
destitute. 
Yet, the sheer scale of these events stretched the capacity of families and voluntary organisations, leading 
to widespread calls for greater involvement of the state and the subsequent expansion of state-funded 
services (Tennant et al., 2008).  
The 1950s brought greater awareness of the opportunities to improve social outcomes for segments of the 
New Zealand population. This saw the expansion of not-for-profit (NFP) service providers and the 
emergence of new community organisations such as IHC and Marriage Guidance. Government supported 
5 This report uses the term agencies to refer government departments, ministries and Crown entities involved in the provision of social services. 
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these and similar social services through grants, training, and support for rent and office costs. These 
providers gradually became more and more dependent on government funding to deliver social services. 
The 1950s also saw many Mäori migrate to urban areas, attracted by employment opportunities. Later 
generations born in the urban environment sometimes had weaker ties with whänau and their traditional 
support networks.  
The full employment economy of the 1950s and early 1960s gave way to a period of economic and social 
stress and a greater focus on efficiency in public spending. The 1970s saw the strengthening of the Mäori 
political movement and demands for Mäori self-determination. This led to a new focus on the relationship 
between Mäori and the Crown, processes to settle Treaty of Waitangi claims, and new forms of social 
services provision designed, governed and operated by Mäori. Box 2.1 provides a discussion on the link 
between social services and Treaty duties. 
By the mid-1980s government had turned to non-government organisations to play a greater role in the 
delivery of social services. The availability of government grants and contracts provided opportunities for 
small community-based organisations to expand. Many marae-based and urban Mäori organisations, such 
as the Manukau Urban Mäori Authority, managed government training programmes and other employment 
initiatives.  
Public sector reforms in the early 1990s saw an increase in the use of tendering for social services contracts 
and a push for greater accountability and efficiency in public spending. A greater use of tendering provided 
additional opportunities for non-government providers to attract government funding. State support for 
NFPs shifted from being predominately grant-based funding to contract-based funding. Many contracts 
included tightly specified services and reporting obligations. The tight specification of contracts often 
limited the flexibility of NFPs to provider services more aligned with their own vision or philosophy (Garlick, 
2012). 
Box 2.1  Social services and the Waitangi Treaty duties  
The Waitangi Tribunal has not yet determined, through its inquiries, the application of the Waitangi 
Treaty’s Article Two to social policy. Some inquiry participants had views on how Article Two is 
relevant to the delivery of social services. 
The principle of active protection of Mäori Interests by the Crown arises from Article Two. Failure to 
provide this active protection, leading to loss of täonga (including natural resources and culture) is the 
basis for much of the redress through the Treaty settlement process. But active protection is also a 
forward-looking duty, and may include Mäori interests in their own development (both social and 
economic). In the Mäori version of the Treaty, Article Two also guarantees the protection of tino 
rangatiratanga, commonly translated as self-determination. The ability of Mäori to determine their own 
social and economic development is therefore sometimes couched as a Treaty right under Article Two. 
Article Three requires that Mäori receive equal rights and privileges. In this case Article Three has been 
seen to create duties on the Crown to provide equal access to services, and consideration for further 
assistance where poor outcomes or potential opportunities warrant it. The debate around Article Three 
mirrors the debate about “equality” in New Zealand generally – does it refer to equality of 
opportunity, or equality of outcome? There is no clear path through that debate.  
Social services providers sometimes pick up the principles of the Treaty to inform their own 
governance structures and work practices. For example: 
Te Tiriti o Waitangi is essentially about relationships. Some of these relationships are expressed in 
law, but many rely upon moral and ethical considerations for their effectiveness. In this regard, the 
health sector has been a leader in “Treaty-based relationships.” Relationships between ALT 
[Alliance Leadership Team] members are predicated on engaging in respectful partnerships, 
equitable resource distribution and social justice, enabling full Mäori participation [in] Mäori and 
 Chapter 2 | Social services in New Zealand 33 
2.3 Government expenditure on social services  
Central government spends around $34 billion a year on health, education and other social services. Most 
of this spending is on services provided directly by Crown entities, such as schools, universities and District 
Health Boards (DHBs). Government agencies use the rest to provide services directly or to pay non-
government providers for supplying services. 
The Commission has found no consolidated data on government purchases of social services from 
non-government providers. However, 20% of MSD’s 2014/2015 social services budget is for contracted-out 
services.6 Approximately 80% of Vote Health expenditure on social services was allocated to DHBs in 
2014/2015. Around 17% of Vote Health is used by the Ministry of Health to contract out services. Some of 
these contracts are with DHBs (Figure 2.1). 
Figure 2.1 Estimated government expenditure on social services for 2014/2015  
 
Source: Budget 2014 data; Productivity Commission.  
6 Excluding income support and benefit payments. 
Health
$14 265m
ACC
$2 083m
Education
$9 412m
Tertiary 
Education
$2 594m
Social 
Development
$2 389m
Housing
$96m
Mäori Affairs
$71m
Justice
$196m
Corrections
$1 180m
Police
$1 462m
$34 Billion (estimated government spending on social services 
in 2014/15, excluding benefits and other transfer payments)
Of the $2 389m for social development:
• $1 847m is used for Ministry of Social 
Development services and administration 
(eg, Work and Income employment 
services)
• $542m is contracted out
Of the $14 265m for health:
• $523m is used by the Ministry of Health for 
administration and provision of some infrastructure 
(such as IT systems)
• $2 387m is contracted out by the Ministry of 
Health (sometimes the recipients of these contracts 
will be DHBs)
• $11 355m is devolved to DHBs (which spend 
about half of this amount contracting services from 
non-DHB providers)
New Zealand society and the active protection of Mäori rights as confirmed by the Treaty. (Te Tai 
Tokerau Alliance for Health, 2012, p. 2) 
Alternatively, the Treaty can be seen as mediating the relationship between kaupapa Mäori providers 
and “mainstream” providers: 
Government has a role in facilitating non Mäori mainstream providers who operate as respectful 
and responsive Treaty partners to work alongside Mäori providers and Iwi in the support of Mäori 
self-determination and aspirations. (Relationships Aotearoa, sub. 56, p. 6) 
Building on the Treaty relationship, and particularly increasing the ability of iwi and Mäori to exercise 
greater control (rangatiratanga) of what and how social services are delivered, is an aspiration that 
would require making changes in the social services system. 
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According to OECD data, government social spending in New Zealand, as a percentage of gross domestic 
product (GDP), is close to the OECD average, and similar to commonly used comparator countries such as 
the United Kingdom and Australia (Figure 2.2). 
Figure 2.2 Public social spending as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product, 2014  
 
Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database (n.d.).  
Total public spending includes benefit payments as well as expenditure on services. Benefit payments are 
outside the Commission’s terms of reference. Figure 2.3 presents OECD data on government expenditure 
excluding benefits payments (referred to in the data as “benefits in kind”).7 The Figure illustrates that 
expenditure in New Zealand, as a percentage of GDP, was higher than the OECD average in 2013.8 
Government expenditure per capita was also higher than comparator countries such as Australia and 
Canada, but was lower than the United Kingdom. 
7 “Benefits in kind” are services received by citizens and paid for by the government (such as health and education services) as opposed to benefit 
payments in the form of cash transfers to residents.  
8 2013 is the latest year for which data is available for all countries. 
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Figure 2.3 Social expenditure on benefits in kind as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product, 2013  
 
Source: OECD Social Expenditure Database (n.d.). 
 
 
 
 F2.1  As a percentage of GDP, public expenditure on social services is currently higher in 
New Zealand than the OECD average. Expenditure is also higher than common 
comparator countries such as Australia and Canada, but lower than the United 
Kingdom. 
 
 
The state sector is the largest social services employer in New Zealand, employing almost 165 000 workers 
in education and health alone (SSC, 2014).  
The Commission used the Charities Register to gain an insight into the magnitude of government purchases 
of social services from NFPs. While not all NFPs are charities, and some NFP have “for-profit” activities (eg, 
“thrift shops”), the Register has the best available information. 
The Charities Register shows government funding for charitable social services providers was approximately 
$3.3 billion in 2013. Data from the register for 2013 is summarised in Figure 2.4. 
In addition to direct funding, the government indirectly supports charities by providing donors with tax 
credits. In 2010, donor tax credits amounted to $195 million. Approximately $45 million of this was for 
donations to charities providing social services. 
The Charities Register also shows that, in total, charities delivering social services get around 50% of their 
income from non-government sources.9 This is a mix of service trading income, donations, grants and other 
sources. Many non-profit organisations use volunteers to provide social services. Volunteers contributed 
9 The focus of the inquiry is social services funded by government. Social services funded by non-government sources are of interest to enable 
comparisons and provide context. 
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800 000 hours a week in 2013 to charities delivering social services. This represents an input of around $600 
million a year if costed at the minimum wage. 
Figure 2.4 Charity service providers, 2013  
 
Source: Charities Register. 
2.4 The social services system  
This inquiry often focuses on the totality of social services as a system (rather than specific services, 
programmes or providers). This allows a broader understanding of the institutions and processes that shape 
the outcomes achieved from government-funded services.  
The totality of social services form a complex system of organisations, institutions and relationships. 
Government is a large, but by no means the only, element of this system. Other important elements include 
non-government providers, philanthropic organisations, volunteers, family/whänau and community-based 
bodies such as churches. These elements play an important role in funding, coordinating and delivering 
services, often independent of government involvement (Figure 2.5). 
For example, government support for older people living at home is only one of a range of possible sources 
of assistance. Many older people organise and fund their own support. Family members help one another 
around the home. Friends and neighbours provide support and company, “checking in” to see that 
everything is okay. Community organisations and volunteers provide services not funded by government. 
Although government support can be important, especially for very frail older people or people with few 
family and friends, it is only part of the picture.10 
These broader networks of support often play a strong role in achieving positive client outcomes. For 
instance, Duncan (2013) found that 86% of the outcomes experienced by people recovering from 
psychological conditions are attributable to “the client’s life circumstances” (p. 4). 
The submission from Barnardos also highlighted the importance of broader networks of support. 
It may be useful to consider the following analogy. For someone to recover from heart disease they are 
likely to need highly skilled and focused attention from surgeons, dieticians, physiotherapists and 
pharmacists. Without this specialist care they may well die. However in order to sustain their health they 
are also going to need a partner that cooks healthier food, friends that encourage them to exercise, a 
local chemist that notices when they don’t come in and/or are getting the wrong medications, a GP 
10 Appendix E provides a case study on home-based support of older people. 
7 300 providers, 39% get 
some funding from 
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who is accessible and has time to listen to them, relationships (to family, whänau church, work, marae) 
that gives them a sense of purpose and so on. It is not the role of the surgeon or physiotherapist to 
make sure that this person has supportive relationships and a sense of purpose. However, if the system 
of specialist medical intervention has no acknowledgement or support for the total picture of care that 
is needed then there is a high chance that this person will receive expensive medical treatment that 
makes little difference to their long term health and wellbeing. 
The same analogy holds true for families that are trying to deal with complex parenting problems, 
chaotic lives or issues of family violence. Seeing the whole picture matters. (sub. 12, p. 6) 
Figure 2.5 Some elements of the social services system  
 
The history of social services in New Zealand illustrates that the line between the role of the state and the 
role of these broader networks of support has changed through time. Changes have occurred in response 
to external shocks (wars, depressions) and changing views of where, when and how the state should be 
involved in delivering social services.  
This inquiry does not try to establish the “right” balance between government support and support 
provided by community networks.  
Rather, the inquiry is concerned with identifying areas where improvements to government institutions, 
processes and capability would improve the outcomes achieved by publically funded social services. The 
next section provides an overview of some of these processes. 
Social services and the machinery of government 
“Machinery of government” is a metaphor for the structures and administrative processes that determine 
the form, functions, management, operation and governance of government agencies. 
Like most government expenditure, commissioning and funding of services take place within the context of 
the machinery of government. Generally speaking, the process is as noted below. 
1. The public, ministers or officials identify the need for a social service. 
Friends and social 
networks
People receiving 
and giving support
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2. Officials advise ministers on how to address the need. Ministers consider the advice of officials and 
propose a programme and budget to Cabinet. 
3. Cabinet approves the proposal. If an existing appropriation covers the programme, the responsible 
minister instructs their support agency to implement it. If the programme cannot be funded under an 
existing appropriation, it is added to the Annual Appropriations Bill. 
4. Parliament authorises money for the programme (if required) and ministers allocate responsibility for its 
implementation to a government agency. 
5. A government agency or non-government provider delivers the service. 
6. Ideally, government agencies evaluate the outcomes of the expenditure and feed the lessons learnt 
back into the process.  
Every step of this process is subject to legislative and operational requirements (such as Cabinet Directives 
and Treasury Instructions). These institutional “rules of the game” are designed to achieve effective 
democratic government through placing boundaries around the power of politicians and government 
officials and by establishing strict lines of budget and political accountability. Figure 2.6 illustrates the 
process.  
Figure 2.6 Government funding and commissioning process  
 
Identifying the need for social services and policy advice to ministers 
Government funds social services in response to an identified social need. For many social services, the 
need for government funding is deeply rooted in people’s sense of fairness and equity, and expectations 
about the role of the state in providing a social safety net. Examples include the provision of universal 
healthcare and education.  
As part of the annual budget process, ministers (supported by officials) estimate how much public funding 
the government will need in order to provide services. They also decide the programmes through which 
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agencies deliver services. Ministers then forward their proposal for expenditure to Cabinet as part of the 
annual budget cycle.  
New programmes that are funded within existing agency budgets may also require Cabinet approval. For 
example, the Cabinet Manual states that ministers must send “significant policy issues” and “controversial 
matters” to Cabinet (Cabinet Office, 2008, paragraph 5.11). 
Cabinet consideration and approval 
Cabinet consideration involves the responsible minister submitting papers outlining the proposed initiative 
or funding proposal. Before going to Cabinet, most proposals are discussed in detail by one or more 
Cabinet Committees. The Cabinet Committee on State Sector Reform and Expenditure Controls is 
responsible for reviewing government expenditure with a view to improving value for money. The Cabinet 
Social Policy Committee considers social policy issues such as education, health, justice and law and order, 
welfare reform, child poverty and vulnerable children.  
Once Cabinet has approved a proposal, the responsible minister will instruct the relevant agency to 
proceed. If the proposal requires new expenditure, it is included as part of the annual appropriations and 
forwarded to Parliament for consideration as part of the Annual Appropriations Bill.  
Parliament authorises spending on social services 
The scrutiny of government spending by Parliament is central to Westminster democracies. New Zealand’s 
Constitution Act 1986 makes it unlawful for the Crown to spend any public money unless the expenditure 
has been authorised by an Act of Parliament (s 22). Similarly, s 4 of the Public Finance Act 1989 (PFA) states: 
The Crown or an Office of Parliament must not incur expenses or capital expenditure, except as 
expressly authorised by an appropriation, or other authority, by or under an Act.  
Annual Appropriation Acts are the main avenue through which Parliament authorises ministers to use public 
resources. Appropriation Acts specify the amount of expenditure that ministers are authorised to incur in 
specified areas (known as appropriations). Appropriations are organised by “Votes” (eg, Vote Health, Vote 
Education and Vote Social Development) and can cover a period of up to five years. The 2014/2015 
appropriations under Vote Social Development included: 
 Assistance to Disadvantaged Persons; 
 Connected Communities; 
 Counselling and Rehabilitation Services; 
 Education and Prevention Services; 
 Family Wellbeing Services; 
 Part Payment of Rent to Social Housing Providers; 
 Services to Young People; 
 Strengthening Providers and Communities; and  
 Trialling New Approaches to Social Sector Change.  
Appropriations for services supplied by non-government organisations are termed “non-departmental 
expenses”.  
The PFA provides the legislative framework for parliamentary scrutiny of government spending. The Act 
governs the use of public financial resources by, among other measures, establishing lines of responsibility 
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for the management of public financial resources and specifying the minimum financial and non-financial 
reporting obligations of ministers and departments11.  
Amendments to the PFA in 2013 sought to improve outcomes from public spending by increasing flexibility 
in the government’s budget system. For example, the amendments included provision for multi-category 
appropriation (MCA). The MCA is a mechanism to shift funding between different classes of expenditure for 
the purposes of “contributing to a single, overarching purpose” (s 7B (b)).  
Government agencies directly supply services or commission them from non-government 
providers 
Government agencies use appropriations to deliver services in accordance with the wishes of Parliament. 
Under the PFA, departments must provide the responsible ministers with information on their “strategic 
intentions” (s 38). This must include an explanation of the “nature and scope of the department’s functions 
and intended operations” (s 40). Departments usually use their Statements of Intent (SOI) to convey this 
information. 
Agencies must decide on a service model for delivering services. For example, agencies could choose to 
provide services in-house or to contract them out. Agencies also need to make choices around the pricing 
of services, performance measurement and the management of risks. Chapter 6 explores commissioning 
tasks in greater detail. The decisions made must be consistent with details of the appropriations and with 
the strategic intentions of the agency. 
The PFA establishes strong vertical accountability, with accountability flowing from the chief executives of 
departments to ministers, and from ministers to Cabinet and to Parliament.  
For instance, section 35 of the PFA makes agency chief executives of departments accountable for the 
financial management of appropriations used for non-departmental expenses (such as the contracting out 
of social services). Chief executives are also responsible for advising the appropriations ministers on the 
“efficiency and effectiveness of expenditure” (s 35a). 12  
The appropriation minister on the other hand is responsible for providing the Parliament with the end-of-
year performance information (s 19B). The information must include an assessment of what the government 
has achieved with the appropriation (s 19C1a), and a comparison of actual expenditure against forecast 
expenditure (s 19C1b). 
A number of other Acts, such as the State Sector Act 1988 and the Public Audit Act 2001, reinforce strong 
vertical lines of accountability. 
 The State Sector Act 1988 makes chief executives responsible to the appropriate minister for carrying 
out the functions and duties of the department (including those imposed by policy), the good conduct 
of the department, and the efficient, effective and economical management of the activities of the 
department. 
 The Public Audit Act 2001 established the Controller and Auditor-General as an officer of Parliament 
responsible for providing independent assurance that public sector organisations are operating and 
accounting for their performance, in accordance with Parliament’s intentions.  
Legislation can also create specific responsibilities for chief executives. For example, s 7 of the Children, 
Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989 sets out the duties of the chief executive responsible for the 
administration of the Act (currently the chief executive of MSD). These duties include: 
 taking “such positive and prompt action and steps as will in the chief executive’s opinion best ensure” 
that the objectives of the Act are attained (s 7(1)(a)); 
11 The PFA and the State Sector Act 1988 refer to departments. Departments are listed in Schedule 1 of the State Sector Act 1988. The rest of this report, 
uses the term agency to refer to the broader set of government departments, ministries and Crown entities involved in the delivery of social services.  
12 The term “appropriation minister” refers to the ministers responsible for a specific appropriation. 
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 monitoring, and advising the minister on, the effect of social policies and social issues on children, 
young persons, families, whänau, hapü, iwi, and family groups (s 7(2)(a)); and 
 promoting the establishment of services designed to provide assistance to children and young persons 
who lack adequate parental care, or require protection from harm, or need accommodation or social or 
recreational activities (s 7(2)(b)). 
In addition to the responsibilities specified in legislation, officials must follow Cabinet directives and 
government rules. For example, the Government Rules of Sourcing set out the Government’s standards for 
procurement planning, approaching the market and contracting (Chapter 12). These rules inform 
departmental operating processes and accountability structures. 
Social service providers are diverse 
The provision of social services occurs directly through government agencies and through contracts with 
non-government providers. For example, MSD has around 3700 social services contracts with some 2155 
providers current in the 2014/2015 financial year.  
These services differ along many dimensions, such as the extent to which the service aims to benefit an 
individual or the wider society, the extent to which specific outcomes can be attributable to specific 
interventions and the extent to which economies of scale are important in the delivery of the service. 
Paralleling service diversity is a diversity in the organisations involved in delivering social services. Non-
government providers vary greatly in terms of: 
 whether they are for-profit or NFP organisations; 
 the extent they are staffed by employed staff or volunteers; 
 the social issue around which their organisational mission centres (eg, services for disabled people, 
family violence, youth offenders); 
 the geographic area that they cover; 
 the cultural communities they service; 
 the breadth of services they deliver; and 
 the strength of their relationship with clients. 
Reviewing the efficiency and effectiveness of social services 
Ideally, government agencies evaluate the outcomes of their expenditure and feed the lessons learnt into 
future design and delivery of services. However, as discussed in Chapters 7 and 8, this element of the 
system is weak. 
2.5 Social services – a client’s perspective 
Government institutions have evolved to make government more manageable and accountable. However, 
several submissions noted that to clients these institutions can seem confusing, distant, overly directive, 
unhelpful and intimidating.  
The current system is overly confusing. Victims, perpetrators and families often find it difficult to 
navigate their way through a complex maze of disconnected services and systems each with different 
policies and processes. Agencies operate as silos and invariably do not know what other agencies can 
offer and hence are unable to make appropriate referrals. (The Impact Collective, sub. 130, p. 9) 
The Office of the Children’s Commissioner expressed similar concerns. 
A report by the Auckland City Mission on its Family 100 Project focuses on the voices of people who 
rely on social services in their daily lives. Many find that dealing with support services is complicated 
and confusing; humiliating when having to ask for help and retell their situation constantly; and feeling 
that their time isn’t valued by employees in the system. (sub. 77, p. 7) 
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Box 2.2 provides a case study supplied by The People’s Project (TPP) that illustrates the difficulties that 
people who need assistance can have when trying to engage with government institutions.13 
 
13 Concerns of the Hamilton people about people living on the streets led to the formation of the TTP. It was a community-wide response based on the 
rationale that no single organisation has the ability to solve homelessness. 
Box 2.2 Story of Chas, 30 January 2015 
The People’s Project (2015) described the experience of Chas, and his difficulties accessing the 
services he needed.  
Chas wandered shyly through the doors of the office late Friday afternoon, lost, and dazed. He 
was a young lad, fresh-faced, with a recent black eye. He stood in the middle of the doorway, 
coyly looking out and up from under a too-long fringe. In his youthful innocence he looked out-of-
place with the other Homeless in the office.  
“I just came from the bakery”, he said pointing next door. “They said you might help me”. He 
was soft-spoken and obviously uncomfortable talking to an adult. Chas had been at the bakery 
asking for a crust of bread or anything they would be able to give him. He was hungry and 
exhausted. He hadn’t eaten all day. The bakery had given him a left-over from the day’s trading, 
and sent him to The Peoples Project. We found him a left-over apple and chocolate in the fridge 
which he devoured. He wolfed down a second milo.  
He had just come from a two hour meeting at [Work and Income New Zealand] WINZ, trying to 
establish his benefit as he had no money. WINZ had done the majority of the linking, but had told 
Chas he needed to go to their Youth Services office in Dinsdale. Chas had been told he needed 
to be sighted by a WINZ officer there and to fill out a form that only the Dinsdale office had. Chas 
had absolutely no money for a bus fare, and was ravenously hungry and dazed from his two hour 
meeting at WINZ. The Dinsdale office was 5 kilometres away and he had just spent the night on 
the street, where he had got into a fight. Making the trip to Dinsdale was off the radar for him. It 
was just too hard.  
Chas said he had been staying on the streets, as well as couch surfing between friend’s places 
and his half-sisters. They all had their own lives, he told us. He’d outstayed his welcome. He had 
been homeless he thought since October 2014. Chas told us he had aged-out of CYF’s care on 
the day that he turned 17. Going back to his mother’s place was out of the question. Going to his 
father’s was also not an option at present, for safety reasons. Chas said he had been in CYF’s care 
from the age of three. Going back to stay with any of his foster care-givers was also not an option 
for him, he told us.  
Initially, the Project team wondered how we would be able to help someone as young as Chas. 
The team did not think the Night Shelter would be appropriate for someone so young. There was 
a hardened crew at the Shelter and Chas was vulnerable. He was barely old enough to sign the 
TPP consent form. 
The Project team completed the necessary WINZ agency linking with Chas and took it down to 
WINZ. We asked WINZ why the necessary forms couldn’t have been sent through from Youth 
Services Dinsdale office to where Chas was. They told us it was protocol. We also let WINZ know 
that Chas had absolutely no money to get him on a bus to Dinsdale. It was late Friday afternoon 
and Chas had given up. In Chas’s mind, he wasn’t going to get any money from WINZ that Friday. 
It was all too hard. Mentally, he had been preparing himself for a weekend at large, sleeping 
rough on the streets. He was concerned the people who had hit him would be waiting for him. He 
had no money, no belongings and nowhere to go.  
The Project team then rang local Non-Government youth service providers, Real. Within 15 
minutes, two of the Real team arrived and spoke to Chas. He was taken immediately to Dinsdale 
WINZ where he completed the necessary paperwork and received access to emergency funds in 
time before WINZ closed for the week.  
The Real team found Chas safe temporary accommodation for the weekend. The following week, 
they helped Chas make connection with more permanent lodgings. Chas was then enrolled in a 
Mechanics course with a local non-government provider. He is now housed, receiving education 
and on-going support from the Real team.  
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 F2.2  From a client’s perspective, government processes for delivering social services can 
seem confusing, fragmented, overly directive and unhelpful.  
2.6 Observations on the market for social services contracts 
Government agencies have a finite level of resources available to fund social services. As such, they must 
make decisions about how to allocate available funds between alternative services and service providers. 
Ministers, based on the advice of officials, typically make decisions about which services the Government 
will fund (and the level of funding). They also make decision around the model of service delivery (Chapter 
6). 
Typically, agencies use competitive tendering processes to select service providers. Unlike tenders for 
private services, potential providers of social services usually do not compete on price. Rather, agencies 
select the provider on the basis of the provider’s knowledge and capability and their relationship with the 
targeted client group. Typically agencies either: 
 allocate a proportion of the expected demand for services to a provider (eg, by contracting for X many 
hours of counselling services); or 
 select an organisation as the sole service provider for the duration of the contract.  
In both these cases, providers compete for contracts, and their service volume or market share is fixed for 
the duration of the contract. Such arrangements are termed “competition for the market”. This approach 
contrasts with “competition in the market” where providers compete alongside each other to attract clients. 
Chapter 6 and Appendix F discuss the differences between these two models of services delivery. 
Social services have distinctive features that mean the “theoretical (market) model is a poor description of 
the social services market in New Zealand” (New Zealand Treasury, 2013, p. 12). The features arise to 
varying degrees in any given social service, so any analysis of how best to provide a particular social service 
will ultimately depend on its particular characteristics. The distinctive features observed by the Commission 
include the following. 
 The absence of price signals: Unlike private markets where consumers make decisions based on price, 
quality and other characteristics of the service, the users of social services rarely pay the full cost of the 
services they use. Rather, the government purchases services on their behalf and providers compete for 
contracts to provide services.  
 The Government has market power: For many services, the Government is the sole buyer and therefore 
yields significant influence over the services supplied, the quality of these services and the price that 
providers receive. It is government (rather than markets) that attempt to match the services provided 
with the needs of clients. 
 The supply of merit goods: Merit goods are things that people should be able to receive aside from 
their willingness or ability to pay, and should be available on the basis of their need. This means that 
equity of access is an important consideration in delivering social services. 
 Spill-over effects: Social services often create social benefits beyond those experienced by the recipient 
of the service.14 For example, excessive alcohol consumption not only imposes “costs” on a person’s 
health; it can also impose significant cost on that person’s family, loved ones, employers, etc. 
Conversely, services that help a person get their drinking under control not only benefit that person, but 
also all the people adversely affected by that person’s excessive consumption. 
 Many providers are driven by a commitment to a mission rather than personal financial gain: While there 
are some for-profit providers, a sense of civic duty and commitment to a mission motivates many non-
14 In other words, they create positive or negative externalities. Note that social benefits (costs) also include private benefits (costs). 
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government providers. Motivations are important because they influence how providers react to 
incentives and how they behave when their actions cannot be observed by the Government.  
2.7 The system has several strengths but many weaknesses 
The sheer size and complexity of the social services system makes generalisation difficult. What may be true 
for one part of the system may not be true for another (or may be less true). Even so, the Commission’s 
broad observations are that the social services system has a number of strengths and weaknesses. The 
strengths include: 
 a willingness in government agencies to launch trials and experiments (Chapter 3);  
 social services workers, including a significant number of volunteers, being highly committed to 
improving the lives of clients. 
 pockets of successful innovation exist in the use of data management and analytics (Chapter 8); 
 government agencies acknowledge the lack of integration of services and the need to address this 
problem (Chapter 10); and 
 Governments have committed, and continue to commit, strongly to improving public services (see Box 
2.3). 
 
The Commission has also identified a number of weaknesses in the social services system.  
Box 2.3 Better Public Services 
The Better Public Services Advisory Group (BPSAG) report in November 2011 recommended reforms 
to increase collaboration and strengthen leadership across the public sector, and to focus the attention 
of ministers and chief executives on a limited number of priority outcomes (SSC, 2011). It also 
recommended the increased use of administrative data and analytics to shape an investment approach 
to public spending. The Government has broadly adopted this reform direction with a set of legislative 
and organisational changes, and increased investment in data linking and analytic capability. 
As part of Better Public Services, the Government committed to 10 result areas that are priorities for 
driving improvement across the five years to 2017. These result areas are aspirational, requiring 
government agencies and providers to work together to achieve better outcomes. The Better Public 
Services result areas relevant to social services are to: 
 reduce long-term welfare dependence; 
 increase participation in early childhood education; 
 increase infant immunisation and reducing rheumatic fever; 
 reduce assaults on children; 
 increase proportion of 18 year olds with NCEA Level 2; 
 increase the proportion of 25 to 34 year olds with NZQF Level 4 or above; 
 reduce the rates of total crime, violent crime and youth crime; 
 reduce re-offending; and 
 ensure New Zealanders can complete their transactions with government easily in a digital 
environment. 
Source:  SSC, 2015. 
 Chapter 2 | Social services in New Zealand 45 
The system struggles to cater for multiple and inter-dependent needs 
Clients access the social services system in different ways and for different reasons. For some, their main 
interaction with the system is through their local school or childcare centre. On occasions, they may have 
cause to visit their local general practitioner or perhaps a hospital if the issue is more serious. For these 
people, coordinating services to meet their needs is relatively straightforward, and in many cases they 
prefer to coordinate their own interactions with the social services system. 
However, many clients have multiple, complex and overlapping needs. For these clients, addressing one 
need in isolation can make little difference to the person’s situation, as the remaining needs cause the 
problem to re-occur. For example, consider a person who is unemployed and has a drug addiction. Finding 
the person employment without addressing their addiction is likely to make their employment 
unsustainable. Similarly, addressing their addiction without helping them find employment may make them 
susceptible to relapse. 
An efficient and effective system must cater for both types of clients. Yet existing institutions are not well 
placed to deal with the multiple and inter-dependent problems encountered by many of New Zealand’s 
most vulnerable individuals and families. During engagement meetings, the Commission heard time and 
time again of situations where the system was failing to cope adequately with the complex needs of clients. 
Many submissions echoed this theme. 
Salvation Army noted that contracts do not cater well for complex needs. 
We recommend that a new contracting environment or approach is needed wherein providers and 
funders can work closely together during the different phases of the contracting process to ensure that 
the complex needs of those receiving social supports is accurately reflected in the design of the 
contracts. This new approach might also ensure that the actual service provision is more in line with the 
required deliverables from agencies, and also create more room for innovative responses to key social 
needs by the service providers. (sub. 104, p. 23) 
Pharmacy Guild of New Zealand noted cases where the system is inadvertently restricting access to 
required services. 
Community pharmacy has experience with a DHB contract that in some areas has been so specific as to 
restrict those patients with complex needs access to a higher level pharmacy care. While understanding 
the need to define the service, this needs to be done in such a way as to not accidentally exclude 
patients who would benefit from the increased level of care especially those considered as vulnerable 
with complex needs. (sub. 11, p. 6)  
Barnardos made the observation that the system is not working well for children in socially deprived areas.  
For families there is often significant choice around where, when, how and the cost of early childhood 
education for their children. However Barnardos is concerned that in areas of significant social 
deprivation and for children or families with high and complex needs, the system does not work as well. 
(sub. 12, p. 13) 
Relationships Aotearoa commented that the system fails to take a holistic approach to individual needs. 
Specialised funding streams do not recognise the holistic nature of the issues that families with 
complex needs face. The current process is not operationally efficient. Furthermore it tends not to be a 
client centred approach but a funder centred approach. This is not the best way to support client 
outcomes. (sub. 56, p. 8) 
CCS Disability Action highlighted that many people with high and complex needs do not access the 
services they are eligible for. 
According to these Ministry estimates, around 49 per cent of people with high and complex needs and 
their family/whänau do not access government support, despite being eligible and having significant 
needs. (sub. 65, p. 11) 
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 F2.3  Existing social services are not well placed to deal with multiple and inter-dependent 
problems encountered by many of New Zealand’s most vulnerable individuals and 
families. 
 
 
Little visibility around what works and what does not 
Government agencies have little system-wide visibility of the services and interventions that work well and 
those that do not. Such knowledge gaps make it difficult to assess the performance of both individual 
services, and of the system as a whole. Further, the absence of such information makes it unlikely that 
resources are being allocated to their highest value use. 
Inquiry participants generally agreed that there are large gaps in knowledge at a system level. 
Social Sector Trial Leads noted that knowledge is patchy throughout the system. 
The social services system is vast and there is currently no comprehensive knowledge base [in] which 
learning is kept. Agencies all have knowledge and learning’s as do learning institutions and service 
providers but this knowledge is often vested in units and people in fragmented ways and is not 
consistently applied or shared … Information gathering varies in reliability and interpretation. In some 
cases information gathered is comprehensive and can be strongly relied on however this is not the case 
across the entire sector. (sub. 126, p. 24)  
The Methodist Mission noted the link between reliable data and improving the productivity of the social 
services sector. 
One of the long-standing barriers to improved productivity in the social services sector has been the 
lack of a reliable method for generating data on client engagement and progress … This coupled with 
the fractured nature of the sector, resistance to anything other than narrative accounts, and the 
relatively low-skilled nature of the sector’s management and governance; has generally meant that it 
has not been possible to identify what works, and even then, why it works. (sub. 4, p. 12)  
Restorative Justice Aotearoa highlighted the link between high staff turnover and the level of knowledge 
within government agencies. 
Government agencies are also notorious for their staff turnover rates. This means that agencies do not 
always have the expertise or knowledge required to develop services in a coherent or consistent way. 
(sub. 28, p. 5) 
Wesley Community Action noted that it is not only government agencies that have limited information on 
performance. 
Social Services, by their nature, are relational services. Every service will be convinced they are 
providing the right service to the right people, but there is very little proof and no local research to 
support this. (sub. 6, p. 2) 
Superu highlighted the presence of barriers to using evaluations to improve system performance. 
Although social service programmes are often subject to some form of evaluation, there are a number 
of barriers which limit the ability of evaluations to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of the social 
services system … There are examples of evaluations in the social sector which are well planned and 
robust. Some features of these evaluations include a system-wide approach (looking at cross-sector 
issues and describing impacts which may be the result of multiple programmes), a long-term focus 
(measuring outcomes), using robust measurement (for example, using randomised control trials or a 
comparison group, or at least measuring change over time), and a client or family centric approach 
(putting the voice of the client at the heart of the evaluation findings, rather than evaluating the funder-
provider process). (sub. 82, pp. 4-5) 
 
 
 
 F2.4  The social services system fails to create and share information about which services 
and interventions work well and those that do not.   
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Social services delivery is poorly coordinated 
Government agencies delivering social services are often poorly coordinated. A study by the Auckland City 
Mission (2014) highlights instances of people in need having to “tell and re-tell their stories of despair to 
many different agents to ‘prove’ they were poor, truly desperate and deserving of help” (p. 18). This 
process can be very disempowering for those in need. The study also observed:  
Most agencies specialised in one or two areas of service provision only, necessitating clients to access 
multiple avenues for assistance. It was common in the stories that [agencies] referred [clients] to other 
services, for instance, WINZ and food banks referred [clients] to budgeters so that clients could get 
help with money management and juggling of debt. (p. 18) 
The need for better coordination was a recurring theme in submissions. For example, Stand Children’s 
Services, Tu Maia Whanau noted: 
There are many opportunities for better coordination, alignment, and collaboration but real service 
integration across and within sectors and services to ensure that the children and families we work with 
experience a seamless transition of supports during their engagement with social services requires a 
systems level approach to service integration. (sub. 127, p. 4) 
Restorative Justice Aotearoa also noted the need to improve coordination between government agencies.  
RJA has a strong interest in a number of cross-sector initiatives as restorative justice practices can be 
applied in so many different contexts and complement many other social services. We consider that 
greater attention could be given to better coordination of these services and collaboration between 
government agencies and between providers. (sub. 28, p. 5)  
The value of good coordination between government agencies is widely acknowledged by government 
agencies. 
 
 
 F2.5  Social services are often poorly coordinated, resulting in missed opportunities to 
improve service outcomes for clients.  
 
Services are often not tailored to the needs of clients  
Clients are individuals and, as such, often respond differently to the same intervention or service. What may 
work well for one person may be inappropriate or ineffective for another. Further, clients have many 
different combinations of needs. This means that the system must supply many different combinations of 
services.  
Yet the social services system tends to bundle clients into homogenous groups – older New Zealanders, 
people with disabilities, people facing domestic violence, people with drug problems, and so on. As such, 
services do not tailor to the individual needs of clients. One symptom of this is the under-utilisation of 
entitlements. That is, even when people are entitled to services, and aware of their entitlement, they choose 
not to use the services because it does not meet their needs. Not only is this a poor outcome for the client; 
it indicates a poor use of public funding. 
Several submissions noted the need for the system to allow the tailoring of services where this would lead 
to better outcomes. For example, Wesley Community Action noted: 
Recognising that some services need to be provided centrally (Child Protection, Health, Housing) there 
should be room for additional flexibility at a community and client level to tailor services to meet 
individual needs. (sub. 6, p. 2) 
Similarly, the Impact Collective also noted: 
Individuals within government departments and NGO agencies hold different understandings about 
the ‘problem’ and different ideas about the appropriate responses. Consequently policy, planning, 
funding and service delivery have become increasingly generalised and less specifically tailored to 
those experiencing violence. (sub. 130, p. 3) 
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Too little innovation and too little learning from innovation 
There are many examples of innovative approaches to the design and delivery of social services in New 
Zealand (Chapters 3 and 7). Yet, with some exceptions, the social services, both in New Zealand and 
elsewhere, lag other services industries in the adoption of new business models that use information and 
communications technology to deliver more or better services (OECD, 2014; Mansell, 2015). These new 
business models have been driving productivity growth in service industries globally (OECD, 2014; NZPC, 
2014a). Chapter 8 identifies reasons for the slow uptake of innovations using ICT in the social services. 
Innovation can also involve incremental changes to make services more effective. Yet a large number of 
social service providers submitted that they had severely limited scope to innovate because of difficulties in 
sourcing funds for innovation and tightly prescribed contracts (Chapter 7).  
Even when providers do innovate, as many do, successful innovations do not easily spread through the 
social services system. Where government agencies fund services, they usually decide what to fund based 
on their own information and analysis, and prescribe how it should be funded. The social services system 
currently lacks an effective means to encourage and spread learning from bottom-up innovation 
(Chapter 7).  
Government processes have high transaction costs  
Transaction costs are an inevitable part of any tendering and contracting process. Parties must complete 
documentation, negotiated contracts and monitored performance. These processes have several aims. They 
aim to select the best provider for the job. They aim to establish the terms of services provision. And they 
aim to allocate public funds in a transparent and accountable manner.  
These aims are important, yet current approaches for achieving them are inefficient and impose higher 
costs than necessary on both government agencies and providers. For example: 
 short-term (yearly) contracts are often “renegotiated” year after year, with little change to the 
underlying contract; 
 providers with more than one contract are audited multiple times by different government agencies; 
 regular changes in contract managers mean providers have to bring new managers “up to speed” with 
the contract and forge new relationships; and 
 performance reporting regimes meet accountability requirements, yet provide little feedback to 
providers about how they can improve performance. 
To providers, existing government processes can appear wasteful. It was clear from submissions that this 
can be a source of frustration. For example, the Wise Management Group noted: 
Onerous paperwork and systems that don’t talk to each other. Providers having to use vital funding for 
endless bureaucracy. There is waste with multiple audits all auditing the same area. (sub. 41, p. 5) 
Similar views were expressed by the Otago Youth Wellness Trust. 
The constant demand placed on organisations to compete for every $ of funding, whether from 
government or the community, is a waste of precious resource and energy. Indeed the cost of 
processing and administering some of the many contestable service grants must at times exceed the 
amount of funding being distributed. This is particularly frustrating when much of the information being 
sought is repetitive and already on record. (sub. 73, p. 10) 
New Zealand Disability Support Network noted: 
…providers do not want to incur high costs in working through the contracting process, as that 
effectively uses money that would otherwise be devoted to providing support. It follows that a focus on 
minimising transaction costs is essential for an efficacious contracting regime. (sub. 47, p. 9) 
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 F2.6  Opportunities exists to reduce the transaction costs of contracting out social services. 
From a provider’s perspective, onerous government processes can appear wasteful in 
that they draw resources away from providing services. 
 
 
Missed opportunities for early intervention 
Early intervention in social problems can significantly improve outcomes for individuals and the return on 
government expenditure. There is strong evidence for this yet the social services system focuses 
predominately on “fixing” problems once they have become apparent, rather than preventing them in the 
first place. Inquiry participants referred to this as the “ambulance at the bottom of the cliff” approach to 
service delivery.  
Heckman (2009) used evidence from a range of sources to show that early intervention in the lives of 
disadvantaged children produces much higher returns on investments than waiting until problems emerge 
later in childhood or adolescence. 
If society intervenes early enough, it can improve cognitive and socio-emotional abilities, and the 
health of disadvantaged children…Early interventions promote schooling, reduce crime, foster 
workforce productivity, and reduce teenage pregnancy…The longer society waits to intervene in the 
life cycle of a disadvantaged child, the more costly it is to remediate disadvantage. (p. 50) 
The characteristics of effective interventions to improve outcomes for young disadvantaged children have 
been known for decades. Heckman and others highlighted the importance of home visits and non-cognitive 
skills: 
Programs with home visits affect the lives of the parents and create a permanent change in the home 
environment that supports the child after center-based interventions end. Programs that build character 
and motivation that do not focus exclusively on cognition appear to be the most effective. (p. 55) 
Evidence-based programmes need to start early in a person’s life, be intensive, involve parents, and focus 
on non-cognitive as well as cognitive skills. Programmes must also be of sufficient duration to enable 
effective and meaningfully evaluation of results. 
Moves to adopt these kinds of evidence-based programmes early in a child’s life have been slow in 
New Zealand and elsewhere. A report to the British Government in 2011 highlighted the same problem 
(Allen, 2011): 
In spite of its merits, which have achieved increasing recognition by national and local government and 
the voluntary sector, the provision of successful evidence-based Early Intervention programmes remains 
persistently patchy and dogged by institutional and financial obstacles. (p. ix) 
One successful regional programme in New Zealand is Early Start. This programme is an evidence-based, 
long-term and intensive home-visiting service aimed at supporting vulnerable Christchurch families who are 
caring for children under the age of five. Evaluation of the programme found it to be as effective for Mäori 
as for non-Mäori. New Zealand has long recognised the need to adopt culturally appropriate services and 
interventions (Sturrock & Gray, 2013). 
New Zealand has adopted other evidence-based approaches, such as the parenting, educational 
programmes for young children (eg, Incredible Years, Triple P). However, adoption is patchy and home-
visiting programmes are not necessarily included in the programmes. A government programme, with wide 
coverage across the country, is Family Start. It has a similar home-visiting approach to Early Start, but it has 
not yet proved to be an effective evidence-based programme. Evaluations have recommended 
improvements. MSD is currently evaluating Family Start in partnership with Auckland University of 
Technology. 
 
 
 F2.7  Strong evidence exists that early intervention in social problems can significantly 
improve outcomes for individuals and the return on government expenditure. Yet, the 
social services system’s investments in early intervention are piecemeal and patchy. 
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A large stock of programmes face little review 
Little is known about the efficiency and effectiveness of government spending on social services. As a 
consequence, there is little transparency around the relative social gains from public investment in different 
types of social services. 
The Commission has observed that a large stock of existing social services continues to be funded and run 
in much the same way as in past decades, with little evaluation of their impact or cost effectiveness. The 
flow of new initiatives have attracted much attention, but has had little effect on the existing stock or lasting 
impact on the performance of the system. Limited evaluations of new initiatives mean that the lessons learnt 
do not feed back into the system – contributing to the “funding inertia” of the large stock of programmes.  
The number of agencies and number of domains in social services makes it difficult to get a clear figures for 
the size of the stock of social services. One stocktake, of programmes aimed at children, identified 
162 different services and programmes across seven government agencies in 2012/2013.15 
Each year further initiatives are added to the existing stock. Figure 2.7 illustrates the flow of new initiatives 
over the past 10 years. To the Commission’s knowledge all of these initiatives are still running. Some of 
these may be excellent, highly effective programmes. The point is that, as a general rule, the system fails to 
identify the effective or the ineffective. 
Figure 2.7 The flow of new initiatives over the past ten years  
 
 
15 Unpublished working data, Social Sector Forum, June 2014. 
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 F2.8  Ministers and government agencies tend to focus on the flow of new social services 
initiatives. Relatively little attention is given to actively managing the large stock of 
social service programmes that account for the majority of public expenditure.  
 
 
Chapter 4 presents a diagnosis of why these problems have arisen.  
2.8 Many reviews, few lasting solutions 
The weaknesses identified by the Commission are not new. Many have been around for decades and 
remain despite attempts to address them. Indeed numerous government reviews over the past 20 years 
have identified remarkably consistent lists of issues, and proposed similarly consistent solutions (Table 2.1).  
While these reviews have generally succeeded in highlighting problems, the fact the problems persist today 
illustrates the limited success they have had in bringing about systemic change. Chapter 4 provides a 
discussion of why this has occurred. 
Table 2.1 Issues identified by selected reviews of social services  
Report Issues identified 
 High 
transaction 
costs 
Lack of 
coordination 
Lack of focus 
on outcomes  
Contracting 
capability 
needs 
improving 
Performance 
for, or 
relationship 
with, Mäori 
McKinlay Douglas (1998) 
     
State Services 
Commission (2001)      
Office of the Minister for 
Social Development and 
Employment (2007) 
     
Association of Non-
Government 
Organisations (2008) 
     
Taskforce on Whänau-
Centred Initiatives (2010)      
State Services 
Commission (Better Public 
Services, 2011) 
     
 
 
 
 F2.9  Over the past 20 years, numerous reports into the social services system have 
highlighted a consistent set of problems and proposed a set of similar solutions.   
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2.9 Pressures on the system  
Addressing the problems is crucial in view of current and forecast pressures on the social services system. 
These include population ageing, increasing demand for services, rising expectations and the rising costs of 
service delivery.  
Demand-side pressures on the system 
The social services system faces demand-side pressures, including those noted below. 
 An ageing population: The ageing population of New Zealand is the most commonly cited demand-
side challenge. Most people experience a decline in health and ability as they age. Older people 
commonly have more than one long-term health condition, and a person with multiple long-term 
conditions is more likely to experience physical impairment (MoH, 2014a). An ageing population means 
a relatively smaller proportion of tax-paying adults to fund the social services system. A further issue is 
that family carers will require care as they age, yet there will be fewer younger people to care for them.  
 Unevenness in outcomes and access: Needs for social services fall unevenly across the population. For 
example, MSD (2014a) has noted that Mäori make up 50% of children in the custody of its chief 
executive, 60% of young people in a youth justice residence, 46% of sole parent support recipients and 
34% percent of job seeker support recipients. Similarly, the MoH (2014a) notes that about 35% of adults 
living in the most deprived areas experienced one or more types of unmet need in 2012/13, compared 
with 23% in the least deprived areas. MoH also highlighted that people living in “high-deprivation areas 
are twice as likely to report cost as a reason for not visiting a GP or after-hours clinic, and are more likely 
to report cost as a reason for not collecting a prescription” (p. 7). 
 Increasing expectations: Public expectations changes through time in response to changes in 
technology, availability of information and social trends. As technological progress makes other aspects 
of people’s lives easier, the public will look to government processes and services to keep pace. One 
example is the ability to interface with government services through the use of mobile devices such as 
smart phones and tablets. Similarly, governments need to manage, and where necessary respond to, 
evolving standards of fairness and equity. Recent court cases on payment for family carers are an 
example. Public expectations can also be impacted by competing promises of politicians.  
 Other demand-side challenges: Other challenges include raised housing costs and increased inter-
generational poverty.  
Supply-side pressures on the system  
Government agencies need to manage demand-side pressures within the reality of fiscal limits to spending. 
Agencies will be under ongoing pressure to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their systems so as 
to generate the greatest value from the available expenditure. 
Other supply-side pressures include: 
 the need to match the skills and capabilities of providers to the changing needs of clients – providers 
(government and non-government) need to ensure that the skills of their workforce keep pace with the 
growing and increasingly complex needs of clients; and 
 regulation that is more stringent is likely to place pressure on the activities volunteers can undertake – 
volunteers may require additional training to undertake activities they have traditionally performed.  
New Zealand is not the only country facing these challenges. Governments around the world are grappling 
with finding ways to improve the outcomes from their large expenditures on social services. And agencies 
can learn much from the innovative approaches to social services applied in New Zealand and elsewhere 
(Chapter 3).  
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2.10 Summary – an under-performing system under pressure 
The delivery of social services occurs through a complex system of organisations, institutions and 
relationships. Government is a large, but by no means the only, player in the system. Other important 
players include non-government providers, philanthropic organisations, volunteers, family/whänau and 
community-based bodies such as churches. These groups play an important role in funding, coordinating 
and delivering services, often independent of government involvement. 
Government processes place strong obligations on Vote ministers to account for public funds. This 
framework has its origins in the need for responsible government – that is, government that is subject to the 
scrutiny of Parliament and the wider public. Under this system, a number of different agencies provide 
social services, each with their own service for which they are accountable. Several submissions noted that, 
to clients, these institutions can seem confusing, distant, overly directive, unhelpful and intimidating.  
While New Zealand’s social services system has several strengths, the Commission has observed a number 
of weaknesses including: 
 the system struggles to cater for people with multiple and inter-dependent needs; 
 government agencies have little visibility of the programmes and interventions that work and those that 
do not; 
 transaction costs are higher than necessary; 
 opportunities for early intervention are being missed; and 
 a flow of new initiatives attracts much attention, but has little effect on the existing stock of programmes 
or a lasting impact on the system’s performance. 
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3 New ideas in New Zealand and 
elsewhere 
Key points 
 This chapter sets out illustrative examples of new approaches to finding more effective social 
services and draws lessons from them. 
 The Ministry of Social Development’s (MSD’s) Investment Approach tests and targets employment 
services to improve outcomes for people at risk of long-term dependence on income support. 
- As part of the Investment Approach, MSD contracts with Youth Services providers to achieve 
educational outcomes for young people previously not in employment, education or training.  
 A number of new approaches give greater choice to the users of social services. 
- The Australian National Disability Insurance Scheme gives people with permanent and 
significant disabilities a guaranteed level of funding to choose supports to achieve goals. 
- Whänau Ora navigators assist whänau to find the services and support they need. 
- Iwi and the Crown are investigating or implementing approaches that give iwi greater power to 
determine the type and shape of social service provision in their rohe. 
 The Canterbury Clinical Network leads work to integrate health services across primary care, 
hospitals and support in the community. 
 Some new approaches to commissioning social services aim to bring in fresh ideas from new 
providers or from non-government investors: 
- The New South Wales Newpin Social Benefit Bond funds UnitingCare to deliver services to 
return children in out-of-home care safely to their families. Investors receive a return that is 
based on success.  
- Te Kura Hourua O Whangarei Terenga Paraoa is a Partnership School (Kura Hourua) sponsored 
by He Puna Marama Trust. The Trust draws from Mäori leadership and educational traditions 
and its own experience as a provider. The school provides for year 7-13 students in Whangarei.  
 The Australian Department of Employment has developed a “managed market” for employment 
services over the last 17 years. Not-for-profit and for-profit providers receive payments and 
compete for market share based on their success in helping clients find employment.  
 Lessons from the initiatives discussed in this chapter include: 
- Social service programmes that give clients an entitlement to a level of, and choice of, support 
promote innovation and responsiveness in provision. Yet such programmes create pressures to 
expand entitlements that would increase programme costs. 
- Successful implementation of substantial new social service programmes is assisted by a clear 
vision of the destination, careful staging and trials, continuing community consultation and 
independent evaluation to guide design and build support. 
- Philanthropic organisations like to take a lead in demonstrating the success of innovative 
approaches to social services design and delivery. They look to government to pick up and 
fund those approaches that prove successful. 
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This chapter looks at illustrative examples of new ideas in commissioning social services that intend to make 
progress on a number of the issues identified in Chapter 2. Some of the ideas are first being tried in 
New Zealand or address New Zealand-specific issues. Other ideas drawn from international experience 
have only recently been tried in New Zealand. Initiatives often address more than one issue simultaneously, 
and some take advantage of the opportunities offered by modern information and communications 
technology, data sharing and analytics. Leveraging data and analytics is discussed in Chapter 8. 
The chapter briefly summarises what has been learnt from these initiatives so far and points forward to more 
developed discussion of the issues in later chapters. Evidence on effectiveness is necessarily tentative as 
many of the initiatives are quite recent. 
The ideas have been chosen to illustrate different sorts of approaches to finding more effective social 
services. The chapter describes how the initiatives address particular problems and discusses their wider 
applicability, rather than evaluating their success.  
Incrementally finding better ways of delivering current services is also innovation. This sort of innovation, 
applied consistently over time, can be as important as “big ideas” in the search for more effective social 
services (Chapter 7). Chapter 7 also identifies barriers to innovation in social services. 
3.1 More efficient investment in social services 
Government and government agencies are continually faced with choices about where best to deploy social 
services resources to achieve the outcomes they seek. In the past there has not been a systematic approach 
to measuring outcomes, evaluating interventions, sharing information and using this to make resourcing and 
programme design decisions (Chapter 2). The Ministry of Social Development (MSD) has begun using a 
model borrowed from the Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) to guide decisions about the design 
and targeting of employment services for income support clients. 
The Ministry of Social Development’s Investment Approach 
The Welfare Working Group (WWG) recommended, in 2011, that the Government manage the 
performance of a work-focused welfare system by regularly calculating the expected lifetime cost of welfare 
to guide its investments in employment services. The WWG expected that, compared to the previous 
system, an “investment approach” would shift attention of services away from clients who are easy to move 
off a benefit more towards “those with greatest disadvantage where investment based on managing a long-
term cost would make the greatest difference” (WWG, 2011, p. 131). 
MSD has in response adopted the Investment Approach. 
 The Investment Approach uses an independent actuarial model to evaluate the likely long-term costs 
(forward liability) of paying benefits to current and recent income support clients. The valuation is based 
on what has happened in the past to other people with similar backgrounds (using 30 years of data on 
patterns of benefit receipt). This may be the first time in the world that an actuarial approach has been 
taken to evaluating the costs of a pay-as-you-go welfare benefit system. 
 MSD staff analyse the details of the yearly valuation to identify the drivers of long-term costs and 
opportunities for initiatives to reduce those costs. 
 MSD, in the initial stages of the Investment Approach, “prioritise[d] investment on ‘short-term high 
intensity’ services targeted towards clients whom the Ministry expects to achieve a positive outcome in 
a short period” (OAG, 2014a, p. 29). MSD recognised that more time is needed to effect lasting change 
for “those people most vulnerable and at risk of long-term dependency” (MSD, 2014b, p. 6). 
 MSD tests new service designs through randomised controlled trials. In these trials MSD’s evaluation 
team (iMSD) allocates clients to service designs according to an assessment of who is most amenable to 
achieving positive change. iMSD randomly streams one in ten clients into a control group to identify the 
effects of different service designs. To protect the integrity of the trial, clients and case managers are 
not able to influence the allocation. Currently, the effectiveness of service designs is measured in terms 
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of “days off benefit” of participants compared with the control group, over a given period of months or 
years.  
 MSD uses the information generated by the actuarial model and service trials to set priorities for 
investment in (and disinvestment from) services. MSD is developing a return on investment framework 
to make this process more systematic by identifying the costs of delivering services down to the level of 
individual clients and by incorporating both immediate fiscal savings from reduced time on benefit and 
reductions in the forward liability. The framework will enable investments with longer-term payoffs to be 
evaluated alongside those with nearer-term returns. 
Guided by the Investment Approach, MSD designed and contracted new services for disengaged youth. 
These services have led to early improvements in disengaged youths participating and achieving success in 
education (section 3.4 and Appendix B). MSD has successfully directed new services to sole-parent clients 
to help them find work (Taylor Fry, 2015). MSD is also looking at how to better assist clients with health 
conditions and disabilities to engage appropriately in work. For example, it has trialled contracting out 
employment services for clients with mental health conditions. Changes to the Public Finance Act in 2013 
now make it easier for MSD to shift resources within a financial year between programmes and between in-
house delivery and contracted programmes. 
The actuarially determined forward liability of the benefit system reduced from $76.5 billion to $69.0 billion 
in the year to 30 June 2014. Taylor Fry (2015) attribute $2.2 billion of the $7.5 billion reduction to “better 
than expected performance over the year – as a result of policy and operational changes over the year that 
influenced benefit dynamics” (p. 3).  
The Australian Reference Group on Welfare Reform recently recommended that the Australian Government 
adopt and adapt the New Zealand Investment Approach to “improve outcomes for people at risk of 
dependence on income support” (Reference Group on Welfare Reform, 2015, p. 126). 
The Government is considering how the Investment Approach could be extended further across the social 
services (Minister of Finance, 2015). Extension requires, among other things, decisions about the outcome 
measures needed to show the value of alternative investments, and the institutional and budgeting 
framework in which decisions will be made. There is also a question about whether and how to use an 
investment model in more devolved approaches to commissioning social services. Investment models for 
the design and delivery of social services are discussed further in Chapter 9. An information systems 
architecture that could provide information on the value add of services towards desired outcomes in more 
devolved systems is discussed in Chapter 8. 
3.2 Increasing choice and empowering service users 
Clients have long been able to exercise choice in some parts of the social services. Patients can choose 
their GP, for instance, and parents can choose which early childhood education service to use. Tertiary 
students can choose their courses and their provider. Yet client choice has been limited in other parts of the 
social services where government contracts organisations to provide a near monopoly service in particular 
locations or for particular types of services. Over recent decades a number of governments, Australia and 
New Zealand included, have moved to expand client choice in the provision of support for people with 
disabilities. The Australian National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) is particularly ambitious and aims 
both to expand client choice and empowerment and to use competition to increase efficiency and 
innovation in the provision of services. 
The Australian National Disability Insurance Scheme 
The NDIS is a new scheme that guarantees a level of financial support to eligible people with a permanent, 
significant or potentially significant disability, who enter the scheme before they turn 65 years of age. 
Funding is based on an assessment of the client’s level of need and is additional to income replacement for 
those adults with disability who are not employed. Based on an individual plan developed with the National 
Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA), clients can use their entitlement to purchase supports to achieve life 
goals, including independence, involvement in the community, education, employment and health and 
wellbeing (NDIA, 2015).  
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An individual may manage the funding for their plan themselves, nominate someone to help them, or ask 
the NDIA to manage all or part of the funding for the plan (NDIA, 2015). The person with the disability, or 
their agent, is able to choose where they spend their entitlement. Service providers will no longer receive 
block funding from the Government. Instead, they will compete for a client’s funds, requiring a radical 
reorientation of their business models. The Commission was told by the NDIA that they expect over time 
this will lead to new providers entering the market, as well as a substantial reorganisation and consolidation 
of the current provider market. 
The NDIS has been described as a “generational reform that will deliver a national system of disability 
support focused on the individual needs and choices of people with disability” (NSW DFCS, 2014, p. 1). 
People with disabilities have been closely involved in leading the design and implementation of the 
scheme. Broad bipartisan and cross government support for reform grew as a result of alignment between 
the wish of people with disabilities to have more control over their lives, government agencies and 
providers realising that the previous system of support was inconsistent and unsustainable, and the 
efficiency and innovation advantages offered by a market approach (APC, 2011):  
Control and choice is so important because it is an essential ingredient to the well-being of people with 
disability, their families and carers. It is simple. People who are in control experience much higher levels 
of self-esteem than those who are not in control and do not have choices. 
Choice and control is also essential if a new market for disability services is going to emerge; a market 
characterised by innovation, competition and efficiency. (Bonyhady, 2013, p. 10) 
NDIS legislation, passed in March 2013, established the NDIA to administer the scheme. Subsequently, the 
Australian Commonwealth and State and Territory Governments have signed agreements for the scheme’s 
roll-out across Australia. When fully implemented in 2018/2019 the NDIS will cover 460 000 people at an 
estimated cost of A$22 billion a year (NDIA, 2015). Commonwealth, State and Territory Government 
contributions, together with an addition of 0.5% to Australia’s universal health insurance levy, fund the 
NDIS. 
The NDIS uses an actuarial approach to evaluate each quarter the projected costs of the scheme. Ensuring 
the financial sustainability of the scheme is a key function of the NDIA. The scheme will need to manage 
pressures that could cause costs and coverage to exceed official estimates. International experience shows 
that labour shortages driving up wages, and political pressures to expand the scheme to people with less 
severe disabilities, could drive up costs (Baker, 2012).  
 
 
 F3.1  Social service programmes that give clients an entitlement to a level of support and 
choice over how that entitlement is spent promote innovation and responsiveness in 
provision. Yet such programmes create pressures to expand entitlements, increasing 
programme costs. Programme design needs mechanisms for keeping costs within 
budget. 
 
 
Implementation will take some years, and involve evaluating trials taking place in various states to enable 
the fine tuning of delivery models. Trials will also help verify cost estimates. States are passing their own 
enabling legislation. The NDIA has closely monitored the scheme’s progress. Actuarial data and surveys 
indicated that in April 2015, 18 months through the initial three year phase, the scheme was on time, on 
budget and participant satisfaction was 95%. In addition, the National Institute of Labour Studies at Flinders 
University is leading a consortium to independently evaluate the trials over the three years from 2013. The 
evaluation will look at the NDIS implementation processes, and assess what is working and what needs to 
be further improved (NILS, 2015).  
Progress in implementing the NDIS shows the value of combining a vision of the destination with careful 
staging and trials as a path to transformational change. Continuing community consultation and 
independent evaluation to guide design and build and maintain support for change underpins successful 
implementation. 
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 F3.2  Successful implementation of substantial new social services schemes is assisted by a 
clear vision of the destination, careful staging and trials of new approaches, continuing 
community consultation and independent evaluation to guide design and build 
support. 
 
 
Client choice in disability services in New Zealand 
The Ministry of Health (MoH) has operated the Individualised Funding scheme since the early 2000s to 
deliver home and community support services for people with disabilities. After an assessment of their 
needs, clients work with a host organisation to develop a service plan and choose the services they require. 
MoH contracts providers to supply the services (Appendix D). A trial of an approach encompassing a 
broader range of services commenced in Canterbury in 2011 and in the Waikato in 2013, under the title 
Enabling Good Lives (Appendix D; Chapter 11). Submissions generally support the principle and practice of 
client-directed budgets, but a range of factors need to be considered in working out when and how to use 
them (Chapter 11). 
Empowering families, whänau, communities and iwi 
Arguments for the welfare-enhancing effects of control and choice at the individual level also apply to 
families, whänau, communities and other social groupings with which individuals identify. Te Roopu Waiora 
submits: 
It is no wonder then that disparity of Mäori wellbeing persists as whanau continue to be sidelined 
observers of decisions made about their lives. Ownership of goals and aspirations is fundamental to 
whanau reclaiming their obligations and responsibilities and therefore must be recognised in the future 
framework for more effective social services. (sub. 97, p. 4) 
Whänau Ora 
Empowering whänau choice is at the centre of Whänau Ora. Whänau are engaged in a planning process 
that helps them set their aspirations and determine what support they want, when and where they will 
receive the support, and who will deliver it (Appendix C). Yet choices are limited by the resources available 
directly through Whänau Ora and the engagement of other government agencies:  
Whanau ora is successful as it has allowed the collaboration of seven Maori health and social service 
providers, aligning service provision and concentrating resources which means better, quicker and 
more convenient services for whanau. The key drivers have been Maori Leadership on the alliance 
model and the provision of a whanau centric model of service “Te Ara Whanauora”. Barriers to success 
include … lack of understanding amongst key government partners of whanau ora delivery; gate 
keeping and suspicion of new ways of doing things, and lack of investment. (Palmerston North 
Community Services Council, sub. 125, p. 7) 
Te Hiku Social Accord 
Te Hiku16 Social Accord was signed between three Te Hiku iwi and the Crown in February 2013 as part of 
iwi Treaty of Waitangi settlements in the far north of New Zealand (Te Hiku Iwi Development Trust, 2013). 
The Accord is an iwi-based approach to: 
empowering whanau living in Te Hiku o Te Ika and helping them to improve the quality of their lives. 
The Accord is about Crown agencies working collaboratively with Te Hiku iwi on the co-design of 
solutions for our whanau and community in Te Hiku.…the Accord brings iwi to sit at the social 
development decision-making table alongside the Crown to provide local iwi voices, focused on local 
issue and local solutions to change and improve the lives of the people of the Far North (Make It 
Happen Te Hiku, 2014, p. 3) 
The Accord is an approach to iwi sharing the governance of social services in their rohe with the Crown. 
Parallel to the establishment of the Accord, the Minister of Social Development invited organisations and 
individuals in the wider Far North community to identify community goals and aspirations and to develop 
16 Literally referring to “the tail” of the fish of Mäui – the North Island – Te Hiku refers to the iwi based in the Far North. 
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an action plan under the banner Make it Happen Te Hiku (Make It Happen Te Hiku, 2014). Make It Happen 
Te Hiku is adopting a collective impact approach (section 3.3). 
Ngai Tühoe entered into a relationship agreement with the Crown in 2011 in which the Crown 
acknowledged the mana motuhake of Tühoe and its aspirations to self-govern. MSD and Ngai Tühoe are 
now actively investigating options to decentralise welfare services in the Tühoe rohe as part of giving effect 
to this agreement (Sapere, forthcoming). MSD proposes that arrangements will be congruent with its 
Investment Approach. 
3.3 Better integrated services 
Integration of social services takes a number of forms (Chapter 10). Social problems are often complex and 
interdependent. Integration aims to get more effective and efficient use of available resources to address 
such complex issues. This may involve, for instance, re-deploying resources to invest them in early 
interventions to avoid the need for more expensive services later.  
Canterbury Clinical Network 
The Canterbury Clinical Network (CCN) is a central part of an approach to integrated health and social care 
in Canterbury. CCN is a consortium of healthcare leaders hosted at Pegasus Health (a Primary Health 
Organisation), governed by a group of health and business leaders. It has only a few employees and draws 
resources from across the Canterbury health system. Clinicians lead CCN’s project work (Timmins & Ham, 
2013; CCN, 2015).  
Timmins and Ham (2013) argued that the three interlocking enablers of integration in the Canterbury health 
system have been: 
 first, the creation of the vision [of integration]; 
 second, a sustained investment in providing staff and contractors with the skills needed to 
innovate, and supporting them when they do; 
 and third, new forms of contracting. (p. 15) 
Leaders of the Canterbury health system promoted the idea that “there is only ‘one system, one budget’ 
…each dollar can only be spent once” (Timmins & Ham, 2013, p. 15). This shifted the focus to the best use 
of available resources to achieve health outcomes, rather than department by department looking for extra 
revenue at the margins. This shift was, in turn, supported by information systems that gave all participants a 
shared view of the whole system (Mansell, 2015). 
This vision was reinforced by a “sustained investment in building the managerial and innovation skills 
needed to achieve it”, involving both employees and those who contracted with the District Health Board 
(DHB) (Timmins & Ham, 2013, p. 15). Participants in courses were invited to come up with proposals for 
change, and some of these were carried forward. Leaders promoted the idea that participants were part of 
a changing health system of which they were the architects. Process engineers worked with clinical and 
other staff on business re-design projects. 
The Canterbury DHB had, as early as 2001, moved from funding its hospital on a price/volume schedule to 
budgets for hospital departments being built from the base up. The change made it easier for managers 
and clinicians to look collectively for efficiencies across the hospital. Management emphasised that funding 
was for capacity and that any efficiency gains would not result in losing resources. Instead, saved resources 
would be channelled into further service improvements. The change also enabled a stronger focus on 
saving patients’ time by reducing waiting and unnecessary or inefficient channelling of patients from one 
part of the system to another. The DHB adopted the view that reduced waiting time made far better use of 
existing resources. The changes in Canterbury worked by “appealing to the professionals’ pride in their 
work and in their ability to achieve more” (Timmins & Ham, 2013, p. 19). 
The Canterbury DHB also moved its external contracts to a form of alliance contracting “… a collective 
contract with pre-agreed gains and losses dependent on the overall performance of all the parties, rather 
than with penalties solely for whoever fails within it” (Timmins & Ham, 2013, p. 19). As far as possible, the 
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contracts are for providing a service capacity rather than fee for service, to give referrers and providers a 
joint incentive to manage the cost. 
All the contractors have agreed margins and a fixed amount of money to work with. Their performance 
is visible to the other partners in the alliance. Each can thus be benchmarked against the others and 
‘profits’ go back into the system in ways the alliance partners agree in order to improve services. 
(Timmins & Ham, 2013, p. 19) 
This happens in a high-trust, low-bureaucracy environment that encourages innovation in achieving the best 
outcomes for patients and the system as a whole. The environment is one “in which problems are aired 
rather than hidden from competitors and the funder” (Timmins & Ham, 2013, p. 20).  
Major innovations from this approach include HealthPathways, created from 2008 by bringing together 
hospital doctors and GPs to work out best treatment and referral practice across primary, secondary and 
tertiary care. HealthPathways defines which treatments can be managed in the community, what tests GPs 
should carry out before a hospital referral and where and how GPs can access required resources. The 
system is electronically-based, regularly reviewed and used to provide GPs with feedback on their referrals. 
The system has led to a fall in the rate of rejected referrals, and more treatments being carried out in 
general practice (Timmins & Ham, 2013). HealthPathways has been adapted and used in a number of other 
health systems across Australasia (HealthPathways Community, 2015). 
An Acute Demand Management System provides short-term resources for interventions to avoid hospital 
admissions. For instance, it might fund repeat home visits for elderly who are unwell. The Community 
Rehabilitation Enablement and Support Team (CREST) is aimed at reducing a person’s length of stay in 
hospital, reducing chances of re-admission and delaying admission to aged residential care. CREST works 
by providing sometimes quite intensive support for patients in their homes, to help them re-build social 
networks and everyday functioning as well as meeting medical needs.  
The combined impact of these many innovations (most of which are not unique to Canterbury) is difficult to 
determine (Timmins & Ham, 2013). Yet Canterbury DHB’s performance on a number of measures has 
improved over the last seven years relative to other major DHBs. It has low rates of acute medical 
admissions and re-admissions; its average length of stay in hospital for medical cases is low; elective surgery 
has been rising as a proportion of all surgery; and waiting times have dropped. The rising trend in 
admissions to aged residential care was checked. 
The Association of Salaried Medical Specialists describes the CCN as a distributed leadership model that is 
“a proven way of applying complex solutions to complex challenges” (sub. 85, p. 34). Yet, by its very 
nature, integration in a complex healthcare and social care system will both take time to effect and have 
uncertain outcomes (Timmins & Ham, 2013). The Association of Salaried Medical Specialists notes: 
[w]hat is clear from the literature, however, is that organisational ‘integration’ involves upfront costs. It is 
a ‘marathon’, rather than a sprint (in fact it is commonly viewed as a continuing process); and it is 
challenging to implement, even when it is a ‘bottom up’ process, let alone when it is an imposed 
directive. (Association of Salaried Medical Specialists, sub. 87, p. 13) 
Collective impact approach to dealing with complex social issues 
While CCN does not use the term, the Canterbury initiative demonstrates the key features of the collective 
impact approach to integration in dealing with complex social issues (Hanleybrown, Kania & Kramer, 2012). 
The approach is based on the view that “large-scale social change comes from better cross-sectional 
coordination rather than from the isolated interventions of individual organisations” (p. 38). 
Collective impact initiatives have five conditions that, according to Hanleybrown, Kania and Kramer (2012), 
allow collaborative actors to achieve social improvements:  
 Common agenda: All participants have a shared vision for change including a common 
understanding of the problem and a joint approach to solving it through agreed actions. 
 Shared measurement: Collecting data and measuring results consistently across all participants 
ensures efforts remain aligned and participants hold each other to account. 
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 Mutually reinforcing activities: Participant’s activities must be differentiated while still being 
coordinated through a mutually reinforcing plan of action. 
 Continuous communication: Consistent and open communication is needed across many players 
to build trust, assure mutual objectives, and create common motivation. 
 Backbone support: Creating and managing collective impact requires a separate organisation(s) 
with staff and a specific set of skills to serve as the backbone for the entire initiative and to 
coordinate participating organisations and agencies. (p. 1)  
Other integration initiatives 
Integration across social services programmes has been a perennial issue in New Zealand and 
internationally (Chapter 10). Recent initiatives designed and led by government agencies in New Zealand 
include Social Sector Trials and Children’s Teams. Strengthening Families was an earlier initiative led by 
MSD. Multiple and overlapping integration initiatives can create confusion, and the continual introduction 
of new initiatives suggests that they are not very effective in achieving their purpose.  
In many ways, integration is business as usual for many social services providers. For instance, the Wise 
Group takes a “whole-of-person” approach to providing employment services for people with health 
challenges. These are “integrated with 60 different clinical and NGO services around the country” (sub. 41, 
p. 13). Integration is effected by aligning individual employment support, treatment and wellness plans. 
3.4 Better contract design and management 
The Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) has, since 2013, been leading a three-year 
project to streamline contracts with non-government organisations. Social services departments, including 
MSD, have been involved in the project which aims to reduce inconsistency in, and duplication of, contract 
management practices across government agencies (Chapter 12). In a related initiative, the Cross 
Government Accreditation Working Group is working to reduce the duplication of accreditation activity for 
government social sector agencies. Doing so will reduce the compliance burden on providers and make it 
easier for them to transact with government agencies (Cross Government Accreditation Working Group, 
sub. 132). 
Contracting for outcomes 
Contracting for outcomes is a form of contracting where payment or contract renewal depends on 
outcomes achieved by providers. Contracting for outcomes can sharpen incentives to perform, while 
reducing the need for prescriptive contracts and providing more room for innovative service design 
(Chapter 7). Outcomes need to be measurable in a useful timeframe and attributable to a service provider 
(Chapter 12). 
The Australian Department of Employment pays contracted providers for employment outcomes achieved 
by their clients (Appendix B). The Department and its predecessors have periodically adjusted the balance 
between fee-for-service and payment for outcomes over the 18 years that contracting for employment 
services has operated. This periodic re-adjustment reflects the difficulty in weighing a provider’s ability to 
bear financial risk against incentives to achieve employment outcomes for different types of clients. 
MSD has introduced outcomes-based performance measures for some services that it contracts 
(Chapter 12) and has begun to use payment for outcome in its contracts with Youth Service providers.  
Payment for outcomes in the Youth Service 
The Youth Service (YS) is a new approach to working with vulnerable young people (Appendix B). The YS 
was established in August 2012 as part of the Investment Approach (section 3.1). Early entrants to the 
benefit system have a high risk of long-term benefit receipt. The YS aims to engage young people not in 
employment, education or training (NEET) and to connect them with education and training as well as 
budgeting and parenting courses (as appropriate). There are three groups of clients. 
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 Young people aged 16 or 17 years who receive the Youth Payment (YP) from MSD because they do not 
receive support from their parents. The YP was previously known as the Independent Youth Benefit 
(IYB). 
 Young parents aged 16 to 18 years who receive Youth Parent Payments (YPP). 
 Other young people aged 16 or 17 years who do not receive income support but who are NEET. 
MSD contracts a network of non-government provider organisations to deliver the YS. MSD believed that 
non-government providers would be better placed than in-house staff to engage and set up positive 
relationships with disadvantaged young people. Most parts of the country have only one provider in each 
community.  
MSD uses the fee structure for YS to motivate providers to assist clients to achieve education, training and 
employment-based training outcomes. A part payment is made upfront as an administration fee. A further 
third of the total possible payment is paid for achieving milestones (such as the young person participating 
in education and training). Another third is paid for achieving specified results such as credits towards the 
National Certificate of Educational Achievement (NCEA). Before implementing the Youth Service, MSD 
carefully modelled the effect of the fee structure on provider viability. 
In its first year of operation the service was successful in engaging youth not previously receiving a service. 
NEET client numbers rose from around 2000 in November 2012 to almost 10 000 by the end of 2013. Over 
75% of NEET clients are now participating in full-time education or training or work-based training. Fifty 
percent of NEET clients gained NCEA credits in their first year in the service and 15% obtained NCEA 
Level 2.  
Outcomes for YP clients (who received the YS) can be compared with recipients of the former IYB (who did 
not receive the YS). While 63% of YP clients gained credits in their first year, only 24% of IYB clients had 
done so; 14% of YP clients achieved NCEA Level 2 compared with only 5% of IYB clients.  
3.5 Fresh ideas from new providers and investors 
Some new commissioning approaches aim to get better results for intractable social problems by using 
investors and providers who are willing to take on a higher-than-usual share of the risk of innovation.  
Social bonds as a new service model 
A social bond is a new form of contracting between the government, social services providers and investors 
in which the government commits to pay for improved social outcomes. An intermediary is typically the 
main contractor and brings together investors and social service providers to fund and provide the 
programme. Payment depends on the outcomes achieved that can be attributed to the programme (Figure 
3.1). This means that the government agency transfers to the non-government investors some of the 
financial risk of unsuccessful outcomes. At the same time, the arrangement reduces the risks for capital-
constrained, not-for-profit providers of implementing innovative new services. Investors may be commercial 
financial institutions, philanthropic organisations or private investors. 
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Figure 3.1 How a social bond works  
 
Source: Minister of Health, 2013, p. 3. 
MoH is leading work on developing social bonds in New Zealand (MoH, 2014b). Social bonds are being 
trialled in the United Kingdom, the United States and New South Wales (NSW). Outcomes sought include 
reduced recidivism among prisoners (eg, New York City) and restoring children in out-of-home care to their 
families (eg, NSW). 
The structure of social bonds and their focus on outcomes provides strong incentives and flexibility for 
investors and providers to find more effective ways of delivering social services. Bonds require improved 
data collection and evidence on effectiveness that can influence system change in other social policy areas 
(SVA, 2013a). 
The Newpin Social Bond 
The NSW Government, after receiving proposals and considering options, announced in 2012 that it would 
work with UnitingCare and Social Ventures Australia (SVA) to develop a social benefit bond. Under the 
agreed arrangement, SVA raised A$7 million in funds from investors in 2013 by issuing a bond. SVA on-
loaned these funds to UnitingCare to expand the Newpin programme over the next seven years (Newpin, 
2014).  
Newpin is an evidence-based, intensive, therapeutic programme aimed at breaking the cycle of inter-
generational child neglect and abuse. Key programme outcomes are the safe restoration of children in care 
to their families and preventing children being placed in out-of-home care. The Newpin programme is 
delivered by working with parents and with children aged less than five. UnitingCare previously met the cost 
of the programme with only minimal government support (SVA, 2013a; 2013b). 
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The expanded Newpin programme is expected to generate approximately A$95 million over seven years in 
savings for the NSW Government in the cost of out-of-home care. 17 The NSW Government will direct about 
50% of these savings to UnitingCare to fund the Newpin programme and provide a return to investors. 
The bond is structured so that UnitingCare pays investors a return based on the rate of success in restoring 
children in care to their families. Payments are calculated as a proportion of government cost savings 
attributable to the programme’s success. All restorations are independently decided by the NSW Children’s 
Court. In the first year, investors received a return of 7.5% for a restoration rate of 60% (NSW DPC, 2015).18 
As numbers in the programme are small and year-by-year results volatile, the cumulative restoration rate 
over all previous years will be used to determine the return to investors in future years (SVA, 2014). SVA 
estimates that over the seven years of the bond, more than 700 families will participate in the Newpin 
programme and more than 400 children will be safely returned to their parents. 
The social bond approach stimulates innovation by linking payment to outcomes while leaving the players 
to work out how to achieve them. If successful, social bonds can generate information on what works that 
can be applied more widely (SVA, 2013a). 
Social bonds require very specific conditions to be viable and involve complex institutional arrangements 
that take time and skill to set up. Social bonds need clear specification of outcomes, and well-elaborated 
independent monitoring and evaluation. They need a large enough target population to generate valid and 
stable measurement of effects on outcomes that can be attributed to interventions. 
Social bonds involve high transaction costs – especially for a pilot scheme. The commissioning agency will 
need to spend extended time in developing “market” understanding of social bonds, “match-making” and 
getting contract parameters right for all parties (KPMG, 2014). Developing a methodologically robust 
outcome measure and payment model that has the confidence of all stakeholders can also be time-
consuming (Disley et al., 2011). Public sector agencies have little or no experience with this approach and 
face a steep learning curve as they design and put in place an initial scheme. 
 
 
 F3.3  Social bonds stimulate innovation by the Government sharing risk with investors and 
linking payments to outcomes without prescribing programmes in detail. They involve 
complex institutional arrangements and take time and skill to set up. They may be most 
useful in demonstrating the effectiveness of new approaches, rather than being applied 
widely across the social services. 
 
 
New partners in areas of traditional state provision 
Governments sometimes bring in non-government partners to generate innovation in areas of social 
services where direct state provision has dominated. Contracts usually give the new provider enough 
flexibility and strong incentives to innovate. While, internationally these approaches have been tried in 
some social services since the 1980s, New Zealand examples are recent. 
The United Kingdom Home Office has been contracting private companies to construct and manage 
prisons since the 1980s. The new providers used more advanced technology (CCTV cameras, magnetic key 
cards and drug detection machines) as well as a focus on more constructive relationships between staff and 
prisoners. These innovations then spread to the state-run prisons. The providers employed staff from 
outside the sector, covered by other unions. This made it easier to introduce a change in culture (Sturgess, 
2012). A third of staff in the first contracted prison were women compared with an average in the UK prison 
service of around 3% at the time. Though, these innovations were possible in the state-run prisons, the 
entry of other providers appears to have catalysed change. 
Modern contracting out of prison management started in the United States in the 1980s, followed by 
Australia shortly after and then the United Kingdom. In 2011, the New Zealand Government contracted 
17 NSW Government spending on out-of-home care totalled A$700 million for 18 000 children in the year to 30 June 2012 (SVA, 2013c). 
18 The difference between the actual restoration rate and a base rate of 55% is used to calculate the return (SVA, 2013c). The base rate reflects an historic 
baseline for three years (KPMG, 2014). Returns are capped at 15% in any year. 
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Serco, a multi-national firm, to manage the Mount Eden Corrections Facility (a remand prison) for 10 years. 
According to Sturgess (2012), private management of prisons has proved relatively uncontroversial, except 
in the United States. In the United States the use of spot-markets to trade some correctional services, with 
less monitoring, has resulted in problems with service quality.  
Some governments have sought to engage non-government providers to run schools for educationally 
disadvantaged students. They hope to stimulate innovation in the delivery of education and so improve 
educational outcomes. The approach also emphasises leadership, school choice and spreading successful 
approaches to other schools. The charter school movement in the United States is the best-known example.  
Partnership Schools | Kura Hourua 
Partnership Schools | Kura Hourua19 (PSKH) is an initiative that commenced operating in New Zealand in 
2014. New Zealand state schools already have a large degree of operational freedom compared to many 
other jurisdictions. Even so, the Government offers PSKH even more flexibility in terms of: 
 inputs – schools are resourced entirely in cash, rather than partly in cash and partly through staffing 
entitlements; and 
 operations – where practicable, regulations governing the operation of schools are lifted. 
In return, PSKH are held accountable for specified results. They are, like state schools, subject to 
Educational Review Office reviews. They must accept all students who apply and hold a ballot if they are 
over-subscribed. 
Te Kura Hourua O Whangarei Terenga Paraoa 
Te Kura Hourua O Whangarei Terenga Paraoa, based in Whangarei and sponsored by He Puna Marama 
Trust, was one of five PSKH that commenced operation in 2014. It is a co-educational secondary school for 
years 7-13 which aims to raise the achievement of Mäori students “by reconnecting them with an ethos of 
leadership and pride” (MoE, 2015a). It works in partnership with local secondary schools, so that senior 
students have access to a wide range of learning opportunities. He Puna Marama, established in 1997, has 
operated bilingual early childhood education since 2001.  
He Puna Marama looked for a new approach to address the poor outcomes of Mäori boys in secondary 
school in Whangarei. Only 19% of Mäori boys had achieved Level 1 NCEA in 2007, compared to 46% for 
Mäori boys nationally, and 64% for all boys. He Puna Marama, with funding from the ASB Community Trust, 
established the Leadership Academy of A Company in 2010 to support Mäori boys attending secondary 
school in Whangarei. The Academy provides a structured environment where “cadets” live at the Academy 
five days a week, while attending regular secondary schools in the Whangarei area. 
He Puna Marama draws inspiration from the leadership traditions of the Mäori Battalion’s A Company made 
up of men from the north and from the Mäori boarding schools. The Trust also draws from the successful 
pastoral support practices of the former Mäori Trade Training Scheme through which many older Mäori had 
achieved post-secondary qualifications. He Puna Marama adopted three central goals to guide its work with 
cadets: “Be Mäori”, “Be Educated”, and “Be Rangatira”. The same philosophy underpins the Trust’s 
sponsorship of the new school, which it regards “as one of the critical building blocks for the rejuvenation of 
Ngapuhi Iwi into the new age” (He Puna Marama Trust, 2013, p. 3).  
The new school collaborates with other schools in the Whangarei area so that students have access to 
specialist subjects. This flexibility would otherwise be difficult within the funding and regulatory 
environment governing state schools. Seven of the eight teaching staff are registered teachers, while one 
part-time teacher is unregistered, as provided for in the PSKH model. 
19 Kura is the commonly used word for school in Te Reo Mäori. The name Kura Hourua was derived from Waka Hourua, which is the Mäori name for the 
traditional sea voyaging double-hulled canoes. 
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The school had 52 students at the end of 2014, all Mäori. A recent Education Review Office Report shows 
that 90% of students at Level 1 of the NCEA and 100% at Level 2 had achieved sufficient credits. The report 
concludes: 
Te Kura Hourua O Whangarei Terenga Paraoa has made a good start to providing education for young 
Mäori consistent with its sponsor’s vision. Adults and young people are working together to develop 
confident, capable, resilient Mäori learners. (ERO, 2015) 
While it is too early to judge the ongoing success of Te Kura Hourua O Whangarei Terenga Paraoa, the 
school illustrates how new approaches to commissioning can provide an opportunity for fresh ways of 
dealing with difficult social issues. The venture combines credible educational experience in the local 
environment, adherence to Mäori values and traditions, and flexibility to do things differently. In doing so, it 
has empowered a local community to design and implement a solution to a locally identified social issue.  
The ASB Community Trust played a significant role in providing funding and support for He Puna Marama 
to try a new way of dealing with an intractable issue. This gave He Puna Marama the base to take 
advantage of a new government-funded opportunity to carry its vision further.  
 
 
 F3.4  Philanthropic organisations like to take a lead in demonstrating the success of 
innovative approaches to the design and delivery of social services. They look to the 
government to pick up and fund those approaches that prove successful. 
 
 
While it is certainly possible for local communities to put forward new ideas and implement them within the 
state education system, in practice culture and regulation limit the extent to which this happens.  
The PSKH initiative is strongly opposed by the teacher unions (New Zealand Educational Institute Te Riu 
Roa, sub. 40; Post Primary Teachers’ Association, sub. 88). Concerns include potential effects on the 
existing network of state schools, funding inequities, effects of school choice on increasing social 
segregation across schools, the potential for fraud and the possible involvement of extremist groups in 
running schools. The Post Primary Teachers’ Association argues that the evaluation of the initiative is not 
well enough designed to establish the effectiveness of the policy.  
As a new initiative that has met strong opposition, PSKH schools are subject to close scrutiny from the 
media. Innovation is hampered by a deeply critical response to anything resembling a failure or lapse. 
Existing parties sometimes strongly resist the innovation in favour of the status quo. 
Innovation is risky (Chapter 7). The PSKH initiative is no exception, and not all of the new schools have been 
as successful as Te Kura Hourua O Whangarei Terenga Paraoa. The initiative has a provision to close down 
new schools early if the basic conditions for success are not being met. A willingness to eliminate failing 
providers is an important aspect of a social services system that learns (Chapter 7). 
3.6 Commissioning to develop an effective managed market 
Conventional competitive markets are not always suited to social service delivery. But commissioning 
agencies can design variations to suit particular circumstances. A managed market is a service model that 
allows multiple providers to compete for market share, usually where there is a single purchaser. A 
managed market can achieve some of the investment and innovation benefits obtained in conventional 
competitive markets (Chapter 6). Yet, to achieve these benefits, such a market needs smart design to 
ensure a sustainable supply of services, the right balance between competition and economies of scale, and 
a fee structure that rewards providers for achieving desired outcomes for different types of service users. 
A managed market for employment services in Australia 
The Australian Department of Employment and its predecessors have operated a managed market for 
employment services since 1997 (Appendix B). While the Department has adjusted the market design over 
time, its main features are below. 
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 The Department contracts with non-government providers (both not-for-profit and for-profit) to provide 
employment services for recipients of income support. 
 The Department holds contract rounds (currently at 5-year intervals). Providers tender for a share of a 
regional employment services market. Prices are fixed. The market share of successful providers may be 
adjusted at a point within a contract period to reflect their relative success in achieving employment 
outcomes for clients. 
 Each provider receives a star rating from the Department to reflect their success in achieving 
employment outcomes given the types of clients they are serving and labour market conditions where 
they operate. Star ratings are made public and also influence the Department’s decisions on market 
share.  
 Centrelink, a separate department, administers income support. It assesses new applicants for their 
likely difficulty in finding employment and so the type and level of employment assistance they are 
eligible to receive. 
 Clients may choose a contracted provider, or, instead, Centrelink refers them to one. Referrals broadly 
reflect the providers’ contracted market share, but the rate of referral may vary somewhat above or 
below the contracted share (according to client choice and the provider’s star ratings). 
 Contracted providers receive set payments for an employment service and for successful employment 
outcomes for clients (section 3.4). Payments reflect the assessed difficulty for particular clients in finding 
employment. 
Over time the market has gradually consolidated, with economies of scale favouring larger providers. In the 
current round, the Department specified that it would favour a limited number of larger providers in each 
employment region. Smaller more specialised providers would need to merge or put forward joint bids with 
larger ones. Employment regions were made larger. Tendering organisations were asked to outline how 
they would collaborate with other organisations (including other providers), with the expectation that they 
would be held accountable for their plans. 
The Australian model has been adopted with modifications in other jurisdictions, including the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands. The Australian experience shows that it is feasible to manage a market of 
contracted providers of employment services, but that commissioning agencies need to make careful 
adjustments to market design over time to avoid unintended consequences. In particular, commissioning 
agencies need to maintain a balance between competitive pressures to stimulate innovation and good 
performance and economies of scale and scope that favour larger providers. The Department has also 
needed to adjust the structure of payments over time to balance provider viability against performance-
based payments (section 3.4). 
The benefits of a managed market are less obvious in remote areas where there are too few people to 
sustain competition among service providers. Under a separate policy and administration, a single provider 
operates employment and other services in remote areas in Australia. In other rural areas with a sparse 
population, the Department of Employment adjusts prices to reflect local difficulties in finding employment. 
Other issues involving the probity of providers and the prescriptiveness of contracts and guidelines have 
arisen from time to time in the Australian employment services market (Appendix B). These are not peculiar 
to a managed market approach; they are more general contracting issues (Chapter 12).  
A developing market for the supply of social housing in New Zealand 
Social housing in New Zealand has traditionally been supplied through the Housing New Zealand 
Corporation (HNZC), some council portfolios, and a much smaller non-profit social housing sector. 
The Government used capital grants and loans through the Housing Innovation Fund (HIF) from 2003 to 
2011 to promote growth in the number and size of social housing providers. In its later years the HIF had an 
explicit focus on trying to leverage the maximum third-party contribution for each government dollar spent, 
aiming to be only 30% to 50% of the total cost of development. 
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The Housing Shareholders Advisory Group reported in 2010. Its report advocated a range of reforms, 
including a re-focusing of HNZCs role, and an expanded role for the community housing sector. This led to 
the Social Housing Reform Programme (SHRP).  
The Government established the Social Housing Unit (SHU) to “maximise the effectiveness and efficiency of 
supply-side provision through increased diversity and scale” (SHU, 2011) in social housing. This is explicitly 
a market-shaping role. Now attached to MBIE, SHU provides funds from several categories to grow the 
social housing sector. The Community Housing Regulatory Authority has also been established to register 
community housing providers (CHPs) as social landlords. CHPs require registration to be eligible to receive 
the income-related rent subsidy (IRRS) on behalf of tenants – something previously only available for HNZC 
customers. CHPs have been able to access the IRRS since April 2014. 
Currently New Zealand has 38 registered CHPs of varying size and geographic spread. There are 5 000 
properties owned by CHPs. Twenty-five CHPs have contracts with MSD to access the IRRS. Currently CHPs 
receive IRRS in relation to 194 tenants. Government decided when it made the IRRS available to CHPs that 
it would apply only to new tenants.  
3.7 Broad lessons 
Some broad lessons can be drawn from the new ideas discussed in this chapter. 
MSD’s Investment Approach has shown early promise both in increasing the rate at which some client 
groups find employment and in engaging more youth in successful employment and training that will 
reduce the prospects of long-term benefit receipt. The approach could be extended more widely across the 
social services and also applied in devolved approaches to commissioning (Chapter 9). This will require a 
significant broadening of the scope of data sharing and linking across government social service agencies 
(Chapter 8). 
Extending customer control and choice to new social service areas can command wide support because it 
both raises wellbeing in itself and better guides the use of resources to improve outcomes. Yet programme 
design needs mechanisms for keeping costs within budget. Customer choice can apply to areas of social 
services provision where customer and wider social objectives are aligned (Chapter 11). 
Whänau Ora aims to empower families and whänau to determine their own goals and choose a set of 
services and support to achieve them. Iwi and the Crown have introduced or are investigating a range of 
approaches under which iwi have greater power to determine the type and shape of social service provision 
in their rohe. These approaches are likely to become increasingly important in a post-settlement 
environment, and offer the benefits of strengthening iwi governance and self-reliance while improving 
outcomes for members (Chapters 5 and 13). 
The CCN has made sustained progress in integrating health services in the Canterbury region and achieved 
improved performance relative to other major DHBs on a number of measures. The CCN’s approach 
requires clinical and management leadership to bring together a complex range of technical capabilities, 
attitudinal shifts and organisational and contract design. Because of the complexity, the approach is neither 
easy to replicate nor to sustain (Chapter 6). 
MSD’s contracts for Youth Service include payments to providers for the educational and training success of 
its clients. Payment for outcomes allows contracts to be less prescriptive and provides more scope for 
innovation in the design and delivery of services. The approach could be applied more widely in 
government contracts with social services providers (Chapter 12). 
Social bonds can stimulate new approaches to old problems by paying investors returns on the basis of 
outcomes achieved, while avoiding tight prescription of services offered. While social bonds introduce 
parties able and willing to take some of the risk of innovation, they involve complex institutional and 
contractual arrangements, and take time and skill to set up. They may be most useful in demonstrating the 
effectiveness of new approaches to service delivery, rather than being applied widely across the social 
services. 
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Governments have sometimes contracted non-government organisations to provide social services (such as 
prison and education services) that the state sector traditionally provides. In some cases new providers have 
introduced innovative approaches to service delivery that have then been taken up more widely. Trying new 
providers and new ideas carries risks. Commissioning skills, including choosing the best service model, are 
important for success (Chapter 6).  
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4 An assessment of the social services 
system 
Key points 
 Focusing on the social services system (rather than specific services, programmes or providers) 
allows a broader understanding of the institutions and processes that shape the outcomes from 
government-funded services. 
 This chapter concentrates on diagnosing the causes of the under-performance in some aspects of 
the social services system that Chapter 2 noted. Diagnosing the causes is a necessary step to 
improving the system. 
 Reasonable consensus exists on what a well-functioning social services system should achieve. The 
current system significantly under-performs relative to the criteria for a well-functioning system.  
 No single factor is the cause of the system weaknesses observed by the Commission. Rather the 
weaknesses are due to a combination of factors. 
- Many agencies and providers lack clarity or disagree about the objectives of the system as a 
whole and their part in it.  
- Few mechanisms exist to capture and analyse information on the impact and cost-effectiveness 
of services.  
- Many government institutions come from a different era of public administration and can 
struggle to deal with the complexity of modern demands on government-funded services.  
- Previous attempts to reform the system failed because they did not address the underlying 
(institutional) causes of problems.  
- Those with decision rights often lack the required information, incentive and capability to make 
decisions that fulfil the objectives of the system.  
- Many contracts for social services are highly prescriptive owing to traditional government 
accountability and delivery arrangements, and aversion to political risk. This prescription works 
against innovation and responsiveness to client needs.  
- Ambiguity often exists around whether government agencies are paying for specific services 
that they wish to buy, or are simply contributing to programmes originated by non-government 
providers. 
- There is room to improve the contracting and procurement of social services. But there are 
limits to the gains that can be achieved through this means. 
- Government agencies have overlooked their potential to shape and manage the market for 
social service contracts. Consequently the market is not performing as well as it could.  
- The organisational cultures of providers and government agencies tend to be resistant to 
change and are sometimes paternalistic towards clients.  
- Political pressures and institutional inertia make it difficult to re-allocate funding away from 
under-performing programmes and initiatives.  
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Chapter 2 provided the Commission’s observations of the strengths and weaknesses of the social services 
system. This chapter explores the underlying causes of the weaknesses. This diagnosis is a necessary step to 
improving the system.  
A system-level analysis recognises that constructive discussions about improvements to social services need 
to make the clear distinction between the performance of the system and the performance of the people 
who work in the system. The Commission is not commenting on the performance, intentions or capability of 
any individual or organisation – government or non-government. Rather the intent is to take a step back 
and look at issues common to the delivery of many social services. 
4.1 A well-functioning social services system 
There are no natural limits to the social services that could be demanded. The environment always has been 
– and always will be – one of limited funding and scarcity of resources. The challenge is to obtain the best 
possible outcomes within those limits. 
Social services are funded and delivered by a complex system with many participants. A system that 
delivers more or higher-quality services at the same cost (or, equivalently, the same services at lower cost) 
will promote greater wellbeing, all else being equal. The term productivity captures such efficiency 
improvements. Importantly, these improvements are about being more effective rather than working harder 
or longer, or accepting lower wages. 
The goal of this inquiry is to find and recommend measures that would lead to such improvements in the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the social services system. The concept of efficiency has several dimensions, 
all of which are relevant to the performance of the system as a whole (Box 4.1).  
Box 4.1 Components of efficiency 
Efficiency can be broken down into productive, allocative and dynamic efficiency, and looked at from 
the supply and demand sides. 
From a service-supply perspective: 
 productive efficiency is producing more outputs for a given set of inputs (eg, planning home visits 
to minimise travel time and vehicle costs, allowing more time to be spent with clients); 
 allocative efficiency is choosing what to fund (and who receives it) to maximise the overall goals of 
the service funder; and 
 dynamic efficiency is spending the right amount on innovation, and physical and human capital to 
support future efficiency improvements. 
From a service-demand perspective: 
 productive efficiency is lowering the costs of service consumption (eg, providing information once 
rather multiple times, or receiving multiple services at one location); 
 allocative efficiency is choosing what services to consume (and in what quantities) to maximise 
overall wellbeing; and 
 dynamic efficiency is users deciding when to consume services to balance current and future 
wellbeing. 
Social service designs that overlook service-demand efficiency may be treating client’s time and 
energy as having no cost. This shows little respect for the client, and risks undermining service 
effectiveness.  
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Chapter 1 describes what a well-functioning social services system would look like from the perspective of 
New Zealand citizens, current clients, providers, social services agencies and the Government. While there 
are differences across these perspectives, there is reasonable consensus that a well-functioning social 
services system should: 
 target public funds towards areas with the highest net returns to society; 
 match the services provided to the needs of clients; 
 align incentives at all levels of the system on delivering the outcomes that matter; 
 ensure decision makers (at all levels) have adequate information to make choices; 
 adapt to changes in client needs and the external environment; 
 meet public expectations of fairness and equity; 
 be responsive to the aspirations and needs of Mäori and Pasifika; and 
 foster continuous experimentation, learning and improvement.  
4.2 Symptoms of a poorly functioning system 
Chapter 2 described a number of ways in which the social services system under-performs. These are 
largely symptoms of deeper causes and problems. Section 4.3 identifies and analyses these causes. This 
section describes the different experiences and perspectives that different players in the social services 
have when it is under-performing. For example, clients with an urgent need will care little about the internal 
structure of the social services system, or who does what. The big question for them is whether the system 
worked or failed in meeting their needs. Providers will have different concerns. 
Symptoms of system failure from a client perspective tend to arise on the demand side and include: 
 being ineligible for any service, despite a client’s need; 
 poorly coordinated services;  
 having to provide the same (or substantially similar) information multiple times to access different 
services; and 
 bouncing between services (or repeatedly accessing the same service) because of previous service 
failures. 
This last point describes what has been termed “failure demand” – high apparent demand for services 
resulting from a failure to address the underlying cause at the most appropriate point in the system (or the 
most appropriate point in time) (Seddon, 2008). 
Providers see symptoms of system failure on the supply side. For example, they may have to supply the 
same (or substantially similar) information multiple times for tenders, performance monitoring and financial 
audits to different agencies. 
Other symptoms of system failure on the supply side are more apparent to funding and commissioning 
organisations: 
 insufficient experimentation, learning and application of that learning; 
 failure to intervene early, leading to higher costs in the longer term; 
 not matching clients to the most cost-effective service; and 
 duplication of services that could be more efficiently provided once. 
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The Government and the citizens it represents are likely to have a larger concern – system sustainability. 
The moral and practical underpinnings of the system include concepts such as fairness and reciprocity. For 
example, the support from taxpayers for older citizens may rest on the expectation that future taxpayers will 
support them. The political sustainability of the system relies on commitment to and respect for these 
concepts.  
A further challenge is fiscal sustainability. In the presence of population ageing, there are widespread 
concerns that a small number of future taxpayers will be unable (or unwilling) to support a larger number of 
older persons. Commitments to fund social services need to be realistic – if overly generous they may 
undermine the fiscal sustainability of the system. 
Submitters drew the Commission’s attention to many symptoms of under-performance (Box 4.2), for the 
most part concentrating on aspects of contracting between government agencies and non-government 
providers. These submissions are broadly consistent with the stories the Commission heard through its 
engagement meetings.  
Box 4.2 Submissions on symptoms of under-performance 
National Committee of Addiction Treatment: 
The current system of contracting services is inefficient and leads to a fragmented system of care 
that is difficult for people to navigate. The over-abundance of small contracts has resulted in a 
high overhead-value ratio as each entity competes for small pieces of the funding pie. Many 
organisations are managing numerous contracts with different reporting and monitoring 
frameworks for each contract. This creates and builds inefficiencies for both government and 
providers … There is little room for and no incentive to innovate in a sustainable way to achieve 
system wide change. (sub. 98, p. 2, 4) 
New Zealand Organisation for Rare Disorders: 
While much of our health system is well organised and of a high standard, there are often areas 
where significant improvements can be achieved, and provision for the needs of rare disorders is 
certainly one of them. (sub. 89, p. 4) 
Aotearoa New Zealand Association of Social Workers:  
Problems in transitions between providers usually occur when there is overworked staff on either 
end or when the waiting time for the next service is too long. This is where clients become lost in 
the system and the handovers are not communicated and recorded appropriately. In order to 
have smoother, uncomplicated transitions staff need a manageable workload and there needs to 
be more appropriate and timely services. (sub. 78, p. 7) 
NGO Health & Disability Network: 
Government rarely involves clients, communities and non-profit providers in commissioning 
discussions, i.e. the process to identify what outcomes are desired and how these might be 
achieved. It usually decides it wants to buy ‘x’ service and tenders for it – leaving little scope for 
innovation or new ways of achieving outcomes … As for purchasing, the funding discrepancies 
between DHBs and the inconsistency in purchasing models compromise NGOs’ ability to deliver 
nationally consistent services and provide equity of access – leading to a ‘postcode lottery’ for 
people using the health system. (sub. 70, p. 3) 
Tauranga Budget Advisory Service: 
…our local relationship with MSD is very professional, but the general funding environment which 
continues to not recognise the interconnectivity of health, education, social services and Maori 
streams of currently “silo” funding is frustrating. (sub. 57, p. 1) 
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4.3 Reasons for system weaknesses 
A first step to addressing the symptoms of under-performance in the social services system is to identify 
and analyse their causes. This step offers the best chance of finding effective ways to improve performance. 
This section identifies eight fundamental reasons for the weaknesses in the current system: 
 reliance on traditional approaches to public administration; 
 misaligned incentives at all levels of the system; 
 lack of agreed measures of value inhibits knowledge about the impact of services; 
 decision makers often lack the right information; 
 inadequate government management of the market for the provision of social services; 
 limits to what can be achieved by contracting out; 
 short-termism leading to missed opportunities for early intervention; and 
 obstacles to change within the system. 
The Commission believes that obtaining better outcomes from the social services system will require 
reforms that address these factors. 
Reliance on traditional approaches to public administration 
While approaches to policy making have evolved and diversified over the past 20 years, many of the 
institutions and frameworks for public administration have remained relatively unchanged. These institutions 
and frameworks have several features that reduce the ability of the system to deal with the multiple and 
inter-dependent problems that many disadvantaged clients suffer.  
For example, budget appropriations are typically allocated to individual agencies along service lines (eg, 
Vote health, Vote education, Vote justice). The key benefit of this structure is to maintain strong vertical 
lines of accountability. Yet it has the effect of breaking services into highly functionalised and specialised 
administrative groups. Therefore, while many clients have several inter-dependent and mutually reinforcing 
issues, the system delivers assistance down discrete channels sometimes called “silos”. A number of 
problems result from delivering services through separate silos.  
The duplication of government processes: Clients are often forced to engage with multiple administrative 
processes across different geographic locations. This typically results in clients having to provide the same 
information multiple times – creating frustration and cost for the client. For providers, contracts with 
 Platform Trust: 
…poor pricing practices coupled with increased compliance, complicated contract reporting 
requirements and unrealistic performance targets are compromising the capacity of community 
organisations to deliver high quality services. (sub. 45, p. 12) 
Palmerston North Community Services Council:  
… there can be an ad hoc approach to funding and service delivery. Funding and service delivery 
often fit like a jigsaw, and if you lose a piece of the puzzle there is a gap which can make the service 
delivery sporadic in the way it meets clients’ needs. (sub. 125, p. 14) 
 Chapter 4 | An assessment of the social services system 75 
multiple government agencies often result in duplication of auditing and reporting processes – pulling 
resources away from higher-value uses.20 
Incomplete diagnosis of a client’s problems and requirements: Because every point in the system is 
evaluating need through its own specialised lens, it is difficult to get a complete picture of the client’s 
overall circumstances. This makes it hard to identify the combination of services that best meets the client’s 
needs, and the client ends up bouncing from one part of the system to the next, seeking assistance. At the 
same time, providers repeatedly call for a more “holistic” approach to service delivery (see 
submissions 100, 103, 104 and 126).  
Repeated calls for more joined-up government: Problems associated with fragmentation are well known to 
government agencies and providers. Chapter 10 identifies over 25 initiatives launched since 2000 with the 
aim of improving coordination within government. However these attempts to integrate have failed to 
address the silo architecture that created fragmentation in the first place. The observations of the UK 
system made by Haldenby, Harries and Olliff-Cooper (2014) are relevant to the discussions in New Zealand.  
New Labour came to power with a huge emphasis on ‘joined up government’, and left office with a 
panoply of boards, partnerships, networks, integrated plans and learning hubs to prove it. This is not 
proper integration. Rather it is keeping the defunct subsystem of separate institutions and budgets in 
place, and asking everyone to send an ambassador to interminable meetings. (p. 25) 
The observations of Locality and Vanguard Consulting (2014), again with respect to the United Kingdom, 
are also relevant: 
Today’s public services are not designed for ‘people who need help’. In the manner of a hospital set up 
to deliver a specific intervention – a replacement hip or cataract removal – they are designed to batch-
process fixes for predefined one-off issues and then close the books. In consequence they are systems 
that assess rather than understand; transact rather than build relationships; refer on rather than take 
responsibility; prescribe packages of activity rather than take the time to understand what improves a 
life. As in any system that fails to solve the underlying problems, they amplify work, appearing 
frenetically busy while accomplishing less and less. Based on identifying needs rather than strengths, 
they fail to help individuals and communities build self-sustaining support systems that increase agency 
and independence, instead increasing resource consumption and dependency and accelerating 
decline. (p. 20) 
Another consequence of a system that operates in non-integrated, vertical silos is that cases that do not 
quite fit a silo, or where the consequences of failure to treat a problem fall on another agency, are accorded 
lower priority than they ought to receive from a system-wide perspective. The risks attaching to such cases 
get “shifted”; they are not dealt with in a timely, cost-effective manner. Mansell (2015, p. 14) makes the 
following observations about silo structures, and their tendency to produce fragmented and ineffective 
services for some clients: 
This kind of services-orientated structure makes collaboration difficult to foster and sustain, particularly 
for high-needs service users with multiple challenges. …The result is that many clients ‘fall between the 
gaps’. They receive inappropriate or even damaging services. What they receive is unresponsive to 
them and comes without the other necessary supports.  
 
 
 
 F4.1  Many government institutions were created in a different era of public administration 
and not set up to deal with the modern demands on state-funded social services. This 
is particularly so when clients have complex, inter-dependent needs that span the 
responsibilities of multiple agencies and ministers. 
 
 
 
Misaligned incentives  
The actions of those working in the social services system are shaped by the incentives they face. Incentives 
often flow from rules and customs that constrain and influence the conduct of ministers, government 
20 Submissions 5, 7, 11, 32, 41, 49 and 112 all refer to this problem. 
                                                     
76 DRAFT | More effective social services 
officials, providers and clients. Rules include formal and enforceable rules (such as regulatory requirements 
and contractual provisions) and informal rules built on social and cultural norms of behaviour.  
The social services system will work best when the incentives created by these rules are strongly aligned to 
improving the outcomes that matter – in terms of the wellbeing of clients and the wider community. There 
are areas of the social services system where this alignment is not as strong as it needs to be.  
Incentives from the political environment 
Ministers operate in a highly contested and adversarial environment. This environment can crudely be 
described as one where: 
 the opposition is committed to discrediting the Government so as to replace it at the next election; 
 the Government is determined to stay in power; and 
 politicians want to get re-elected.  
The New Zealand Treasury noted: 
The need to win elections leads politicians and their parties to develop a very good understanding of 
the factors that drive public opinion. Media exposure is “political oxygen”, mainstream media analyse 
the politics and not the policy of an issue, and the media require instant reactions and ready sound 
bites. Consequently, Ministers feel the pressure to: 
 respond quickly and decisively to the latest risk, accident or misdeed; 
 commit to concrete action, even without evidence that the action will address the problem, or that 
benefits are likely to exceed costs; 
 stick to a political commitment once made; and 
 deliver on the commitment as soon as possible. (2011, p. 10) 
In such an environment, government contracts are under persistent scrutiny by groups with an interest in 
discrediting government policies. The threat of opportunistic scrutiny provides a strong incentive for 
governments to use contracting approaches that minimise political risk – such as highly specific contracts 
and rigid performance reporting (Moszoro, Spiller & Stolorz, 2014). The threat of opportunistic scrutiny also 
prompts government agencies to offer contracts of short duration and works against relational 
contracting.21 Providers often interpret these phenomena as indicating that the agencies do not trust them. 
The risk of opportunistic scrutiny and criticism of government programmes also inhibits governments from 
subjecting the programmes to robust evaluations.  
Chapter 2 noted there is too little innovation in social services both among providers and within 
government agencies. 
One reason for this is that contracting-out models that involve short, tightly specified contracts create little 
room or incentive for providers to experiment, or to share and adopt innovations. This is particularly the 
case where experimenting would mean providers investing in assets, relationships, personnel or processes 
that are specific to their current contracts. If the lengths of these contracts are short, providers have limited 
assurance that they will be able to recover their costs should the Government choose not to renew them. 
Figure 4.1 shows data on the length of Ministry of Social Development (MSD) contracts for services in 
2014/2015. Little contracted expenditure is on contracts longer than 3.5 years, and 46% is on contracts of 
less than 2.5 years. 
21 Relational contracts, as used in the private sector, rely on informal agreements and self-enforcement based on the parties agreeing to contract 
variations without formal renegotiation or litigation (Chapter 12). 
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Figure 4.1 Percentage of MSD contracted-out expenditure in 2014/2015 by contract duration  
 
Source: MSD contract databases; Productivity Commission. 
These issues are not new. In 2001, the Review of the Centre identified “Risk aversion due to the political 
cost of failure” as an impediment to better frontline services (p. 15). The review noted that “[t]here are 
inherent features of the State Sector that discourage innovation (eg, high political cost if risky innovation 
fails)” (p. 16). 
More recently, the Better Public Services Working Group found that: 
…in the New Zealand state services, innovation is being stifled by a lack of capability, an undue degree 
of risk aversion on the part of chief executives, boards, and Ministers and little consideration of how to 
manage risk in this context. (2011, p. 20) 
In addition to political risk, the behaviour of officials can be heavy influenced by: 
 accountability for allocated budgets rather than the total costs to government and the wider public; and 
 incentives to manage costs rather than value. 
 
  
 F4.2  Accountability and delivery structures within government agencies place a high 
emphasis on managing costs and political risks. This can result in a lack of focus on 
value, and in highly prescriptive contracts that work against innovation in services. 
 
 
The highly prescriptive contracts that government agencies tend to offer providers also limit the discretion 
of providers to tailor services to the individual needs of clients – even when this would be in the interests of 
the client and consistent with the outcomes sought by agencies.  
Birthright New Zealand noted: 
Contracts between Government agencies and providers are typically tightly prescribed and do not 
recognise the dynamic situations of the families we work with. The Growing Up in New Zealand 
longitudinal study report which focusses on vulnerability highlights the rate at which family 
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circumstances may change. To ensure that services can be targeted to address need, contracts need 
greater flexibility. In some instances, longer term interventions may be required for children and 
families whether this is due to chronic health conditions or complexity of need. Contracts with providers 
should reflect that they are best placed to assess and identify how available resources are best 
matched to client need. (sub. 128, p. 4) 
This view is echoed in a report by the New Zealand Treasury (2013). 
…accountability from the purchaser to the provider for the contracts and funding is still primarily based 
on volumes, inputs and outputs. Highly specified contracts are an important form of risk management 
for government in industries where there is great uncertainty about the outcomes, such as supplying 
social services to clients who may not agree they have problems they need to address. It gives some 
ability to identify and manage poor performance by agencies where this is captured by the measures 
used. However, when the level of specification interferes with the delivery of the service, there may be 
a case to rethink if contracted delivery is the best way of supplying the service. (p. 17) 
 
 
 
 F4.3  Tightly prescribed government contracts reduce the flexibility of providers to tailor 
services to meet the needs of clients. This is problematic in cases where the tailoring of 
services would improve client outcomes.  
 
 
Incentives from the competitive environment  
As well as the effects of tightly specified and short contracts, the way that competitive tendering for social 
services contracts works can adversely affect the inclination of providers to collaborate and share 
information. Barnardos notes that this disincentive creates an undesirable tension. 
The aim may well be to get the best of both worlds. However this is a difficult combination for 
organisations to manage. There are strong incentives to build our own competitive advantage by not 
sharing, by seeking to undercut others and by closely guarding our own intellectual property. At the 
same time the strong message from government (and from the children, families and communities we 
work with) is that they want and value genuine collaboration amongst providers. An effective system 
cannot ignore this tension. (sub. 12, p. 8) 
The leads of the Social Sector Trials make a similar point. 
…that the contestable nature of funding means that providers often revert to the strict terms of their 
contract rather than engendering co-operation or alignment with similar or complementary providers – 
unless it’s forced. (Social Sector Trials, sub. 126, p. 15) 
The Commission has heard of instances where providers have invested resources in developing innovative 
programmes, only to miss out on government contracts in a tender process to supply the programmes they 
created, and without any form of reward for the innovation (Chapter 7, Box 7.4).  
Another adverse incentive can occur when providers have been awarded a contract for a specific number of 
clients or units of activity. When that point is reached and providers are at capacity, they will have an 
incentive to “cream skim” easier clients and “park” the more difficult cases. 
Lack of agreed measures of value inhibits knowledge about the impact of 
services 
As described in Chapter 3, MSD’s Investment Approach is based on a single measure of value against which 
the agency can assess the relative cost effectiveness of different services for different client types. This 
single focus has led to impressive progress in achieving greater value (in the form of smaller expected 
future benefit payments). Such an agreed measure of value and the ability to measure it is not present in 
other social services areas. This undermines the quality and usefulness of the performance measurement 
that happens in these areas. All too often the result is a fragmented and incomplete picture of service 
performance, of which interventions work and which do not. 
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In a well-functioning system, decision makers will have the information they need to make good decisions. 
This can be achieved by allocating decision rights to those that hold the information or by developing 
systems to capture and share information. 
Changes made to contracts are more often driven by the desire to reduce spending, political ideology 
and election cycles than in response to information about what is or is not working. (Workbridge, 
sub. 102, p. 16) 
The knowledge gaps within New Zealand’s social services system are pervasive and are a key cause of 
weakness in the efficient and effective commissioning of services. Currently the system is vulnerable to 
advocates who can choose specific, ad hoc measures of social outcomes to support stories of success or 
woe. More clarity is required around the goals of social services, and better measurement of progress 
towards those goals. 
There is relatively little gathering of evidence, evaluation of it and identifying and spreading good practice. 
The effect is that commissioning agencies all too often are unable or not motivated to redirect resources to 
more effective services and providers. Some aspects of the system support failure and do not reward 
success. Indeed, as noted above, some incentives in the system actively work against the sharing of 
information. 
Part of the explanation for lack of transparent measures and robust performance reporting is that this carries 
less political risk than an open approach dedicated to improving outcomes. The lack of visibility of 
performance occurs despite statutory obligations on departmental chief executives to advise ministers on 
the efficiency and effectiveness of interventions. MSD’s Investment Approach is a shining exception to lack 
of transparency, but it covers only services associated with work-related benefits. MSD initiated Investing in 
Services for Outcomes in 2012 to improve programme assessment and investment decisions in community 
and family services, but progress has been very slow. 
 
 
 F4.4  The lack of agreed measures of value has led to too little measurement and reporting 
of the outcomes achieved from social service programmes. Aversion to political risk has 
compounded this. The combined effect has often been performance reporting that, 
while costly, provides few insights into the impact and worth of programmes.  
 
 
 
 
 F4.5  Government agencies often do not subject their social service programmes to rigorous 
and transparent evaluation and learn from previous experience.   
 
Decision makers often lack the right information 
The top-down architecture of the social services system means it is not well adapted to the fact that actors 
within the system hold different types of information. For example, clients (or their family/whänau) know 
their individual needs, preferences and aspirations. They know the social worker they prefer, the type of job 
that would make them happy, the activities they need help with, and the locations that are most convenient 
for them to receive services.  
Professionals on the other hand hold important technical information about the service options available 
and the processes through which clients can gain access to services. Providers also often have deep local 
knowledge and networks that can be used to help meet the needs of clients. 
Government officials understand the priorities of ministers, the competing priorities outside social services 
for the uses of taxpayer funds, and the best ways to collect and analyse information on the performance of 
the system as a whole.  
Under the current system, many important decisions – such as which services should be provided and how 
they are to be delivered – are made by people or organisations that lack vital information. For example, 
officials in government agencies mostly do not have all the information needed to efficiently and effectively 
match client requirements to services design. Some of this information sits closer to the clients. 
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Overcoming this source of poor design and delivery decisions requires either moving relevant information 
to existing decision makers, or moving decisions to those with the relevant information.  
 
 
 F4.6  There is useful information at all “levels” of the social services system, but decision 
makers frequently lack important relevant information to make good decisions. 
Overcoming this requires either moving relevant information to existing decision 
makers, or moving decisions to those with the relevant information. 
 
 
Inadequate government management of the market for the provision of social 
services 
In a market with a single large purchaser, that purchaser’s commissioning and contracting procedures and 
funding decisions will have a big influence on the “ecosystem” of providers. As a single large purchaser of 
social services, the Government has this sort of impact. Yet, no central point or other arrangement across 
government agencies consciously acknowledges this impact and accepts the responsibility for using it to 
shape the supplier market. This is an important cause of weaknesses in this market. Weaknesses include: 
 many providers being in a precarious financial position, only one contract away from going under; 
 some providers lacking the resources to invest in staff training, innovation, evaluation and adequate IT 
systems; 
 a lack of trust and good relationships in many cases between government agencies and providers; and 
 government agencies becoming too dependent on particular providers for some services. 
Submissions offered different perspectives on the problematic effects of government contracting on the 
provider market. Examples include: 
A loss of a single contract can make some providers unviable and, over time, this can lead to just one 
provider in an area. Then, even if service quality is not of a high standard, government can be ‘stuck’ 
with funding that provider because no-one else is left to provide the service. (NGO Health and 
Disability Network, sub. 70, p. 8) 
An alternative way to look at this issue is to cast “mutual dependency” as the essence of partnership. 
There may be risks for government agencies and service providers in monopsony/monopoly situations, 
but this is an inherent feature of New Zealand being a small market. Attempting to introduce 
competition among service providers where there is not sufficient capacity or capability tends to 
damage the limited capacity or capability that is available, with a corresponding decrease and 
disruption to the quantity or quality of the services available. There are real examples where this has 
happened in the last few years. (Carers New Zealand, sub. 711, p. 7) 
Clients need choice. They need to be able to choose between providers based on culture, the services 
they deliver and whether it best meets their unique needs. Where and who a client receives services 
from is usually decided by a government agency and client choice is not readily supported.  
However funding hundreds of small non-government agencies to achieve provider diversity costs not 
only in terms of contract management and auditing but is compromising the sustainability of the entire 
system. (Wise Group, sub. 41, p. 25) 
 
Reasons for government overlooking its potential to shape the ecosystem of social services providers 
include: 
 individual parts of government each focusing on their own contracts without seeing the big picture and 
the overall impact of government purchasing behaviour; 
 tight budget limits lead government agencies to underfund some contracts; 
 insufficient understanding of providers’ ability to manage risk; and 
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 predominant use of “competition for the market” as opposed to “competition in the market”, and 
failing to understand the difference in terms of their risk implications for, and other effects on, providers.  
 
 
 F4.7  Government agencies have overlooked their potential to shape and manage the 
market for social services contracts. Consequently, the market is not performing as well 
as it could. 
 
 
Limits to contracting out 
There is a long history of attempts to improve the delivery of social services (Chapter 2). The public service 
has pursued “streamlined contracting” and “contracting for outcomes” for the last two decades, with 
limited results in implementing them and achieving better performance.  
The complaints that have surfaced in submissions and in the Commission’s engagement meetings with 
providers indicate that contracting is a pain point – the place where problems show up. Yet these problems 
often have deeper causes. Full resolution is likely in most cases to require changes to the wider system 
rather than fiddling with contractual details and tendering processes. This is not to say that improvements 
to contracting would not be worthwhile (Chapter 12). 
Contracting out and in-house provision are natural approaches for ministers and government agencies 
because they enable top-down control and management of political risk. But that top-down control comes 
at a considerable cost – lack of innovation, and frustrated providers who are inhibited in their ability to 
provide responsive, integrated services.  
When contracting out gives a single provider a geographic monopoly for the duration of the contract, 
clients are disempowered and denied choices about services and providers.  
So there appear to be natural limits to what can be achieved within top-down approaches, especially when 
there are no agreed measures of value-for-money of different interventions. This makes it important to 
develop measures of value and explore other approaches. Chapters 5 and 6 examine the questions of 
institutional design and the commissioning of social services to help develop alternative approaches that 
perform better. 
 
 
 F4.8  Contracting models that give a service provider a geographic monopoly for the 
duration of a contract deny clients a choice of services and providers, and create a poor 
incentive for providers to deliver good services to clients. 
 
 
 
 
 F4.9  Problems with contracting out are often symptoms of deeper causes such as the desire 
to exert top-down control to limit political risk. Letting go of central control will require 
agreed measures of the value created by social services, and a willingness to explore 
different institutional designs and approaches to commissioning. 
 
 
Missed opportunities for early intervention 
As observed in Chapter 2, the current system does not invest in early interventions to the extent warranted 
by the strong evidence on the high rates of return to such investments. The underlying reasons for this 
under-investment are likely to be: 
 lack of measures and data that enable quantification of the value of such investments (again the 
exception is MSD’s Investment Approach, which quantifies the effects far into the future of current 
interventions); 
 short political horizons that may make investments unattractive where the payoffs appear only well 
beyond those horizons; 
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 uncertainty about whether the long-term benefits of the investments will actually be realised because 
they may not be implemented well; and 
 shifting social-services investment towards prevention rather than “picking up the pieces” entails a 
period where fiscal costs rise before they fall. Funding these costs will not be easy in a period of fiscal 
constraint. 
Obstacles to change 
Sometimes the cause of persistent system under-performance is that change is disruptive and will inevitably 
be threatening for some. It is useful to identify different types of obstacles to system change.  
Investment in the status quo 
Healthcare of New Zealand Holdings noted that many people and organisations have much investment in 
the current design and operation of the social services system. 
The health sector is highly resistant to change despite significant evidence to suggest that a 
fundamental reorientation of the health system is required to cope with the challenge of an ageing 
population. This resistance to change is likely the result of a combination of factors including: 
entrenched interests, fiscal concerns and a short term horizon for decision making. (sub. 51, p. 16) 
New Zealand Organisation for Rare Disorders made similar remarks about officials: 
…officials are mostly strongly wedded to the status quo. Their focus on political risk management, 
cautious budget management, extremely cautious approaches to any other risks, and their investment 
in the system as it is, leads to a lack of willingness or opportunity for creative and flexible approaches. 
(sub. 89, p. 12) 
All reforms create winners and losers. And prospective losers tend to push back harder than prospective 
winners (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Those with a significant stake in the status quo have a natural 
inclination to resist change. This complicates any objective interpretation of resistance to change: is that 
resistance based on good reasons, or does it reflect self-interest, or a mixture of both? 
Seeing only a small part of the system 
The culture of “getting the best for my client” by working the system often permeates the delivery of social 
services. Mansell (2015, p. 78) observed this culture when teaching doctor-patient ethics: 
Under the old services-focused accountability and incentives model that focuses on inputs and outputs 
and where the centre makes allocative decisions, the mental model of the actors within the system 
could be characterised as ‘How do I adapt to the system, or subvert it, to secure a better outcome for 
patients?’… The primary obligation was to work around the system to meet the needs of the patient.  
This culture, with participants in each part of the system taking a narrow view, is likely to lead to a poor 
overall allocation of resources (on both equity and efficiency grounds) and an over-investment in lobbying. 
Palmerston North Community Services Council notes how hard it can be to view the system as a whole: 
…the complexity of the contracting environment and the government sector means that while 
organisations often have a handle on how their own contracts work they do not necessarily know about, 
or understand, how all the different contracts with other organisations affect the sector as a whole. Even 
PNCSC as an umbrella organisation finds it difficult to properly comprehend the context in which we 
operate. (sub. 125, p. 3) 
 
Competing worldviews 
Strongly held worldviews interact with knowledge gaps to create wide differences of opinion on many 
subjects among system participants. The diversity of opinion on the desirable size and organisational form 
(for-profit versus not-for-profit) of providers offers a good example (Box 4.3). 
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Systemic change is a long-term process that requires a broad consensus on problem definition, causes and 
solutions. The Commission has been struck by the degree to which system participants shared a genuine 
commitment to the same ends – yet were sometimes miles apart on the means. 
The strong sense of mission of social services providers offers many advantages (Appendix F), but can 
create a formidable barrier to change should it lead to intransigence over means. Partnerships require 
Box 4.3 Submissions on the desirable size and organisational form of providers 
Submitters offered contrasting and conflicting views on the desirable size and organisational form (for-
profit versus not-for-profit) of social service providers. 
New Zealand Council of Trade Unions: 
The community and voluntary sector needs more resourcing rather than face unfair competition 
from large scale corporate providers. (sub. 103, p. 14) 
Blind Foundation: 
There has been a significant increase in the number of individual contract arrangements … Often 
the rationale for this is that community based organisations are able to add value at a local level 
but we are not aware whether this has been demonstrated. (sub. 16, p. 14) 
The Impact Collective: 
We strongly advocate a move away from vertical and centralised purchasing via large corporate 
generalist NGOs to a client-centric and community focused model that facilitates the horizontal 
integration of service providers within each region. (sub. 130, pp. 18–19) 
Otago Youth Wellness Trust: 
While large international/national Providers, with corporate cultures may offer the Funder 
economies of scale and some surety their lack of local knowledge can stifle innovation and 
discourage flexibility. When large Provider organisations respond only to contracted specifications 
there is no incentive to work proactively or to have regard for community strengths and assets. 
(sub. 73, p. 16) 
Barnardos: 
The number of non-government agencies within the social services sector is a factor that needs to 
be addressed within an effective and efficient system. It is very difficult to have a system that 
consciously manages issues of sustainability, quality, staff development and retention, capacity 
building etc, and at the same time has an agnostic attitude to the type and number of providers 
that exist… Barnardos realise that this is a contentious issue … New Zealand has a small 
population and a limited pool of both public and private funding. How thinly do we want to 
spread funding? How many client management and payroll systems do we want to create? Do we 
really have enough skilled people to sit on hundreds of effective governance boards? Why should 
families have to deal with ten different organisations to get what they need? (sub. 12, p. 9) 
Footsteps Education: 
Generally private businesses already have people with knowledge, good structure, management, 
financial accountability, stability and reporting practice. They generally have the skills and 
knowledge to be successful and to make the social service they are providing work for the benefit 
to the receiver. (sub. 42, p. 9) 
New Zealand Nurses Organisation: 
The aged care sector is a case in point. Smaller local providers are gradually being overtaken by 
large multinational providers yielding sustained high returns to their shareholders. Their target in 
development is around the profit share, and this can and has resulted in service gaps, and poorer, 
less equitable, access than with other models. (sub. 133, p. 16) 
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compromise and flexibility on all sides, and strongly held worldviews can be a barrier to constructive 
partnership. 
 
 
 F4.10  Previous attempts to reform social services have often struggled because of competing 
“worldviews” that inhibit agreement on problem definitions and the underlying causes 
of problems. 
 
 
Organisational culture  
Organisational culture can be defined as the set of beliefs, values and tacit assumptions that influence the 
behaviour of people working for an organisation (Schein, 2013). These include commonly held notions 
around the factors that are important for organisational success and how success is best achieved (NZPC, 
2014b).  
Organisational culture can be hugely positive for organisational performance, yet problems arise when 
deeply embedded assumptions restrict the ability of the organisation to adapt to changes in its external 
environment. One example is when the established “way of doing things” acts as a barrier to adopting new 
approaches to delivering services.  
There is a saying ‘culture eats strategy for breakfast’ – meaning culture in an organisation plays a 
defining role in how the organisation performs – how it innovates and how it operates in a changing 
landscape. That’s the case for both the government and for the Social Sector. The impact of culture 
and leadership is evident in EVERY service area. (Age Concern New Zealand, sub. 100, p. 11) 
In our view, the success of the Government’s change to funding for outcomes with integrated contracts 
depends on achieving a complete change of culture in the funding agencies and the providers of 
Family Start. This will take some time and good, consistent leadership. (Myra Harpham and Jennifer 
Coote, sub. 102, p. 16) 
Paternalistic cultures that engender a “we know what’s best for you” approach to delivering services can, 
while well-meaning, inhibit change and be disempowering for clients. 
Government officials often think they know best when in the disability sector they often don’t and the 
real innovation which is in the community is either lost or not funded through the Government 
initiatives that Officials develop. (Workbridge, sub. 102, p. 9) 
Historically, disability support and services have been heavily steeped in paternalistic and charity 
approaches. Thanks to the civil rights, women’s rights and disabled people’s rights movements’ things 
have moved on.  
However, many disability support services are still operating in old and outdated frameworks and 
policies, and not realising disabled people can determine their own lives. Whilst the Government have 
developed some high level principles of engagement and a few small pilot programmes looking at 
changing disability support services, most decisions continue to be made with little or no regard to the 
voice and perspectives of disabled people or the expertise of disabled advocates and Disabled 
Person’s Organisations. The overall impression is that Government systems are still largely operating in 
paternalistic frameworks. (Disabled Peoples Assembly, sub. 54, p. 6) 
 
 
 
 F4.11  The organisational cultures of providers and government agencies tend to be resistant 
to change and can be paternalistic towards clients.   
 
Table 4.1 provides a summary of the underlying causes of the system weaknesses identified in Chapter 2. 
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Table 4.1 Summary of weaknesses and their underlying causes  
Weakness Underlying causes 
Trouble dealing with multiple and inter-
dependent problems 
Reliance on traditional government institutions and structures; vertical 
service delivery and accountability arrangements. 
Little visibility of the services (or 
interventions) that work well and those that 
do not 
No agreed measures of value; few mechanisms to capture information; 
fragmented information systems; performance management processes 
that are built around accountability requirements rather than learning 
and knowledge sharing. 
Too little innovation and learning  Prescriptive contracts aimed at minimising political risk; competitive 
tendering processes that reduce incentives to share information. Lack 
of positive incentives to innovate. 
Excessive transaction costs  Tightly prescribed systems and processes aimed at minimising political 
risk (but creating a paper trail), overuse of contracts as a method of 
allocating funding. 
Poorly coordinated government processes Reliance on traditional government institutions and forms of 
organisation; lack of overall system view and stewardship. 
Poor targeting of services to needs Decisions made by officials at a distance from clients (and lack 
information on client-specific circumstances); few mechanisms for 
capturing information on the services and interventions that are 
successful. 
Missed opportunities for early intervention Fragmented service delivery and accountability arrangements, making 
it difficult to see the holistic requirements of clients; short-term political 
horizons; lack of transparent measures of value; fiscal limits 
constraining attempts to invest in prevention. 
Too little evaluation of existing services Desire to avoid the political risks of finding programmes are 
ineffective; lack of agreed measures of value; reporting requirements 
focused on narrow accountability rather than outcomes and learning. 
Financial and capability weaknesses among 
providers 
Inadequate management of the provider market; over-use of the 
contracting-out model; tight funding of contracts. 
 
4.4 Scope for system improvement 
Armed with insight and understanding about the main causes of under-performance in the social services 
system, it is possible to start developing constructive solutions that neutralise or at least mitigate their 
effects. The Commission has followed this approach. Its analysis and proposals for system reform are 
covered in Part Two of this report. The areas where the Commission sees the most scope for beneficial 
change (to be covered in depth in subsequent chapters) include: 
 purposeful stewardship by the government of the overall system within which social services are 
delivered (Chapter 5); 
 a more sophisticated and systematic approach to commissioning social services (Chapter 6); 
 increased visibility of the full range of benefits and costs of different services for different client types 
(Chapters 6, 8 and 9);  
 a system that learns and innovates (Chapter 7); 
 greater use of data and analytics (Chapter 8);  
 arrangements and incentives that promote service integration where integration is important for 
effectiveness (Chapter 10); 
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 greater use of client-directed and other devolved approaches (Chapters 5, 6, 7, 8, 11 and 13); 
 improved contracting and purchasing (Chapter 12); and 
 openness to opportunities to partner with Mäori groups to meet their aspirations and needs 
(Chapter 13).  
Dealing with individuals and families with multiple and inter-related needs is a particular challenge. This 
challenge is not unique to New Zealand, and defies simple solutions. What is clear is that well-intentioned 
people are attempting to solve complex problems in somewhat of a vacuum of information about what 
works, why it works, who it works for and how much it costs.  
It is also clear that exhortation – calls to “do better”, “collaborate more” or “innovate” – is insufficient to 
drive behavioural or system change. Change initiatives need to be properly grounded in an understanding 
of the institutions in which people work and the incentives that they face. 
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Part Two: What is needed 
for improvement? 
Part One listed many reported shortcomings of the social services system. These shortcomings have been 
known for a long time. They remain despite well-intentioned attempts to address them. Some, perhaps 
many, of those attempts treated symptoms, rather than identifying and addressing underlying causes that 
arise from the way the overall system operates.  
Part Two explores what is needed to make the social services system more effective. 
 Chapter 5 sets out and explores the strengths and weaknesses of two broad institutional architectures 
that can be used to commission and deliver social services. It finds that decentralised approaches offer 
significant advantages over the status quo. 
 Chapter 6 explains and explores commissioning – the set of important inter-related tasks that need to 
be undertaken to turn policy objectives into effective social services. 
 Chapter 7 makes the case that improving social services requires a system that learns – one that tries a 
variety of innovative approaches, selects what works, ditches what does not, and expands successful 
approaches. 
 Chapter 8 describes the opportunities increasingly offered by expanded datasets, new information 
technologies and data analytics to track the value add of services for different types of clients, and how 
this can greatly improve return on investment. It explores ways to expand data sharing safely to increase 
innovation and effectiveness. 
 Chapter 9 explains the Government’s Investment Approach, and argues for it to be extended. It 
explains social insurance, using the Accident Compensation Corporation and Australia’s National 
Disability Insurance Scheme as examples. 
 Chapter 10 explains how different types of service integration affect outcomes for clients, and why lack 
of integration is a common problem. The chapter reports evidence of positive effects from efforts to 
integrate. Devolved, bottom-up approaches offer the most promise. 
 Chapter 11 makes the case that greater devolution of choice and control to individual service users will 
produce better outcomes in many situations. The chapter explores the mechanisms and models that 
could empower service users, increase choice and spark innovation. 
 Chapter 12 proposes ways to improve purchasing practices and the design and management of 
contracts between government agencies and non-government providers of social services. 
 Chapter 13 explores the inquiry’s themes and findings from a Mäori perspective, including Mäori 
concepts of respect and caring, Treaty obligations, and what the Treaty means for partnership and 
devolution in social services. It describes the governance arrangements of several Mäori-Crown 
collaborations on social services.  
Part Three covers the implementation of the Commission’s recommendations.
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5 Institutional architecture 
Key points 
 Responsibility for the social services system is shared. Individuals and those in their natural support 
networks (family, friends, workplaces etc.) have responsibility for social outcomes. Collective 
responsibility for supporting people in need is expressed through a plethora of organisations and 
institutions, including government. 
 Governments have paid considerable attention over the years to developing programmes and 
initiatives aimed at specific social services or client groups. Relatively little attention has been paid 
to the overall system design. The current arrangements may not be the best of available options. 
 This chapter adopts the term institutional architecture to describe the design of a social services 
system. It focuses on the design choices available to government. Two broad architectural designs 
are applicable to social services. The main distinction is who has the responsibility to design and 
commission services.  
- Top-down control means that primary decision-making power sits with the relevant minister or 
chief executive of the agency. 
- Decentralisation transfers substantial decision-making power to semi-autonomous 
organisations with separate governance. It is used to varying degrees, particularly in health and 
education. Social insurance is a special case of decentralisation that assigns both decision-
making power and liability for future costs to an insurer. 
 The crucial consideration in choosing between architectures is under which architecture decision 
makers have authority, information, capability and incentives to make and implement decisions 
that maximise social returns. 
 No architecture performs well for all needs and in all circumstances. And similarly, no architecture 
always performs poorly. However, the social services system would be improved by greater and 
smarter use of delegation and devolution. 
 Because of the need to accommodate services and clients with highly varied characteristics, the 
social services system is likely to comprise several different architectures. This creates a need to 
manage the boundaries between different architectures.  
 There are some important roles that government cannot delegate. Government is the major funder 
of social services, and only Parliament, led by the government of the day, can legislate and assign 
regulatory powers. Government has responsibility for the “enabling environment” for the social 
services system.  
 Institutional architecture and the enabling environment require active management if social 
services are to be effective. This active management is the role of a system steward. The current 
arrangements fall somewhat short of what is required of a system steward. 
Government has a unique role in the social services system. It is the major funder of social services, and has 
statutory and regulatory powers unavailable to other participants. Government needs to take responsibility 
for system stewardship, and for making considered decisions that shape the system. 
Chapter 6 introduces the concept of commissioning – making informed, deliberate choices about service 
design. Effective commissioning is fundamental to well-functioning social services, and that chapter 
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examines the best ways to commission services, and the capabilities required by commissioning 
organisations. 
But there is an important conceptual and practical question to be answered before commissioning 
commences – who is best placed to commission social services? That question is the primary subject of this 
chapter. 
Such decisions can result in the creation, re-arrangement and removal of government and sometimes non-
government organisations. Those organisations, and their roles, responsibilities and interactions, largely 
define the institutional architecture of a social services system. 
Splitting the who and the how of commissioning into two chapters may appear somewhat arbitrary. This 
split may be less-than-obvious in real-life examples of policy development. However, the split emphasises 
that: 
 Two decisions are being made, even if one is implicit or made by default. 
 These decisions have different natural lifetimes. Decisions about institutional architecture may be 
expected to last a decade or more, while commissioning decisions may be re-visited every few years. 
 The responsibilities of commissioning organisations vary. One may be responsible for commissioning a 
single service, while another could manage a commissioning “pipeline” with hundreds of services. 
Government also has responsibility for the “enabling environment” for the social services system 
(section 5.5). Three enablers are particularly relevant to improvements in social services: budget 
appropriations, data infrastructure and regulation. 
5.1 The broader context of social support 
Responsibility for the social services system is shared. Individuals and those in their natural support 
networks (family, friends, workplaces etc.) have responsibility for social outcomes.  
…it is hard to consider the effectiveness and efficiency of government funding for the production of 
social services without looking at the interface between government production and family production, 
and government production and community production. (John Angus, sub. 109, p. 5) 
Whilst few NGOs will report this, the most vulnerable people in NZ will not go to them for help. The 
most vulnerable will turn first to a family member or friend. (Richard Wood, sub. 18, p. 1) 
Collective responsibility for supporting people in need is expressed through a plethora of organisations and 
institutions, including government. While the decentralised arrangements discussed and recommended in 
this chapter move decision making further away from ministers and departmental heads, they do not go 
very far towards answering the more basic question of where the boundaries of responsibility best lie. It is 
clear that these boundaries have shifted over time (Chapter 2). 
Some demographic and social changes will likely lead to increased pressure on government and 
government-funded social services (Chapter 2). For example: 
…the trend for more women participating in the paid workforce is reducing the number and calibre of 
people available for volunteering. (Waimakariri District Council, sub. 75, p. 3) 
While most would agree that social problems are usually best resolved by individuals and their families, the 
reality is that not all individuals and families are functional or capable, and sometimes others – such as 
communities or the state – need to assist. 
Some inquiry participants felt that this could best be addressed by local communities, and the providers 
associated with them, taking a leading role, with government as a largely passive funder. The Commission 
believes that the social services system would be improved by greater and smarter use of delegation and 
devolution. Yet this decentralisation cannot be entirely unfettered, because democratic principles mean that 
there must be appropriate accountability to Parliament for how funds are spent.  
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No simple solution is likely to suffice. There is a complex nexus of expectations and responsibilities that link 
individuals, families, social networks, voluntary/collective organisations and the public sector. There are a 
variety of views about those expectations and responsibilities, and some are politically contested.  
Government should be cautious in extending its responsibility, and do so only where there is evidence of 
wide community backing for such an extension, and reasonable expectation of being effective. A wider 
debate may be required about where the boundaries of responsibility for social services best lie. 
There is a need for careful consideration and open dialogue of the responsibilities that should be 
tagged to volunteers and community groups, vis-à-vis families, non-government social service 
providers, and the state. (Social Sector Trials leads, sub. 126, p. 3) 
Crowding out through government service provision? 
The concern is sometimes expressed that an expanding role in social services for government is simply 
“crowding out” – substituting for – voluntary/collective efforts. This view suggests there is no net gain to 
government taking on additional responsibilities. 
The Chairman of Australia’s National Disability Insurance Agency pointed out that family has an ongoing 
role in caring for family, with judicious support from government. He noted that government is a minority 
provider of disability support: 
With 80% of supports for people with disability being provided informally by families and friends and 
20% by governments, every 1 percentage point decline in informal support capacity has led to about a 
5% increase in demand for government funded disability services. (Bonyhady, 2014a, p. 3) 
On the other hand, caring by family members can have an opportunity cost if it means those carers are 
excluded from the regular job market. In recommending a National Disability Insurance Scheme, the 
Australian Productivity Commission:  
…concluded that the economic benefits of the Scheme would significantly outweigh the costs, 
estimating that the NDIS would add close to 1% of GDP, primarily through increased employment 
opportunities for people with disability and their carers. (Bonyhady, 2014a, p. 4) 
Also, from the perspective of many not-for-profit (NFP) providers, demand for their services is higher than 
they can meet. Should government take on part of that demand, there are still plenty of clients that could 
benefit from the voluntarily provided services. 
This discussion suggests that the “crowding out” effects of government service provision will depend on 
the specific service details. 
5.2 Governments have paid relatively little attention to 
institutional architecture  
Over the years, governments and government agencies have paid considerable attention to developing 
programmes and initiatives aimed at specific social services or client groups. Yet relatively little attention 
has been paid to the overall system design.22  
It is possible that current arrangements do not represent the best of available options. Circumstances 
change, and ideal designs become less ideal unless systems learn, evolve and, when necessary, take bold 
steps. 
Chapters 2 and 4 listed many reported shortcomings of the social services system, and some of their 
potential causes. These shortcomings have been known for a long time. They remain despite well-
intentioned attempts to address them. Some, perhaps many, of those attempts treated symptoms, rather 
than identifying and addressing underlying causes that arise from the way the overall system operates.  
22 Health is an exception to this general statement. “Since 1983 the New Zealand public health sector has undergone four structural transformations. With 
each change there has been a new set of organisations to fund and deliver health services: 1983-1993 Area Health Boards (AHBs); 1993-1997 Regional 
Health Authorities (RHAs) and Crown Health Enterprises (CHEs); 1998-2001 Health Funding Authority (HFA) and Hospital and Health Services (HHSs); and 
2001 District Health Boards (DHBs).” (New Zealand Medical Association, sub. 39, p. 5) 
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This chapter adopts the term institutional architecture to describe the high-level design of a social services 
system. It focuses on the design choices available to government. These choices cover the government 
organisations involved, their roles and authority, and the basis of their relationships with other system 
participants. Making those choices – and choosing well – is the responsibility of government, acting on 
behalf of its citizens. Citizens have multiple, potentially conflicting, interests in the social services system, 
including as clients, future clients and taxpayers. 
It is crucial that the institutional architecture supports the features of well-functioning social services system 
discussed in Chapters 1 and 4. Poor architectural choices are difficult and costly to remedy at lower levels of 
the system, if indeed they can be remedied at all. 
5.3 Broad architectural designs 
Two broad architectural designs are applicable to social services: top-down control and decentralisation. 
Social insurance is an important special case of decentralisation. The main distinction is who has the 
responsibility to design and commission services.  
 Top-down control means that primary decision-making power sits with the relevant minister or 
department head. 
 Decentralisation transfers substantial decision-making power to semi-autonomous organisations with 
separate governance. Social insurance assigns both decision-making power and liability for future costs 
to an insurer. 
The following subsections explore these broad architectures and some important variants of them. Table 
5.1 lists these architectures and their variants, along with some New Zealand examples. 
Table 5.1 Institutional architectures with New Zealand examples  
Broad architecture Variant New Zealand example 
Top-down control Classic Department of Corrections 
 Investment approach Ministry of Social Development1 
Decentralisation Place-based District Health Boards 
 National Pharmac 
 Community of interest Whänau Ora commissioning agencies 
 Co-governance Te Hiku Social Accord 
 Social insurance Accident Compensation Corporation 
Notes: 
1. At the present time the Investment Approach applies to income support and employment services only. 
 
Top-down control 
Top-down control of social services is common in New Zealand. This section distinguishes between 
“classic” top-down control, and top-down control with the investment approach. 
Classic top-down control 
Top-down control is implemented in practice through hierarchical structures. Top-down control facilitates 
strong risk management, but tends to dampen innovation because: 
 experiments are subject to tight specification, reducing the possibility of serendipitous findings; 
 experimentation is limited to relatively “safe” dimensions; and 
 pressure to adopt “best practice” can lead to a one-off improvement, but eliminate service variations 
that might form the basis of future best practice. (Chapter 7) 
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Top-down control emphasises standardisation. Performance is driven through setting measures and targets 
and holding agencies to account for their delivery (see Box 5.1). But top-down control is limited in its ability 
to adapt services to the needs of specific clients and to local circumstances. The services provided by 
different organisations may be poorly integrated. Top-down control is likely to be inefficient where there is 
substantial variation in these needs and circumstances, particularly when the relevant information is not 
available centrally. 
Likewise, the strong accountability of top-down control creates incentives to limit effective performance 
measurement and evaluation (Chapter 8). These are more likely to deliver bad news than good, from the 
perspective of those who might be held accountable. 
The need for transparency and accountability under budget rules means that attention of both ministers 
and third parties focuses on dimensions that can be readily measured. As a consequence, social services 
programmes are often assessed in the political arena in terms of budgetary commitments (ie, dollars spent) 
rather than in terms of client outcomes. But dollars spent may bear little relation to actual outcomes 
achieved. 
Top-down control with the investment approach 
The Investment Approach (Chapter 3) contains features that potentially improve on the less desirable 
characteristics of top-down control. It does this primarily through creating new performance measures (eg, 
future benefit liability, return on investment), which can be aggregated within silos and compared across 
silos. These are much better measures on which to hold political decision makers accountable than the 
typical alternative of dollars spent.  
An expanded investment approach could increase cross-organisational cooperation and reduce incentives 
for cost and risk shifting (Chapter 9). 
The investment approach within a top-down control architecture also permits rapid experimentation on at 
least some dimensions, led from the operational rather than the policy arm of the organisation. 
The investment approach – particularly if broadened along the lines discussed in Chapter 9 – may mitigate 
some, but not all, of the problematic aspects of top-down control. Better performance measures can only 
mitigate the risks of quality shading if they capture all relevant aspects of quality, which is inherently difficult 
to do.  
An investment approach improves the information available to top-down controllers. This enables (but does 
not require) tighter monitoring of frontline staff and providers. Such monitoring can conflict with staff trust 
and loyalty (Frey, 1993). Greater monitoring can be de-motivating if staff perceive it as a sign of distrust. 
Increased monitoring supports increased service specification, with likely negative effects on efficient 
adaptation to local and client circumstances. 
Box 5.1 Using targets to drive performance 
Le Grand (2007) uses the terms “targets and performance management” and “targets and terror” to 
describe top-down control. These terms reflect the usual approach to improving service delivery under 
such models. Targets defined at a high level and driven downwards can create substantial one-off 
performance improvements.  
Targets are less sustainable over the long term as organisations find ways to “game the system”; that 
is, increase their measured performance in ways that do not improve the “real” or intended outcome. 
It is typically necessary for governments to revise targets frequently. A downside of constantly moving 
targets is the de-motivation of staff (Le Grand, 2007).  
Quality shading is another problem in target-driven systems. Quality shading means increased effort to 
achieve measured targets at the expense of lowered effort on non-measured aspects of service quality 
(Appendix F). 
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While the Investment Approach has been conceived as an adjunct to top-down control, it is not intrinsically 
tied to that architecture. With appropriate supporting infrastructure, some – perhaps all – of its advantages 
may be available in decentralised architectures. 
Considerations for choosing to use top-down control  
In some cases top-down control will be the option that best balances competing requirements. Demands 
for political accountability will always be high for the use of coercion, and top-down control is good at 
providing accountability for procedural correctness when coercive powers are used (eg, statutory child 
protection). And it can be efficient to bundle other services with the use of coercive powers. 
Top-down control emphasises accountability and responsiveness, but at the expense of collaboration, 
flexibility and innovation: 
In my experience the discourse on coordination, cooperation and collaboration across government 
departments in the social services sector, in particular around families and children, has gone on in 
Wellington for at least 30 years. The current Minister of Finance himself has been speaking about it for 
24 years. Unfortunately little has changed. What has been put in place is a succession of new 
cooperative initiatives with aspirational programmes and even more aspirational names, but the reality 
does not match the rhetoric… 
Much of what drives non-collaborative behaviour is issues of accountability and power. The new public 
management paradigm in the late 1980s set in place very strong lines of vertical accountability from 
front-line to the Minister. While an excellent initiative it did make cross-departmental collaboration 
more difficult.  
A second even more important factor is power. Collaboration requires some devolution of power from 
the centre. The executive arm of government in NZ is characterised by a very strong and deliberate 
nexus of power between individual ministers and their CEs, sustained by the two common ministerial 
goals in the social services of leaving a legacy of programmes and pleasing the 9th floor of the Beehive. 
(John Angus, sub. 109, p. 7) 
Where top-down control remains the best option, it needs to be designed with an eye to achieving 
integration when appropriate. For example, statutory powers are often exercised in situations where clients 
have multiple, inter-dependent needs. It is in such situations where collaboration across silos is particularly 
important. The difficulties of achieving integration suggests that there should be preference for greater use 
of decentralised approaches where possible. 
 
 
 F5.1  Top-down control has significant limitations. Expanded use of other architectures may 
achieve substantial improvements in the performance of social services.  
 
Decentralisation 
Decentralisation can overcome some of the challenges posed by top-down control. It can include a greater 
range of actors and capabilities in decision making, which can lead to improved decisions. Where 
decentralisation moves decision-making to the communities affected by those commissioning decisions it 
can enable and empower those communities to improve their wellbeing (see Chapter 13 for a discussion of 
this in the Mäori context). 
Greater decentralisation may reduce the impact of the incentives that work against innovation in the core 
public sector. These are explained more fully in Chapter 4 (section 4.3). Briefly, political risk and the rigidity 
it engenders can pose barriers to diversity and experimentation. This rigidity also means that the current 
system exerts overly strong pressure to select “safe” services that are unlikely to cause political problems 
for responsible officials and ministers. 
Although there are potential benefits, greater decentralisation requires careful consideration. There are 
many different influences on organisational effectiveness and many different attributes of institutional 
design that can be varied. Optimising one attribute, such as the level of decision making, can be at the 
expense of other attributes important for organisational effectiveness.  
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This section is not a full analysis of all the costs and benefits of different decentralised institutional forms. 
Such assessments can only be made for specific proposals. Rather the section contrasts the features of 
some different forms of decentralisation with each other, and with top-down control architectures. 
For this discussion, three core concepts need to be distinguished: 
 Administrative decentralisation describes the re-distribution of authority and responsibility away from 
central government. Delegation and devolution – forms that are of most interest to this inquiry – lie in a 
continuum of forms of decentralisation.  
 Through delegation central governments transfer responsibility for decision-making and administration 
of public functions to semi-autonomous organizations not wholly controlled by the central government, 
but ultimately accountable to it (The World Bank Group, 2001).  
 When governments devolve functions, they transfer authority for decision-making, finance, and 
management to quasi-autonomous units… In a devolved system, [quasi-autonomous units] have clear 
and legally recognized geographical boundaries over which they exercise authority and within which 
they perform public functions (The World Bank Group, 2001). 
Figure 5.1 shows some of the considerations that have shaped decisions about delegation and devolution. 
Figure 5.1 Considerations shaping delegation and devolution   
 
This subsection examines four types of decentralisation, based on place, national service agency, 
community of interest, and co-governance. 
Place-based devolution 
Many submitters drew the Commission’s attention to the disadvantages of centralised decision-making. For 
example: 
…centralised decision-making [is] too often disadvantaging to isolated, smaller or rural regions … 
cultural and regional needs [are] not well enough considered, especially in rural areas. (National Council 
of Women of New Zealand, sub. 20, p. 2) 
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problems related to poverty even 
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…local decision making is critical to service delivery. Social services have developed as a response to 
the needs of different communities. There is a risk that decisions made at the national level may not 
account for regional variation. (Supporting Families in Mental Illness New Zealand, sub. 49, p. 7) 
Other submitters identified costs imposed by additional levels of decision-making and reporting: 
As a national organisation we work directly with few government purchasers who centrally manage 
contracts. It would significantly increase our overhead costs if we had to negotiate individual 
agreements at a regional level, if for instance DHBs were given responsibility for the local purchase of 
sensory disability services. (Blind Foundation, sub. 16, p. 14) 
For one major contract, RA is currently required to write about 35 narrative reports quarterly to meet 
reporting requirements for different funding streams (regional and central funding). (Relationships 
Aotearoa, sub. 56, p. 8) 
It is instructive to look at two New Zealand examples of place-based devolution: DHBs and local 
government. 
District Health Boards 
New Zealand has 20 DHBs. Each DHB is governed by a board of up to 11 members. DHB boards set the 
overall strategic direction for the DHB and monitor its performance. The Minister of Health appoints up to 
four members to each board, and the board’s chair and deputy chair. Seven members are publicly elected 
every three years at the time of local government elections. DHBs have both a funding arm (which 
purchases services for the district) and a provider arm (largely hospitals). 
DHBs are reliant on central government for almost all their funding. They operate in a complex environment 
of legislation, regulation and contracts with central government. While these place significant constraints on 
their policy and operational flexibility, some DHBs have managed to be quite innovative within these limits 
(Chapter 3).  
However, partly because of this tight funding accountability to the Ministry of Health, the New Zealand 
public tends to consider the Minister of Health to be accountable for health services. As an institutional 
form, DHBs appear to be relatively ineffective in muting the political risks of the Minister of Health.  
Local government  
Significant responsibilities for social services are devolved to local and state governments in many other 
countries. Local government in New Zealand is much less involved in social services (such as education) than 
its counterparts in other jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom.  
That said, local government makes an important contribution to social services. Local Government New 
Zealand (LGNZ) submitted several examples: 
 Social sector trials which are partnerships of government agencies, third sector agencies, local 
government and Iwi providers;  
 The Mayors’ Taskforce for Jobs which adapts funding from national programmes to address local 
circumstances;  
 The provision of supported facilities that provide a base for local social service agencies, thus 
enhancing community access to services, reducing agency costs and improving inter-agency 
information flows; and  
 The establishment of the Wellington Strategic Coordination Group which brings together the 
leaders of key central-government agencies, reduces duplication and agrees priorities. (LGNZ, 
sub. 124, p. 2) 
Territorial authorities are often involved in social housing (LGNZ, sub. 124; Wellington City Council, 
sub. 43). Wellington and Christchurch City Councils are the second and third largest social landlords in 
New Zealand.  
Contributions to social services are determined by councils in line with their priorities. Box 5.2 illustrates two 
different stances taken by councils. 
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Some submitters argued for an increased role for local government in social services (eg, Noelene 
Buckland, sub. 61). However, devolving responsibility for social services to territorial authorities would 
require a significant reshaping of the role of local authorities. 
Although LGNZ (sub. 124, p. 3) has indicated limited interest in discussing the potential for locally pooled 
budgets in some areas (such as skill training), the Commission finds little reason to support the large-scale 
devolution of responsibilities for social services to local government.  
Australia and the United Kingdom both have significant State and local government responsibility for social 
services, yet those countries’ social services systems are reported to suffer from much the same systemic 
problems as New Zealand (eg, Haldenby, Harries & Olliff-Cooper, 2014; Harper et al., 2015). Devolving 
social service responsibilities to local government does not appear to be a solution to the problems 
identified in Chapter 4. 
 
 
 F5.2  The case for large-scale devolution of responsibilities for social services to local 
government does not appear strong in New Zealand. It would not resolve some 
significant problems of the current architecture. 
 
That said, the Government should be open to councils choosing to take an expanded role in providing or 
coordinating social services for the populations they serve. 
National (service-agency based) delegation 
It is possible to delegate functions within government, rather than to communities of place or interest. This 
kind of delegation involves a structural separation between ministries and semi-autonomous entities. 
Delegation can improve on top-down control where delegated decision makers have better information 
and incentives to balance current and future interests. There are some good examples of such delegation. 
Pharmac 
An example in social services is Pharmac. The Government, through its normal budget process, allocates an 
overall budget each year to Pharmac. In turn Pharmac makes decisions about which pharmaceuticals and 
medical equipment the budget should be used to fund. It makes these decisions in line with clear cost-
benefit criteria designed to maximise the impact on New Zealand health outcomes within the assigned 
budget. While Pharmac is responsible to the Minister for Health, its drug purchase decisions cannot be 
Box 5.2 Examples of different stances taken by councils 
Wellington City Council’s stance 
Council projects support partnerships and programmes within communities and neighbourhoods 
as a way of building local community resilience, and working with our partners to ensure the city's 
social infrastructure supports vulnerable people in the city... 
The Council contributes $2.44M per annum to the social services sector … in Wellington City 
through contracts and project funding. Grants are given to projects that make a positive 
contribution to achieving the Council's outcomes. Funding focus areas are currently youth, 
building capability and capacity, increasing personal and community safely, encouraging health 
and well-being and increasing preparedness. (Wellington City Council, sub. 43, pp. 1–2) 
Waimakariri District Council’s stance 
The Council does not see itself as having a direct role in seeking contracts to provide social 
services. It does, however, consider that it can play a constructive role in support the locally based 
service providers by contributing information about the community, including the analysis of data 
from Censuses and administrative data relevant to service provision in the District. This 
information is used to support funding applications for grants from funders and/or to help to 
identify gaps in current services in the area. (Waimakariri District Council, sub. 75, p. 6) 
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overridden by the Minister. Such overrides require an Act of Parliament. The override has only been used 
once. 
Housing New Zealand Corporation 
Housing New Zealand Corporation (HNZC) is a statutory corporation established by the Housing 
Corporation Act 1974. It is a Crown Agency under the Crown Entities Act 2004. HNZC is governed by a 
board, which in turn is responsible to the Ministers of Housing and Finance. The Ministers communicate 
their policy requirements through a Letter of Expectations. 
Ministers have used Letters of Expectations in the past to direct HNZC to build more state houses – without 
necessarily balancing competing operational demands such as maintenance. The Social Services Select 
Committee reported in 2008 that:  
Some of us are concerned that HNZC has focussed on acquiring new houses, rather than maintaining 
its existing stock. HNZC has estimated that it will cost approximately $2 billion to address deferred 
maintenance of State houses around the country over the next 10, possibly 15, years… 
We were interested to learn that the depreciation fund for housing stock was not specifically allocated 
to either maintenance or replacement, and that the Government was responsible for deciding on which 
of the two to spend more of the funds. HNZC noted that it was difficult to balance competing pressures 
on this matter, and that it was directed in this area by the priorities of the Government of the day. 
(Social Services Committee, 2008, p. 2) 
In 2010, the Housing Shareholders Advisory Group noted that HNZC was under pressure, which was 
apparent in the “burgeoning maintenance liability, partly due to the diversion of funds to deliver state 
house numbers, the pre-eminent key performance indicator” (HSAG, 2010, p. 33). 
HNZC, like DHBs, is an example of a decentralised structure based around existing infrastructure (in this 
case, state houses). Its structure as a Crown entity has given it a measure of independence in operational 
decision-making. HNZC has had independence in its operational decisions, but policy expectations may 
have reduced its effectiveness in managing the state housing stock (HSAG, 2010, p. 39). 
The Reserve Bank, Commerce Commission and NZ Super Fund 
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand has the job, devolved to it by Parliament, of conducting monetary policy 
(and prudential regulation of the financial sector). The Commerce Commission has been given a similar role 
in competition policy and the regulation of industries with monopoly or network characteristics. The case for 
assigning these entities independence in carrying out these roles is widely recognised. It largely frees 
decisions in these spheres – vital for the medium and long-run performance of the New Zealand economy – 
from the unhelpful influence of short-term political pressures. 
A further example is the Guardians of New Zealand Superannuation (Box 5.3). 
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Analysis 
Pharmac and HNZC are both Crown Agents as defined in s 7 of the Crown Entities Act. Crown Agents have 
the least distance from Ministers of any kind of Crown entity.23 The legal form is only one factor that 
influences this distance. The specification of decision-making independence in the entity’s enabling 
legislation is perhaps more influential. 
The Commission’s 2014 report Regulatory institutions and practices noted that:  
Legal independence does not automatically lead to independence in practice. In particular, an agency’s 
reputation and capability will influence the degree of independence it is accorded, regardless of legal 
designation. A regulator that is formally within ministerial control will, in practice, be able to act 
independently if it is held in high regard. A regulator that is formally independent but held in poor 
esteem by government or regulated firms will find their independence under threat, even with legal 
protections. (NZPC, 2014b, p. 223) 
The Commission also found that “the choice of institutional form will be important as much in terms of what 
it signals around expected levels of agency independence, as for the legal protections associated with 
particular agency forms.” (p. 249).  
 
 
 F5.3  Delegation of responsibility for social services to semi-autonomous government entities 
can improve on top-down control where such entities have better information, 
capability and incentives to make and implement decisions that maximise social 
returns.  
 
 
Delegation to communities of interest 
A further basis for decentralisation is communities of interest – people with a shared interest and identity 
that can be wider than living in the same place. The Whänau Ora Commissioning Agencies (Chapter 3; 
Appendix C) are an example of such delegation. Three agencies cover Pasifika, North Island Mäori and 
South Island Mäori. Chapter 13 contains a fuller discussion of how devolution might empower Mäori 
23 In comparison, Autonomous Crown Entities need only have regard to government policy when directed by the responsible Minister, and Independent 
Crown Entities are generally independent of government policy. 
Box 5.3 Guardians of New Zealand Superannuation – a “double arm’s length” Crown entity 
The New Zealand Superannuation and Retirement Income Act 2001 established a fund to support the 
Government saving now in order to help pay for the future cost of providing universal superannuation. 
The Act also created the Guardians of New Zealand Superannuation, an autonomous Crown entity 
charged with managing the fund. 
Sound governance is critical to maintaining stakeholder and public confidence in the Guardians 
and the Fund. As an autonomous Crown entity, the Guardians is legally separate from the Crown. 
This means that, although we are still accountable to the Government, we have operational 
independence regarding investment decisions and are, instead, overseen by an independent 
Board. 
Ministers can give the entity directions, but directions are constrained and must be transparent: 
The Minister of Finance may give directions to the Guardians regarding the Government’s 
expectations of Fund performance – as long as directions are consistent with the duty to invest 
the Fund on a prudent, commercial basis. The Guardians must have regard to any direction from 
the Minister and all directions must be tabled in Parliament. 
Source: NZ Super Fund, n.d.  
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communities, and examines several ways that Mäori groups have chosen to become involved in the 
commissioning of social services. 
Deaf people are another example of a community of interest: 
The term ‘Deaf’ is used to denote those people who identify themselves as part of a linguistic and 
cultural community and who are likely to use New Zealand Sign Language as their primary 
communication method. (Deaf Aotearoa, sub. 69, p. 1) 
As a general principle, devolution to a community of interest should be initiated by the aspirations of that 
community, rather than by government. The Commission welcomes submissions on how different 
communities of interest would like to be further involved in commissioning decisions. 
 
 
 Q5.1 
 
Which communities of interest would like to be part of greater devolution of service 
commissioning?   
 
Co-governance  
Co-governance involves agreements or structures that share responsibility and decision-making power. Co-
governance in New Zealand is used more in the environment sector than in social services. Formal co-
governance arrangements in New Zealand occur more often with Mäori, and may or may not derive from 
the Treaty of Waitangi settlement process. 
For example, the Te Hiku Social Development Accord (Chapter 3) is a co-governance arrangement, where 
the Crown and iwi in the Far North share responsibility for governance of local social services. Likewise, the 
Partnership Group with governance responsibilities for Whänau Ora consists of both ministers and iwi 
leaders. Chapter 13 includes examples of other iwi and Mäori groups engaged in the governance of social 
services. 
Social insurance 
Social insurance is an insurance scheme organised by the state with compulsory membership. The Accident 
Compensation Corporation (ACC) is an example of a social insurer (Box 9.4 in Chapter 9).  
Social insurance can mean different things in different contexts and different countries. Box 5.4 summarises 
some of the general features of social insurance schemes. Chapter 9 contains further discussion and 
examples.  
Box 5.4 General features of social insurance schemes 
A working group looked at social insurance models in 2002 as part of a report on future funding of 
health and disability services in New Zealand: 
The … social insurance model is hard to define, as examples of it vary considerably around the 
world. Finance is generally raised from taxes (or levies) on labour income that are compulsory, 
usually levied at a flat rate and capped at a maximum dollar limit. Entitlements are often more 
explicit and schemes tend to be more responsive to demand than general tax-financed systems. 
Another important distinction is that income compensation is often included in the insurance 
package as well as health services. 
Models that include some of these wider health-related costs can be more effective at getting 
people restored to health, or better supported, in a timely fashion. The accident compensation 
scheme (ACC) provides an excellent example of this type of model. 
Social insurance systems have their disadvantages, however, including more difficulty in 
controlling overall costs, funds being raised less equitably, less stability of revenue and higher 
administration costs. In practice, many social insurance systems around the world are topped-up 
by general tax-financing, which means that some of the advantages of the model are lost. 
Source:   MoH, 2002, pp. vi-vii. 
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The incentives facing social insurers 
Ideally, devolved organisations should face strong incentives to intervene early to reduce future costs. 
Devolving to social insurers could fulfil this ideal. Social insurers face incentives to reduce the total cost of 
current and future claims. This can lead to three kinds of behaviour: 
 investing in preventative actions (such as ACC’s falls-prevention programme) to reduce the number of 
future claims; 
 spending resources early on a claim, to reduce the long-term costs of that claim; and 
 setting a “higher bar” for claims approval. 
Social insurance schemes need to be carefully designed to enhance incentives for the first two behaviours. 
Competition among multiple insurers reduces the incentive for the third behaviour. Alternatively, criteria 
can be set in legislation. 
There are some other significant challenges in the design of such social insurance, including how to 
determine premiums and rules for moving between insurers. Chapter 9 sets out the Commission’s analysis 
of social insurance. 
Conclusions on decentralisation 
Decentralisation on all the bases noted above risks overlaps and fragmentation. Government needs to think 
this issue through carefully, and make careful choices as to the optimal configuration.  
5.4 Choosing between architectures 
One or many architectures? 
No one architecture is likely to be a good fit for all social services, because of the wide variety of service 
characteristics and the wide variation in client needs for those services. Consequently, a social services 
system is likely to comprise multiple different architectures. 
This creates a need to manage the boundaries between organisations (and the services they are responsible 
for) organised on different bases. Boundary management can be expensive for government and providers, 
and create confusion in all parts of the system. So it is desirable to limit boundaries, or at least minimise the 
number of clients adversely affected by them. Chapter 10 contains a fuller discussion of when service 
integration will and will not be valuable, and mechanisms to achieve it. 
Comparing architectures 
The crucial consideration in choosing between architectures is under which architecture decision makers 
have the authority, information, capability and incentives to make and implement decisions that maximise 
social returns. 
Information technology (IT) is offering improved ways to move information and, to lesser extent, capability, 
within a system. This has affected, and will continue to affect, the best choice of architecture. 
None of the architectures outlined in this section performs well for all needs and in all circumstances. And 
similarly, no architecture always performs poorly.  
In the Commission’s judgement, the social services system would be improved by greater and smarter use 
of delegation and devolution. These architectures often feature better incentives for encouraging 
innovation and improving social service outcomes. 
 
 
 R5.1  The Government should make greater and smarter use of delegation and devolution in 
the social services system. These architectures often feature better incentives for 
encouraging innovation and improving social services outcomes. 
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5.5 The enabling environment 
There are some important roles that government cannot delegate. Government is the major funder of social 
services, and only Parliament, led by the government of the day, can legislate and assign regulatory powers. 
Government is responsible for creating the “enabling environment” for the social services system. 
Three enablers are particularly relevant to improvements in social services: budget appropriations, data 
infrastructure, and regulation. 
Budget appropriations 
The budget appropriation system is determined by the Public Finance Act 1989 (PFA). This is the central 
piece of legislation in New Zealand for determining financial accountability. Another key piece of legislation 
is the State Sector Act 1988, which devolves responsibility to departmental chief executives for running 
their departments and for managing the resources allocated to those departments (Chapter 2). 
These Acts (together with the Crown Entities Act) set up strong vertical budgeting and accountability 
arrangements. Those arrangements have traditionally made it hard for departmental chief executives to 
move funds within departments and between departments. 
This system has both strengths and weaknesses. It is strong on accountability and delivering services 
specified in terms of outputs yet weaker on delivering outcomes. This weakness is due both to 
fragmentation of expenditure and to a lack of focus on, and information about, actual clients. This weakness 
has become more apparent over time, especially as hard-to-solve issues have persisted, despite efforts to 
tackle them.24 There is a significant tension between narrowly specified budget appropriations, and efficient 
cross-service allocation and service integration. 
The PFA and the State Sector Act were both amended in 2013 to provide more flexibility in the budget 
system and a greater focus on achieving better outcomes, while maintaining accountability and 
transparency (Box 5.5).  
 
The Multi-Category Appropriation (MCA) was introduced to support the Better Public Services results and 
to address budgetary fragmentation. An MCA is a mechanism to shift funding between different classes of 
expenditure for the purposes of “contributing to a single, overarching purpose”.25 MCAs allow 
appropriation ministers or those with delegated authority to move money between categories of 
expenditure. MCAs may have conditions and any large movements need ministerial sign off. 
24 For example, low educational achievement for Mäori, Pacific Island and students from poorer homes (Education Counts, 2015). 
25 PFA s 7B (b). 
Box 5.5 2013 changes to the Public Finance Act and the State Sector Act 
The legislative changes to the PFA included:  
 the introduction of multi-category appropriations (MCAs); 
 a requirement to report on what is intended to be achieved and what has been achieved with 
expenditure from appropriations; and 
 a focus on results and outcomes. 
The focus on results and outcomes was to help achieve the 10 Better Public Services targets adopted 
in 2012 (Chapter 2). 
The State Sector Act was amended to enable public service chief executives’ responsibilities to extend 
beyond their department’s boundaries to create greater shared impact. In practice this has involved 
setting up cross-agency boards, such as the Social Sector Board (discussed in section 5.1). 
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Once an MCA is established, those with delegated authority can approve shifts in funding between what 
were separate expenditure categories (eg, “departmental” and “non-departmental”), thus enabling 
agencies to move funding flexibly and in response to data and information about how services for different 
clients are performing.  
Not all submitters were convinced that the changes to the budget appropriation system would change 
purchasing practice: 
The amendments to the Public Finance Act are understood but at the moment are experienced as 
Wellington-centric with government officials regularly meeting with [each] other and collaborating. This 
is not being felt in the regions however where control and resource is held tightly by the relevant 
agencies. (Wise Group, sub. 41, p. 35). 
Siloed funding streams continue to be a hindrance to working in integrated and family centred ways 
where providers are only able to deliver what is specified in their contract despite being well placed to 
address a range of needs for a family. (Alliance Health Plus Trust, sub. 119, p. 3). 
MCAs are a useful addition to budget structures, but they (and indeed any purely structural change) will not 
prove sufficient. In practice, the number of reallocations, or the speed of reallocations, may be limited. 
 
 
 F5.4  Multi-category appropriations and other mechanisms added in 2013 to the Public 
Finance Act 1989 are useful additions to the budget appropriation system. But these 
mechanisms are not sufficient on their own to provide flexibility at the interface 
between providers and clients.  
 
Improved measurement of service cost and impact on client outcomes – such as that being pursued with 
the Investment Approach – may support further delegation of authority to shift funding between budget 
appropriations. Improved measurement is necessary to support accountability for outcomes. Greater 
visibility of what is or is not being achieved may lead to less focus on how much has been spent.  
 
 
 F5.5  Improved measurement of service cost and impact on client outcomes – such as that 
being pursued with the Investment Approach – may support further delegation of 
authority to shift funding between budget appropriations.  
 
 
Data infrastructure 
Chapter 8 discusses the potential of data analytics in much more detail, but briefly, data infrastructure that 
permits better sharing of relevant information across all social services organisations would support better 
service integration, improved targeting, and more efficient service delivery. It also permits better and easier 
monitoring and evaluation of service performance. 
The data infrastructure needs to be well designed to encourage trust between system participants and to 
achieve an appropriate balance between efficiency, data accessibility, data quality and privacy. This is also 
discussed further in Chapter 8. 
Regulation 
Regulation can affect social services provision in intended and unintended ways. 
Some submitters were concerned that government regulation is making it increasingly difficult and costly to 
provide social services using volunteers. Submitters identified the importance of volunteers for social 
services and for communities more generally (Box 5.6) 
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Government regulation is having consequences for voluntary provision. Several submitters raised concerns 
about recent and proposed changes in legislation: 
Recent changes to legislation such as the Vulnerable Children’s Act, and the need for Police vetting 
along with the changes in Health and Safety and the Worksafe environment may influence provider 
choices in utilising volunteers due to the increased risk that individuals and organisations are liable for. 
(Community Care Trust, sub. 96, p. 10) 
Other submitters were also concerned about the proposed health and safety reform on their organisations 
for governance and operations, for example:  
The difficulty many non profits face is how to attract the right calibre of trustee for their organisation – 
people with the skills, knowledge and expertise that can drive the changes. And even if the trustees are 
skilled, competent individuals, the time that they can give is often limited. Adding to the difficulty in 
attracting good trustees is the personal liability that trustees can face and this will become even more 
difficult once the new Health and Safety Act comes into force… (The Raglan House, sub. 24, p. 5)26 
These regulatory effects (proposed or actual) on voluntary work are likely unintended, yet they can create 
real barriers. Volunteers may be deterred by what they see as unnecessary security, training and supervision 
requirements. And the costs of providing that security, training and supervision discourages NFPs from 
using volunteers. Further, any increased personal liability on those in governance roles is likely to make 
NFPs more risk averse and thus even more reluctant to use volunteers. 
 
 
 R5.2  The Government should take account of the role and value of volunteers as an 
important part of social services in drafting new legislation to ensure that volunteers are 
not crowded out by new regulation. The Government should pay particular attention to 
this issue when finalising the Health and Safety Reform Bill.  
 
 
5.6 System stewardship 
Institutional architecture and the enabling environment require active management if social services are to 
be effective. There is currently little conscious oversight of the social services system as a whole: 
Each part of the system currently looks after its own best interests. What is missing is an appropriate 
mechanism that takes responsibility [to] oversee the system as a whole. By this we do not mean tight or 
cumbersome regulation. (Barnardos, sub. 12, p. 11) 
The responsibility to oversee the system as a whole is encompassed by the idea of system stewardship. 
Stewardship, in this sense, is an overarching responsibility for the monitoring, planning and management of 
26 See also New Zealand Red Cross (sub. 94), Presbyterian Support New Zealand (sub. 76) and Community Networks Aotearoa (sub. 31). 
Box 5.6 Submissions on importance of volunteers 
Volunteers are a bridge between service users. They are embedded within communities, they do 
help out of a real interest in the area and build networks and experiences in those interest areas. 
They truly represent the communities we work in, and can make valuable contributions to 
understanding best ways to address need – often in a way that paid professionals may not. 
Volunteering promotes participation through activities and advocacy, can lead to a more dynamic 
community by enhancing work of social services (Volunteering New Zealand, sub. 86, p. 5) 
Volunteering has significant benefits to volunteers also – research consistently shows that giving is 
good for mental health – volunteering has always been an essential part of New Zealand’s history 
– there is a risk in the increasing professionalisation of the community and voluntary sector and 
increasing compliance expectations that the goodwill associated with volunteering may be lost as 
volunteers get frustrated with increased compliance expectations (Age Concern New Zealand, 
sub. 100, p. 3) 
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resources in such a way as to maintain and improve system performance.27 Relevant activities include 
monitoring system performance, identifying barriers to and opportunities for beneficial change, and leading 
the wider conversations required to achieve that change. 
Government has a unique role in the social services system. It is the major funder of social services, and has 
statutory and regulatory powers unavailable to other participants. Government is the only participant that 
can take on responsibility for system stewardship. 
Government needs to take responsibility for system stewardship, and for making considered decisions that 
shape the system. Oversight of the system will require an actor with data, research and evaluation capacity, 
and advisory capability. 
Current institutions 
Some current institutions play a role in overseeing the social services system. 
Cabinet Social Policy Committee 
The Social Policy Committee is one of 10 Cabinet committees that report to the Cabinet. The Committee 
has 20 members, and is currently chaired by the Hon. Paula Bennett. It covers 22 portfolios. Its terms of 
reference are to “consider social policy issues, including education, health, justice and law and order, 
welfare reform, child poverty and vulnerable children” (DPMC, n.d.). 
Social Sector Board  
The Social Sector Board comprises the chief executives of the Ministries of Social Development, Education, 
Health, Corrections, Justice, Business, Innovation and Employment, Pacific Island Affairs, Te Puni Kökiri, 
Statistics New Zealand, New Zealand Police and the New Zealand Housing Corporation.28 The Board is 
chaired by the Chief Executive of MSD and reports to the Cabinet Social Policy Committee. It leads cross-
agency work in seven areas: 
 Budget 2015 population approach; 
 material deprivation and service response to families with complex needs; 
 Social Sector Trials; 
 Children’s Action Plan; 
 data analytics and integration; 
 social sector integration, horizontal governance and contracting; and 
 delivery of Better Public Services results. 
The Board is supported by a deputy chief executives group (pers. comm., 14 April 2015).  
Justice Sector 
The Ministry of Justice, the New Zealand Police, the Department of Corrections, the Crown Law Office, the 
Serious Fraud Office and Child Youth and Family work as a “sector” to make society safer and provide 
accessible justice services. The sector collaborates to reduce crime and enhance public safety; and to 
provide access to justice by delivering modern, effective and affordable services (Ministry of Justice, n.d.). 
A system steward 
The current arrangements fall somewhat short of what is required of a system steward. Chapter 14 proposes 
an “Office for Social Services”. One task for this office would be to play a core role in system stewardship. 
27 The related topic of service stewardship is covered in Chapter 6. 
28 The Board was formerly the Social Sector Forum. 
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 F5.6  Institutional architecture and the enabling environment require active management if 
social services are to be effective. This active management should be the responsibility 
of a system steward. The current arrangements fall somewhat short of what is required 
of a system steward. 
 
 
 
 
 R5.3  Government has a unique role in the social services system. It is the major funder of 
social services, and has statutory and regulatory powers unavailable to other 
participants. Government needs to take responsibility for system stewardship, and for 
making considered decisions that shape the system. This includes the overarching 
responsibility for monitoring, planning and managing resources in such a way as to 
maintain and improve system performance. 
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6 Commissioning 
Key points 
 Commissioning is a set of inter-related tasks that need to be undertaken to turn policy objectives 
into effective social services. This report emphasises that a wider range of skills and capabilities are 
required for commissioning than suggested by the more commonly used terms procurement and 
purchasing, and that a wider range of options are available to commissioning organisations than 
contracting out and in-house delivery. 
 Effective commissioning is fundamental to well-functioning social services. Commissioning 
organisations need to make informed, deliberate choices. They should consider objectives, needs, 
cost effectiveness, funding, pricing, risk management, quality, eligibility, performance 
measurement, information flows, provider-market sustainability and interactions with other 
services. 
 The commissioning of social services is a challenging task. It is not generally undertaken in 
New Zealand in a structured, consistent and effective way. Commissioning organisations should 
actively build the required skills, capability and knowledge base. Commissioning requires careful 
design, reflecting the characteristics of a particular service. 
 A key commissioning task is choosing an appropriate service model. The model should be chosen 
to match policy objectives, and the characteristics of the service and its intended clients. 
Considering a wide range of models increases the likelihood of a better match, and better service 
outcomes as a consequence. 
 This chapter explores seven conceptual service models, and their strengths and weaknesses.  
- In-house provision is useful when statutory powers are required, or the service is most 
efficiently bundled with services that require statutory powers. 
- Contracting out is useful when providers offer specialised skills or capabilities, including access 
to difficult-to-reach clients. 
- Managed markets allow multiple providers to compete for market share. They can encourage 
efficiency, investment and innovation, which are difficult to achieve in non-contestable systems. 
- Trust and shared goals models capitalise on the intrinsic motivation of provider employees and 
organisations. Shared goals models also promote common ownership of problems and goals, 
and so encourage constructive and integrated problem solving and creative solutions. 
- Client-directed budgets and voucher models offer much when the client (or their agent) is best 
placed to make service consumption decisions. These models motivate providers to offer good 
value to clients, encourage innovation and empower service clients.  
 There is significant scope to use a wider range of service models in New Zealand. Client choice 
should be built into service design to the extent appropriate, even where client-directed budgets 
and voucher models are infeasible. 
 Many of these models require a mental shift for government, from being in direct control to service 
stewardship. This requires ongoing monitoring of service performance, and re-visiting design 
choices as necessary to improve service outcomes. 
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 Government should always be explicit about the type of funding, the appropriate level of control 
that this funding brings, and the likely consequences of its funding decisions. Legitimate options 
for funding include full funding, contributory funding, tied and untied grants, and no funding. 
 Government should fully fund those services for which it desires full control over service 
specification. Payments should be set at a level that allows an efficient provider to make a 
sustainable return on resources deployed, and so encourage investment by existing providers and 
entry by new providers. 
Commissioning is a set of inter-related tasks that need to be undertaken to turn policy objectives into 
effective social services. Chapter 5 addressed the important question of who best commissions social 
services. This chapter deals with the how and the what of commissioning. While these questions are not 
completely independent, this report deals with them separately to emphasise that both decisions need to 
be made, and it is best that they are made explicitly. 
A key commissioning task is choosing a service model appropriate to the circumstances. Section 6.2 
introduces seven models. All might be applicable in different circumstances. Two service models (client-
directed budgets and vouchers) are further detailed in Chapter 11. Purchasing and contracts are important 
features of contracting-out and managed-market models, and are relevant to some other models. These 
topics are examined in Chapter 12.  
Section 6.4 examines the tasks that face the commissioning organisation, and the skills required for 
successful service commissioning. 
The topic of service stewardship is introduced in section 6.5. Stewardship includes ensuring healthy, 
capable and sustainable providers. The prices that government pays for services is an important factor, as 
government is the major funder and purchaser of social services,  
6.1 From social objectives to service delivery 
Governments need a process to turn citizen expectations and political commitments into tangible service 
delivery. Commissioning is a key element of that process. 
Commissioning 
Commissioning is a set of inter-related tasks that need to be undertaken to turn policy objectives into 
effective social services.29 This report uses the term commissioning to emphasise that a wider range of skills 
and capabilities are required than suggested by the more commonly used terms procurement and 
purchasing, and that a wider range of options are available to commissioning organisations than contracting 
out and in-house delivery. 
Effective commissioning is fundamental to well-functioning social services. Commissioning organisations 
need to make informed, deliberate choices. They should consider objectives, needs, cost effectiveness, 
funding, pricing, risk management, quality, eligibility, performance measurement, information flows, 
provider market sustainability and interactions with other services.  
Commissioning does not include the actual purchasing or delivery of services. It does include service 
stewardship – ongoing monitoring of service performance, and re-visiting design choices as necessary to 
improve performance. 
This report separates out commissioning tasks from those involved in institutional architecture (Chapter 5), 
data systems (Chapter 8), service integration (Chapter 10), and purchasing and contracting (Chapter 12). 
29 Definitions of commissioning vary widely. Narrower definitions include procurement, project initiation or testing prior to final delivery. The Productivity 
Commission sought a definition that is consistent with the inquiry’s terms of reference, conceptually sound and able to be operationalised. This definition 
was influenced by relevant literature, including Alder (2010) and Sturgess (2012). 
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While this separation is useful for analytical and presentational purposes, the tasks are not independent. For 
example, commissioning decisions should be informed by the purchasing, contracting and delivery issues 
that arise under different service models. 
Depending on the institutional architecture in place, commissioning tasks may be undertaken by 
government agencies, Crown entities or organisations independent of government. In many cases it will 
require the involvement and cooperation of multiple organisations. 
An important commissioning task is considering the needs of clients who require multiple services, and the 
appropriate grouping of services. Commissioning services on a service-by-service basis might be optimal 
for the specific services, but runs the risk of an inefficient and ineffective overall system. There are complex 
interactions between services, and economies (sometimes diseconomies) of scale and scope in their 
provision.  
The commissioning of social services is a challenging task. It is not generally undertaken in New Zealand in 
a structured, consistent and effective way. Commissioning organisations should actively build the required 
skills, capability and knowledge base. 
Mistakes during commissioning ripple through the system until they reach the frontline of service delivery. 
Yet New Zealand’s approach to commissioning is patchy at best (Chapter 2; Chapter 4). Too frequently 
government agencies commission services in isolation of one another, resulting in a disjointed tapestry of 
contracts and forcing clients to navigate multiple eligibility procedures. Bureaucratic processes are used to 
select providers and offer providers little reward for good performance. The tendency of agencies to roll 
over contracts, in some cases for decades, makes it is difficult for new providers to enter the market. Clear 
pricing principles are lacking. And it is often unclear whether government is “purchasing a service” or 
simply making a “contribution” to service delivery.  
 
 
 F6.1  Effective commissioning is fundamental to well-functioning social services. It is a 
challenging task. It is not generally undertaken in New Zealand in a structured, 
consistent and effective way. 
 
 
Purchasing and contracting 
Purchasing is the process of selecting providers. It includes calling for expressions of interest to supply 
social services, evaluating proposals from potential providers, completing due diligence, negotiating the 
terms of the contract and awarding the contract.  
A contract is a formal agreement that commits the parties to meet specified obligations. For a contract to 
be useful, it needs to specify those obligations clearly and to facilitate subsequent measurement. 
Specification matters for the purchaser, as otherwise it cannot be sure that it is not wasting its money. It 
matters similarly for the contractor, as it may need to prove that it has fulfilled the contract. 
Chapter 12 covers purchasing and contracting issues. 
6.2 Choosing a service model 
A key commissioning task is choosing an appropriate service model. The model should be chosen to match 
policy objectives, and the characteristics of the service and its intended clients. Considering a wide range of 
models increases the likelihood of a better match, and better service outcomes as a consequence. 
Over time much thought and energy have been applied to the “make vs. buy” question – whether a task is 
best undertaken in-house or contracted out. Yet this question, while important, frames things very narrowly, 
and risks missing the most effective service model. 
Models are useful to help understand real-world observations, and as a basis for discussion of the pros and 
cons of different ways of organising social services. 
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This section explores seven conceptual service models (Table 6.1). Some models are only applicable to 
relatively limited circumstances. 
Each service model has strengths and weaknesses. The weaknesses are such that pure examples of each 
model are relatively rare. Those commissioning services typically attempt to reduce the consequences of 
specific weaknesses by adopting additional features – often those present in other models. 
Table 6.1 Service models with examples  
Service model Example Further information on example 
In-house provision Employment services Chapter 3; Appendix B 
Contracting out Youth services Chapter 3; Appendix B 
Managed markets Employment services in Australia Chapter 3; Appendix B 
Trust General practice1  
Shared goals Canterbury Clinical Network Chapter 3; Appendix E 
Client-directed budgets Enabling Good Lives Chapter 11; Appendix D 
Vouchers Early childhood education Chapter 11 
Notes: 
1. General practice is also an example of a voucher system, as subsidy payments from government follow client choices of GP. 
 
In New Zealand, voucher models are common in education but rare elsewhere. The Ministry of Social 
Development (MSD) and the Department of Corrections use in-house provision and contracting out almost 
exclusively. Trust models and in-house provision dominate in healthcare. Managed markets are all but 
absent, and client-directed budgets are rare. 
There is scope – and likely benefit – for commissioning organisations to make use of a wider range of 
service models, as there is great diversity across the social services system.  
In-house provision 
Direct delivery by government agencies is optimal when the costs of contracted delivery are prohibitively 
high (Williamson, 1999), or there is significant value in having a government provider in competition with 
non-government providers.  
In-house provision is useful when statutory powers are required, or the service is most efficiently bundled 
with services that require statutory powers. 
Formal contracts between the agency and its internal delivery arm make costs and expectations explicit. 
They should be mandatory when in-house government providers compete directly with non-government 
providers. 
 
 
 R6.1  Formal contracts between an agency and its in-house service delivery arm make costs 
and expectations explicit. They should be mandatory when that delivery arm competes 
with non-government providers, and are desirable in other cases. 
 
Commissioning agencies (or at least their staff) may prefer in-house provision. Such a preference could 
determine the choice of in-house provision over another more effective or efficient option. In the interests 
of improving outcomes from social services, it is important that in-house provision is treated neutrally in 
comparison with other service models. 
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 R6.2  Commissioning organisations should ensure that in-house provision is treated on a 
neutral basis when compared to contracting out and other service models. This requires 
independence in decision-making processes. In-house provision should be subject to 
the same transparency, performance monitoring and reporting requirements as would 
apply to an external provider. 
 
 
Contracting out 
Contracting out is useful when providers offer specialised skills or capabilities, including access to difficult-
to-reach clients. 
Contracting out is the primary service model used for non-government provision in New Zealand. Many of 
the problems in social services reported in Chapters 2 and 4 can be attributed to the overuse and poor use 
of this service model. 
Providers face a single purchaser, able to exert power in various ways, including through bureaucracy and 
control over funding. This power is countered (at least to some extent) by the political influence of 
providers, often wielded through the media. This political influence will often be exerted to lock in provider 
contracts. 
High levels of control dampen bottom-up innovation. Top-down innovation is possible, but is often 
constrained by highly specific contracts and risk aversion. 
Contracting out does little to overcome the problems of monopoly supply that come with in-house 
provision. Clients get little or no choice over their provider.30 Competition between providers only happens 
when contracts are re-tendered. That competition can be intense; for example, when loss of a tender would 
threaten a provider’s viability.  
Competition can also be largely absent; for example, when previous tender rounds have resulted in only a 
single provider being capable of providing the service. It can also be absent if there are substantial 
economies of scale in provision, because, for example, of a requirement for substantial capital investment. 
The Blind Foundation is the major supplier of vision rehabilitation services in New Zealand… No other 
agency offers the same range of integrated services or has the capital investment or intellectual 
property to be able to effectively compete with the Blind Foundation on a major scale at this time. 
(Blind Foundation, sub. 16, p. 22) 
Conducting a tendering process when there is only one realistic tenderer is likely a wasteful process. Direct 
negotiation might be preferable. However, purchasers should remain alert to the possibility of new entrants. 
Some problems of contracting out might be resolved through increased use of contracting for outcomes 
(Box 6.1). 
Box 6.1 The challenge of contracting for outcomes  
Chapter 2 identified that the typical service models in New Zealand were in-house delivery and 
contracting for outputs in a tendering environment. 
The main problems with contracting for outputs are that: 
 contracts are overly prescriptive – dampening experimentation, flexible tailoring of services to 
client need, and efficient resource allocation; 
30 Providers compete for contracts allocated by government agencies. Typically the service volume or market share of a provider is fixed for the duration 
of the contract (Chapter 2). This may allow some client choice of provider, though such choice is incidental rather than central to the service model. 
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 the specified outputs are not necessarily aligned with the outcomes31 actually sought by the 
contracting agency; and 
 performance incentives are weak. 
When compared to contracting for outputs, contracting for outcomes has two essential attributes:  
 performance incentives based on outcomes measures; and 
 reduced prescription. 
Contracting for outcomes (and more specifically, payment for outcomes) is attractive to government 
because it strengthens performance incentives. And it is attractive to providers because it reduces 
prescription. But at the same time it may be unattractive to government if reduced prescription 
increases political risk, and to providers if performance incentives increase financial risk. Given that 
government is (politically) risk averse, and providers – especially smaller not-for-profits (NFPs) – are 
(financially) risk averse, risk aversion can win out, with both parties preferring the less risky option of 
specifying contracts in terms of outputs. 
If outcome-based contracts are unrealistic, this does not excuse government (or providers) from developing 
clear intervention logic, from measuring outcomes, and from being clear and upfront about the purpose of 
the contract and using that purpose as a basis for discussion aimed at improvement. This report refers to 
such contracts as outcome-focused contracts, even though the actual contracts may be specified in terms of 
outputs. 
Contracting out is likely to remain a significant feature of government-funded social services. It is important 
that it is done well. Chapter 12 covers the issues involved in contracting out, and recommends ways to 
improve purchasing and contracting processes. 
Managed markets 
Managed markets allow multiple providers to compete for market share. Social services are not regular 
“markets”, so market share needs to be set administratively rather than implicitly through the actions of 
providers and clients. 
Employment services in Australia is a good example of a managed market (Chapter 3; Appendix B). Around 
five providers compete in each geographic service area. Market share is initially set through a tender 
process; after that it changes as clients are allocated on the basis of published performance ratings, and 
through explicit client choices. Prices and service standards are set by government. 
The recently-established social housing market is a New Zealand example (Chapter 3). 
Managed markets are complex to set up and administer, and require ongoing adjustment. So they are best 
applied to relatively large-scale social services. 
Providers have some flexibility as to how they provide services and how they package services for particular 
clients. This, combined with rewards based on performance, can encourage innovation. 
The employment services system in Australia has tended to accrete rules over time, and become over-
specified, reducing provider flexibility (Appendix B). This may reflect the fact that it is embedded in a top-
down control architecture. The solution applied to date could be described as a “system reset” – re-
thinking and re-establishing the system every six years or so. 
31 Outcomes in this context are end goals (where they are measurable) or intermediate outcomes (where those are more practical to measure, and a clear 
logic links the two). 
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Managed markets also incentivise better performance by providers – relative to contracting out – to the 
benefit of clients and funders. This happens though the ongoing competition for market share. However, 
these incentives can also encourage providers to “game” the system (ie, find ways to increase their income 
without improving client outcomes).32 
Competition for market share is on the basis of quality rather than price.33 So information about quality is 
important to this service model. Commissioning organisations typically collect and publish information on 
provider performance and service quality. That information can be used to allocate market share or to 
influence client choice of providers. 
Relative to contracting out, managed markets can reduce the financial risks of providers. They support 
gradual changes in market share, allowing more time and opportunity for providers to react to signals of 
poor performance. This is different from contracting out, where the first signal of poor performance can be 
the loss of a contract, with a consequential harsh transition from 100% to nil market share. Similarly, 
managed markets allow for gradual entry by new providers. 
By lowering financial risk and incentivising better performance through market share, managed markets can 
encourage investment and innovation.  
 
 
 F6.2  Managed markets – in which providers compete for market share – are likely to 
stimulate better performance and more innovation than where services are simply 
contracted out. They reduce the financial risks of providers, as they allow more time 
and opportunity to react to signals of poor performance (relative to loss of contract). 
However, managed markets are complex to set up and administer, and require 
ongoing adjustment. So they are best applied to relatively large-scale social services. 
 
 
Trust  
The trust model (Le Grand, 2007) describes the provision of social services where (usually professional) 
providers are trusted to design and deliver the service that clients need, with minimal oversight and control 
by funders. 
It reflects a view that only those in certain professions and/or who work closely with clients really understand 
the needs of those clients. According to this view, intensive oversight, control and measurement are 
counterproductive. They likely reduce the motivation of professional and voluntary staff, detract from 
service quality and reduce the tailoring of services to individual client needs. 
Trust models rely on ethical behaviour. In practice, some service providers may exploit opportunities for 
personal benefit. This is one reason that trust models are usually combined with occupational regulation. 
Trust models are not inherently equitable, or responsive to client needs (Le Grand, 2007).  
Trust models assume that the interests of clients, professionals, provider organisations and funders 
coincide. Many provider organisations would prefer untied grant funding, reflecting their “trusted” role. 
However, untied grant funding does not necessarily suit funders, as they are accountable to others (eg, 
taxpayers, donors) for their spending.  
Prices and competition for clients play relatively minor roles in trust models. Trust models do not generate 
information on service cost, client need or service effectiveness in a form that can be aggregated and used 
by funders to allocate their funds so as to achieve the best overall outcomes. Lacking this information, 
funding may end up being allocated though a contest of advocacy – rewarding the most effective 
advocates over those who might be more deserving on more objective criteria.  
32 See Besser (2012) for an example affecting employment services in Australia. Also see the discussion of cream skimming and parking in section 6.4. 
33 At least in theory, a managed market could allow for variable client co-payments. This would bring in an element of competition on the basis of price. 
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One response by funding agencies is to adopt complex formulas that incorporate measures of population 
needs and the cost of servicing that population. However, such formula-based funding creates little 
incentive to improve service.34 
Trust models feature prominently in the social services landscape. In New Zealand services are generally 
organised along the lines of professions, much like the system in the United Kingdom: 
The pattern of public service providers is still largely very traditional in structure and culture. It is still 
fundamentally based on professions demarcated in Georgian times (the constable, the school teacher, 
the turnpike engineer, the social worker, the surgeons versus the apothecaries, the secular academics, 
the nurse, etc.) which are organised into Victorian institutions (the library, the police station, the town 
hall, the city universities, the free school, the hospital, the charitable housing, etc.), and which are 
funded and governed in a 1940s settlement (the welfare state, the NHS, national control over local 
services, education entitlements, social housing, etc.). (Downey, Kirby & Sherlock, 2010, pp. 7–8) 
Organisations based on professions have significant advantages, which goes some way to explaining their 
durability. These advantages include scale, specialisation and the ability to develop and retain technical 
expertise. However, such organisations can suffer from professional “capture”, elevating the interests of 
professionals over that of clients or the public in general. They also tend to generate cost pressures as 
professional staff focus on getting the best services for their own clients, while ignoring the overall budget.  
Trust models may perform well in terms of service integration within the boundaries of a single profession, 
but poorly when integration across those boundaries would be useful. 
The weaknesses of trust models can be addressed to some extent by peer monitoring or regulatory 
oversight, mechanisms to increase client voice and the imposition of hard budget limits.  
 
 
 F6.3  Trust models capitalise on the intrinsic motivation and professional behaviour of 
providers. These models require careful design to ensure sufficient peer monitoring 
and regulatory oversight, and work best with hard budget limits and strong client voice.  
 
 
Shared goals 
The shared goals service model reflect a view that complex social problems are best addressed by the 
organisations and social services personnel closest to clients working together to share information, 
resources and expertise for the benefit of those clients. 
The model emphasises that achieving good outcomes often depends on service integration and its ability 
to: 
 reduce client and provider costs (eg, fewer and better sequenced appointments); 
 create better outcomes for clients (eg, through adapting service offerings to the needs of specific 
clients); and 
 reduce overall system costs (eg, when early intervention avoids subsequent hospitalisation). 
The Canterbury Clinical Network (CCN) is an example of a shared goals model (Chapter 3). CCN is a 
consortium of healthcare leaders hosted at Pegasus Health (a Primary Health Organisation), governed by a 
group of health and business leaders. It has only a few employees and draws resources from across the 
Canterbury health system. Clinicians lead CCN’s project work. 
Shared goals models capitalise on the intrinsic motivation of provider employees and organisations. 
Participants take greater ownership and have greater commitment when they set their own goals and 
actions, relative to when goals and actions are specified from “above”. 
34 Formula-based funding can provide incentives for providers to invest in their clients’ longer-term wellbeing. To have this effect, providers need to face 
reduced future costs as a consequence of making such investments. GPs, for example, have relatively stable lists of enrolled clients, and receive the bulk 
of their government funding on a per-client basis. A successful early intervention by a GP will reduce future consultations, and therefore their costs. 
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Service integration is difficult to achieve between organisations with separate goals, cultures, budgets and 
accountabilities (Chapter 10). Gaining and sustaining service integration where one or more organisation 
has effective veto power requires the creation of shared goals – and ongoing commitment to those goals 
by organisations with separate governance and priorities. The common ownership of problems and goals 
encourages constructive and integrated problem solving and creative solutions. 
In practice, services using this model exist in a wider environment that includes funders with their own 
priorities and accountabilities. Organisations commissioning services using a shared-goal models need to 
set high-level goals within a broad performance-measurement framework that is acceptable to those 
participating in shared goal setting. Yet it must leave them room to develop their own compatible, but 
subsidiary goals and measures. Expert Advisory Group (2014) provided an example of such a framework. 
Collective Impact is an approach that has many features in common with this model (Chapter 3). Collective 
Impact emphasises that goals need to be measureable, progress against those goals need to be 
transparent, and that participants need to hold each other to account. 
Shared goals models share weaknesses with trust models. They similarly require peer monitoring or 
regulatory oversight, mechanisms to increase client voice and the imposition of hard budget limits.  
Shared goals models can be costly to create and maintain. Success appears to be situation and personnel 
specific, and working examples can be difficult to replicate. What has worked well in one place may well be 
thwarted in another, for example, by a group with veto power. 
 
 
 F6.4  The shared goals service model reflects a view that complex social problems are best 
addressed by the organisations and social-services personnel closest to clients working 
together to share information, resources and expertise for the benefit of those clients. 
This service model promotes common ownership of problems and goals, and so 
encourages constructive and integrated problem solving and creative solutions.  
Organisations commissioning services using a shared goals model need to set high-
level goals within a broad performance-measurement framework that is acceptable to 
those participating in shared goal setting, and leave them room to develop their own 
compatible, but subsidiary goals and measures. 
 
 
Client-directed budgets 
Client-directed budgets offer much when the client (or their agent) is best placed to make service 
consumption decisions. This service model motivates providers to offer good value to clients, encourages 
innovation and empowers service clients. 
Client-directed budgets and voucher service models have many similar characteristics. This report refers to 
them collectively as client-directed service models. They require either an informed, motivated client to 
make decisions, or an agent that can be trusted to decide on the client’s behalf. These models, the specific 
conditions under which they should be applied, and relevant design issues are covered in more detail in 
Chapter 11. 
The essential difference between client-directed budgets and vouchers is that in the former the client is 
allocated a specific amount of money – a budget – and they can divide that budget as they see fit to 
purchase the best mix of services for them. By contrast, a voucher is an entitlement to a particular service 
offered by multiple service providers. The client gets to choose the provider, but the voucher cannot be 
divided. 
Le Grand (2007) presented a case for a clear preference for these service models, provided that design 
challenges are overcome and a real choice between providers is offered to clients. Le Grand’s preference is 
based on the model’s ability to be equitable, efficient and responsive, and to generate the highest client 
benefits. 
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Design challenges include that clients may lack the information required to make informed choices, or travel 
costs may constrain their options. Providers may collude or cherry pick.35 Budget setting and the allocation 
of budgets to clients are difficult tasks and may become highly politicised. 
Client-directed service models allow good providers to expand at the expense of poor providers. In so 
doing, they encourage providers to be responsive and efficient. Unlike most of the other models, they 
encourage investment and bottom-up experimentation. Providers benefit from being able to supply a mix 
of quality and types of service better matched to what their clients want. 
Client-directed budgets support gradual changes in market share and allow for gradual entry by new 
providers. This reduces the financial risks of providers (relative to a contracting-out service model). 
Chapter 11 explores client-directed service models in more detail. 
Vouchers 
Client choice can also be relevant where there are multiple providers of the same “service”.36 Essentially, 
clients have an entitlement, and the payment associated with that entitlement follows the client’s choice. 
Such arrangements are generally referred to as voucher systems, even though the “voucher” is conceptual 
rather than physical.  
Tertiary education provides a good example – eligible citizens and residents have an entitlement to enrol 
for a bachelor’s degree at a New Zealand tertiary institution of their choice. They are free to choose when 
and with whom they enrol. The institution’s funding from government reflects their choice. 
Early childhood education provides another example. The government subsidises services for every 
enrolled child. The subsidy is paid direct to the provider. 
General practice is a further example of a voucher system, as subsidy payments from government follow 
client choices of GP. Many clients face a co-payment on top of that subsidy. 
START suggested that vouchers could be used for those recovering from sexual violence: 
Services in the crisis space need to be demand driven but recovery services could operate on a voucher 
system whereby a professional assessment of individual need would result in the provision of vouchers 
to ‘purchase’ services of choice. Service providers could be accredited by a Government department 
for quality assurance in much the same way that the present MSD accreditation and auditing processes 
operate. (sub. 121, p. 9) 
The Bay of Plenty Community Response Forum was less positive about vouchers (sub. 53). The Post Primary 
Teachers’ Association identified that parental school choice can lead to schools being more socially 
segregated (sub. 88). Section 6.3 and Chapter 11 discuss the wider application of vouchers.  
Client-directed service models are not meaningful unless the client can choose services, providers or both. 
Where those models are not applicable, it still makes sense to provide client choice to the extent feasible. 
Even control over small things can make a big difference to clients, such as choosing which professional 
they work with, or being offered their choice of appointment times.  
Comparing service models 
Government is the dominant provider and purchaser of social services. This carries with it the usual risks of a 
monopoly, in particular costly production and low levels of innovation. Diversity and contestability of supply 
can help address these risks (Sturgess, 2012). 
A basic distinction between service models is the degree and type of contestability in provision. This varies 
from no contestability (in-house provision, trust, shared goals) to contestability based on the funder’s 
35 “Cherry pick” in this context means providers taking actiosn to ensure that, on average, they deal with easier or more profitable clients. 
36 The services are not necessarily identical. For example, different universities offer different bundles of courses that make up a degree.  
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assessment of performance (contracting out, managed markets) to contestability based on clients’ 
assessment of performance (client-directed budgets, vouchers). 
Contestability by itself is only valuable if the “contest” is on useful measures of performance: 
As the price is set by Government and reliable performance data is rare, contestability in the social 
services sector has traditionally been a question of character, not a competition for excellence. 
(Methodist Mission, sub. 4, p. 18) 
Service models where contestability is based on client assessment of performance are less likely to have this 
problem. It remains a problem for the other service models. This suggests those models need to be 
supplemented by measures to improve the collection, dissemination and analysis of performance data. 
Table 6.2 summarises the service models, outlining the problems they seek to address, key assumptions 
and their strengths and weaknesses. 
Table 6.2 Service models: strengths and weaknesses  
Model Problems 
addressed 
Assumptions Strengths Weaknesses 
In-house provision Accountability for 
performance 
Knowledge at the 
centre, bureaucrats 
can best judge 
quality 
Performance 
improvement (short 
term), political 
responsiveness, 
uniform delivery 
Political allocation, 
risk aversion, lack of 
innovation, lack of 
adaptation to client 
or local conditions 
Contracting out Accountability for 
performance, 
insufficient in-house 
skills 
Knowledge at the 
centre, bureaucrats 
can best judge 
quality, contestability 
through tendering 
improves 
performance 
Performance 
improvement (short 
term), some 
adaptation to client 
or local conditions, 
specialisation 
Over prescription, 
political allocation, 
risk aversion, lack of 
innovation, limited 
performance 
feedback 
Managed markets Accountability for 
performance 
Competition 
improves 
performance 
Efficiency, 
investment, 
innovation, reduced 
financial risk for 
providers 
Complexity, setup 
costs, gaming 
Trust Unmeasured inputs, 
intrinsic motivation, 
quality shading 
Interests of 
providers, clients 
and funders 
coincide; providers 
best judge of quality 
Intrinsic motivation Performance 
measurement, 
accountability, 
innovation, efficient 
resource allocation 
Shared goals Lack of knowledge at 
the centre, siloed 
service design 
Shared information 
and decision making 
improves 
performance 
Integration, 
adaptability, 
commitment, 
intrinsic motivation 
Reproducibility, 
accountability, 
transparency, 
sustainability 
Client-directed 
budgets 
Client rights, client 
preferences 
Competition 
improves 
performance, clients 
can judge quality 
Efficiency, client 
allocation, equity, 
innovation 
Difficult market 
design, boundary 
issues, client 
knowledge 
Vouchers Client preferences Competition 
improves 
performance, clients 
can judge quality, 
multiple providers 
Efficiency, client 
preferences, equity, 
innovation 
Cream skimming, 
competition on 
wrong dimensions 
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Choosing the “best” service model  
Table 6.2 emphasises that there is no widely-applicable “best” model. Rather, it is important to match the 
model to the service. One challenge is to do this with an eye towards overall system efficiency. It is easy, for 
example, to concentrate on reducing administration costs and miss bigger opportunities for early 
intervention or service innovation. 
 
 
 R6.3  Commissioning agencies should consider a wide range of service models, and carefully 
select a model that best matches the characteristics of the service being commissioned.  
Social services should, to the extent feasible and appropriate, respect the preferences of clients and value 
their time. For these reasons, the Commission generally leans towards client-directed service models, all 
else equal. The Commission believes that commissioning organisations should always consider client-
directed service models. However, these models are not always applicable. Where other service models are 
chosen, client choice should be supported to the extent feasible. 
 
 
 R6.4  Commissioning agencies should always consider client-directed service models, as they 
empower individuals and lead to more effective services. However, those models are 
not always applicable. Where other service models are chosen, client choice should be 
supported to the extent feasible. 
 
 
Interaction with institutional architecture 
Splitting the who and the how of commissioning into two chapters may appear somewhat arbitrary, as 
noted in Chapter 5. The two steps can be taken, and may be best taken, sequentially. However, the best 
choice of service model may be affected by who is undertaking the commissioning. This report does not 
consider that question in detail. But some predictions can be reasonably made. 
 For architectures with top-down control, it is important to increase diversity of experiments, providers 
and judges of quality. This would favour the managed markets, trust, shared goals, client-directed 
budgets and voucher service models. 
 As architectures get more devolved, contracting out becomes less problematic. 
 For architectures with competition between commissioning agencies, in-house provision becomes less 
problematic. 
Changing service models 
Many of these models require a mental shift for government, from being in direct control to stewarding a 
system and enabling it to function well.37 Implementing a change in service model may require enabling 
legislation and extensive re-organisation of existing arrangements.  
For example, Australia’s National Disability Insurance Scheme moves disability support from a combination 
of in-house provision and contracting out to a client-directed budget service model. Implementation 
required a new agreement between federal and state governments, new legislation and the creation of a 
new agency (Chapter 3). 
Chapter 14 discusses wider implementation issues. 
 
 
37 System stewardship is discussed in Chapter 5. The related topic of service stewardship is covered in section 6.5. 
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6.3 Innovative service models 
This section examines two innovative service models. While currently unproven, both show promise. 
Social bonds 
A social bond is a contract between the Government, social services providers and investors in which the 
Government commits to pay for improved social outcomes. Payment depends on the outcomes achieved 
that can be attributed to the social services programme (Chapter 3). Social bonds provide strong incentives 
and flexibility for investors and providers to find more effective ways of delivering social services. 
The investors might appear somewhat redundant in this model – or just another source of cost: 
There is, however, inherent additional expenditure in the form of the intermediary and independent 
assessor costs and the “financial return” paid to investors when delivery is successful. Given that 
government is set on no additional investment in the sector, these extra costs are likely to be met from 
within the existing quantum of funds already in play. (Methodist Mission, sub. 4, p. 7) 
Given that income from social services is largely from the State, and given that the State can raise 
finance more cheaply that the private sector, there are limited opportunities for profit that attract 
private finance to social services. (Public Service Association, sub. 108, p. 15) 
Bringing investors into social bonds has three main benefits. First, they are less risk averse than either 
government or typical providers. Second, they add a new party to the mix, with a strong interest in 
achieving better outcomes. Third, they can bring new skills and new ways of thinking about old problems. 
Should these benefits outweigh the higher cost of finance and higher transaction costs of this service 
model, then the involvement of investors will create a new benefit. 
Social bonds need clear specification of outcomes, and well-elaborated, independent monitoring and 
evaluation. Investors may be unwilling to take on financial risks unless the bond covers a large enough 
target population to generate valid and stable measurement of effects on outcomes that can be attributed 
to interventions. 
Social bonds require very specific conditions to be viable and involve complex institutional arrangements 
that take time and skill to set up. They may be most useful in stimulating the development of new 
approaches and testing their effectiveness, rather than being applied widely across large populations. 
Social bonds are a relatively new innovation. Experience is limited to a few projects, and each of these was 
at a small scale. As experience grows and transaction costs fall, social bonds may be able to fulfil a larger 
role in delivering more effective social services. 
Markets for good 
The Markets for Good proposal would extend voucher systems into service areas where they have not been 
previously applied (Box 6.2). Such vouchers – both in terms of desired outcomes and dollar value – are 
individualised to a client’s specific needs and circumstances. Social service providers receive payments 
conditional on the client achieving the outcomes specified in their voucher. 
Box 6.2 Markets for good 
Reform, a UK think tank, recently published a report describing the problems in delivering social 
services that the United Kingdom faces. These have direct parallels with the challenges faced in 
New Zealand. 
The report recommends the creation of markets for good. The essential feature of these markets is a 
client-assessment process that results in vouchers individualised to the client and their circumstances. 
Each voucher is essentially a promise of payment to any licensed social services provider that can 
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This model has many interesting features. It has some foreseeable advantages and problems, and no doubt 
many unforeseeable ones. The Commission regards it as an interesting yet unproven model that is worth 
watching. 
6.4 Commissioning tasks and skills 
Social services markets rely heavily on formal and informal institutions. These cannot be assumed to exist – 
they may need to be created or adjusted to support specific services. 
Commissioning tasks 
Commissioning will be ineffective if the problem it is intended to address is poorly defined, so clear 
problem definition is an essential pre-requisite. 
Commissioning involves the design of a system to efficiently and effectively deliver a service, including 
consideration of the following aspects: 
 outcomes sought and performance measures; 
 service specification; 
 allocation of decision rights (who can decide what, and with what authority); 
 eligibility; 
 quality; 
 price; 
 sustainability; 
 innovation; and 
 monitoring, evaluating and learning. 
Careful design, reflecting the characteristics of a particular service 
Conventional markets work within a legal framework determined by government.39 Standard market 
mechanisms, operating within the legal framework, can be relied on to set prices, communicate information, 
38 A proportion of the payment is made up front, irrespective of success, to reduce the financial risk faced by providers. 
39 In New Zealand, this framework includes the Sale of Goods Act 1908, the Consumer Guarantees Act 1993, the Contractual Remedies Act 1979 and the 
Fair Trading Act 1986. 
deliver a specified outcome for that individual.38 For example, an unemployed client facing multiple 
disadvantages might receive a voucher for £11,000 payable to a provider who finds them employment 
that is sustained for two years. 
Clients get to choose their provider, but cannot switch once that choice is made. 
A feature of the proposal is the breadth of the proposed outcomes. The report envisages that 
vouchers would be issued for around 10 “king outcomes”. These are intended to span multiple 
bureaucratic silos, encouraging service prioritisation and integration. 
Providers can be licensed for one or more king outcome. Licensing would be the responsibility of an 
independent regulator. Licensing would be intentionally “light handed”, encouraging new providers 
into the market.  
Source:  Haldenby, Harries and Olliff-Cooper, 2014. 
                                                     
120 DRAFT | More effective social services 
resolve disputes, and provide incentives for investment and innovation. This approach is reasonably 
generic, in that it (relatively) rarely requires extension for specific products and services. 
Social services markets are not conventional economic markets (Appendix F). Their characteristics typically 
mean that one or more framework parameters need to be administratively designed or specified. And as 
social services have varying characteristics, typically the framework needs to be customised for the specific 
social service. 
Co-existence with other services 
Commissioning, as described above, is mostly undertaken one service at a time. One could envisage a 
process started at the top of a master list of services, deciding on the best way to organise the first service, 
implementing the necessary changes, and then moving down that list. 
Such a process, however, is unlikely to lead to the best overall solution. It risks a system with lots of unclear 
boundaries and accountabilities. It also risks inequitable outcomes. For example, the Disabled Persons 
Assembly pointed out:  
New Zealand has two separate systems providing disability supports: 
a. Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC) that covers people disabled by injury or accident, and 
b. Ministries of Health and Social Development, including the District Health Boards, that fund 
people disabled from congenital factors or from ageing (sub. 54, Attachment One, p. 28) 
Individuals facing the same condition are assigned to a system based on the causal mechanism. However, 
the two systems offer different levels of support: 
…if a leg or sight is lost through diabetes, supports are likely to be much less than if sight or a leg was 
lost as the result of an accident. (sub. 54, Attachment One, p. 28) 
As well as co-existing with other services, new or redesigned services have to fit with the wider policy 
environment (eg, income support obligations and sanctions) and other initiatives such as social marketing 
campaigns. 
Service commissioning requires a wide understanding of the other services and activities that may 
complement or substitute for the service in question, and of how these services might interact. This is 
particularly important in the case of services for clients with multiple, interdependent problems that require 
integrated assessment and support (Chapter 10). 
Information and incentives for efficient allocation 
The markets for regular services have mechanisms for spreading information about service availability and 
quality. These include price, reputation, advertising, independent quality certification and third-party 
reviews. Social services lack some or most of these mechanisms, so it is likely that they will need to be 
designed as part of the commissioning process. 
It is important for commissioning organisations to address information availability, reliability and 
dissemination. A client-choice driven service, for example, will not have the desired effect on provider 
quality if clients are ill-informed about provider quality. 
In the Australian employment services system, each provider receives a star rating from the Department of 
Employment to reflect its success in achieving employment outcomes given the types of clients they are 
serving and labour market conditions where they operate. Star ratings are made public to inform client 
choices. They also influence the Department’s decisions on market share in each contract round (Chapter 3; 
Appendix B). 
Goal specification and measurability 
Service stewardship is an overarching responsibility for the monitoring planning and management of 
resources in such a way as to maintain and improve service performance (section 6.5). Relevant activities 
include performance monitoring, identifying barriers to and opportunities for beneficial change, and 
leading such change. 
 Chapter 6 | Commissioning 121 
Key to this is having clear goals, clear service performance metrics, and a strong logic joining the two. A 
well-designed data infrastructure is essential for quick feedback on the chosen performance metrics 
(Chapter 8). 
Allocation of decision rights 
Decision rights define who can change what, and with what authority. The who is important, because 
different participants face different incentives, and have access to different information (Chapter 4). 
Chapter 5 discusses the importance of carefully allocating the responsibility for commissioning. 
The allocation of decision rights should reflect the desired balance between national consistency and local 
adaptation, and permit experimentation without compromising service outcomes. This is a hard balance to 
get right; but even harder if it is not treated as an explicit design decision. When contracting out, one useful 
framework is tight-loose-tight: 
In our experience contracts that come closest to adopting a ‘tight, loose, tight’ high trust contracting 
framework gain the benefits of flexible service delivery and maintain government accountability. Tight 
in terms of specified resource, population and impact/outcomes; Loose in terms of how the provider is 
monitored to apply the model of care (assuming a foundation of evidence-based best practice), Tight in 
regards to evaluation and improvement. (Wise Group, sub. 41, p. 44) 
Essentially, the commissioning organisation needs to decide the desired outcomes, the provider needs to 
decide the how of service delivery, and the provider needs to demonstrate their performance against those 
outcomes. This framework is applicable to most service models and is a good starting point for the 
allocation of decision rights. 
Client eligibility for services 
Social services range from those that are at risk of being under-consumed (eg, drug and alcohol 
rehabilitation programmes) to those that might be over-consumed (eg, elective surgery). In each case, an 
important commissioning task is deciding who the service is for. 
Having decided that, the next question is how to ensure that the service is targeted to those people. This 
usually involves establishing eligibility criteria and deciding who will assess people against those criteria. 
A further question is how the service deals with changing client circumstances, which may necessitate 
reassessment. An appeals mechanism may be required should clients be likely to challenge eligibility 
decision. 
There is a trade-off between simplicity of eligibility criteria and accurate targeting through more complex 
criteria. Similarly there may be a trade-off between national consistency in assessment, and assessments 
that are more responsive to the particular situation of individuals and their local environment. 
These issues are present in all service models, though the specifics may vary. See Chapter 11 for a 
discussion of eligibility in the context of client-directed budgets.) 
Quality 
Quality is inherently ambiguous and contested in many social services markets. In a conventional market, 
consumers judge quality, and trade it off against other service attributes (eg, price, colour, convenience). In 
social services markets, different participants may apply differing criteria when judging quality – and thus 
may make different trade-offs. For example, process integrity is an important aspect to quality from a 
government perspective, providers may be more concerned about the qualifications of the person 
delivering the service, and clients may care more about availability, friendliness and approachability. 
Governments may be tempted to over-specify services to ensure quality on the dimensions they think 
important. This may, however, unnecessarily reduce the flexibility of providers and dampen innovation. 
For the contracting-out and managed market service models, the regulation of quality is usually done by 
the funder and specified contractually. Quality regulation can be internal under in-house provision; however 
this risks conflicts of interest. 
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The regulation of quality can be more complex under other service models. Some form of independent 
quality regulation is often used. Occupational regulation is typical for some professional services. For 
health, this is supplemented by the Health Quality & Safety Commission. 
The Health Quality & Safety Commission was established under the New Zealand Public Health & 
Disability Amendment Act 2010 “to ensure all New Zealanders receive the best health and disability 
care within our available resources”. (HQSC, n.d.)  
The Educational Review Office performs a similar function for schools. 
Competition between providers on the basis of price runs the risk that providers skimp on quality 
(Appendix F). This will be of concern if quality is difficult to observe by those making choices between 
providers. The best response to this risk will depend on the specifics of the service and service model. 
Responses could include: 
 changing who makes the choice between providers (eg, allowing clients to choose their provider rather 
than being assigned to one by a bureaucracy); 
 collecting and publishing information on provider quality; 
 fixing prices administratively, so that competition shifts to other observable service attributes; 
 increasing peer monitoring; or 
 licensing and regulation to set minimum quality standards. 
Consultation and feedback 
Consultation during service commissioning has three distinct purposes. First, consultation is a means of 
finding information held by others that can be used to clarify objectives and design a better service. 
Second, consultation is a means of building wider support for, and ownership in, a service design. Third, 
consultation may be necessary to meet a wider requirement (eg, a Treaty relationship). 
Providers, client representatives and commissioning agencies may hold different views about the purpose 
of consultation. Service commissioners should be clear why they are consulting and convey this clearly to 
those consulted. This avoids imposing unnecessary costs on those consulted. 
Feedback has three important purposes. First, it provides information that supports ongoing fine-tuning and 
service evaluations. Second, it can identify incidents of unsatisfactory service performance. Third, it can 
identify individuals who are poorly matched to a service, with the aim of redirecting them to one more 
suitable. 
Provider consultation 
The importance of early consultation of service providers and user groups has long been recognised. For 
example: 
It is fundamental that potential and actual service user needs form the basis for the specification and 
monitoring of social service delivery contracts. Consultation with service providers and user groups and 
regular surveys of individual users should be an inherent part of agencies’ systems and procedures for 
formulating contract specifications and performance monitoring criteria. (Deloitte Ross Tohmatsu, 1993, 
p. 15) 
While the benefits of consultation are recognised, implementation appears patchy. For example, Health 
Care of New Zealand Holdings considered: 
There is an important opportunity prior to going to market to work with the sector to define the 
requirements so that the best outcome is achieved for the community. This kind of sector collaboration 
prior to such processes is not happening often enough or in a way that improves the quality of the 
process. (sub. 51, p. 13) 
Many are attracted to the concepts of “co-production” and “co-design”, which includes wider involvement 
in design, governance and on-going service management and delivery (Box 6.3). 
 Chapter 6 | Commissioning 123 
The concept of co-production overlaps with devolved architectures (Chapter 5), the shared-goals service 
model (section 6.2) and devolution to Mäori organisations (Chapter 13). Readers should refer to those parts 
of this report. 
Co-design can be valuable for complex services where expertise and information is widely dispersed, and 
where it is crucial to build wider support for, and ownership in, the service design. Service commissioners 
should be very clear about the limits within which co-design operates; that is, which aspects of the service 
are being co-designed and which remain the responsibility of the service commissioner. Failure to be 
explicit will likely frustrate participants (Appendix D). 
Consultation can cause delay, and involves costs. Commissioning agencies should therefore target those 
most affected by the service and match the amount of consultation to the size and complexity of the service 
to be supplied, and the value expected from that consultation. 
Client consultation 
Service clients should be consulted by commissioning agencies for the same reasons that providers should 
be consulted. Clients can have information that no-one else has. So it makes sense to access and use that 
information. However that information can be difficult to access. Service providers may be the best proxy of 
client views for some difficult-to-access clients (eg, homeless people). On the other hand, there are capable 
and effective advocacy groups for some service users (eg, people with disabilities). 
Clients may be better able to judge service quality than can service commissioners. This ability can be 
exploited through choice of service model (eg, vouchers). 
It is unreasonable to expect clients to be professional service designers. If service commissioners lack 
professional capacity, they should deal with that problem directly rather than relying on consultation to fill 
gaps in expertise. Commissioners should seek the combination of client-held information and professional 
expertise that leads to the best service design. 
Box 6.3 Co-production and co-design 
Matahaere-Atariki et al. (2008) described co-production in a Mäori context: 
Co-production is more than a “bottom up” community development model and does not aim 
simply to promote community planning and user-focused services. It involves a more active role 
for iwi and Mäori authorities in designing and delivering local services, as well as providing the 
opportunity to influence the policy process by working with government to invest in shared 
outcomes for Mäori. (p. 34) 
The concept of co-production was developed by a group of academics at the end of the 1970s in 
reaction to what they considered were problems with dominant theories of the time about urban 
governance and centralisation, and to address the failure of conventional development 
programmes... These academics were concerned with the idea of engaging citizens in both the 
design and production of public services. At the same time, Edgar Cahn was developing his 
concept of an alternative currency he termed “time dollars”. Cahn developed a theory to explain 
why and how this currency could change the dynamics of social welfare programmes, which he 
too termed co-production... Both models have similar aims: to give responsibility to and involve 
those who have in the past been regarded as “the problem” in creating solutions for themselves. 
It is the opposite of deficit thinking and offers an alternative to only public or only private service 
provision... (p. 35) 
The Wise Group supported a co-design approach: 
…generally described as “a product, service, or organisation development process where design 
professionals empower, encourage, and guide users to develop solutions for themselves. Co-
design encourages the blurring of the role between user and designer, focusing on the process 
by which the design objective is created”. (sub. 41, p. 17) 
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 F6.5  Consultation with service providers and users during service commissioning can 
discover information that can be used to clarify objectives and design a better service, 
and to build wider support for, and ownership in, a service design. But consultation can 
cause delay, and involves costs. 
 
 
 
 
 R6.5  Commissioning agencies need to be clear why they are consulting and convey this 
clearly. Agencies should target those most affected by the service and match the 
amount of consultation to the size and complexity of the service, and to the value 
expected from consultation. 
 
 
Complaints and feedback 
Direct feedback from complaints is also very helpful. The literature states that only 4% of people 
dissatisfied with a disability support service will actually make a complaint about it – so complaints 
provide vital information that the other 96% are unwilling or unable to provide for a host of very good 
reasons. (National Services Purchasing, sub. 111, p. 8) 
A very strong and clear message [from] service users … was that above all they needed to be treated 
with respect by service providers. (Kay Brereton, sub. 9, p. 1) 
Empowerment is not only about engagement in individual or collective decision-making processes. It also 
includes mechanisms for making complaints and seeking reviews. Brereton contended: 
An important safeguard for people using the social services of statutory agencies is the statutory access 
for review and appeal rights as well as to watch dog agencies such as the Ombudsman. (sub. 9, p. 2) 
Brereton further cautioned that if a service is contracted to a non-government provider, it is important to 
ensure that the contracting-out process does not create barriers to review and appeal mechanisms for 
clients.  
The Auditor-General recently described the benefits of well-functioning appeal and complaints systems: 
Public entities that welcome complaints signal to citizens that someone is listening to them and that 
they can influence public services. For the entities, complaints are a free source of advice. Complaints 
can provide valuable insight into poor service, systemic errors, or problems with specific processes. 
Complaints also give public entities an opportunity to understand the motives, feelings, and 
expectations of the people using their services. (OAG, 2014b, p. 4) 
The Commission agrees that good consultation and complaints mechanisms are part of a well-functioning 
learning system (Chapter 7) and signal the commitment of an organisation to empower its clients. 
 
 
 F6.6  Complaints mechanisms are part of a well-functioning learning system, and signal the 
commitment of an organisation to empower its clients.  
 
Price 
Many systems need to establish prices through administrative mechanisms. At least two prices matter – that 
paid by clients and that paid by the funder to the provider. Setting prices – or determining who will set 
them and on what basis – is part of the commissioning process. 
Client prices 
Client prices are often set to zero to encourage uptake by those targeted. But this may be an insufficient 
incentive to get all of those in target groups to take part. So it may be necessary to subsidise some 
transaction costs, make the service compulsory or to bundle an activity with income support. Respective 
examples include: 
 paying a client’s transport costs to a health clinic; 
 Chapter 6 | Commissioning 125 
 free, compulsory schooling; and 
 obligations to seek work. 
Client prices at zero can encourage over-consumption. So a rationing system and/or differential pricing may 
be needed for different groups of clients. That, in turn, requires the specification of eligibility criteria and to 
define who is in what group. 
Price discovery 
Regular markets determine prices through many interactions between buyers and sellers, each motivated by 
private interest. These interactions and incentives are limited in social services markets, so alternative means 
of determining an efficient price may be required. 
In particular, contract markets with a dominant purchaser, mission-oriented suppliers and/or limited 
numbers of suppliers may not be very reliable for price discovery.40 And generally speaking, governments 
face incentives to underpay providers.41 So contract markets may need supplementing with administrative 
price-setting mechanisms. 
Similar issues arise for other service models. The criteria for pricing levels are discussed in section 6.4. 
(Other contract payment issues are discussed in Chapter 12.) 
Cream skimming, parking and lemon dropping 
Clients have different characteristics. For example, in the case of employment services, some clients will find 
it easy to get a job, even without help. For others it may be near impossible, regardless of the level of 
support. Cream skimming (or cherry picking) refers to the behaviour of providers that actively recruit the 
clients on whom they can make a profit, or avoid those on whom they expect a loss. Competing providers 
who do not cream skim may end up with loss-making clients only, which can threaten provider viability: 
The Salvation Army cannot always compete with fully commercial private operators, particularly in the 
education, early childhood education centres and homecare sectors where local and overseas providers 
can afford to screen clients or students or deliver only the contracted clinical services. (Salvation Army, 
sub. 104, p. 8) 
Overly specific contracts linked to outcomes can also cause providers to ‘cherry pick’, i.e. choose to 
work with those clients who will achieve outcomes easily rather than those who have more challenges, 
and are arguably those most in need. (Inclusive NZ, sub. 32, p. 7) 
The same payment for each client creates the conditions for cream skimming.42 For this reason, most 
managed markets and voucher systems typically vary the payment based on the client’s characteristics. 
Employment services in Australia is an example (Chapter 3). 
Alternatively, statutory or administrative rules can be used to limit the ability of providers to select their 
clients. For example, New Zealand state and partnership schools with additional places to offer are subject 
to statutory rules designed to prevent them from cream skimming43. 
Parking refers to the behaviour of providers who leave difficult clients “on their books”, doing the minimum 
to continue receiving a service fee, but not enough to achieve the desired outcome for those clients. 
Payment schedules with relatively high service fees and relatively low success fees create the conditions that 
encourage parking.  
40 Specifically, both a dominant purchaser and mission-oriented suppliers tend to push prices below sustainable levels. Limited supplier numbers, supplier 
collusion or product differentiation may support higher prices (Appendix F). 
41 Ideally, these incentives would be balanced by a concern about the long-term sustainability of the provider market. However, contract cost savings are 
certain and immediate, while the costs of non-sustainability are longer term and less certain. The electoral cycle favours short-termism in government 
decision making (Chapter 4). 
42 More specifically, cream skimming might occur if the payments for some clients substantially exceed the costs of servicing those particular clients, and 
providers have some control over which clients they service. 
43 See Ministry of Education (2015b) for a description of these rules. 
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Incentive-based payments may be one way to achieve social outcomes specified in a contracts but they 
are subject to many problems such as the “parking” of difficult clients and gaming and a focus on 
“numbers and outputs” rather than people and communities. (Council of Trade Unions, sub. 103, p. 11) 
Youth Service is an example of a payment schedule that attempts to discourage parking (Chapter 3; 
Appendix B). 
Lemon dropping or risk shifting refers to the behaviour of providers who try to get rid of “expensive” 
clients. Careful design of payment schedules is required to discourage it.  
These behaviours are not eliminated simply by choosing particular types of providers. For example, 
submitters variously suggested that government agencies, clinicians, FPs, and the larger NFPs cherry pick 
(or are likely to respond to incentives to do so). 
Cream skimming, parking and lemon dropping are all symptoms of a mis-alignment between provider 
behaviour and the apportionment of resources to clients that commissioning organisations wish to achieve. 
Commissioning organisations need to be clear about their objectives and the apportionments that follow. Is 
their objective, for example, that each client receive equal resources (equity of inputs), the same service 
(equity of outputs), have their condition raised to a common standard (equity of outcomes), be improved by 
a similar amount (equity of relative improvement) or receive a service according to return on investment 
(greatest improvement in social value per unit of resource)? What might appear to be “parking” or “cream 
skimming” of specific clients under one objective may be the desired behaviour under another.44 
Commissioning organisation needs to carefully design client assessments and provider payment schemes to 
align the incentives that influence provider behaviour with their objectives. 
Innovation 
Different service models encourage or discourage innovation in different ways. It is important for 
commissioning organisations to understand the effects of model choice. 
Innovation issues are discussed in Chapter 7. 
Monitoring, evaluating and learning 
A crucial commissioning task is the collection and analysis of data. This data is required to support 
commissioning, the ongoing operation of the service, performance measurement and for service 
improvement. 
This topic is covered in Chapters 7 and 8. 
Rural and remote areas with low population densities 
Rural and remote areas have low population densities. This increases the costs of providing social services 
to those populations, and limits the likelihood of multiple providers. 
Population density affects client choice (or lack thereof) of social service providers, and ultimately the 
accessible services. Population density was also seen to effect the ability to recruit and retain volunteers 
to provide the services, due to the high pressure on volunteers and can lead to competition between 
rural community groups to source the most capable volunteers. (Volunteering NZ, sub. 86, p. 13) 
Almost all services face higher per-capita costs in rural areas. For example, it is a lot more expensive to 
provide telecommunications to rural and remote areas. It is normal to adjust policy to reflect these 
differences. For example, the companies that cooperate to provide the Rural Broadband Initiative (covering 
around 15% of the population) act more as competitors in the Ultra-Fast Broadband initiative (covering 
around 75% of the population). 
44 For example, Mansell (2015) discussed different performance targets that affect teaching effort allocated to individual students. He noted that Better 
Public Services target of getting more students to NCEA Level 2 was leading educators to allocate more effort to students currently just below that level, 
and less effort to those well below or above that level. He characterised this allocation as “cherry picking” and “risk shifting”. This characterisation is 
correct if the education objective is equity of relative improvement. But it is incorrect if the education objective is maximise the number of students 
achieving NCEA Level 2. This highlights the important of being explicit about service objectives. 
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Sometimes this problem can be dealt with by careful commissioning: 
ACC has used contracting processes to ensure that clients in smaller centres and rural areas have 
access to a choice of providers. For example, ACC’s vocational rehabilitation contract requires 
providers to deliver services throughout one or more defined geographical areas. These areas are 
defined to ensure that a choice of service provider is available to all New Zealanders. For example, 
Northland is included within the same area as Auckland, which means that providers who apply to 
deliver services in Auckland must also do so in Northland. (ACC, sub. 30, pp. 6–7) 
The challenge for commissioning organisations is to find the most efficient and effective way to service their 
target population. This may mean adopting more than one service model, or adapting the chosen model to 
suit different populations.  
 
 
 F6.7  Service commissioning may need to adopt different service models (or significantly 
adapt their adopted model) to cover urban and rural populations respectively. A 
differentiated response is likely more effective than a one-size-fits-all model. 
 
 
Behavioural change campaigns 
A high-level choice for government is between programmes that deliver social services directly to clients 
and influencing campaigns aimed at behaviour change – or indeed the appropriate mix of the two.  
John Angus (sub. 109) made the point that it is families (and communities) that will ultimately solve social 
problems that arise within families and that “the challenge for government is to find respectful ways to 
assist families to do this. The effectiveness of purchase of services by contract will play a very minor role in 
this” (p. 2). He identified two successful initiatives: SKIP in the area of child welfare and It’s not OK in the 
area of family violence. 
There can be significant economies of scale for influencing campaigns. They are part of the set of choices 
available to commissioning organisations and are most likely complementary to direct service provision. The 
marketing profession is reasonably sophisticated at measuring its impacts, so establishing return on 
investment may be easier for behavioural change campaigns than for the corresponding social services. 
Commissioning skills 
Commissioning is inherently wider than purchasing or procurement. Commissioning crucially involves the 
ability to make a considered choice between different service models.  
The Wise Group identified a current lack of commissioning skills in government: 
The capacity and capability of the workforce undertaking commissioning on behalf of central or local 
government is variable and workforce churn for such roles is particularly high. (sub. 41, p. 12) 
To get the most from a commissioning approach, government will need to develop new capabilities for 
commissioning at all levels. 
Commissioning also requires ongoing service stewardship, which means:  
 understanding the interactions between the service and other parts of the social services system; 
 monitoring impacts on providers and clients; and 
 taking actions aimed at ongoing improvement. 
Government agencies responsible for commissioning will need to build their skills and capability. 
 
 
 R6.6  The government agencies responsible for commissioning social services should actively 
build staff skills and agency capacity to make effective commissioning decisions.  
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A commissioning approach is a significant step from the current emphasis on purchasing and contracting. 
Government should take active steps to build awareness of commissioning and demonstrate good 
commissioning. 
 
 
 R6.7  Government should initiate some well-resourced demonstration projects designed to 
build awareness of and capability in commissioning.  
Chapter 14 covers implementation issues, including building a skilled workforce. 
6.5 Service stewardship 
The social services system requires healthy, capable and sustainable providers. Government is the major 
funder and purchaser of social services. Its commissioning and purchasing decisions will substantially 
determine provider quality. 
Government needs to clarify its objectives in funding services, and match the type of funding to those 
objectives. Legitimate options for funding include full funding, contributory funding, tied and untied grants, 
and no funding. 
Government should always be explicit about the type of funding, the appropriate level of control that this 
funding brings, and the likely consequences of its funding decisions. Government should fully fund those 
services where it desires full control over service specification. 
Government faces incentives to underfund contracts with non-government providers for the delivery of fully 
specified social services. Long-term underfunding has undesirable consequences. Payments for such 
services should be set at a level that allows an efficient provider to make sustainable return on resources 
deployed, encouraging investment by existing providers and entry by new providers. 
Pricing principles 
The question of price is central to contracting out, but also arises under other service models – and indeed 
any arrangement where government funds others to provide a social service.  
Government has the ability to underfund providers 
Submitters to this inquiry claim that government is trying to deliver social services “on the cheap” by 
squeezing providers very tightly on funding. For example: 
NGOs are … on the coal face and are not given anywhere enough funding. (Social Services Providers 
Aotearoa, sub. 129, p. 8)  
…these government-driven services are not fully funded by government. Instead the costs of 
government-driven services are being subsidised by NGOs as NGOs use their infrastructure and 
fundraised money to cover the costs of delivering on government contracts. (Barnardos, sub. 12, p. 11) 
[I]t does need to be stated that most Community and Voluntary organisations who contract with 
Government have not received funding increases (even CPI) for up to 10 years. This means that most 
social service organisations are actually delivering services on much less money than 10 years ago, with 
an increase in clientele and having gone through the global economic crisis. (Community Networks 
Aotearoa, sub. 31, p. 6) 
The community sector often finds that they are in the position of having to accept a price rather than 
negotiating one. Some DHB funders have not changed the contract price for the same service over the 
past five years despite the growing complexity in client needs and the increase in costs to deliver those 
services. (Platform Trust, sub. 45, p. 6) 
The funder has most of the bargaining power – largely a take it or leave it negotiation strategy which is 
often used to play one provider off against another. This is enabled because the MoH is a large funder 
purchasing a sizeable portion of the sector’s output. In a virtual monopoly there is little room to 
negotiate. The latest [Autism Spectrum Disorder] addition to the contract without consultation is a 
prime example of the attitude of a monopoly funder and their dismissal of our response consistent with 
their previous responses. The cost to the Ministry of switching to another provider is relatively low, and 
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in any event they are government funded and can absorb the cost. A large range of similar providers 
also provides a cushion for the MoH to deal with a single provider who won’t cooperate. We also know 
that a lack of cooperation can see funding or relationship penalties. There is little one can do in the 
face of this bargaining power except to provide a range of products, services, skills that other providers 
cannot emulate thus making it difficult for the funder to accept a lesser service, or a more risky one for 
them. (Spectrum Care Trust Board, sub. 90, p. 7) [original emphasis] 
While some might be tempted to see this as simple self-interest on the behalf of providers, other 
commentators have noted this problem: 
In respect of levels of funding from government, it is my view that over the past decade successive 
governments have screwed down NFPs in the social services sector (or certainly the parts of it I am 
familiar with), putting at risk their sustainability. (John Angus, sub. 109, p. 6) 
One reason for the lack of inflation adjustments in recent years may be government financial constraints 
following the effects of the global financial crisis on New Zealand. However, providers have told the 
Commission that underfunding is a long-standing system feature, with its genesis in a policy of 
“contributory funding” (Box 6.4). 
45 The CFA was a branch of the Department of Social Welfare, established in 1992 at “arm’s length from the New Zealand Children and Young People’s 
Service” (Garlick, 2012).  
Box 6.4 A history of “contributory funding” 
Contributory funding – where government agencies intentionally provide part, but not all of the 
funding for a service – is a lasting and contentious issue in the provision of social services. Arising from 
the practice of government providing grants to charitable organisations, the “contributory funding” 
model was developed as part of a move to contracting for outputs in the 1990s. 
Most funding is a contribution to the total costs of the service. This practice reflects the history of 
government assistance to community based social and welfare service in New Zealand although, 
in order to maintain its contributory nature the contract specifies that the full quantum of service 
must be delivered by the provider. (DSW, 1997a, p. 2) 
Part of the logic of contributory funding was that it would stimulate local community activity for 
delivering social services that they deemed desirable: 
What makes the [Department of Social Welfare] relationship with community providers particularly 
interesting is the contribution model. This model aims to stimulate voluntary community activity 
through part funding. It has been suggested that the implementation of this model plays a key 
role in building strong cohesive communities (in other words the model produces an output of 
greater value than the simple input – both in terms of quantity of output and external factors). 
(DSW, 1997b, p. 3) 
The Community Funding Agency (CFA) had a budget for purchasing national services on the behalf of 
the organisations that now make up MSD (principally the then Child, Young Persons and Their Families 
Service), and a separate budget for funding community organisations.45 That separate budget 
allocated funding on a population basis to eight areas across the country. Allocations from each area 
budget used the contributory approach. CFA provided funding to increase the scale or volume of 
work done by community organisations where more output was desirable, but local resources could 
not support it. 
This explicit community support function was lost after the CFA was disestablished. Service purchase 
became the dominant approach. Submitters expressed very strong views on the negative 
consequences of contributory funding within a service purchase approach. 
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Ministers may also be reluctant to expand funding should they be unsure about how effectively funds are 
being applied.46 This reluctance may be best dealt with through improving data infrastructure, knowledge 
of service costs and impacts, and the learning capacity of the system (Chapters 7 and 8). 
The claims of providers are consistent with government exploiting its position as the sole purchaser of many 
social services (Chapter 2). However, that does not mean that the correct response is to pay contractors 
based on their current costs. Such payment arrangements have their own problems, including dis-
incentivising efficiency and innovation (Chapter 7; Appendix F). 
What is needed is a system where government is explicit about its goals and applies funding principles that 
match those goals. 
 
 
 F6.8  Government faces incentives to underfund contracts with non-government providers 
for the delivery of social services, with probable adverse consequences for long-term 
service provision. These incentives are consistent with reports from many providers that 
they are underfunded. However, those reports are not definitive without clear criteria to 
determine a “correct” level of funding. This points to a need to be explicit about the 
basis of funding, the appropriate evaluation criteria, and the pricing processes applied 
by government. 
 
 
Be explicit about full funding, contributory funding, grants or no funding 
There are very unclear roles, responsibilities and accountabilities within this current system. The 
unconscious actions of both NGOs and government have contributed to this situation. To rebalance 
the system there needs to be real clarity about when and how the NGO sector is expected to act 
separately and independently from government, and when it is operating as a fully funded agent of 
government. (Barnardos, sub. 12, p. 11) 
The Commission agrees with Barnardos’ statement of the problem and need for clarity.  
Government may reasonably choose the type of funding to match its priorities. It should always be explicit 
about the type of funding, the appropriate level of control that this funding brings, and the likely 
consequences of its funding decisions. 
The distinction between funding types and the basis of the corresponding relationships between 
government and the funded party is summarised in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.3 Funding types and basis of government–provider relationship  
Funding type Basis of relationship 
Full funding Government pays non-government organisations (NGOs) to deliver the Government’s 
goals or commitments. Payments should aim to cover the economic cost of service 
delivery. Payment structures should be carefully designed to create the correct incentives 
for service improvement over time. It is reasonable for government to fully specify the 
service delivery details (though a less-restrictive specification – eg, outcomes – may be 
more efficient). 
Contributory funding Allows government to subsidise activities that others specify and lead. Reasonable for 
government to require accountability for funds spent. 
Tied grants Allows government to subsidise organisations for specific purposes aligned with 
government goals. Reasonable for government to require accountability for funds spent. 
Untied grants Allows government to subsidise organisations to meet their own goals.  
No funding A legitimate decision for government. 
 
46 Contributory funding can provide some assurance of effectiveness; as it can be presumed that a local provider or community would not want to put 
their own resources into an ineffective scheme. 
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 R6.8  Government may reasonably choose the type of funding to match its priorities. It should 
always be explicit about the type of funding, the appropriate level of control that this 
funding brings, and the likely consequences of its funding decision. Legitimate types 
include full funding, contributory funding, tied and untied grants, and no funding. 
 
 
Full funding 
Full – or sustainable – funding is appropriate when government agencies pay NGOs to deliver the 
Government’s goals or commitments. This is the appropriate funding arrangement when government wants 
full control over the service specification (though a less-restrictive specification may be more appropriate, 
eg, contracting for outcomes). 
 
 
 R6.9  Full funding is appropriate when governments are paying non-government 
organisations to deliver the Government’s goals or commitment, and want full control 
over the service specification. 
 
Payments should aim to cover the economic cost of service delivery, so that the market for service provision 
is sustainable. According to Barnardos (sub. 12), sustainable funding means that: 
 services are fully funded;  
 funding recognises the costs of infrastructure (eg, training, business reorganisation and IT systems) 
required to support services; and 
 there is no expectation that NGOs will subsidise the costs of service delivery that is commissioned by 
the Government to meet government objectives. 
A sustainable return on resources deployed 
“The economic cost of service delivery” is not the same thing as paying at the level of costs currently 
incurred by existing providers. That arrangement would mean higher rewards for less efficient providers. 
Payment levels and structures should be designed so that “there are incentives to reduce overhead costs 
and to provide quality infrastructure in efficient and effective ways” (Barnardos, sub. 12, p. 19). 
 
 
 R6.10  “Fully funded” social service payments to non-government providers should be set at a 
level that allows an efficient provider to make a sustainable return on resources 
deployed. This funding level will support current providers to invest in training, systems 
and tools. It will also encourage entry by new providers.  
 
 
By “sustainable return on resources deployed” the Commission means a “normal profit”, as explained in 
Box 6.5. 
47 Another source of difference is that asset values in accounting do not, in general, reflect opportunity costs. 
Box 6.5 Economic, accounting, normal and super-normal profits 
Discussion of the term “profit” is complicated by the many different uses of the term. It is useful to 
determine between four different uses. 
 Economic profit is the difference between revenue and costs, where all inputs (including capital) 
are valued at their opportunity cost (ie, what they could earn in their next most valued use). 
 Accounting profit is the difference between revenue and cost as measured by the applicable 
accounting standards. It is typically larger than economic profit, as it (implicitly) assumes that 
equity capital is costless.47 
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Low population density and other factors can increase the costs of providing social services. 
In addition to funding the infrastructure that is necessary to support quality service previsions, it is also 
important to consider how to support the provision of regional services. The costs of this for a national 
organisation like Barnardos are very high. Once again, if government wants organisations like 
Barnardos to be available to provide high quality services in rural and regional areas, then our regional 
infrastructure needs to be sustainably funded. (Barnardos, sub. 12, p. 19) 
Where independent factors, such as low population density, mean that any provider faces higher costs, then 
prices should reflect those higher costs. This is implicit in the “normal profit” criterion that underlies the 
Commission’s recommendation. 
48 Super-normal profits can be earned in the short term as a result of innovation. In the long term, they generally rely on market power arising from 
protection from competition; for example, a monopoly right granted by government. 
49 Despite this problem, this report uses NFP in the absence of a more descriptive term that is widely understood. 
50 Most organisations undertake multiple activities, each with revenue and costs. Their profits, and therefore their sustainability, are dependent on the net 
effect of profits and losses across those activities. An organisation can reasonably choose to make a loss on an activity (eg, a service contract) if it can 
make that loss up through profits on other activities.  
 A normal profit is an economic profit of zero. This is the expected average long-run profit of firms 
in a competitive market. 
 A super-normal profit is a long-run positive economic profit, generally based on holding exclusive 
rights to a valuable resource.48 
Discussions about profit are further complicated by the common term not-for-profit. The term is a poor 
description of the organisational form.49 NFPs are in no way constrained from making profits. The 
constraint they face is that they cannot distribute profits to shareholders (as can an investor-owned 
firm) or to members (as can a cooperative). This means that NFPs must retain or spend all their profits. 
All organisations, whether for-profit (FP) or NFP, need to make a normal profit over the long term to 
be sustainable. And, indeed, it is the opportunity to make profits that attracts new entrants to a market 
and spurs innovation. 
Zero or negative accounting profits imply negative economic profits, and therefore unsustainable 
organisations. Social services providers should seek – and indeed welcome – positive accounting 
profits.50 Furthermore, they should be wary if in a situation of positive accounting profits but negative 
economic profits, as this may indicate a rundown of assets and long-term unsustainability. 
The issues about “profits” by some inquiry participants might arise more from a concern about super-
normal profits than about accounting profits. 
We have been alarmed by the increasing trend towards private for-profit providers entering the 
social services arena for the very reason the title for-profit suggests. (Community Care Trust, 
sub. 96, p. 5) 
We are concerned that this review is in reality another step towards creating opportunities for 
making profit from vulnerable people, rather than actually addressing the under lying causes of 
the problems being faced by individuals/families/whanau and communities. (Homebuilders Family 
Services North Rodney, sub. 38, p. 1) 
Super-normal profits might arise in social services if monopoly rights are created by government, if 
providers act as a cartel or if service prices are set too high. If the super-normal profits were being 
earned by NFPs whose mission was aligned with the Government, then that might be of lesser concern 
than if the same super-normal profits were being earned by a FP. However, it would still be of concern 
as it may imply an inefficient use of government funds. A better arrangement would avoid the situation 
that created the super-normal profits. 
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Implications for providers 
The flip side of government being explicit is providers being more explicit about their own mission and their 
motives in pursuing government funding. Providers capable and confident of delivering services in the way 
and to the standard specified by government should welcome fully funded contracts. Those who wish to 
pursue goals not necessarily aligned with those of government should not expect full funding. This may 
entail providers making hard choices. 
 
 
 F6.9  Providers capable and confident of delivering services in the way and to the standard 
specified by government are likely to welcome a commitment to fully fund such service 
contracts. Those providers who wish to pursue goals not necessarily aligned with those 
of government should not expect full funding. 
 
Full funding, properly implemented, should allow sustainable provision by either FPs or NFPs, or both. The 
distinction between the two is perhaps less marked than many might expect. 
It is important to note that while the vast majority of the providers that compete in our sector are “not 
for profit” their provider arms often seek to generate a profit to support the activities of their parent 
organisation. Just because a provider’s mission is not to make a profit doesn’t mean they are willing to 
make a loss and in fact most would expect a margin for sustainability and reinvestment in their 
business. Therefore, there is not a significant gap between what is sustainable for us as a for-profit 
provider and what most not-for-profit providers would consider sustainable and reasonable funding. 
(Healthcare of New Zealand Holdings, sub. 51, p. 4) 
Generally speaking, the Commission would expect to see a predominance of FPs in markets with high 
capital requirements; and a predominance of NFPs in markets where service quality is difficult to specify 
and observe.51 This reflects the strengths and weaknesses of these organisational forms. 
Cost models 
Prices in contract markets are set via a tendering process. In managed markets and voucher systems they 
are set administratively. And irrespective of the service model, funders and providers may have different 
views on whether prices are at the correct level. Commissioning agencies need to understand the costs 
faced by providers in supplying services. 
The costs of delivering social services include direct labour costs; a share of overheads such as staff training; 
the annualised cost of capital used in the service, allowing for depreciation; the cost of taking on and 
managing risk; the costs of activity-related monitoring; the costs of reaching required standards; and a 
share of the costs of achieving other regulatory requirements. The government needs to understand these 
costs even when there is competitive tendering, to satisfy itself that services can be delivered as envisaged 
(APC, 2010). Excluding any of these costs from service pricing may make provision unsustainable. 
Government agencies have developed some service costing tools. MSD developed a service costing 
analysis tool in an Excel spreadsheet and takes into account both direct costs, and indirect overhead and 
operational costs. (MSD, 2008). However, this tool is not readily available on MSD’s website and the 
Commission understands that it is no longer used. Work and Income developed a costing tool in 2012 
when they tendered for Youth Service contracts. The tool was provided to potential bidders as part of the 
request for proposal (RFP) process. Its purpose was to introduce the outcomes-based payment framework, 
which was new for many providers, to help them model outcome assumptions and the impact on their 
income under contract. The tool was in the public domain.  
The Commission is not aware of any general guidelines about how to approach the costing of social 
services. The Office of the Auditor-General (OAG) has published guidelines for charging fees for public 
sector goods and services, but they do not apply to contractual payments (OAG, 2008). The Treasury 
guidelines for setting charges in the public sector apply only for services for which the Government is the 
51 In the latter case, the strong mission orientation of an NFP provider can alleviate concerns the funder might have about quality shading (Appendix F). 
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monopoly supplier (New Zealand Treasury, 2002), and so do not seem to apply to the provision of services 
by non-government providers in contestable or competitive situations. 
 
 
 R6.11  Agencies commissioning social services need to be prepared to understand the costs 
that providers face in supplying services. They should invest in the skills, tools and 
research necessary to develop costing models. The Treasury could provide useful cross-
government guidance. 
 
 
Pricing disputes 
It is almost impossible for NGOs to challenge funders about price or the significant and unfair 
differential between DHB funding and NGO funding. (Platform Trust, sub. 45, p. 7) 
This raises the question of how best to resolve disputes over pricing. Independent arbitrators and regulators 
are used in other contexts. The Commission is interested in the views of inquiry participants as to an 
appropriate dispute resolution mechanism for funding social services. 
 
 
 Q6.1 
 
What mechanisms are appropriate to determine whether prices for “fully funded” 
services are set at a level that allows an efficient provider to make sustainable returns on 
the resources they deploy? Should there be an independent body to resolve disputes? 
If so, should it take the form of an arbitrator or a regulator? 
 
 
Contributory funding 
Contributory funding allows government to subsidise activities that others specify and lead, or are jointly 
specified.  
It is not the role of government to fund all of our activities or to support all of our priorities. However, 
we do want a system that enables us to have enough space to self-fund activities and ways of working 
that we value. (Barnardos, sub. 12, p. 7) 
Generally speaking, payment should be a negotiated, fixed contribution or a fixed proportion of what 
would be payable under a full funding arrangement. 
In a contributory funding model, it is reasonable for government to require accountability for funds spent, 
though not for outcomes achieved. 
What proportion should government fund? 
The services and activities that the community expects government to fund, and the scale of funding, vary 
across countries (APC, 2010). The Australian Productivity Commission suggested that what government 
should fund, and to what extent, is ideally based on an assessment of the net benefit, although only 
governments can decide what proportion of the costs of a service to fund. Factors they should consider 
include: 
 whether services are considered citizen entitlements or part of a social safety net; 
 whether government is clearly purchasing the service on behalf of the community; 
 the impacts of government funding for service quality; 
 the long-term impacts of the level of funding on service capacity; 
 whether the NFP service providers have agreed to make a contribution; and 
 the value to the community of alternative uses of additional government funding, taking into account 
the efficiency costs of raising taxation revenue. 
Factors such as these can provide a framework that government can use to enable it to articulate its 
approach to funding (APC, 2010). 
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Grants 
Grants have low transaction costs and may be more efficient than contracts for some purposes. This is 
particularly the case where relatively small amounts of money are involved. 
Tied grants 
Tied grants allow government to subsidise organisations for specific purposes. It is reasonable for 
government to require accountability; that is, that the funds were spent on goods or services that 
contributed to the specified purpose. 
Untied grants 
Untied grants allow government to subsidise organisations to meet their own goals. Government also 
indirectly supports charities (of whom many provide social services) by providing donors with tax credits. In 
2010, donor tax credits amounted to $195 million. Approximately $45 million of this was for donations to 
charities providing social services (Chapter 2). 
Community development 
The New Zealand Council of Christian Social Services (NZCCSS) (sub. 35) argued that contract funding of 
NFPs for specific social services creates positive spill-over effects for the communities in which these NFPs 
operate: 
Government funding of social services assists in the development of strong, capable, community based 
organisations. These organisations are critical to the wellbeing of their communities. Any government 
procurement of social services process should consider the whole contribution of the social services 
organisations to their communities – it should not just separate out a social services outcome as a 
commodity to be purchased in a transaction. (p. 10) 
The NZCCSS further argues that these spill-overs are sufficient to justify the continuation of funding for 
existing NFPs and a strong contracting bias against FPs. 
Other submitters questioned whether contract payments for services are an effective or appropriate 
mechanism for supporting community development: 
In the disability community we often see initiatives developed under the guise of community 
development where the community has little control over the initiatives and the officials set the agenda 
from afar. This means the Ministries agenda is met, but not necessarily the community or disabled 
people involved. (Workbridge, sub. 102, p. 10) 
…government needs to take a broad investment approach to communities and community 
development, and not confine itself to a narrowly defined contracting approach. (Waves Trust & 
Community Waitakere, sub. 83, p. 6) 
The Methodist Mission did not think it reasonable to equate social service community organisations with the 
community they service: 
We are not our clients, we do not gather their voice, we frequently do not even gather their feedback 
on our services. The equation of social service community organisations with the community they 
service is, with a few honourable exceptions (typically Mäori and Pacifica organisations), a conceit. 
(sub. 4, p. 17) 
John Angus submitted that government attempts to support and build up community initiatives have not 
been successful (Box 6.6). 
Box 6.6 Government and community-based initiatives 
In my view Government’s attempts to support and build up community initiatives – those that 
have genuine grassroots ownership and support – have not been successful. For many 
communities government support has been a very mixed blessing. Here are some examples:  
 I have heard Kim Workman very cogently argue that for 100 years iwi, hapu and marae based 
initiatives have been essentially colonised by government departments. Examples are: 
initiatives within Maori communities to support families of men who were at war, the Maori 
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The Community Care Trust identified a community development initiative funded through the Department 
of Internal Affairs: 
…the Greater Green Island Community Network where a cross sector of business, Government, 
education and social service providers form a steering committee based on a shared vision of the 
community but with unique interests and input into how this vision is achieved. This is supported by 
Department of Internal Affairs Community Development Fund. (Community Care Trust, sub. 96, p. 6) 
Funding should use a mechanism consistent with its goal. In this case, the goal concerns developing and 
applying community decision-making capability. Grants are a more appropriate mechanism. Co-funding in 
some form by the relevant community is desirable, as it is a reliable signal of their priorities. Such co-
funding could be in resources or volunteer time. 
Fully-funded contracts for the delivery of social services should not be awarded on the basis of claims of 
“community development” spill-overs.  
 
 
 R6.12  Government funding for community development should be through grants for that 
purpose, and co-funded in some form by the relevant community.  
 
Joint costs 
A provider delivering multiple services may have fixed overheads. For example, all of their services require 
an office, but one office is sufficient to deliver all services. This is an example of economies of scope, which 
reduce the total cost of delivering services. However, when the services are independently funded, these 
circumstances create a joint cost problem (eg, Pfouts, 1961) for the provider, as identified by inquiry 
participants (Box 6.7).  
Women’s Welfare League and, potentially, kohanga reo. Such a process is a risk for Whanau 
Ora and I urge you to be aware of it in your case study.  
 Provisions under the CYPF Act allowed for the establishment and approval of Iwi Social 
Services and Cultural Social Services, services with some of the powers of Child Youth and 
Family. In the 1990s I was responsible for making it happen along with senior officials from 
Child Youth and Family and the Community Funding Agency. The reasons for the failure 
were several: non-cooperation between Child Youth and Family and CFA over funding, an 
insistence that any service look very similar to Child Youth and Family, an unwillingness to 
give up power and control that verged on institutional racism and a breach of article 1 of the 
Treaty  
 A Community Initiatives Fund that threw money at community programmes in a way that 
almost inevitably set up failures. 
Source:  John Angus, sub. 109, p. 10. 
Box 6.7 Contracting arrangements cater poorly for provider overheads 
Submitters made the point that contracts do not cover all overheads, and that losing one contract can 
make the provider unviable. 
The area that remains problematic is the provision of some support for core organisational 
activities that enable groups to ‘keep the doors open’ and staff employed with some security … If 
groups are largely dependent on a succession of short term contracts they often find that 
legitimate overhead costs are discounted. Groups with a long and valuable contribution are too 
often only one failed contract or grant application away from dissolution. In this sense capability in 
the sector is lost – almost by accident. (WAVES Trust & Community Waitakere, sub. 83, p. 6) 
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If each service was funded to cover the full cost of overheads, then this would solve the provider’s problem; 
but funders might baulk at paying the same cost multiple times. Yet providers face a funding shortfall if 
individual contract payments do not collectively cover overheads. 
There is no simple solution to this problem. A practical approach involves bundling services together into a 
single contract when it is efficient for them to be supplied by a single provider. Ideally, such opportunities 
should be identified early in the commissioning process.  
Because government is the dominant purchaser, it has the power to make existing providers with high fixed 
costs unviable. What it wants is for new providers to be able to enter, and for less efficient ones to improve 
or exit. Ideally market forces would sort this out – including dealing with fixed-costs problems. Since such 
markets are managed to at least some extent by government, solutions will likely involve government. The 
challenge is to intervene in a way that maintains the health and vitality of the provider market. 
Provider diversity 
Provider diversity has many aspects. Two important dimensions are organisational form and provider size. 
Inquiry participants had strong, and opposing, views on the desirability of large versus small providers, and 
FP forms versus NFP forms (see Box 4.3 in Chapter 4). 
The Commission does not support a bias towards particular provider types. Social services and the 
environment within which they are delivered are sufficiently diverse that there is no basis to rule out 
particular forms or sizes of providers.  
It is appropriate for commissioning agencies to take account of provider specialisation, and economies of 
scope and scale where they exist; and at times these factors will favour particular types of providers. 
 
 
 R6.13  When commissioning services, government agencies should be open-minded about the 
size or organisational form of current and potential social service providers. 
Preconceptions about provider size or form risk keeping out new entrants and reducing 
innovation. 
 
 
How many providers? 
Markets do not necessarily lead to an optimum number of suppliers. This is especially likely to be the case 
in social services markets. So it may be reasonable for commissioning agencies to “intervene”, in the form 
of encouraging consolidation of small suppliers or encouraging new entrants. Such intervention should be 
well-justified and transparent. 
There is a tension between efficient provider scale and provider diversity. For example, the Blind 
Foundation pointed out that: 
[as] a national organisation we work directly with few government purchasers who centrally manage 
contracts. It would significantly increase our overhead costs if we had to negotiate individual 
agreements at a regional level, if for instance DHBs were given responsibility for the local purchase of 
sensory disability services … Fragmenting provision to very local levels and the use of intermediary 
Often government wants national providers but they have more overheads than smaller niche 
providers (who often don’t have the resource for extensive quality systems). Overhead costs are 
not well recognised in many government contracts. (Relationships Aotearoa, sub. 56, p. 10) 
…providing funding that covers overheads as well as service delivery [would reduce the cost to 
service providers of participating in contestable processes, as] this would enable social service 
providers to focus on what is really important, i.e. service delivery, which would ultimately result in 
better social outcomes and would reduce costs to service providers by not having to spend time 
and money sourcing alternative funds to cover overheads. (Age Concern New Zealand, sub. 100, 
p. 8) 
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agencies for managing payments such as those used for individualised and enhanced individualised 
funding will generally mean additional administrative overhead that could create significant financial 
and reputational risk for government. Managing those risks will add cost to the overall social service 
programme. (sub. 16, pp. 15, 20) 
Alzheimers New Zealand warned that diverse approaches can impose costs. It pointed out that the strategy, 
purchasing and administrative arrangements of the current health-based contracting arrangements are: 
…replicated 20 times (through each District Health Board (DHB)) and nationally across the various 
public service departments. And with those fragmented arrangements comes risks (and actual) 
unplanned inconsistencies in approach that negatively impact the consistency and quality of services 
that people affected by dementia are able to access … Some efforts are underway to address some of 
these issues. To date though, new arrangements have been limited in number and scope. (sub. 27, 
p. 6) 
Other inquiry participants submitted strongly in favour of small providers (see Box 4.3 in Chapter 4). 
But small niche providers may be unviable should they be too small to generate the performance 
information needed to: 
 run themselves effectively; 
 be part of a wider information architecture that rewards good performance; and 
 be an effective part of a learning system.52  
Alternatively, small niche providers may be unviable if their financial reserves are insufficient to survive 
revenue shocks, or their overheads are too high relative to their size. 
Efficient adaptation to local preferences does not necessarily mean a plethora of tiny local provider 
organisations. For example, the Blind Foundation (sub. 16) described a model that balances the costs and 
benefits of local adaptation against national consistency and infrastructure. 
Smaller NFPs may not wish to get large, because size may threaten their mission, proximity to known 
clients, or other characteristics they hold to be important (Box 6.8). 
52 Niche providers are likely organised around one or more of: (i) technical specialisation; (ii) reaching a (potentially geographically dispersed) client group 
with a common identity; (iii) a particular location; (iv) a narrow (operational) mission; or (v) a narrow (philosophical) mission. 
Box 6.8 Getting larger has trade-offs for NFPs 
NFPs are typically strongly mission-oriented (Appendix F). There are natural diseconomies of scale in 
mission – missions need to be more generic as organisational scope grows.  
A larger organisation may no longer be able to attract (or necessarily want) staff with very narrow 
mission orientation. That may mean paying higher salaries. And as an organisation gets larger, more 
generic management skills are required.  
So it might be expected that the organisation, its management style, its staff and salaries converge 
closer to that of an equivalent FP provider. None of these changes may be attractive to the 
organisation’s current staff and stakeholders. 
It is also difficult for NFPs to get larger through mergers: 
The [not-for-profit] sector has no mechanism for easily negotiating mergers or takeovers in the 
way that the commercial sector does. There are no shareholders, bankers, venture capitalists, or 
mentors brokering collaboration initiatives, and there are few if any measures with which an 
organisation can benchmark itself to other agencies. (Methodist Mission, sub. 4, p. 6) 
Mergers between NFPs also face difficulties in negotiating a new mission acceptable to the merging 
parties. Notwithstanding these difficulties, some mergers do occur (Chapter 10). 
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An efficient provider market is one that avoids monopoly, has providers operating at efficient scale, 
encourages investment and permits entry by innovative or more efficient providers.  
Careful market design – with some assistance from the Commerce Act 1985 – can avoid the problems of 
monopoly provision. The other criteria can be difficult to achieve. Generally speaking, providers will know 
more about their costs and efficiency than will commissioning agencies; so it makes sense to give them 
room to contract and grow rather than mandating a particular size. 
Subcontracting 
Presbyterian Support New Zealand described how social services can be successfully delivered through 
subcontracting relationships: 
Presbyterian Support East Coast is contracted by MSD to provide family violence prevention through its 
Family Works service. Whakamana Whanau is a joint response with a Maori provider to family violence 
prevention. With Presbyterian Support as the fund holder Te Ikaroa Rangitahi delivers services in a 
kaupapa Maori framework to the same contract as Family works. Family Works is responsible for 
monitoring and ensuring timely reporting for both services.  
The Family Works part of this service has recently been evaluated with excellent outcomes. The next 
stage is to engage a Maori researcher to evaluate the Te Ikaroa Rangitahi service model.  
This style of funding ensures MSD has oversight by organisations with depth of experience, credibility 
and admin/management infrastructure to support outcomes achievement. (sub. 76, p. 6) 
The Home and Community Health Association presented a contrary view: 
In our sector there has been considerable sub-contracting going on following the 2012 ACC service 
review. We have not seen any evidence that it has made any measurable difference in terms of better 
outcomes. 
We would be very concerned if the commissioning of home support for older people was devolved 
from District Health Boards to non-governmental organisations for the larger population based 
contracts. The examples from the ACC service review would apply to any other devolved 
commissioning: 
a) Providers working under sub-contracts have found that they have lost incentive to innovate 
because the administrative rate that is taken off the contract rate by the commissioning agency is 
what used to be their profit. 
b) Providers working under sub-contracts lose their ability to put in place their own quality measures 
and sometimes feel compromised by the ethics and quality of the commissioning agency. 
c) Providers working under sub-contracts lose their direct connection with the government agency. 
(sub. 114, p. 13) 
Providers may feel that a direct relationship with government offers them more mana. And there is no 
question that the standing of a provider within its target community can matter for effective service delivery. 
But ultimately provider mana should not receive priority over achieving more effective social services.  
Contracts for social services are relationship-intensive, reflecting difficulties in service specification and 
monitoring.  
The relationship between the Government contract manager and their understanding of the work of the 
organisation is imperative in specifying, measuring and managing the performance of services where 
outcomes are not easy to observe or attribute. Previously contracts managers were based in the 
regions but increasingly are based in Auckland, Wellington or Christchurch and may lack an 
understanding of the local environment. We also tend to see less of the contracts managers which is 
unfortunate as this provided a platform from which to build trust, identify areas of non-performance and 
share stories of success. (Community Care Trust, sub. 96, p. 3) 
And social service provision can be very fragmented. 
The culture and leadership of the domestic violence, child abuse and sexual violence sectors is 
confusing and fragmented. There are multiple agencies working at multiple layers:  
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 There are over 200 – largely disconnected leadership, governance and multi-agency groups, 
networks and coordinators trying to address the problem nationally and regionally.  
 According to MSD's Family and Community Services website they contract with 774 different 
providers for ‘family violence’ services. In addition, family violence services are contracted via 
Ministry of Justice (eg stopping violence programmes), and other government agencies. (The 
Impact Collective, sub. 130, p. 14) 
Government agencies cannot efficiently manage hundreds or thousands of contractual relationships. The 
Commission has heard evidence that some of these relationships are in poor shape, reflecting in part the 
sheer number of relationships. 
Provider subcontracting can be an efficient way to reduce the number of relationships managed by 
government agencies. Prime contractors – those with a direct relationship with government and their 
subcontractors – can devote more resources to individual relationships.  
Smaller providers may fear the consequences of the replacement of a single government purchaser with a 
single non-government purchaser. The underlying problems – those associated with a single purchaser – 
remain in both cases, and are best dealt with by changing the service model. The bargaining power of small 
providers will be increased should they have the option of supplying multiple purchasers. 
 
 
 R6.14  Provider subcontracting can be an efficient way to reduce the number of relationships 
managed by government agencies, and to improve the quality of relationships overall. 
Government agencies should be open to providers of social services subcontracting the 
delivery of services to other providers. 
 
 
A healthy provider ecosystem 
Barnardos (sub. 12) suggested that the provision of social services can be viewed as an ecosystem, with 
three roles for providers: 
 delivering services under contract to government; 
 designing and implementing their own services and supports for clients and their families; and 
 social enterprise. 
Providers can choose one or more of these roles: 
The ecosystem model that we are articulating does not require organisations (or even service types) to 
fit neatly in one part of the system or the other. Rather it requires: explicit recognition of the role and 
objectives of each different part of the system, conscious choice about when to use which part, and 
some oversight to keep all parts in balance and to allow movement and learning between all three 
parts. (Barnardos, sub. 12, p. 12) 
Some submitters considered a fourth role to be important – that of political advocacy: 
Community and voluntary groups argue that it is time to listen to their voice more and to ensure that 
the conditions exist that allow for engagement in public debate. (NZCTU, sub. 103, p. 14) 
The key role of community services providers is to be responsive to the needs of the most 
disadvantaged and inform government of the issues and gaps to ensure that resources and services are 
directed where they are most needed in an effort to reduce inequality and increase the health and 
welfare of citizens. (Auckland North Community & Development, sub. 22, p. 4) 
Sturgess (2012) made a strong case for encouraging a diversity of service providers: 
…until recently, policymakers have not been particularly concerned with increasing the diversity of the 
supply side. Diversity serves a number of functions: 
a) Choice. Diversity increases the effective choice available to the beneficiaries of public services, at 
the individual and the collective level. 
 Chapter 6 | Commissioning 141 
b) Adaptability. The public service economy is better able to adapt to changing circumstances when 
there is greater institutional diversity. It gives us a deeper ‘gene pool’ from which to fashion new 
institutional forms for an uncertain future. 
c) Innovation. Different kinds of service providers with different backgrounds bring different 
perspectives to the challenge of delivering better and more cost-effective public services. Diversity 
allows for experimentation and problem-solving in parallel rather than in serial (trying one solution 
and only after it has been tested, trying another). (p. 8) 
Like natural ecosystems, the social services system is better served by having diversity in service providers. 
It should be up to providers to decide the roles they wish to undertake in such a system. There may be 
trade-offs for organisations that span multiple roles. Such organisations are best placed to deal with those 
trade-offs. 
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7 A system that learns and innovates 
Key points 
 Key features of a system that learns are: 
- trying a variety of new ways of doing things; 
- tolerating trials that fail;  
- dealing with failure quickly;  
- identifying and selecting the variants that perform better; and 
- spreading the uptake of these more successful variants. 
 A system that learns needs to have: 
- clear goals around improving the return on investment in social services in terms of better 
outcomes both for clients and for taxpayers;  
- strong incentives to find, and the flexibility to try, new ways of doing things;  
- information flows that provide ongoing feedback to service users, providers and 
commissioning organisations and citizens about what is working; and 
- the flexibility to take up successful innovations. 
 Choosing commissioning institutions and service models that incorporate these features is likely to 
increase learning and innovation in the social services system. Devolved approaches to 
commissioning are well suited to a social services system that learns. 
 Innovation in the social services involves introducing new or significantly improved services or 
business processes, for the purposes of getting better outcomes from available resources. 
 The social services, with some exceptions, lag far behind many other services in adopting 
innovative productivity-enhancing business models. Such models are often enabled by modern 
information and communications technology.  
 Innovation in social services is often small scale, local, dependent on a few committed individuals 
and incremental; but there are some examples of disruptive innovation that have dramatically 
changed prevailing business models. 
 Risk aversion in government agencies and in not-for-profits (NFPs), overly prescriptive contracts, 
capital constraints and “bare-bones” funding partly explain low levels of innovation in the social 
services. 
 There is wide acknowledgement of the importance of evaluation for continual improvement in the 
design and delivery of social services. In practice, evaluation of many social services is absent or of 
poor quality, or not given enough weight in subsequent decision making. 
 Initiatives under way may improve the quality of evaluation. Yet a new approach is needed that 
better enables cost-effective monitoring and evaluation in real time across the system, using a 
wider range of information than is typically used in evaluations.  
 
Lifting the effectiveness of social services in New Zealand will require a system that learns over time about 
what works, then selects the successful approaches and winds down the approaches that fail to achieve 
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good results. The chapter will set out the system characteristics needed to achieve these things, and how 
they differ from some current features that inhibit them. The chapter looks at barriers to innovation in the 
social services and ways of reducing these barriers. The chapter also identifies weaknesses in the evidence 
base for system-wide learning. Leveraging data and analytics to address these weaknesses is discussed 
further in Chapter 8. 
7.1 A system that learns 
Complexity and uncertainty make it difficult to solve social problems  
Social services commonly address problems involving complex human interactions among people with 
multiple and interdependent needs (Chapter 2). Solutions are often uncertain and incomplete because: 
 the underlying causes are specific to a particular individual, family or community; and 
 once services deal with some aspects of a complex problem, other aspects emerge unpredictably and 
in unintended ways.  
Solving complex problems requires a system that can respond to unintended negative consequences when 
and where they emerge by trying new approaches and selecting the most promising solutions.  
A system that learns needs to place a high value on evidence about what works. Where evidence on what 
works is lacking, the system needs to allow and then evaluate a diverse range of innovative approaches. A 
search for a solution will likely consist of a gradual refining of the approach to improve its effectiveness as 
further evidence accumulates. 
Top-down initiatives and restructures tend not to work because, as complexity theory teaches us, the 
most effective change in a complex system comes about endogenously and incrementally, rather than 
externally and suddenly. Innovation comes about through learning over time. (Muir & Parker, 2014, 
p. 68) 
Trying new ways of doing things and selecting the successes 
A system that learns needs: 
 clear goals around improving the performance of social services;  
 strong incentives and the flexibility to find and try new ways of doing things and test them against 
current approaches; 
 ongoing feedback to the users and providers of services and commissioning organisations about what is 
working (Chapter 8); and 
 a means to discard the less successful and the failing services, and to select and spread the successes.  
Commissioning organisations need to build system-wide perspectives and understanding of how the 
system is performing as a whole (Figure 7.1). 
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Figure 7.1 A system that learns  
 
The Australian National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) demonstrates how a large-scale reform can be 
set up to learn. The NDIS is an ambitious, innovative approach to giving people with permanent disabilities 
more effective choice of the supports they need. The Scheme is being rolled out over several years 
(Chapter 3). The National Disability Insurance Agency (NDIA) is implementing a “learn-build-learn-build” 
approach to continually improve the Scheme’s design while meeting quarterly performance targets. The 
Chair of the NDIA, Bruce Bonyhady, sees this as: 
similar to computer software companies which regularly update their programs based on user feedback 
and research, but is unusual in social policy. Since the scheme’s inception we have redesigned and 
introduced significant improvements every six months. These changes are based on evidence and the 
NDIA now has more data on disability in Australia than has ever been available. (Bonyhady, 2014a, p. 4) 
Bruce Bonyhady told the Commission: “The only thing we can get wrong is not learning…It is only through 
trialling you discover the real implementation issues.” 
Choice of commissioning institutions and service models matters for 
innovation 
Different commissioning institutions and service models have different strengths and weaknesses in trying 
and selecting new approaches. A centralised top-down approach tends to generate fixed decisions about 
what works with too little tailoring of services to particular circumstances and discourages bottom-up 
experimentation. A top-down approach with political leaders at the apex emphasises risk management and 
has a low tolerance for failure. Such a model, even with experimentation, tends to dampen innovation 
because: 
 experiments are subject to tight specification, reducing the possibility of serendipitous findings; 
 experimentation is limited to relatively “safe” dimensions; and 
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 pressure to adopt “best practice” can lead to a one-off improvement, but eliminate service variations 
that might form the basis of future best practice. 
A totally decentralised approach permits a lot of local experiments, but applies little pressure to select 
successful ones. Ineffective services continue to operate indefinitely.  
New Zealand has a highly centralised approach to commissioning social services (Chapter 2). The main 
funder, central government, takes most of the responsibility and is the main player in deciding what services 
should be provided to what clients. Commissioning organisations stress risk management, which poses a 
barrier to learning (Chapter 4; section 7.3).  
Most providers of public services, whether currently in-house or independent, have been bred to obey 
the diktats of their funders. Shaking this habit will take time (Haldenby, Harries & Olliff-Cooper, 2014, 
p. 61) 
While there is a continual stream of new initiatives, usually designed and specified from the centre, these 
rarely generate widespread change in the social services system. Instead they are quickly superseded by yet 
further initiatives (Chapters 2 and 4). Meanwhile, funding for many existing services continues with relatively 
little evaluation or policy attention.  
Even so, commissioning organisations have sometimes encouraged decentralised and diverse solutions for 
some services. Yet without adequate evaluation and recognition of what does or does not work, no 
effective means exists of expanding successful approaches and curtailing unsuccessful ones. Social Sector 
Trials are an example where responsibility for finding coordinated local solutions to specific problems has 
been handed over to local staff, without a system for collecting data in a standardised way to permit 
evaluation. 
Devolved commissioning for learning and innovation 
Devolved approaches to commissioning services are well suited to a social services system that learns. 
Devolving commissioning to regions, communities of interest or subsidiary national organisations distances 
the choice of new approaches from risk-averse central government ministers and officials. Moreover, 
regions, communities and organisations vary not only in the nature of their social problems but also in their 
capabilities and perspectives. They are therefore likely to generate quite different solutions (section 7.3). 
Service models that are particularly suited to encouraging bottom-up innovation and learning and the 
spread of successful new ideas include managed markets, shared goals, client-directed budgets (CDBs) and 
voucher models (Chapter 6). By putting weight on the achievement of outcomes or meeting client needs, 
these service models reduce the need for prescription and provide more scope for providers to test new 
ways of doing things.  
In some service models such as managed markets, CDBs and vouchers, providers also face competitive 
pressures to innovate. Providers can gain a greater share of the market if they are successful. This provides 
a mechanism for successful new ideas to spread (section 7.3). 
 
 
 F7.1  Service models without overly centralised control encourage learning in the social 
services system. They foster diversity and encourage the selection and expansion of 
effective services and the curtailing of less effective ones. 
 
 
7.2 Innovation and why it is important 
There is a continuing stream of innovations in social services in New Zealand (Chapters 2, 3 and 4). Some 
have proved successful and led to shifts in the social services landscape. Many others have tackled 
troublesome issues without resolving the underlying problems. Further, in many parts of the system, social 
services continue to operate relatively untested in much the same way as they have for many years.  
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In contrast, many services in other parts of the economy, such as banking and retail, have experienced 
disruptive business re-organisation over recent decades, facilitated by information and communications 
technology (ICT). For example, service firms have used ICT to process transactions more efficiently, improve 
knowledge about customer behaviour, allow rapid testing of alternative services, speed up information 
feedback loops, streamline supply chains and change the locus of decision making. This has led to strong 
productivity growth in many service industries (NZPC, 2014a). 
If productivity growth in social services does not match that in the wider economy, social services will 
become relatively more expensive as wages rise. To get more from existing resources: 
 the social service system needs to generate more innovation and learn more effectively from successful 
innovations; and 
 commissioning organisations and providers of social services need to better understand and address 
the barriers to successful innovation.  
Innovation in social services  
Social services are typically relationship intensive, often involving skilled interpersonal interactions that 
might seem to offer limited opportunities for innovation. Yet the definition of innovation used in the 
business context suggests that there is in fact wide scope for innovation in the social services. Statistics 
New Zealand (2012) defines business innovation “as the introduction [by a business] of any new or 
significantly improved goods, services, processes, or marketing methods”.  
In the social services, innovation could, for instance, involve: 
 finding new types of services that are more effective in achieving results, especially for complex hard-to-
solve issues; 
 re-designing services so that they are more effective and more cost effective at achieving results for 
clients; 
 re-designing business processes so that the costs of engaging with clients is reduced for the client and 
the provider; 
 identifying and providing services for new groups of clients; or 
 commissioning services in a way that makes better use of information about what works, for whom, and 
how much alternative approaches cost. 
Innovation can be relatively small scale, local and incremental; at the other extreme it can involve system-
wide step changes that involve large investments. Some examples of social services innovation in 
New Zealand are given in Box 7.1. 
Box 7.1 Examples of social services innovation in New Zealand 
Youth Horizons has introduced new (to New Zealand) programmes for young people with severe 
conduct difficulties, based on international evidence on effective programmes. Introduction involves 
careful implementation to show that the programme is working as intended and suits local conditions 
(sub. 67). 
From the early 2000s the Wise Group: 
…was able to substantially disinvest in high cost, low service volume bed based services [for 
people with complex mental health needs] and reinvest in mobile support services that enabled 
people to live well in their own home. Service access increased markedly over this period. 
(sub. 41, p. 19) 
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A European panel of experts looked at innovation in the social services and concluded: 
…innovation in social services is characterised by incremental changes and adaptations rather than 
disruptive processes. Most of the time, an innovative solution is characterised by the implementation of 
a new idea or a new step into a pre-existing process in order to better adapt it to new needs and/or 
make it more efficient. This kind of cumulative change can have greater impact on the quality and 
responsiveness of social services in the long-term but they are not always visible in the short-term. 
(Laino & Sütó, 2013, p. 5) 
The Australian Productivity Commission (APC) (2007, p. 70) came to a similar conclusion about the nature of 
innovation in small service firms in the market sector: “…many service sector innovations arguably reflect 
the routine, incremental experimentation that is merely part of the business of being a successful service 
supplier”.  
Yet APC (2007) argued that large service firms and those that have significant economies of scale often 
innovate using technology and complementary investments (for instance in ICT hardware and software) to 
obtain gains from coordinating across multiple functions. As a result, even though the ideas are not 
expensive to create, and are easily understood by other firms, “their detailed realisation does involve large 
resource requirements”. So it is not easy for other players to copy them (p. 70). 
The same is likely to be true to some extent of larger players in the social services sector. Social services, 
like other services, are transaction intensive. Providers should be able to transform their business models 
using ICT, just as service firms in other parts of the economy have done. “…collecting, accessing and data 
sharing is the central feature of so many social services…” (Mansell, 2015 p. 26).  
 
 
 F7.2  Social services providers have not, for the most part, been affected by the disruptive 
innovation that has transformed many market services. Services firms in other parts of 
the economy have adopted new productivity-enhancing business models enabled by 
information and communications technology. 
 
 
 
 
 F7.3  Social service providers have many opportunities to use information and 
communications technology to transform the way they engage with clients and 
commissioning organisations, and the way they design, monitor, evaluate and adapt 
their services. 
 
 
Wise Group has since introduced employment services for this client group, targeted at the open job 
market which “was seen as revolutionary at the time”. (sub. 41, p. 19) 
Relationships Aotearoa is implementing a “truly mobile client management and feedback system” that 
enables counsellors to work with clients wherever they are, record progress and provide counsellors 
with feedback about their practice. “Data is captured in real-time, is accurate, and not reliant on a high 
level of administration to maintain and extract for reporting purposes” (sub. 56, p. 9). 
The Ministry of Social Development (MSD) uses randomised controlled trials to identify which types of 
employment services work best for which clients in terms of reducing long-term benefit dependency. 
This information is used to assign clients to services in a way that makes best use of the Ministry’s 
resources in achieving the outcomes sought by the government (Chapter 3; Appendix B). 
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7.3 Generating and spreading innovation 
Where do ideas come from?  
New ideas in the social services can come from any direction. Sources might include, for instance, local 
reflection on practice, client and community feedback, the example of successful social service practice 
elsewhere in New Zealand and internationally, or new private sector business models and innovations using 
ICT. 
The New Zealand Council of Christian Social Services submitted: 
Community level innovation emerges from a variety of sources; it often occurs as a result of passion, 
drive and appropriate resourcing. Community organisations will use their infrastructure to provide 
venues, staffing and accountability structures for new initiatives. This is usually done at the cost of the 
community organisation which may start off just using their resources and skills to take a new approach. 
As additional needs and solutions are identified this may lead to a funding application to a 
philanthropic group, then after further refinement and development this may emerge as a bid to a 
government agency for support. (sub. 35, p. 8)  
The Waimakariri District Council also stressed the importance of local initiatives: 
Innovation is more likely to be achieved at local level by people perceiving a need and having the 
imagination and energy to make changes, or by organisations confident in their role in providing 
services working beside other organisations undertaking similar work … to compare methods and 
outcomes and learn from each other. (sub. 75, p. 3) 
On a much larger scale, MSD’s Investment Approach (Chapter 3 and Appendix D) drew ideas from the 
operation of the Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC), and from private sector development of real-
time evaluation facilitated by ICT. 
Philanthropists, social enterprises and for-profit (FP) businesses can be valuable sources of new ideas for 
social services. An important advantage of these sources is that they can act more freely and independently 
than governments, as they are not subject to the same political risks or other constraints. 
Organisations can also use commissioning expressly to generate more innovation in social services. For 
instance, social bonds have generated innovative ways to address difficult-to-solve social problems. 
Government social services agencies sometimes engage non-government providers to bring fresh ideas to 
areas where state provision has traditionally dominated (Chapter 3).  
Stand proposed that government agencies and non-government providers co-create and co-produce 
innovative approaches: 
Stand is aware that a range of alternative commissioning models are being tested both in New Zealand 
and internationally. Evaluation on the effectiveness of these approaches is in the early stages although 
indicators are promising for some, such as the Social Sector Trials. Internationally, commissioning 
approaches appear to be more ambitious and more comfortable in taking a higher level of innovation 
risk to try different approaches, reflected in an attitude of – Have a go “fail fast”, keep focused on the 
outcomes sought, adapt efforts quickly, take the learning forward, have another go. 
Strong trust-based relationships developed between commissioning agencies, government and service 
providers that focus on co-creation and co-production would create a stronger 
partnership/accountability culture and in turn provide more stability for innovations that need long term 
investment. (Stand, sub. 127, p. 12) 
Lack of new ideas is not, by itself, likely to be a constraint on innovation in the social services. However, the 
social services system with its current institutions favours some sources of innovation over others and 
dampens innovation overall. 
Government officials often think they know best when in the disability sector they often don’t and the 
real innovation which is in the community is either lost or not funded through the Government 
initiatives that Officials develop. (Workbridge, sub. 102, p. 9) 
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Central government currently has a dominant role in sourcing and gatekeeping new ideas for resourcing 
and trying out. This not only limits the size and diversity of the pool of new ideas; it tends to bias the 
selection according to political preferences, aversion to political risk and officials’ need to keep control. The 
system needs to permit and encourage a greater flow of new ideas from “below”, whether from social 
entrepreneurs, philanthropists, not-for-profit (NFP) and FP organisations, or from service users and 
communities. 
 
 
 F7.4  The social services system appears to be too focused on central government as a 
source of new ideas, and as a gatekeeper of which ideas are trialled. This limits the size 
and diversity of the pool of new ideas available to commissioning organisations. The 
system needs to do more to permit and encourage trialling of new ideas from social 
entrepreneurs, philanthropists, non-government providers, service users and 
communities. 
 
 
Innovation in government provision of social services 
Innovation in government services has an important role in promoting more effective social services. Yet 
government-provided services typically do not provide much room for experimentation. In particular, some 
services, such as policing, child protection and corrections, involve the exercise of coercive powers and 
close judicial scrutiny. Providers of such services need to follow prescribed processes rigorously, which limits 
innovation.  
MSD’s innovative Investment Approach to designing and targeting employment services for recipients of 
income support is a notable exception where experimentation and re-deployment of resources to more 
effective service models is built into the design (Chapter 3). Yet, while the Investment Approach is good at 
trialling and allocating resources more efficiently across different designs and client segments, it does not 
by itself encourage bottom-up innovation in the way that case managers work with clients. 
The Public Service Association (PSA) argued that “there is … evidence that there is much innovation within 
the public sector, but it is often not recognised or well-supported” (sub. 108, p. 10). The PSA pointed to 
initiatives such as a project that successfully reduced the time taken for scheduling acute appointments at 
the Bay of Plenty District Health Board from 5 hours to 1.5 hours, reduced the need to re-book 
appointments and allowed patients to choose their appointment times so that they were more likely to turn 
up. The PSA argued that “culture change needs to be normalised, to become the ‘way we do things around 
here’, so that lessons are systematised and used to innovate and improve outcomes, and failures are 
examined for ideas on how to improve” (p. 10). 
Yet, consistent with the discussion in section 7.1, the PSA also argued that “the top-down managerialism 
enshrined in the State Sector Act 1988 … does not help create a culture of high-trust workplaces where all 
workers contribute to public value and are supported as entrepreneurs” (p. 12). 
Governments recognise the value of innovation in government-provided services. The Better Public Sector 
Advisory Group (BPSAG) identified in 2011 that “sharply improved state sector performance will require a 
culture that supports and actively encourages innovation and continuous improvement” (BPSAG, 2011, 
p. 39). BPSAG recommends that the government require “state agencies to drive continuous business 
process improvement through the use of ‘lean’ methodologies and to drive innovation by benchmarking 
activity, identifying and implementing best practice from across the system” (2011, p. 11). Clearly this 
recommendation covers government-provided social services, and MSD’s Investment Approach is an 
example of the recommendation being adopted. Yet the PSA judges that the Better Public Services 
Programme and amendments to the State Sector Act in 2013 “indicate a rather limited view of the 
imperative for change” (sub. 108, p. 12). 
The Australian Government Management Advisory Committee made 12 broad recommendations in 2010 
on fostering innovation in the public services (Australian Government, 2010). The recommendations 
covered strategy and culture; leadership; resourcing and management; and recognition, sharing and 
learning within the Australian Public Service. Each recommendation has a number of components, in sum 
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presenting a complex and inter-dependent map of proposed changes. Making sustained progress across 
such a broad range of initiatives represents a significant challenge in face of the barriers recognised by the 
report: 
Some powerful barriers, in particular political risk and public scrutiny, have a specific impact on public 
sector innovation. Governments and ministers are judged on their success and, in seeking to avoid 
criticism or failure, they can be conservative or resistant to innovative approaches. Political risk also 
contributes to risk-averse attitudes among public servants, and innovation is inherently risky. In the 
public sector, failures tend to happen in the full glare of public scrutiny, with consequent risks for the 
reputations and careers of public servants. It can be easier to avoid criticism by not taking risks. 
(Australian Government, 2010, p. VII) 
Mulgan and Albury (2003) identify the same and other barriers to innovation in the public sector (Figure 
7.2). 
Figure 7.2 Barriers to innovation in the public sector 
 
Source: Mulgan and Albury, 2003. 
One recommendation made by the Australian Government report was for the public service to: 
…establish a collaborative experimentation programme, modelled on the Danish MindLab, to develop 
and trial solutions to significant and cross agency problems in areas including policy and service 
delivery. A key activity under this program would be the development and implementation of 
collaborative pilots and trials. (Australian Government, 2010, p. X) 
…MindLab is a cross-Ministry innovation lab that facilitates the active involvement of citizens and 
businesses in developing new public sector solutions. MindLab specialises in facilitating discussions 
between public servants, citizens and business out in community settings. It uses the outcomes to 
redesign public policy in key areas. (Kelly, 2010, p. 1) 
The MindLab model chimes with research that shows that public sector innovation often happens at middle 
levels in an organisation, led by individuals who are constructively engaged with service users, and who are 
willing to work around current rules and procedures (Eppel et al., 2008; Mulgan & Albury, 2003). Public 
sector innovation often involves crossing organisational boundaries and process re-engineering (Borins, 
2001). 
In other jurisdictions, non-government foundations hold competitions, such as the Ford-Kennedy School of 
Government awards in the United States, for public sector innovation (Borins, 2001). In New Zealand, the 
Institute of Public Administration New Zealand holds a yearly competition for public sector excellence in a 
number of categories (IPANZ, 2015). Innovation is one criterion on which the awards are made.  
Not-for-profits are reluctant to take on the risk of innovating 
NFPs often match government agencies in their unwillingness to take on the risk of innovation. NFPs are 
less able than FPs to raise capital to fund innovation. NFPs also generally face the risk of high dependence 
on a single (government) buyer who prefers short-term contracts and has the regulatory power to shift the 
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investments in equipment, recruiting new staff, training or substantial organisational change (Appendix F). 
They are likely instead to favour incremental innovation in business processes and service refinements, in 
much the same way as small private-sector service firms do (APC, 2007).  
Yet large NFPs with diversified funding sources are less constrained than their smaller counterparts. Some 
larger New Zealand social services NFPs such as the Wise Group, Barnardos and the Auckland City Mission 
have introduced significant innovations. Large NFPs sometimes establish joint ventures, set up research 
capabilities in-house, and extend their professional capabilities by adopting new evidence-based 
methodologies. 
 
 
 F7.5  Many social services currently involve risk-averse government agencies contracting for 
services from not-for-profits who are unable to take on the risk of innovation. The 
combination stifles innovation. 
 
 
Innovation and risk sharing 
Innovation carries risks for any organisation or business. Innovation may require capital investments, 
substantial re-organisation of business processes and the re-deployment of staff. The investment may be 
lost if the innovation is unsuccessful. NFPs rely mostly on current and retained earnings to fund the costs, 
and underwrite the risks, of innovation, as they have limited ability to raise capital (Appendix F).  
The difficulty that NFPs face in funding their innovation is exacerbated if payments for services are 
insufficient to cover the full costs of supply (Chapter 6). NFPs often have limited capacity to spread risks 
across customers, service lines and regions. Short-term contracts and payment for outcomes also increase 
financial risks for NFPs (Restorative Justice Aotearoa, sub. 28). 
Many submitters saw the tight budgets of NFPs as a main reason for the social services lacking innovation. 
Many argued that government agencies need to bear more of the risk of innovation (Box 7.2). 
Box 7.2 Risk and difficulty in raising funds can stifle innovation by NFPs 
The Methodist Mission submitted: 
...the sector [non-government social service providers] has a nasty habit of undercapitalising its 
innovations leading to high rates of innovation failure that are frankly inhibitive. (sub. 4, p. 21) 
The Salvation Army reported: 
Community Ministry does attempt to encourage innovation despite the very tight budgets they 
work within. They have approached Ministry of Social Development on some occasions to raise 
key issues and ideas. Community Ministry have also challenged and declined to bid for some 
Requests for Proposals (RFP) on the basis that the RFP required services were too risky or 
achievement of the outcomes for the funding being offered was highly unrealistic. (sub. 104, p. 7) 
Others submitted: 
There is an inherent tension between delivering business-as-usual and exploring new ideas and 
testing them. This requires an organisation to develop a culture of innovation and to be willing to 
risk some of its capital to invest in innovation for the future. This can be very difficult for smaller 
enterprises. (Blind Foundation, sub. 16, p. 33) 
Contracts linked to contributory funding demonstrate a lack of commitment and investment by 
government in outcomes for that community/population. It is difficult to innovate when constantly 
having to focus on cash-flow issues and alternate sources to ‘top up’ funding. (Inclusive NZ, 
sub. 32, p. 7) 
Innovation will always include an element of risk and at government level there appears to be a 
low appetite for any risk but a high appetite for organisations to work differently and innovate. 
The risk is therefore left with organisations that operate in an unstable funding environment with 
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 F7.6  Innovation is risky and sometimes costly. Not-for-profit organisations cannot easily raise 
funds for investments. As a result, access to capital and limited cashflow are significant 
barriers to innovation in parts of the social services.  
 
Submitters offered a range of solutions to the negative effect of funding arrangements on innovation. 
Understandably, many saw higher levels of government funding as an answer, perhaps tagged specifically 
to innovation: 
We recommend fostering an increase in bottom-up experimentation through the inclusion of 
innovation funding as standard across service delivery contracts. Collation of this information and 
sharing what does work to shape future service delivery and celebrate most promising practice would 
be welcomed. We do not believe the current system reinforces successful approaches nor do we 
believe it encourages the reform of less successful approaches. (Community Care Trust, sub. 93, p. 3) 
It was suggested that local innovations be funded as pilot schemes and, if successful, rolled out and 
adapted to other communities across the country. (National Council of Women, sub. 20, p. 2) 
One way to encourage innovation would be to have a supplementary innovation fund in contracts that 
could be accessed subject to a proposal for new or better ways to achieve outcomes. (Social Sector 
Trials, sub. 126, p. 17) 
Lifewise argued that government needs to fund innovation directly: 
Government needs to accept the risk inherent in testing new approaches, and commission innovative 
new approaches. Funding should be allocated to further developing social services, rather than simply 
funding services to continue to deliver the same results. Government could commission ‘test contracts’ 
that would enable providers to try new approaches to solving social issues. Developing fail-fast systems 
where failures in the system could be quickly identified and resolved would ensure that programmes 
could be refined in real-time, and reduce the risk of new programmes not delivering good outcomes. 
This design process used often on business start ups is also useful in the social service space. 
There should be a culture both within government and in not-for-profits of continuous improvement. If 
government wants more results with less, then it needs to fund community organisations to come up 
with innovative ways to achieve their goals without compromising their outcomes. Government needs 
to partner with community providers to be ‘contract makers’ not ‘contract takers’. (sub. 46, pp. 2–3) 
Relationships Aotearoa submitted that government funding for capability development had enabled it to 
put in place innovative use of IT systems to manage customer relations and capture real-time data on client 
progress: 
Much of this innovation was funded by the Capability Investment Resource (CIR) administered by MSD. 
Without this level of investment from MSD we would not have been able to develop these systems in 
the way we have. (Relationships Aotearoa, sub. 56, p. 9) 
Footsteps Education (sub. 42) supported the idea of a public endowment to fund innovation in services 
addressed at reducing child maltreatment. Other submitters saw philanthropic funding as a promising 
source of support for innovation: 
limited capacity to predict longer term funding streams. (Birthright New Zealand Inc., sub. 128, 
p. 4) 
In reality providers are averse to taking risks or taking bold approaches to service delivery 
because of the potential impact this might have on their bottom lines or prospects for further 
contracts. (Restorative Justice Aotearoa, sub. 28, p. 7) 
Innovation and experimentation means risk. Some public service agencies are highly risk averse – 
this means the organisations they contract are unlikely to take risks as well. The public service 
funders and the social services agencies must be able to take risk, and where necessary learn from 
failure – and not be punished for it. (New Zealand Council of Christian Social Services, sub. 35, 
p. 8)  
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Small, agile NGOs that can access philanthropic funding/grants often have a better chance of being 
innovative and creative. If they do not receive any government funding, they have little to lose in 
experimenting with new ideas and approaches, in the best interest of improving the quality (and 
quantity) of service delivery. (New Zealand Disability Support Network, sub. 47, p. 14) 
There is a real need for opportunities for innovation to be undertaken at a privately funded local level. 
This innovation needs to have opportunity for being tested without the fear of failure. (BOP Community 
Response Forum, sub. 53, p. 2) 
Barnardos proposed that while government should fully fund activities that are clearly linked to government 
objectives, NFPs would use their own resources, possibly subsidised by government, to pursue their own 
objectives. Through its support, government would gain “…the ability to test or trial new ideas and 
approaches at lower cost and lower risk than if it fully funded an activity” (sub. 12, p. 15). 
Consistent with Barnardos’ proposal, the Commission considers that where the government contracts with 
providers for the delivery of fully-specified services, payments should be set at a level that allows an 
efficient provider to cover economic costs. This will give providers the confidence and greater capacity to 
invest in innovation (Chapter 6). 
 
 
 R7.1  Organisations commissioning social services should set payments at a level that allows 
an efficient provider to make a sustainable return on resources deployed. This will give 
providers the confidence and greater capacity to invest in innovation. 
 
 
Commissioning organisations could also contract providers to design and try out different innovative service 
designs to assess which is most effective in achieving desired outcomes. This might be similar to the 
approach that MSD takes in trialling different service designs for income-support clients (Chapter 3; 
Appendix B). Where the Government specifies and directly funds the development of an innovative 
programme and an evaluation that shows whether it works, it should own the intellectual property rights 
(IPR) and be able to promote the spread of the innovation through the social services system. 
 
 
 R7.2  Organisations commissioning social services should look for opportunities to contract 
providers to design and try out innovative service designs. This will promote learning 
about what approaches are most effective in achieving desired outcomes. Where the 
Government specifies and directly funds the development of innovation, it should own 
the intellectual property rights. 
 
 
Contract design and innovation 
Because of the risk that other parties may challenge contracts and contractors’ performance in the public 
arena, government agencies and contractors tend to prefer highly specific contract terms and payments 
that relate only weakly to performance (Spiller, 2008). Contracts that specify inputs, processes and outputs 
make it easier for each party to demonstrate that the terms of the contract have been met.  
Over the last 25 years, public sector agencies have moved to more detailed, mostly outputs-based, 
contracts and audits for government-funded NFPs (Garlick, 2012). Yet, in submissions, providers of social 
services generally view negatively the current degree of prescription in contracts. In particular, many 
submitters consider that prescriptive contracts stifle innovation (Box 7.3).  
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 F7.7  Many government contracts with social services providers are overly prescriptive. This 
stifles innovation.  
Some submitters advocated alternative, less prescriptive, contracting approaches to foster innovation: 
The Salvation Army submits that the process should be where the key issue or need was presented by 
the agency, and then proposals were invited from NGOs essentially asking ‘what would you do?’ to 
address this issue or need. This kind of process is less restrictive or prescriptive, and also allows for 
greater innovation in service design and delivery. The contract requirements and details should not 
necessarily be written by agency officials and policy makers isolated from vulnerable communities, or 
who might not have the real life experience of social service provision to vulnerable and marginalised 
New Zealanders... 
The Salvation Army offers examples like the Hauora Programme, our involvement in the Drug Court 
pilot projects, and our public health work in gambling addictions as some examples of client-led and 
innovative service design and delivery. (The Salvation Army, sub. 104, pp. 20–22) 
Stand is participating in the MSD Outcomes Trial work and considers that outcomes-based contracts 
can contribute to more flexibility for service providers to try new service approaches based on 
understanding how social service outcomes are best achieved, and understanding the journey required 
Box 7.3 Prescriptive contracts can stifle innovation 
The Youth Wellness Trust referred to: 
… highly prescriptive and inflexible service specifications that stifle innovation, deliver poor 
outcomes and unwittingly increase risk because they do not reflect actual need. (sub. 73, p. 5) 
Stand Children’s Services Tü Mäia Whänau similarly argued that: 
[t]he current form of government contracts is also restricting innovation due to an over emphasis 
on performance risk resulting in ‘directive’ contracts that specify to the highest detail, limiting 
flexibility to try new approaches. (sub. 127, p. 18) 
Wesley Community Action provided a specific example: 
By nature, most government contracts restrict the opportunity to innovate as the reporting 
requirement tends to lead the service delivery – leaving no room for innovation. An example is 
Family Start – aimed to engage those Whänau most at risk of poor outcomes, yet there is no 
flexibility in the manner or number of visits by a Whänau worker. The lack of flexibility and lack of 
understanding the individual issues of each Whanau means a one size fits all approach which is 
risk adverse and thereby restricting innovative opportunities. (sub. 6, p. 2) 
The Dunedin Community Law Centre considered that prescriptive contracts, by stifling innovation, can 
lead to service provision that lags behind international practice: 
… if there is limited room for a service to develop and demonstrate their own ideas, this may 
discourage services from doing exactly this. In order to keep pace with the ever-developing world 
we live in, we need to ensure that services are continuously encouraged to research and develop 
new ways of doing things. Being at the coal-face of the issues, as they deal with clients on a daily 
basis, social services are indeed best placed to be undertaking development of new techniques 
and methods for service delivery, and they need the freedom to be able to do so. Highly 
prescriptive and limiting contractual arrangements between services and government will not help 
this. Failure to encourage social services to innovate may lead to New Zealand lagging behind 
their global counterparts in terms of programme development and service delivery, with the 
potential to let social service users down. (sub. 48, pp. 8–9) 
Te Rünaka o Ötäkou simply stated: 
The risk-averse nature of most government contract managers makes bottom-up experimentation 
and innovation virtually impossible. (sub. 110, p. 10) 
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to continuously respond to changing needs… (Stand Children’s Services Tü Mäia Whänau, sub. 127, 
p. 18) 
…if high level outcomes are identified and agreed then how the organisation works with individuals to 
achieve the outcomes is where creativity and innovation at a local level will stem from. (Community 
Care Trust, sub. 93, p. 7) 
Wise Group (sub. 41) reported that contracts with the former Health Funding Authority (HFA) gave it the 
room to undertake substantial innovation in shifting from bed-based to mobile support services that 
enabled people to live well in their own home. Under the contract, the HFA required the Wise Group to 
experiment and report on innovation in services to improve outcomes for a specified population, but did 
not specify the model of care and service continuum. 
MSD also recognised the advantages for innovation of less prescription in contracts: 
We could…redesign contracts to encourage innovation and ensure accountability in the design of 
service delivery amongst providers. At risk clauses and tight service specifications can enhance 
accountability but there is a risk that they could stifle innovation by limiting the ability of providers to 
tailor services to clients. This tension will need to be carefully managed in new contracting approaches. 
(sub. 72, p. 5) 
Better evidence on the impact of services and less prescriptive contracts for outcomes, with longer 
durations, would give providers both a stronger motivation and more flexibility to innovate. Yet 
circumstances do not always support the use of contracting for outcomes (Chapter 12). A greater use of 
more decentralised service models could substantially reduce prescription, increase the focus on outcomes 
and provide more room for providers to innovate (Chapter 6). 
 
 
 R7.3  Social services commissioning organisations should shift more contracting towards 
contracting for outcomes and make greater use of decentralised service models. Doing 
both would give providers increased flexibility and incentives to innovate. 
 
 
How do successful innovations spread 
The spread of successful new ideas and the elimination of less effective or unsuccessful services are central 
to a system that learns (section 7.1). 
In a normal market, the choices of consumers, suppliers and investors, influenced by the prospect of profits, 
stimulate the production of new goods and services that represent the best value for money in the eyes of 
consumers. The rewards of profit and higher wages, and the willingness of investors to fund goods and 
services that go well in the market, are the key mechanisms that expand these goods and services and 
conversely shut down those that do not go well. 
While social services commissioning institutions and service designs have some of the same dynamics as 
normal markets, in many, if not most, cases, the funding decisions of ministers and officials shape which 
innovations spread. Selecting and spreading successful innovation within the public sector faces similar 
barriers to the generation of innovation (Figure 7.2). Where innovations are selected, public sector 
organisations tend towards identifying and then universalising “best practice”. This then limits diversity and 
further experimentation. Conversely, government is reluctant to close down failing programmes or 
organisation as doing so limits the resources available to support the spread of successful innovations 
(Mulgan & Albury, 2003). 
Albury (2014) identified five mistaken assumptions about the way in which innovation spreads in publicly 
funded services. 
“Scaling and adoption are just informational issues”  
In fact, factors such as the advantages innovations offer, how well they fit with existing values and practices, 
how simple and easy they are to use, whether they can be tried out on a limited basis first, and the 
observability of their results are highly influential in the spread of innovations (Robinson, 2009). 
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“Practices spread and scale through transfer from one organisation (or locality) to another”  
In fact, innovative organisations growing and displacing the unsuccessful ones makes a stronger 
contribution to the spread of innovations than the transfer of ideas across organisations. 
“Innovation and scaling (‘pilots’ and ‘rollout’) are separate and sequential processes”  
In fact, innovating at scale requires identifying and thinking from the beginning about the demand and 
necessary conditions for implementing at scale. 
“Increasing the pipeline of innovations increases the likelihood of scaling and adoption”  
This puts too much weight on the supply side and ignores the demand for innovation. The perceived need 
for change and the factors that make innovations attractive and easy to adopt influence demand. 
“Professionals are the key agents of scaling and adoption”  
In fact, user demand is the key driver of innovation. For example, in Australia and the United Kingdom 
disabled people drove the change to individualised funding for support services (Chapters 3 and 10).  
Demand from users (individuals, families or communities) is the main driver of the spread of innovation. 
Devolved service designs that give weight to user preferences and allow successful innovations to replace 
failing or less successful services are likely to be best at spreading innovation.  
Short of this, a more centralised commissioning approach needs to be systematic and ongoing in 
identifying and increasing the share of successful innovations and, conversely, eliminating less effective and 
failing services. Barnardos, for example, proposes that the costs of funding new innovative programmes are 
met by decommissioning less successful programmes (sub. 12, p. 16). 
Managed markets, client-directed budgets, prices, information and innovation 
Managed markets, client-directed budgets and vouchers are service models that, if well designed, support 
the generation and spread of successful bottom-up innovations. 
Managed markets allow multiple providers to compete for market share. Managed markets are intended to 
mimic the dynamics of, and achieve some of the benefits of, normal markets. A main reason for using 
managed markets is that they can encourage innovation and the spread of successful new ideas. 
Contracted employment services for welfare benefit recipients are Australian examples of a mature 
managed market. Providers compete for market share based on how successful they are in helping clients 
find and stay in a job. Yet the high degree of prescription in contracts and guidelines has likely limited how 
much providers’ can innovate (Chapter 3; Appendix B). 
In managed markets, client-directed budgets and voucher service models, commissioning organisations 
more often than not set prices, and service providers compete for market share. The prices that 
commissioning organisations set will affect how willing providers are to innovate. If providers can do no 
more than cover their ordinary costs, they will be reluctant to innovate. Yet if prices are so high that they 
can make easy margins, providers will also have less reason to innovate (Figure 7.3).  
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Figure 7.3 Price and innovation: the innovation bell curve  
 
Source: Haldenby, Harries and Olliff-Cooper, 2014; Productivity Commission. 
CDBs are likely to generate a high level of diversity and experimentation, because funding and decision 
making are highly devolved. Clients have strong incentives to find the mix and quality of services that best 
suit their needs within their budget. Providers, alert to the market opportunity presented by the buying 
power of the clients, will be keen to offer attractive services (including some that are novel) and make 
innovative use of new technologies. Clients choose the services they prefer and pay the provider for them. 
As a result, the successful providers have the incentive and funding to expand their supply of those services. 
For this market-selection process to work well, it is critical that customers are well informed about the 
services they can choose. This is not something that can necessarily be relied on. Often customers find it a 
considerable challenge to know the characteristics and effectiveness of services that they are buying. As the 
Commission said in its report Boosting productivity in the services sector: 
By seeking the best value, consumers play an important role in the competitive process. However, 
search costs (ie, finding a preferred supplier) and switching costs (ie, changing suppliers) are particularly 
pronounced in some service markets. These costs can reduce competition by making it difficult for 
consumers to compare different service providers and respond to price and quality signals. 
Well-informed consumers that are able to switch between suppliers, increase the intensity of 
competition. ….[But] competition can be diminished if service offerings become so complicated that 
consumers face prohibitive costs in evaluating competing service offerings in order to identify the best 
option. (NZPC, 2014a, p. 4) 
When parents face the important decision of which school their children will attend, the government helps 
them make an informed choice by providing information about schools In New Zealand. This information is 
mainly through Education Review Office (ERO) reports on each school.  
Similar information is likely to help other social-service users to make choices that result in the selection and 
expansion of effective services and providers. In the UK’s National Health Service, people now have 
extensive opportunities to choose providers. For example, a patient needing a hernia operation will 
normally have a choice of hospital and even surgeon. The government assists with the patient’s decision (or 
the GP’s decision on the patient’s behalf) by mandating the measurement and publication of a range of key 
performance measures for individual hospitals and surgeons (NHS, 2015). 
Across the social services, information that compares the performance of services using a common measure 
is crucial to ongoing adjustment of service design and targeting to improve outcomes for service users. The 
more comparative information that is publicly available the better. Publicly available information on 
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effective services will build support for expanding them and help eliminate poorly performing services. Data 
and analytics to provide this information are the subject of Chapter 8. 
 
 
 F7.8  Good information that compares the performance of services using a common measure 
is crucial for building support for spreading successful innovation and eliminating 
poorly performing services 
 
 
Who gets the benefits of innovation: policies to stimulate innovation 
Government policies to stimulate innovation in the private sector are usually justified by the spill-overs that 
occur when innovations spread through the economy. Innovation is costly and innovators do not take 
account of the wider benefits when they decide how much to invest in innovation. Policies to increase the 
rate of innovation can include: 
 research and development (R&D) grants;  
 R&D tax credits;  
 prizes (such as the Prime Minister’s Science Prizes);  
 intellectual property rights (IPR) protection; and  
 promotion of collaboration between public institutions (such as universities and Crown Research 
Institutes) and private companies.  
All these either increase the rewards to, or reduce the cost of, innovation. 
Innovation in services (including social services) is often incremental and involves adjustments to business 
models and processes that are relatively easily observed by others:  
Spillovers appear to be ubiquitous in many parts of the service sector, though the innovative activities 
that lead to them do not necessarily involve R&D as usually defined. In these industries, many, but 
certainly not all, of the innovations visibly affect organisational structures, business processes and 
customer products. By their nature, the broad ideas underlying these innovations are easily understood 
and reproduced in ways that are far less ambiguous than for knowledge flows in any other part of the 
economy. (APC, 2007, p. 69) 
APC (2007) argued that there is little justification for government support for innovation in services in a 
normal market: 
…most policy analysts contend that spillovers in the service sector do not affect the amount of 
innovation to a degree that would warrant direct public support for these activities… (p. 71) 
These conclusions clearly do not apply in the case of social services, which rely heavily on public funding 
and usually lack the strong competitive pressures that drive innovation in services elsewhere in the 
economy. It is in the government’s longer-term interests to stimulate the generation and spread of 
innovation in social services. 
Further, innovation in social services is not necessarily easily reproduced. Learning how to make a new 
process work well may involve tacit knowledge and a developing organisational culture that is not easily 
transferred to a different organisation. “It is sometimes difficult to transfer innovative practices [in the social 
services] as they arise at micro-level and under particular and given local conditions” (Laino & Sütó, 2013, p. 
7). Innovation that depends on scale and complementary investments in technology to drive the benefits is 
likely to be even more difficult to copy (APC, 2007). 
Some of the policies that are used to stimulate innovation in the private sector could also be used in social 
services. The government could, for instance, give grants to organisations, offer prizes or award contracts 
for new ways of developing and delivering social services. 
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Two recent and interesting examples of this approach are: 
 the Ministry of Health and Treasury’s current process to elicit ideas for a social impact bond (Chapter 3); 
and 
 the Treasury’s announcement in October 2014 that it was seeking ideas on how to improve outcomes 
for vulnerable families, children and communities (Hickey, 2014).  
Organisations commissioning social services could also encourage more collaboration between universities 
and social services providers. For instance, the Centre for Evaluation and Monitoring at the University of 
Canterbury has worked with New Zealand schools since 1999 in using value-added modelling to measure 
and monitor pupil progress, identify students at risk of under achievement, and set learning targets 
(Boustead, 2012).  
Barnardos (sub. 12, p. 16) propose a system where NFPs are free to develop new ideas with their own 
resources and, if successful, this is rewarded by the government providing stable long-term funding for the 
programme. This mirrors the use of patents that reward innovators with an assured market for a number of 
years. Barnardos proposes that costs of funding new innovative programmes would be met by 
decommissioning less successful programmes. 
While innovation in the social services generally does not lend itself to formal IPR such as patents or 
copyright, programmes are being developed that are then licenced to other providers. These programmes 
are usually evidence-based complex interventions, targeted to very specific client groups. Highly skilled 
staff implement the programmes. Successful implementation relies on close attention to staff development 
and programme fidelity. Examples include multi-systemic therapy and family functional therapy targeted at 
chronically violent youth offenders. Developers of assessment tools also sometimes make them available 
under licence, at least in some jurisdictions (see eg, NFPN, 2015).  
Some submitters argued that contestable contracting makes it hard for providers to protect their innovative 
ideas from use by competitors (Box 7.4). 
Box 7.4 Intellectual property and contestable contracts: who gets the benefits? 
Barnardos consulted closely with Child, Youth and Family to develop a tool for their social workers to 
use when working with families. The development of the tool and associated training and ongoing 
support in its use represented “a significant investment in our intellectual property and social work 
practice capability …[which] has the potential to give us a competitive advantage when we go through 
the RFP process” (sub. 12, p. 9).  
So Barnardos faced a conflict when asked to share the tool with another organisation similar to them. 
In practice, Barnardos “share what we know as openly as possible …There is very little incentive (other 
than our commitment to our principles) for organisations to work to improve outcomes for children and 
families by sharing our learnings, our ways of working, our expert staff, and our systems and 
processes” (sub. 12, p. 9). 
Other submitters also argued that contestability harms innovation: 
Another problem Carers NZ has seen with contestability is that it undermines the opportunities 
and incentives for “social enterprises” to innovate. Carers NZ has faced situations where it has 
presented innovative ideas to government agencies, only to have them share the ideas with 
potential competitors through a contestable procurement process. Carers NZ has had to compete 
to implement its own ideas. (Carers New Zealand, sub. 71, p. 8) 
Contestability can also erode collaboration and innovation that has been developed over a 
number of years. Providers may be unwilling to share in professional conversations about practice 
because they might need to rely on this to win a tender process. (Workbridge, sub. 102, p. 14) 
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NFPs operating in contestable markets often have a strong sense of mission and an intrinsic motivation to 
share the benefits of their innovation (Box 7.4). Some engage in joint ventures to share and get more 
leverage from innovation. Youth Horizons, for instance, has formed a joint venture with the Otangarei Trust 
and Ngäpuhi Iwi Social Services. Te Pae Aronga Taitamariki, the joint venture, provides a basis to share 
clinical, cultural and local expertise, knowledge and experience to deliver intensive services for youth in 
Northland (Youth Horizons, 2015).  
Yet it is in the funder’s long-term interests both to ensure that providers are rewarded for their innovative 
activity (so increasing the rate of innovation) and that successful innovation spreads to other providers. 
Government agencies should observe normal commercial good practice and respect the confidentiality of 
innovative ideas that they receive from providers in the course of tendering contracts or otherwise. Where 
they wish to spread the innovative ideas, they should negotiate for the rights to do so.  
 
 
 R7.4  Government social services commissioning agencies should respect the confidentiality 
of innovative ideas that providers submit as part of a tender or otherwise. Where 
government agencies wish to spread an innovation that a third party creates, they 
should negotiate for the rights to do so. 
 
 
Service models that provide for competition in the market rather than competition for the market (Chapter 
6) are likely to alleviate some of the concerns about innovators losing the benefits of their innovation. 
Innovators would not then need to worry about the funding agency appropriating their ideas. They can 
appeal directly to service users to test the success of, and get the benefits of their innovation. If innovators 
choose, they can work collaboratively with competitors under arrangements that satisfy each party, just as 
happens in other goods and services markets.  
In sum, innovation is a key to improved effectiveness in social services. The government should develop 
policies to increase the rate of innovation in social services by rewarding innovation and removing barriers, 
while promoting the spread of innovation through the social services system. 
 
 
 Q7.1 
 
How can government agencies manage contracting processes in a way that best leads 
to the development and dissemination of innovative approaches to service design and 
delivery? 
 
 
 
 
 R7.5  Government agencies should explore a variety of additional initiatives to encourage 
innovation in the social services. These could include innovation funds, prizes and in-
house innovation labs. 
 
 
The Community and Voluntary Sector, on the other hand, is hard pressed to innovate. [Reasons 
include] … Innovative ideas in a competitive funding world, can lead to others ‘stealing’ that 
innovation. (Community Networks Aotearoa, sub. 31, p. 7) 
On the other hand, the New Zealand Council of Christian Social Services argued that learning from 
evaluations of programmes should be widely disseminated and not treated as intellectual property 
belonging to a particular provider: 
Quality independent evaluation of programmes at regional and national levels should be utilised 
to demonstrate the effectiveness of programmes and of service providers. Learnings from these 
evaluations should be widely shared – not seen as intellectual property to be used to derive profit 
for a company. (sub. 35, p. 10)  
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7.4 Building a better evidence base 
Service users, providers and organisations that commission social services have a range of information 
sources to support learning about what works and for whom and which groups should be the focus of new 
initiatives.  
Youth Horizons submitted: 
As governments increasingly seek to obtain the best value for their populations and look for the 
evidence to guide this work, various approaches have evolved to provide helpful evidence. There is a 
wide range of relevant evidence including:  
 broad population-wide prevalence, demographic and other census information,  
 systematically collected longitudinal research,  
 randomised controlled trials, where confounding variables are relatively well understood and 
controlled,  
 sustained programmes of work to develop evidence based interventions for particular 
applications,  
 implementation science which examines how to replicate and then roll out these evidence-based 
interventions and practices on a larger scale,  
 well-coordinated independent evaluations of programmes or initiatives,  
 service providers’ own evaluation of their programmes to demonstrate value added and inform 
quality improvement , 
 narratives and informal client feedback. (sub. 67, p. 2) 
Different methods are needed to gather and share information from these sources, of which formal 
evaluation is only one. Yet the social services system currently places a lot of weight on formal evaluation as 
a means to support learning. This is tied to a “plan, do, review” approach to service development that 
devotes significant time to problem definition, information gathering, option identification, policy design 
and risk identification. Implementation then follows the template, without further adjustment until the 
service is reviewed. Even so, traditional evaluation is often weak in practice – especially across the large 
number of smaller programmes and providers of social services.  
In contrast, a “learn-build-learn-build” process emphasises building the evidence base as part of a process 
of continuous learning and adaptation (section 7.1). Private sector service firms (such as retail chains and 
banks) use information systems that provide constant feedback about how the business is performing. This 
process allows continual adjustment to prices, marketing and logistics (NZPC, 2014a). 
Some approaches in social services similarly recognise that much of learning comes from on-the-ground 
experience and that this knowledge can be captured in real time and spread. One example is the Youth 
Service that MSD purchases from non-government organisations. MSD monitors the uptake of the 
programme weekly, and provider performance is monitored closely (on a monthly basis at a minimum). 
Generally, however, these real-time approaches to performance monitoring currently operate at small scale 
(compared to the use of information in other service industries) and have limited impact overall.53  
While recognising the importance of a wide range of information sources for learning, this section mostly 
discusses evaluation in social services and its limitations. Chapter 8 looks at how smarter data collection and 
analytics can address the limitations in evaluation and accelerate learning throughout the social system. 
The role of evaluation in a learning system 
Evaluation as broadly conceived is central to a system that learns. 
Evaluation is widely considered to be an integral part of public sector management. The promise of 
evaluation is that it will contribute meaningfully to the decisions made and the actions taken around 
53 The Australian National Disability Insurance Scheme is a large-scale social services reform that is taking a learn-build-learn-build approach (section 7.1 
and Chapter 3). 
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policies, programmes, projects and operations. Evaluation is, at one level, viewed as a taken for 
granted ‘good’, i.e. as something that will contribute to better government, better policy, better 
delivery etc. It is considered an important part of ensuring government accountability, trust and 
credibility. Underpinning the public sector management frameworks of many developed countries is an 
assumption that public agencies will focus on results, and use empirical evaluative information to adjust 
activities and revise policy settings. (Aotearoa New Zealand Evaluation Association, sub. 37 p. 2) 
Service providers can use evaluation to develop and improve programmes and to demonstrate programme 
effectiveness. Commissioning organisations and funders can use evaluation to identify effective 
programmes or programme elements. Information from evaluations is more valuable to providers and 
others if they can use that information to compare effectiveness and cost-effectiveness across a range of 
interventions and programmes (section 7.3).  
Evaluation can and should take place across the lifecycle of a program, from design and piloting 
through to implementation and ongoing mainstream delivery … It has an equally important role to play 
in testing the impact of new policies and testing whether existing mainstream programs are continuing 
to deliver outcomes effectively… Different types of evaluation provide different information and 
support different decisions. That’s why it is important to plan upfront what questions need to be 
answered, how they will be answered, and by when. (NSW Government, 2014, p. 6) 
The NSW Government has developed a set of good evaluation practice principles to guide government 
agencies commissioning services (Box 7.5). 
 
Superu (the Social Policy Evaluation and Research Unit) has a role to “increase the use of evidence by 
people across the social sector so that they can make better decisions – about funding, policies or services 
– to improve the lives of New Zealanders, New Zealand’s communities, families and whänau” (Superu, 
2015).54  
 
 
 R7.6  Superu should develop and adopt a set of principles for good evaluation and provide 
guidance to support those principles. When the Government funds social services 
evaluations, it should require adherence to those principles. 
 
 
Quantitative and qualitative evaluation and capturing the voice of service users 
Evaluation can be quantitative, qualitative or both. Measurement of impact and cost effectiveness and 
comparison of programmes at a population level usually requires quantitative data. Yet qualitative data is 
54 The Families Commission operates under the name Social Policy Evaluation and Research Unit (Superu). 
Box 7.5 Good evaluation practice principles 
The NSW Government has set out good evaluation practice principles: 
 Evaluations should be built into program design… 
 Evaluations should be methodologically rigorous, with appropriate scale and design … 
scaled to each program in accordance with the program’s size, risk and significance… 
 Evaluations should be conducted with the right mix of expertise and independence ... the 
person or agency conducting the evaluation should be independent from program 
managers… 
 Evaluations should be timely to support and influence decision making … planning of 
evaluations should commence before implementation with the selection of methodologies 
and collection of baseline data…Summative evaluations should not be undertaken too early, 
in recognition of the time it can take to accrue sufficient evidence and produce measurable 
outcomes. 
 Evaluation processes should be transparent and open to scrutiny. 
Source:   NSW Government, 2014, p. 9. 
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often important for understanding the relationships between practice and outcomes, developing 
hypotheses for further testing, and for identifying issues with programme implementation. The Impact 
Collective argues that qualitative data is needed to understand change with wicked or complex problems – 
for instance to identify what is or is not working with current services, learning from service implementation 
trials, and obtaining service-user input into the design, review and evaluation of services (sub. 130, 
pp. 23, 26). 
A number of submissions stressed the importance of getting service user input into the evaluation of 
provider performance:  
Ensuring a strong voice of the service user in monitoring and evaluation of provider (government and 
non-government) performance is important. Empowering citizens to have a voice in these processes is 
important. (Social Sector Trial Leads, sub. 129, p. 16) 
Auckland City Mission’s ‘Family 100 Research Project’ is an example of a client-centric project providing 
findings on a range of issues such as housing, debt, food insecurity, health, education and 
employment. Although this is not an evaluation with a control group or randomised control trial, it does 
provide insights on how multiple issues can work in concert to prevent people from moving forward. 
(Superu, sub. 82, p. 5) 
Client feedback is the most effective way of measuring the effectiveness of a service. If the client 
reports that the counsellor or budget advisor have helped them achieve their goals or improved their 
life then that is a positive outcome. (The Raglan House, sub. 24, p. 8) 
Auckland North Community and Development went further and argued that outcome goals and measures 
for evaluation should be developed locally: 
Successful evaluation recognises differences between people, places and programmes. The 
requirement of differentiation raises doubts over the efficacy of a single common outcome framework 
such as RBA [Results Based Accountability] promoted by the current government. Outcome goals and 
measures should be developed and established where the delivery takes place. It should be based on 
effectiveness of service delivery or a determinant of programme shortcomings as the basis for 
improvements and not just as a reporting tool. Reporting with this framework can create considerable 
work for the provider without the benefit of activating any real learning and improvements in service 
delivery. (sub. 22, p. 3) 
Evaluation weaknesses in New Zealand 
Good evaluation is well embedded in some parts of the broader social services. Pharmac in health and the 
ERO in education carry out structured, systematic evaluations of service effectiveness that guide continuing 
refinement of services.  
A systematic, structured approach is less apparent in other parts of the social services. While the 
contribution of good evaluation to an effective system of social services is widely recognised, the 
government and its agencies sometimes have strong incentives to suppress results that show a programme 
is performing poorly. New initiatives are often associated with a departmental or political brand, and a 
perception of poor performance puts that brand at risk. One senior official, in meeting the Commission, 
described a government agency’s internal evaluation unit as a “bomb factory” because evaluations were 
late and found faults. In practice, even major programmes are often not effectively evaluated, whether 
because evaluation was not planned as part of policy development or the programme’s objectives and 
intervention logic were not well specified.  
For instance, according to CCS Disability Action: 
[t]here are … no key performance indicators, or targets, for Ministry of Health or Ministry of Social 
Development disability services, despite the Ministry spending over one billion dollars a year on 
services ... There has been a lack of robust evaluation and critical analysis of reforms.  
There has been little attempt to objectively compare the effectiveness or efficiency of piloted services 
to existing services, which provide a similar role. System wide reform needs to be based on reliable 
data, including data that measures actual impacts by comparing pilots with existing services ... (sub. 65, 
p. 5) 
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The Impact Collective commented: 
There are virtually no routine outcome monitoring, evaluation or audit activities currently undertaken in 
the domestic violence and child abuse sector. Almost no new initiatives have been evaluated. 
(sub. 130, p. 22) 
A recent Cabinet paper on youth mental health services noted:  
We lack information about whether services are efficient, cost effective or appropriate for the 
New Zealand context. There is insufficient information about programme effectiveness and particularly 
evidence about what works for Mäori and Pacific people. We tend to focus on new interventions at the 
margin, rather than considering the appropriateness and efficacy of what is already in place. (Prime 
Minister, 2012) 
To the extent that evaluations can adversely affect the payment they receive for services or the opportunity 
to receive future contracts, some NFP providers may also prefer weak or no evaluation.  
Superu summed up the weaknesses in the evaluation of social services in New Zealand. These include: 
 Inadequate consideration of research, evaluation and monitoring at the design and 
implementations stage [so that] … data collections systems are [not] put in place to allow effective 
evaluative activity; 
 Funders are primarily interested in evaluating the success of their individual programmes, but 
when dealing with complex social issues ‘a system-wide approach’ is required to understand 
whether or not long term benefits are being realised… 
 …evaluations are often limited in scope and/or conducted over a limited period of time. This 
means that information received from monitoring and evaluation activity tends to focus on inputs 
and outputs rather than long-term outcomes… (sub. 82, p. 4) 
Current initiatives to address evaluation weaknesses in New Zealand 
Initiatives are underway to address some of the weaknesses in social services evaluation in New Zealand.  
MSD is promoting better evaluation of programmes that it funds as part of the Investing in Services for 
Outcomes (ISO) initiatives (now forming the Community Investment Strategy).55 Working with Superu, this 
includes: 
 identifying priority programmes to be evaluated and developing an evaluation schedule to cover the 
next three years;  
 developing guidance for evaluators and providers on using evidence and evaluation; and 
 developing a strategy for disseminating the results of evaluations. 
MSD also provides guidelines, resources and expertise to support providers to use Results Based 
Accountability (RBA) (MSD, 2015b). RBA uses measures of the quantity, quality and impact of the work done 
to show how an individual agency or programme or system of services achieves client results/outcomes. 
The approach tailors accountability and measurement to the scale and sophistication of a provider, 
reducing unnecessary use of paper. The aim is to monitor and show how services contribute to improving 
population-level outcomes. Yet the Commission understands that RBA practice in New Zealand tends to be 
qualitative rather than quantitative and does not currently provide a consistent population-level picture of 
outcomes. 
As part of the ISO strategy, Superu has set up: 
[a] new contestable fund which will involve NGO social service providers participating in external 
evaluations funded by Superu. The evaluations aim to understand how previously under-investigated 
and/or innovative services and practices achieve important outcomes for groups and in locations that 
55 ISO is a set of MSD initiatives designed to achieve better engagement with community service providers. This includes work on rationalising and 
consolidating decisions on funding across the Ministry, streamlining contracts and focusing them more on achieving long-term outcomes and support for 
providers to develop their capability and capacity (MSD, 2015a). 
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are of high priority to the Ministry of Social Development. The evaluations are planned to begin in May 
2015 and finish in May 2016. (sub. 82, p. 3) 
The fund will provide $700 000 for between two and five evaluations in the initial year (Superu, 2015).  
In addition, Superu is undertaking: 
[t]he development of evaluation standards in partnership with the Aotearoa New Zealand Evaluation 
Association (ANZEA). This set of standards aims to ensure that high quality and worthwhile evaluation is 
undertaken by policymakers, funders and providers. (sub. 82, p. 3)56 
Nevertheless, even within the scope of the ISO initiative, a large number of smaller programmes will not be 
formally evaluated over the medium term. More generally, according to Superu, “ …there is widespread 
recognition that social sector providers often do not have the capability to conduct robust outcomes-based 
evaluations” (sub. 82, p. 5). 
Indeed, at a more fundamental level, many providers are not even recording basic data required for 
monitoring and evaluation:  
…information about who receives services and programmes is often limited and is collected by 
providers in an ad-hoc manner without any systematic method to capturing this data… Where there are 
data-capturing systems, they tend not to be consistent in what they record or how it is determined. 
(Social Sector Trial Leads, sub. 126, p. 23) 
Funding for evaluation 
Building evaluation capability and carrying out evaluations require resources:  
There are costs at multiple levels in relation to using data. There is client time taken to complete client 
measures (e.g. behaviour scales, questionnaires etc.). There is the cost of practitioner/evaluator time in 
gaining consent and collecting data, data entry costs, data analysis costs and the cost of skilful 
interpreting data to accurately inform service development. As data collection is not the focus of most 
practitioners, time and effort is required to promote an evaluation culture and checks to promote 
compliance with data collection.  
These costs need to be weighed up against the reliability, validity and meaningfulness of the data. That 
is, is the data “worth” the effort required to not only collect but interpret and use it… (Youth Horizons, 
sub. 67, pp. 5–6) 
As discussed in section 7.3, many NFPs lack the capacity to raise funds for investment in capability 
development. Unsurprisingly, many submissions reported that providers find it hard to fund evaluation: 
…it must be emphasised that there is no additional funding for evaluating outcomes of the service 
purchased (say 1% of the contract price), despite the notice from MSD that Evaluation is going to be a 
contractual requirement. This squeezes margins even further under the contributory funding model. 
(Social Services Providers Aotearoa Inc., sub. 129, p. 9) 
Community organisations often do not have the time or expertise to effectively design and deliver a 
good evaluation model, and this is seldom funded (apart from MSD and its promotion of the RBA 
model in Auckland). (Auckland North Community and Development, sub. 22, p. 2)  
Alcohol Health Watch referred to: 
[i]nadequate resourcing of evaluation – so we don’t know/can’t show a programme has worked or not. 
This can result in significant waste of resources and reinventing wheels. (sub. 84, p. 8) 
WAVES Trust and Community Waitakere queried: 
…are community organisations adequately funded to do this [evaluation] work? Many contracts do not 
currently provide funding that is earmarked for evaluation. (sub. 83, p. 17) 
Submitters proposed a range of approaches to funding evaluation (Box 7.6). 
56 ANZEA, with over 400 members, has also developed a set of “evaluation competencies” to guide evaluation practice, the commissioning of 
evaluations, and the development and employment and accountability of evaluators (Aotearoa New Zealand Evaluation Association, sub. 37, p. 3). 
                                                     
166 DRAFT | More effective social services 
 
 
 
 F7.9  Many not-for-profit organisations find it difficult to fund evaluation on top of service 
delivery and, in any case, lack the capability for good evaluation.   
 
 
 
 F7.10  Decision makers in the social services system lack good timely information on what is 
working, for whom and through which service providers. This undermines the ability of 
the system to learn and adapt. 
 
 
Limits to the standard evaluation model 
The Commission considers that current initiatives led by MSD, Superu, ANZEA and others to develop a 
more systematic approach to evaluation of social services programmes and to improve the quality of 
evaluations are worth pursuing. Yet, in the standard evaluation model, there is a trade-off between good 
evaluation practice and cost and time. In practice many evaluations fall back on looking at a few outcomes, 
using small samples and no control or comparison groups. This means that making generalisations of the 
findings is difficult (Mansell, 2015). This suggests that the standard evaluation approach is best applied to 
larger programmes or experimental work that will likely lead on to larger-scale implementation.  
 
 
 F7.11  The standard programme-based approach to social services evaluation involves a 
trade-off between good evaluation practice, and cost and time. The standard 
evaluation approach may be best applied to larger programmes, or to experimental 
work that will likely lead on to larger-scale implementation. 
 
 
The Commission considers that it is simply not feasible to extend the standard model of good evaluation on 
a programme-by-programme approach across the large numbers of small contracts and small providers 
with whom government agencies currently contract.  
Further, extending good evaluation practice widely across small providers and programmes would not, by 
itself, provide all the capabilities needed to support learning across the social services system. In particular, 
there would still be a need to compare performance across the system to better identify, reward and spread 
superior performance, help average performers to identify ways to improve their performance, and assist 
the exit of unsatisfactory services. Comparisons of this sort require a consistent and coherent system-wide 
Box 7.6 How should evaluation be funded? 
Submitters had a variety of views on how evaluation should be funded: 
If government wants greater accountability and evidence of service effectiveness to support 
funding decisions, it needs to fund research and evaluation when purchasing services, as current 
service provision rates do not enable NGOs to fund this themselves. (NGO Health and Disability 
Network, sub. 70, p. 14) 
[Funders should] …[r]equire a proportion of the cost of a service to be spent on evaluation in 
order to build the body of data required to do this a lot better. This may mean less activity in 
order to better understand quality, effectiveness and attributability. (Public Health Association of 
New Zealand, sub. 122, p. 11) 
It would be in government interests to build evaluation capacity in the sector in a way that is 
sustainable and not dependent on project funding and pilots as is currently the case. (Youth 
Horizons, sub. 67, p. 6) 
Barnardos (sub. 12) proposed that when services are contracted to meet government objectives, the 
“costs and infrastructure requirements of measuring outcomes and outputs is factored into the price 
paid for services” (p. 14). But when services are funded mostly by the provider to meet provider 
objectives, then the government may, but would not be expected to, provide funding for evaluation. 
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collection and analysis of data, cost-effectively scaled to the size and sophistication of programmes being 
funded.  
Real-time evaluation 
One problem with the standard evaluation model is that considerable time often elapses before results are 
available to influence commissioning, contracting and operational decisions. Real-time evaluation aims to 
overcome this problem, and is widely used in private-sector service industries such as retail.  
Real-time evaluation in social services has a few examples in New Zealand. For instance, the Department of 
Corrections submitted: 
The success of the original [Out of Gate] programme has led to it being extended to a more 
demanding subset of short serving prisoners. The real-time evaluation of the service has enabled the 
Department to expand the programme more rapidly than would have been possible if the expansion 
had been reliant on a post-trial evaluation. (sub. 21, p. 2) 
MSD uses real-time data to regularly monitor when clients assigned to different services move out of the 
income support system. With changes to the Public Finance Act 1989, MSD has more flexibility to shift 
resources between services to respond to emerging trends. 
Monitoring and evaluating a much wider range of social services in real time and responding to trends as 
they emerge would offer significant improvements in efficiency and effectiveness. 
Using multiple data sources for evaluation 
Currently, most social services evaluations rely on data collected for the purpose that, because of cost, 
cover a narrow range of variables. Yet some submissions commented on the value of a broad range of low-
cost sources of information for operational and evaluative purposes: 
While conceptually everyone is clear that preventative work may well save both economic costs, and 
human costs, demonstrating this requires a broad approach to data, and a need to learn from many 
sources of information to assess whether benefits are realised over time. (Youth Horizons, sub. 67, p. 3) 
One way to reduce the burden of data collection and increase the number of service users that can be 
followed up, particularly over time, is to utilise interagency data, such as youth offending data pre, post 
and at follow up, police involvement, school enrolment and attendance and other key indicators. While 
there are promising moves towards making this kind of anonymised programme wide data available for 
evaluation, this has not yet been successful…  
The MSD Youth Service contracts for youth people not in education, employment or training on Youth 
Payment or Young Parent Payments are an example of a government Ministry working with service 
providers in this way, providing outcome data as part of the process of assessing the impact of the 
service. (Youth Horizons, sub. 67, pp. 5–6) 
The greatest potential though would be that these [IT] systems could potentially provide for the 
collection of aggregate data on a considerable range of issues and other variables not dissimilar to that 
collected in the health sector, and not previously available to the social services sector and its 
contracting partners. (Relationships Aotearoa, sub. 56, p. 9) 
Multiple real-time data sources on particular clients will also allow more timely and accurate interventions. 
For instance, geospatial location data combined with wearable sensors (eg, measuring heart rate) and the 
ability to integrate this with medical records and communicate directly with doctors or emergency services 
promises to allow a range of new services that could save lives (and cost) (Mansell, 2015). 
 
 
 F7.12  The current approach to evaluation in the social services fails to make cost-effective use 
of the wide range of information being generated by daily interaction between users 
and services. 
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 R7.7  Commissioning organisations and providers should monitor and evaluate in real time a 
much wider range of services than at present. This would enable commissioning 
organisations and providers to respond to trends as they emerge and offer significant 
improvements in efficiency and effectiveness 
 
 
A new approach is needed to monitoring and evaluation in the social services 
The Commission considers that a different approach to building the evidence base across a wide range of 
providers and contracts is needed. This should be designed to support a learning system that allows a much 
more cost-effective and integrated approach to monitoring and evaluation than at present, and one that is 
less onerous for providers.  
At the same time, social service agencies should promote a culture of learning that welcomes evaluation 
and has the maturity to take results showing service faults as an opportunity to improve. 
Wide access to, and use of, data and analytics offer the attractive prospect of both stimulating a diversity of 
approaches and providing a practical and powerful technique for evaluating their effects in terms of 
improved outcomes (Chapter 8). 
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8 Leveraging data and analytics 
Key points 
 Developments in data technology and analytics have transformed many service industries. The 
same developments have the potential to support new business models in social services that will 
bring substantial improvements in effectiveness.  
 A system that learns needs timely client-centred data and analytics to be available to decision 
makers at all points in the system. The data and analysis needs to match the different types of 
decisions being made by commissioners, purchasers, providers and clients of social services. 
 Cost-effectively collecting, sharing and analysing data across the social-services system will greatly 
increase its capacity to design and commission effective services, and to target resources to where 
they have the greatest effect on improving outcomes.  
 The New Zealand Data Futures Forum (NZDFF) has recommended a way forward to realise the 
potential benefits and mitigate the risks of sharing, linking and using data.  
 The NZDFF recommended that getting value from sharing, linking and using data should follow 
the principles of inclusion, trust and control. Inclusion is raising public awareness and capability in 
finding, using and understanding data and the data environment. Trust is focused on building trust 
in the sharing of data. Control is giving individuals more control over the use of their personal 
data. 
 The Government, and social services providers and clients, should use the NZDFF 
recommendations as an opportunity to explore innovative approaches to addressing social 
problems and enhancing social outcomes.  
 As a first step, government social services agencies need to make progress on sharing their 
operational data (with appropriate protections). Better use of linked cross-agency data could 
increase the scope and accuracy of the Government’s investment approach to targeting social 
services as well as supporting better-integrated tailored services for clients. 
 Government social services agencies and social services providers should capture information on 
their clients and services in a consistent way. Doing so would allow commissioners, providers and 
evaluators of services to track clients’ use of services across time, and so identify service outcomes 
and provider performance. This information should be used to continuously improve how 
commissioners, providers and clients of social services make decisions. 
 The Social Sector Board has commissioned work to develop a plan for implementing social sector 
data integration, including common standards. This work should include the design of institutions 
and processes to develop a comprehensive, wide-access, client-centred data infrastructure 
accessible to commissioners, providers, clients and researchers of social services.  
 Sharing government-held data with third party providers would support innovative approaches to 
solving social problems. Where individuals give consent, government agencies should permit 
access to identifiable personal data so as to support the provision of innovative services.  
 
This chapter highlights the opportunities to use data and analytics to create a learning system that increases 
the effectiveness of social services. A client-centred data infrastructure and analytics will support a range of 
decentralised service models discussed in previous chapters and provide better information to support 
decisions made by the clients, providers and commissioners of social services. 
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8.1 Data and analytics can transform the social services 
landscape 
Data and analytics to support a system that learns 
Information flows are central to a system that learns (Chapter 7). Broadly, a system that learns needs timely 
information on which clients are accessing which services, who is providing those services and with what 
effect. The broader and deeper the scope of the information, the more powerful will be the learning 
opportunities. The information needs to be collected, configured and analysed in a continuous process that 
creates value through learning feedback loops (Figure 8.1).  
Figure 8.1 Data value cycle  
 
Source: OECD, 2014; Productivity Commission. 
A client-centred data infrastructure and analytic capability will be the foundation for providing information 
for system-wide learning. This infrastructure will allow data users to follow the pathways of social services 
clients in detail and over time as they access or interact with different services. Data users will be able to use 
information at very different scales (from client-specific assessments to system-wide analysis), and for 
operational, evaluative and commissioning purposes. A client-centred data infrastructure should be able to 
support the full range of commissioning approaches and service delivery models discussed in Chapters 5 
and 6 and meet a wide range of needs.  
A better data infrastructure and data analytics will help address a number of current issues in the design and 
provision of social services. 
 By providing better information on the quality and effectiveness of services, clients will be able to make 
better-informed service choices. 
 Better information will provide a more holistic picture of client circumstances and of available services 
and enable the assembly of a more effective mix of services to meet client needs. This picture may 
focus on individual clients or on groups of clients with similar characteristics and prospects. 
 Better information systems will enable providers to capture client-centred data once for operational, 
monitoring, evaluation and audit purposes. 
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 Better information will support more effective operations by, for instance, facilitating client interactions 
with service providers. It will also help the service provider to customise services to better meet the 
preferences and needs of client. 
 Better information will allow the performance of services to be measured as client-specific value-added, 
not just as averages across the client cohort. Commissioners of social services will be able to match 
service levels to client characteristics and set prices accordingly. This will help manage cherry-picking 
and parking (providers focusing on the clients for whom it is easy to achieve desired outcomes while 
providing no, or a low level of, service to others) (Chapter 6; Appendix F). 
 Better information will greatly reduce the cost and increase the power of service evaluations (using 
economies of scope and scale in the use of data). 
 Better information will enable evaluations to be conducted in real time and so promote continual 
adaptation in services to better meet client needs. It will enable providers to compare their performance 
with other providers of similar services, and so help them identify the scope for improvement. 
 Better information will help identify the impacts of services as a basis for payment of providers, and so 
leave more room for providers to experiment and innovate in pursuit of improved performance. 
 Better information will enable commissioning organisations to set prices for services at a level that 
covers the economic costs of provision (Chapter 6). 
 Using suitably anonymised data, better information will guide the identification of effective interventions 
and the deployment of resources across the social services system.  
A comprehensive, wide-access, client-centred data infrastructure could have further beneficial effects by: 
 stimulating new and existing providers to develop innovative ways to add value; 
 making it difficult for providers and other decision makers to justify services that do not work, or fall 
short of the best return on investment (ROI) – an essential component of effective selection pressure; 
 leading to improved measurement of outcomes, making it more possible for agencies to contract with 
providers for outcomes (Chapter 12); and 
 enhancing the ability of providers to match the services they offer to the types of clients that could most 
benefit from them.  
On the final point above, a comprehensive, wide-access, client-centred data infrastructure could help 
providers reach these clients and establish trust. Relatedly, it could help solve the challenge of service 
integration by revealing the combination of services that work best for different client types (Chapter 10). 
 
 
 F8.1  Cost-effectively collecting, sharing and analysing data across the social services system 
will greatly increase the capacity to design, commission and provide effective services. 
Better data and data analysis will help target resources to have a greater impact on 
improving outcomes. 
 
 
A social services data infrastructure will build over time in terms of client histories and the scope of social 
services included. This will continue to increase understanding about the effects of different services and 
different providers on outcomes, both generally and for particular clients. 
The power of data technology and analytics 
Modern data technology and analytics have greatly increased the capability to inform decisions being made 
by clients, providers, purchasers and commissioners of social services. 
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Innovations over the last 40 years include: 
 high-volume parallel processing of huge datasets, that allows large numbers of users to access data in 
real time; 
 vastly increased capacity to analyse the content of large datasets for a wide range of uses; 
 cheap and ubiquitous electronic networks that enable data users to collaborate, communicate, 
coordinate or mobilise at scale globally on matters of mutual interest; and 
 devices that capture personal data in real time – for instance through mobile phones, watches and 
wearable fitness monitors. 
Taken together, these innovations provide opportunities to build new kinds of knowledge-based tools 
and to adopt different kinds of business models … (Mansell, 2015, p. 24).  
Services in many parts of the economy have used these technologies for decades to continually transform 
themselves, though New Zealand lags behind international leaders (NZPC, 2014a). The retail industry, for 
instance, has used information and communications technology (ICT) to track inventories and supply in real 
time, integrate supply chains across and within borders, set prices to respond to changing demand, and 
target marketing to customer segments. Online shopping has grown rapidly over the last decade. Parallel 
developments have been transforming the banking, finance, freight and air transport industries.  
In New Zealand, Xero has developed a cloud-based accounting system for small- to medium-sized 
businesses that is used internationally. The system uploads banking transactions automatically for use by 
accountants and employees and submits tax returns electronically with the consent of the service user. 
More than 300 third-party providers of related services are using the Xero platform to build and introduce 
innovative applications. These innovations are reviewed by the community of 300 000 users of Xero – a 
guide to their usefulness (Mansell, 2015).  
New Zealand examples of data-driven innovation in the social services 
Some of these capabilities are already in place in some parts of the social services system. For instance, the 
Ministry of Social Development (MSD) has used its in-house benefits dynamics database as the backbone of 
its Investment Approach (Chapters 3 and 9; Appendix B). MSD is linking other data sources, including 
information from Child, Youth and Family service use, to increase the power of its analytics. The database 
allows real-time tracking of service performance as input into investment decisions. This has enabled MSD 
to identify and successfully channel services to previously under-served client groups, including youth and 
sole parents. Private sector services have been using similar client segmentation, testing and targeting of 
services for decades. 
While MSD uses its own data systems for operational purposes and as a key tool to enable its Investment 
Approach, Statistics New Zealand has been implementing the Integrated Data Infrastructure (IDI) for 
research and evaluation purposes. The IDI contains de-identified longitudinal individual-level administrative 
data from education, inland revenue, justice, corrections, Accident Compensation Corporation (injury data), 
MSD (benefit and student loans), and the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (immigration 
and tenancy bonds), as well as data from Statistics New Zealand surveys. The IDI is complemented by a 
central agency Analytic and Insights team located at the Treasury. The team’s role is to undertake and 
promote research and evaluation using IDI to inform the Government’s resourcing decisions and 
commissioning of services. Statistics New Zealand and the Ministry of Health are piloting the addition of 
health data to the IDI, initially for the purposes of the Treasury carrying out research. 
The IDI is not set up for operational purposes; it takes time to analyse data and feed results back to the 
commissioners of services. Other social services systems are using shared data operationally. For instance, 
the National Health IT Board is leading the development of a comprehensive distributed-data infrastructure 
in the health sector (Box 8.1).  
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Box 8.1 National IT Health Board 
The Government established the National IT Health Board in 2009 to provide strategic leadership on 
information systems across the sector. Since its inception, the Board has carried forward a range of 
complementary initiatives, including: 
 building the capacity for patients and their treatment providers to have a core set of personal 
health information available electronically, regardless of the setting as they access health services; 
 setting up the capacity for patient portals that give patients electronic access to their personal 
health information; 
 rolling out a national electronic prescription services; 
 developing networking and interconnectivity standards that allow information exchange between 
existing private health electronic networks (such as those used in general practice); 
 developing a common architecture for national and regional information systems and 
infrastructure; 
 establishing the ConnectedHealth brand as an umbrella term for the IT (information technology) 
environments that securely share information; 
 harnessing clinical leadership in the development of health IT initiatives; and 
 supporting the New Zealand Health IT Cluster, an alliance of software and solution developers, 
consultants, health policymakers, health funders, infrastructure companies, healthcare providers 
and academic institutions (National Health IT Board, 2015). 
The National IT Health Board has taken a “guided market approach” to data-driven innovation that 
includes: 
co-production and co-design of health care information solutions or eHealth solutions by 
consumers and health care providers [and] … direct access for health consumers, including the 
development of patient portal and ultimately consumer apps that use all or part of their health 
information record. (NZDFF, 2014, p. 35) 
According to Ian McCrae, chief executive officer of health IT company Orion Health, one of the key 
advantages that New Zealand gained in innovation in health IT was the launch of the National Health 
Index number (the unique patient identifier) in the early 1990s (Riley, 2014).  
 
Some non-government social services providers are also exploring the possibilities of client-friendly, data-
driven innovation. Auckland City Mission told the Commission that organisations such as MSD should 
consider using smart phone applications similar to banking apps. Clients would not then need to visit 
agencies and tell their stories time and time again. This way clients would be in control of their data and 
could give consent as appropriate. Auckland City Mission found that clients will almost always give consent 
to sharing their data. Yet the National Beneficiaries Advisory Group told the Commission that people 
outside the main cities and older people were less likely to use smart phones or the internet to interact with 
providers and government agencies. Over time, familiarity with digital technology is likely to spread more 
widely as costs fall and use becomes the norm.  
Inquiry participants drew the Commission’s attention to other examples of data-driven innovation: 
The RealTime Feedback project being run by the Health and Disability Commission is an example of 
using technology to obtain data (in this case on client satisfaction) in a way that is engaging for clients, 
automates data entry and draws on centralised skills in analysing and feeding back data in real time. 
(Youth Horizons, sub. 67, p. 8) 
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…RA [Relationships Aotearoa] has invested heavily in the development of a comprehensive client 
management system which can not only provide a comprehensive data set for all RA clients seen, but 
has the capability of hosting a number of other providers who do not have the infrastructure to build 
such a system. (Relationships Aotearoa, sub. 56, p. 9) 
The social services have been slow to use data and analytics to innovate 
While examples of data-driven innovation in the social services exist, in general, the social services have 
been slower than many other service industries in taking up the opportunities. Tens of thousands of 
transactions take place daily between social services clients and providers, each generating information that 
may or may not be recorded electronically. Yet OECD (2014) notes that while industries that use data and 
analytics intensively experience a productivity gain in the order of 5% to 10%, industries in the public 
sector, healthcare, and science and education have made relatively weak use of the opportunities. 
These sectors employ the largest share of occupations which perform many tasks related to the 
collection and analysis of information and which are becoming increasingly data-intensive. However 
these tasks are also still performed at a relative low level of computerisation. The targeted deployment 
of data analytics could thus boost efficiency gains even more in these sectors. (p. 19) 
Consistent with this judgement, the Social Sector Trial Leads submitted: “Where there are data-capturing 
systems, they tend not to be consistent in what they record …” (sub. 126, p. 23). Even where information is 
adequately captured, data infrastructure and analytics mostly do not match the sophistication and 
innovative power of those used in other service industries. 
The social services system is vast and there is currently no comprehensive knowledge base from which 
learning is kept. Agencies all have knowledge and learnings as do learning institutions and service 
providers but this knowledge is often vested in units and people in fragmented ways and is not 
consistently applied or shared. (Social Sector Trials Leads, sub. 126, p. 24) 
Health services have relatively well-developed data and analytic systems compared to other social services 
(NZDFF, 2014). For instance, general practitioners can analyse data to determine treatment needs, access 
patient histories, make patient referrals and receive and analyse the results of tests and specialist 
investigations electronically (National Health IT Board, 2015). Yet, according to the Home and Community 
Health Association, community health lags behind in the use of data and analytics: 
a) There is much opportunity for improving efficiency and effectiveness for organisations and clients 
through further use of technology. Technological advancements include rostering and client 
management, use of cellphone and app technology for support workers, further use of GPS [global 
positioning system], use of remote client health monitoring and use of medical alarms.  
b) We need greater connectivity around New Zealand to allow community nurses to link and input, no 
matter where they are, to shared records and other centralized data stores.  
c) Many of our providers simply don’t have the capacity within the contract price to develop their 
technology.  
d) In some instances secondary care technology is running behind community services technology and 
its incompatibility frustrates community innovation. (sub. 114, p. 14) 
Similarly, the Wise Group, which specialises in community-based mental health services, submitted: 
There is an urgent need to identify a subset of information about an individual client than can be 
shared, the development of a protocol about how that information should be managed and the 
development of a central mechanism to manage the sharing of information. (sub. 41, p. 4) 
Alliance Health Trust Plus (AH+), a public health organisation that, among other roles, commissions health 
services for Pacific peoples, notes that “it is often difficult to capture the extent to which our providers 
provide additional support to families” (sub. 119, p. 10). AH+ argues: 
Investment in IT solutions that are ‘user friendly’ for frontline staff that provide up-to-date data 
collection and timely analysis is essential for guiding the decisions made by commissioning agencies. It 
also allows providers to make evidence based judgements about their models of care and informs 
business planning processes (eg: number of FTEs required). (sub. 119, p. 3)  
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Even so, health sector community providers are probably more aware than other community social services 
providers of the potential use of data analytics, because other parts of the health system have relatively 
better developed data infrastructure.  
Schiff et al. (forthcoming) estimated that, in 2014, data-driven innovation generated $2.4 billion of value in 
the New Zealand economy. Of this, $260 million was attributable to health, education and social services 
industries. The proportion of gross value added attributable to data-driven innovation in these industries 
was substantially below the proportion for many other service industries and lower than across the whole 
economy. 
 
 
 F8.2  Social services have lagged behind many other service industries in adopting data-
driven innovation.  
 
Reasons for slow adoption of data-driven innovation in the social services 
One reason for late adoption of up-to-date data technology and analytics is the small size and not-for-profit 
(NFP) form of many social services providers. As a result they find it difficult to fund the investments 
required, or to acquire the skills to use them: 
Significant barriers to the use of information technology and data include the cost of developing and 
provision of solutions and the bespoke nature of IT tools often limiting the application and consistency 
of the use of these tools. This also limits the quality and depth of data available to learn from.  
There is an IT knowledge deficit among many NGOs which needs to be addressed to make the most of 
new technology to improve efficiency and effectiveness. This can be expensive for NGOs so finding 
ways of sharing information and systems that is supported by funders is important. (Social Sector Trials, 
sub. 126, p. 19) 
In general, community organisations struggle to access the funding to build adequate and responsive 
client management systems, websites and reporting systems that will allow them to deliver the more 
professional, visible and accountable social services that government agencies are now seeking. 
(Palmerston North Community Services Council, sub. 125, p. 11) 
Workbridge submitted: “Government agencies need to be aware that community organisations have 
limited resources to dedicate to IT systems for the purposes of data collection, and that introducing new 
systems will require supporting infrastructure, training and implementation” (sub. 102, p. 15). 
A more fundamental reason for slow adoption of new technology is that the collective benefits of a 
comprehensive client-centred data infrastructure and analytical capability are far greater than the sum of 
benefits that would be gained by each provider pursuing their own solution (Mansell, 2015). In many private 
sector service industries this problem has been ameliorated by successful adopters of new technology 
growing in scale at the expense of laggards (NZPC, 2014a). Successful NFP social services providers, 
because of capital constraints, have much less scope to grow in size through increasing their share of 
service provision or by merging or taking over other providers (Appendix F). 
Historically, the collection of operational data within service lines has created strong barriers to sharing 
client-centred data across the social services. In many cases, providers and commissioning organisations 
have found it easier to accept the limitations of current data-sharing practices, rather than work to realise 
the benefits of greater data sharing.  
A client-centred data infrastructure covering many dispersed social services providers requires a collective 
solution to establishing standards for data sharing as well as meeting the development and set-up costs. 
The Government has a strong interest in obtaining the benefits of a comprehensive client-centred data 
infrastructure, given its role as the main funder of social services and its interest in getting better outcomes 
for available resources (section 8.3). 
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 F8.3  Establishing standards for data sharing and developing a client-centred data 
infrastructure covering many dispersed social services providers requires a collective 
solution across government agencies and social services organisations. 
 
 
8.2 New Zealand Data Futures Forum proposals 
Data-driven innovation in the social services requires the linking and sharing and use of personal 
information across the points at which clients engage with providers. This increases the potential for harmful 
use of personal information and so raises significant issues of privacy and trust.  
New Zealand Data Futures Forum proposals 
The Ministers of Finance and Statistics established the New Zealand Data Futures Forum (NZDFF) “to 
explore the potential benefits and risks for New Zealand of sharing, linking and using data” (NZDFF, 2014, 
p. 6).57 In its report, NZDFF recommended: 
 getting the rules of the game right by establishing an independent data council to act as guardians of 
the system and develop best-practice guidance, and by reviewing information legislation and so 
developing a robust data-use ecosystem; 
 creating value by supporting catalyst projects that use data to innovate – “Trusted data use for the 
social sector” (p. 34) is one possible project recommended by NZDFF; 
 establishing the foundations of a data-use ecosystem in which inclusion (by raising public awareness and 
capability in finding, using and understanding data and the data environment and its potential to 
transform lives), building trust and giving individuals control over the use of their personal data leads to 
innovative data sharing that builds value; and this, in turn drives further sharing of data.  
NZDFF (2014, p. 17) argued for a “more collaborative, open and protected data future” and sketched out 
different scenarios to show how the principles of value, inclusion, trust and control could be applied in 
practice (Figure 8.2). Quadrants 3 and 4 cover the linking, sharing and use of de-identified data such as 
through the IDI. Quadrant 2 covers situations where an individual has the right to decide whether data that 
identifies them can be linked, shared and used to target interventions. Quadrant 1 covers situations where 
an agency or agencies have the right to decide whether data that identifies an individual can be linked, 
shared and used to target interventions to that individual. An example in quadrant 1 would be a hospital 
sharing data with a child protection agency to identify a child at risk of abuse and to target interventions to 
mitigate that risk. 
57 NZDFF members were a mix of public sector, private sector and academic leaders. 
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Figure 8.2 Different data-use scenarios for protecting privacy  
 
Source: NZDFF, 2014; Productivity Commission. 
Notes: 
1. “Collective” could include, for instance, a government agency or agencies. 
 
NZDFF (2014) argued that organisations should minimise the mandatory use of identifiable, personal data 
“…and, wherever, possible, move either to an arrangement where individuals have more say over the use 
of personal data or to one where data is anonymised or de-identified and used in a non-personal way” 
(p. 23). NZDFF further argued that government’s social sector agencies “…need to do more to ensure that 
trust, inclusion and control underpin the use of social sector data. This sector needs to put strategies in 
place to ensure sustainable trusted and safe data use” (p. 34). 
NZDFF also recommended that: 
… [t]he government agencies responsible for the delivery of social services (Justice, Health, Education, 
Social Development) should better coordinate their operational data-sharing to avoid duplication, 
improve safety and coordinate expertise….Agencies need to ensure that operational sharing is done 
with appropriate collective oversight and protections, such as by making use of the proposed data 
council, or find ways to enable greater individual control over the uses of data… 
The state sector’s operational data should be made available in anonymous form via Statistics 
New Zealand’s Integrated Data Infrastructure (IDI), or some other form of trusted, safe data-sharing 
mechanism, to improve transparency and the ability for researchers, communities, iwi and others to 
analyse data for themselves. (NZDFF, 2014, p. 34) 
In addition, NZDFF argued that the Government should form partnerships with NFPs, academics and the 
private sector: 
…to link data to better understand social challenges, and this should be done in safe and trusted ways 
– not for individual targeting purposes, but to learn and measure needs and outcomes…[this] enables 
co-production of insights, and has the potential to increase accuracy and relevance, create reciprocal 
solutions, as well as support inclusion and trust. (NZDFF, 2014, p. 34) 
NZDFF uses an example of how data sharing and the use of trusted community brokers could help provide 
better services for transient families and ameliorate adverse effects of transience on children’s outcomes.  
Collective decisions 
/ personal data use
Individual decisions 
/ personal data use
Collective decisions 
/ non-personal data use
Individual decisions 
/ non-personal data use
Data not used to target 
interventions to individuals
Data used to target interventions to 
individuals
Collective has decision rights on 
linking, sharing and using data
Individual has decision rights on 
linking, sharing and using data
1. 2.
3. 4.
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8.3 Building and using a better data infrastructure and analytic 
capability 
This section looks at how a better data infrastructure and analytics can: 
 contribute to more effective social services under different commissioning and service delivery 
approaches;  
 expand the scope and increase the depth of an investment approach to resourcing social services; and 
 cost-effectively capture data from many small and dispersed social services providers, helping to 
integrate them into a learning social services system in a transparent way.  
The section briefly discusses governance arrangements; the issues of data security, privacy and trust; and 
the need for a collective solution to building a better data infrastructure. 
Data and analytics for different commissioning approaches 
Any future social services system is likely to involve a mix of high-level designs (Chapter 5) with some 
commissioning decisions being taken from the centre, some devolved to national or regional bodies, and 
some possibly assigned to social insurers. The future will also inevitably see a range of service models being 
used (Chapter 6). A client-centred data infrastructure needs to be flexible enough to allow the sharing, 
linking and use of data across different commissioning and service arrangements. The broader and deeper 
the scope of a data infrastructure, the more powerful and dynamic will be the innovation and learning that it 
supports. 
Fortunately, fast-evolving modern electronic networking, information-sharing technology and analytics can 
be configured with great flexibility, through distributed systems supported by network connectivity 
standards (OECD, 2014). This is already being demonstrated by health information systems in New Zealand 
(Box 8.1). The Impact Collective has proposed such an approach for services to address domestic violence 
(Box 8.2). Modern data infrastructures make it more possible than in the past to combine devolved 
commissioning and client-centred delivery of social services with system-wide learning. 
Box 8.2 A nation-wide integrated data system to help address domestic violence 
The Impact Collective (sub. 130) proposes a nationwide integrated system involving multiple 
agencies, profession, communities and individuals working collaboratively together to address 
domestic violence and child abuse. The proposal is a response to the Impact Collective’s assessment 
of the current situation: 
There is no consistent data collection or means of comparing what is happening between 
regions and no accurate data or ongoing mechanisms from which to measure 
change/outcomes. (p. 21). 
As part of an integrated system, an integrated data system (with suitable protections) would enable 
cross-agency sharing and national analysis of information: 
The Integrated System would include local information and national information management 
systems underpinned by a set of national and local outcome indicators, data dictionary, 
standardised data sets, and system and service performance measures ie response times. It 
would enable cross-agency sharing of information throughout the Integrated System and to 
provide a continual flow of standardised data for performance and outcome monitoring. (p. 22) 
The information collected would, with other evaluative activity, “enable a formalised continuous 
improvement process to be established…” (p. 22). 
The Impact Collective also draws on the Glenn Inquiry’s finding that information systems and 
databases do not lend themselves to cross-agency sharing of information (Glenn Inquiry, 2014). With 
multiple agencies involved in providing services and clients moving between locations, the ability to 
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Depending on the model, the data infrastructure would help managers of social services markets to identify 
prices for different services that will allow efficient providers to cover their full economic costs, while 
achieving good outcomes for clients (Chapter 6). Intermediaries could also use the data to provide 
information on service quality and effectiveness to help clients to choose, where they have a choice of 
services. 
Under more devolved arrangements, there is the possibility for a wide range of individuals (including clients 
and client advisors) and providers to have access either to anonymised data or, with permission, to private 
data (section 8.4). These arrangements would give the greatest scope for diversity of new ideas and 
innovation. Subject to protocols, third parties could access data to develop and offer services, measure 
their added value and compete for funding (Mansell, 2015). 
In short, with the role of the centre limited to being a steward, a devolved social services system could yield 
better outcomes, with a common (transparent) view on how the sector is performing. A wide-access, client-
centred, consent-based data infrastructure could become a key enabler of a collectively-owned, creative 
and adaptive social system. 
Broadening and deepening the investment approach 
MSD’s Investment Approach has so far proved to be an effective way of deciding where best to target 
resources, which service designs to use and for which types of clients (Chapter 3 and Appendix B). Yet, as 
currently configured, it has a focus on a relatively narrowly defined outcome (the present value of future 
income support for current and recent clients) and a relatively narrow range of investment opportunities (the 
services MSD either provides in-house or contracts out). 
Chapter 9 discusses the potential to expand the investment approach to cover both a wider range of 
outcomes and a wider range of investment opportunities. This expansion will require linking of individual 
client data held across different social services agencies, possibly including health, education, social 
development and justice. Data with wider scope will generate more accurate individual-level predictions, 
and lead to better targeting of services and better measurement of the value added by services. The 
NZDFF recommended increased data sharing among government social services agencies, while at the 
same time moving to a more consent-based approach (section 8.2).  
The Social Sector Board58 has commissioned work to develop a plan for implementing social sector data 
integration, including common standards (Cabinet Economic Growth and Infrastructure Committee, 2015).  
 
 
 R8.1  The Social Sector Board should initiate a project to coordinate client-level operational 
data sharing to increase the scope, power and accuracy of the Government’s 
investment approach to targeting social services. The work should follow the principles 
recommended by the New Zealand Data Futures Forum..  
 
 
Principles similar to those in the current investment approach could also be used under more devolved 
commissioning and decentralised delivery models for social services. Data analytics and a data 
58 The Social Sector Board consists of Chief Executives from the Ministries of Social Development, Education, Health, Corrections, Justice and Pacific 
Island Affairs, Te Puni Kökiri, Statistics New Zealand, the New Zealand Police and Sport New Zealand.  
share information is vital to providing effective and safe services. The Impact Collective proposes 
that, at the regional level, the information system would be used as a case management system for 
“multi-agency case management processe[s]” such as those run by the Family Violence Interagency 
Response System (p. 22). 
The Impact Collective’s proposal for an integrated data system is an example of backbone support 
that is a key condition for a successful collective impact approach to service integration (Chapter 3).  
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infrastructure that collects the right data on services, on the clients who consume services and on the 
outcomes that eventuate for these clients hold the key to coupling the power of the investment approach to 
a much more devolved system. Properly set up, this approach could incentivise a diversity of new ideas and 
new approaches. 
Commissioning organisations and providers could categorise clients into segments in different ways, based 
on a range of demographic and historical data for that individual (eg, whether the family or individual has 
been notified to Child, Youth and Family; health and education history; teen pregnancy; or interaction with 
the benefit system). This would enable probabilistic forecasts of outcomes (and some quantifiable elements 
of the outcomes, such as future fiscal liabilities) for many different types of clients. 
Together, data of this type will help commissioning organisations and providers, either as a result of chance 
variation in services offered, or through a randomised controlled trial (RCT), to identify the impacts of 
services. Through links to provider data, the commissioning agency should be able to identify the cost of 
services at the client level, and so calculate an ROI. This in turn would allow commissioning organisations to 
shift resources towards the more effective services. 
The Commission is attracted to the idea of organising and configuring at least some social services along 
these lines. The combination of clearly specified outcomes, much greater freedom and opportunity for 
providers to design and deliver their services, and providers supplying data on what services have been 
delivered to which types of client is a very powerful one. It would generate far greater diversity of ideas for 
new services and a means of testing their effectiveness. Diversity and learning what works are key 
components of a system that successfully learns to perform better in the face of complex and difficult 
challenges (Chapter 6). 
 
 
 F8.4  Modern data technology and analytics can support a devolved approach to guiding 
investments in social services, by collecting and analysing data on service costs and on 
client participation in services and subsequent outcomes.  
 
 
Capturing data from many small and dispersed providers 
Many small social services providers receive funding from one or more government social services agencies, 
in total producing a large number of small-scale contracts. It is rare for these services to be well-evaluated 
or even for basic data on client participation to be adequately captured (Chapter 7, section 8.1). A common 
social-sector-wide data infrastructure that allowed providers to supply data electronically at low cost and in 
standardised format on client participation and their programme costs would contribute to overcoming 
these shortfalls in the evidence base. Client data linked across social sector agencies would, in turn, allow 
easier identification of the outcomes of service participation and low-cost, real-time evaluation of service 
effectiveness: 
At the simplest level data collection could be improved by having a common IT system for service 
providers that captures basic data consistently and comprehensively. This would require investment 
into IT tool development. There would also need to be significant effort to improve data sharing 
arrangements and clear transparent guidance… Sharing systems and learning across providers is 
another way that they can be supported to undertake more robust evaluation and monitoring… (Social 
Sector Trials Leads, sub. 126, pp. 23–24) 
The Cross Government Accreditation Working Group (CGAWG) was set up to coordinate the approaches of 
separate government agencies to accreditation of social services providers. One barrier to CGAWG’s work 
is the lack of a common IT system across government social sector agencies (sub. 132). CGAWG (sub. 132, 
p. 3) notes that: “…the burden of compliance extends well beyond accreditation: specifically accreditation, 
monitoring and reporting require large amounts of provider resource (staff, time and tools)”. 
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CGAWG argues for: 
One IT system across the social sector agencies for accreditation, funding, planning and contracting 
a) One New Zealand Business number for providers 
b) Sharing accreditation information 
c) A portal for accessing information  
[while noting as barriers] 
a) Cost of cross government IT solutions 
b) Privacy of data – needs to be carefully managed 
c) Trust – all parties need to trust the process and delivery 
d) Risk management. (sub. 132, p. 3) 
While the CGAWG proposal does not extend to the collection and analysis of client-level data for the 
purposes of programme evaluation, some obvious synergies in the two purposes exist. Government social 
services agencies should investigate these synergies further. 
 
 
 R8.2  Government social services agencies and social services providers should capture 
information on their clients and services in a consistent way. Doing so would allow 
commissioning organisations, providers and evaluators of services to track clients’ use 
of services across time, and so identify service outcomes and provider performance.  
 
 
Governance arrangements 
The Government is currently considering the NZDFF proposal to establish an independent data council to 
act as guardian of a system of sharing and linking personal data in New Zealand. The council would advise 
government and data users and develop best practice guidance on data use. The Government has agreed 
that the principles of value, inclusion, trust and control, as set out by the NZDFF, should underpin 
approaches to data use in New Zealand (Cabinet Economic Growth and Infrastructure Committee, 2015). 
The principles involve recognising the economic and social value to be derived from the use of data, the 
inclusion of all parts of New Zealand society in the benefits, using data management to build trust and 
confidence in institutions and giving individuals more control over the use of their personal data (NZDFF, 
2014). The Commission considers that the NZDFF principles provide a sound basis for the successful 
sharing of personal data across social services agencies.  
 
 
 R8.3  The Government should require government social services agencies engaged in 
sharing personal data to adhere to the four guiding principles of value, inclusion, trust 
and control proposed by the New Zealand Data Futures Forum. 
 
 
The Commission considers that, in any exercise to link personal data across the social services, the 
Government should establish governance arrangements to give effect to the NZDFF principles. The 
governing body should be the custodian of a safe and high-trust environment in which personal data could 
be shared for operational, evaluative and commissioning purposes. It would also set data standards to 
facilitate efficient data sharing. 
 
 
 R8.4  The Government should set up governance arrangements that secure confidence and 
trust in the sharing of data across the social services, provide advice to government and 
data users on proposals for change, and develop best-practice guidance. 
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Data security, privacy and trust 
The viability of an expanded model of data sharing across the social services following NZDFF principles 
depends on the willingness of often vulnerable clients to consent to sharing their personal data. Seeing and 
getting value from sharing data is one of the key principles that will encourage client consent (NZDFF, 
2014). This approach is already working in areas such as accounting software (Xero) and customer-managed 
relationships (MyWave) (NZDFF, 2014). There are many international examples (see Mansell, 2015). 
Under the NZDFF proposals, clients and citizens would, to the extent possible, control the use of their 
personal data. As far as possible, government agencies, other corporate entities and individuals would only 
have access to personal data by fully-informed consent, and then only for agreed purposes and in an 
agreed form. Researchers and analysts could use de-identified data without the consent of individuals, as is 
currently the case with data in the IDI. 
There will clearly always be some areas of social services, such as child protection, policing and corrections, 
where it is not always appropriate to seek consent to the sharing of personal data. Social services agencies 
will need to develop agreed protocols to govern the sharing of such data. 
Some providers have told the Commission of their frustration that some government agencies, based on 
the agencies’ interpretation of privacy law, are unwilling to share information on clients with non-
government agencies. Government agencies should review their interpretations, and clarify and publicise 
the provisions of privacy law affecting the sharing of data between government and non-government 
agencies serving the same clients. 
Investing in a wide-access, client-centred, social services data infrastructure 
A wide-access, client-centred, data infrastructure involves strong economies of scale and scope as well as 
network effects – the wider the range of data shared and the more people who share data, the greater the 
potential value. The broader the scope of a data infrastructure, the greater the power it will have in 
supporting innovation in operations and commissioning. The combining of disparate sources of data at the 
client level allow a much better understanding of likely outcomes and of which services are likely to be most 
effective for particular clients. This, in turn, allows for better evaluation of the impacts of different 
interventions. The marginal costs of adding additional data and users are low.  
These conditions point to a role for government in helping to establish a wide-access, client-centred, data 
infrastructure. The returns from an investment of this sort would depend on a range of factors, including 
other necessarily experimental changes that the Government made in the commissioning of social services 
(Chapters 5 and 6). While the Government could not predict what the returns would be over time, it could 
be confident that establishing a wide-access, client-centred, data infrastructure would be a step towards 
higher returns from the use of social services resources.  
The Social Sector Board has commissioned work to develop a plan for implementing social sector data 
integration, including common standards. This work provides an opportunity to look further ahead to the 
development of a wide-access, client-centred, social services data infrastructure. 
 
 
 R8.5  The Social Sector Board should initiate a project on social sector data integration that 
includes the design of institutions and processes to develop a comprehensive, wide-
access, client-centred data infrastructure. This infrastructure should be accessible to 
commissioning organisations, providers, clients and researchers of social services.  
 
 
8.4 Data sharing to support innovation 
The flexibility provided by a consent-based, wide-access, client-centred, data infrastructure would 
potentially allow easy entry of new providers and for existing providers to join up to address identified 
service gaps. This would help change the role of the government social services agencies to be system 
stewards rather than system controllers. It would allow actors within the sector to drive more relevant, 
nuanced and successful innovation (Chapter 7).  
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Allowing consent-based data access to third parties would stimulate new kinds of solutions and faster 
adaptation and innovation. It is likely that third parties will identify particular client segments where they 
have innovative ideas on how to address difficult-to-solve problems (Mansell, 2015). This would remove the 
government agencies’ monopoly on data and provide a high-trust platform for developing new services. 
The data infrastructure provided by the recently announced Apple Research Kit is a good analogy. This 
allows a wide range of providers to build specific apps aimed at niche markets. For instance, the Fox 
foundation, a charity, has been working on an app to find ways of tracking the symptoms of Parkinson’s 
disease. The app “can measure someone’s finger-tapping on an iPhone’s screen …The phone’s 
accelerometer studies gait and balance while the user is walking” (The Economist, 2015, p. 72). 
Mansell (2015) proposes using consent-based sharing of individual data to find ways to address obesity.  
[Obesity] is a complex issue that involves multiple influences ad outcomes (life style, health support, 
employment, etc.). There is a lot of research required and learning what works will likely indicate 
different solutions for different kinds of people. The forward fiscal risk to government makes this a high 
fiscal ROI for government. The forward social costs are likely high too. (p. 105) 
The National Health IT Board is already building the opportunity for third-party providers to develop apps 
for use with personal health data (Box 8.1). As a shared data infrastructure develops, other government 
social services agencies will be able to draw from the National Health IT Board’s experience. 
 
 
 F8.5  Where individuals give consent, government agencies could give third parties, such as 
non-government organisations and academia, access to identifiable personal data to 
support the development and provision of innovative social services. 
 
 
 
 
 R8.6  The Government should seek partnerships with non-government organisations and 
universities to use data sharing and analysis to create new solutions to difficult-to-solve 
social problems. This should, where individuals consent, include sharing identifiable 
personal data held by government agencies. 
 
 
 
 
 Q8.1 
 
What difficult-to-solve social problems would be amenable to new solutions developed 
by data-sharing partnerships between the Government, non-government organisations 
and academics? 
 
 
8.5 Implementing better data and analytics 
The design of a wide-access, client-centred, data infrastructure 
A wide-access, client-centred, data infrastructure that shares information across social services organisations 
would support better service integration and targeting, more efficient service delivery and better and easier 
monitoring and evaluation of service performance. The data infrastructure design needs to encourage trust 
between system participants and achieve an appropriate balance between efficiency, data accessibility, 
data quality and privacy. The design should build in flexibility and scalability to learn from experience and 
adjust to future needs as they emerge. 
The design of an efficient and effective wide-access data infrastructure is a specialised task. There are both 
international and New Zealand examples of setting up such infrastructures that show they are feasible, and 
can be both fit for purpose and cost effective.  
The Estonian Government’s X-Road (or data exchange layer) is a system that routes queries between 
independent computer systems. Each system, based on different technologies, needs an “adapter” to be 
able to send and receive encrypted information in the X-Road format (Bershidsky, 2015).  
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The X-Road allows institutions/people to securely exchange data as well as to ensure people’s access 
to the data maintained and processed in state databases. 
Public and private sector enterprises and institutions can connect their information system with the X-
Road. This enables them to use X-Road services in their own electronic environment or offer their e-
services via the X-Road. Joining the X-Road enables institutions to save resources, since the data 
exchange layer already exists. (REISA, 2015) 
Bershidsky (2015) noted that “the distributed nature of the system makes it inherently more secure than if it 
had been centralized. The architecture also makes it possible to use legacy systems and databases in the 
public and private sector. Plus the system has been cheap.”  
Citizen access to the X-Road system requires a unique identifier. Estonian citizens have used either a 
national identity card, or an internet banking identifier (Ott, 2003). 
In New Zealand, the National Health IT Board is overseeing the development of a range of data-sharing 
initiatives that include health service providers and patients having access to a patient’s personal health 
information. Private health electronic networks will be able to exchange information securely across 
networks, and third parties will be able to provide services that use personal health information (Box 8.1). 
Sharing of personal health information relies on the use of the unique personal National Health Index 
number. 
Building on current initiatives and learning from experience 
The Commission considers that the social sector agencies should investigate the building of a wide-access, 
client-centred data infrastructure across the social services. In doing so, they should consider, among other 
initiatives, what can be learnt from: 
 the National IT Health Board’s experience of sharing personal information in the health sector (Box 8.1); 
 current work under way to link data, including personal data, held by government social sector 
agencies; and 
 the work being undertaken by the CGAWG to encourage the efficient capture of data for the purposes 
of monitoring and audit of non-government social services providers (section 8.3). 
The design of a data infrastructure should allow for scalability and flexibility to learn from experience and to 
adjust to new opportunities that emerge. While a broad vision of future capabilities will be a useful guide, 
incremental trialling of successful smaller-scale initiatives will build confidence and momentum. Incremental 
implementation within a coherent vision will reduce the risk of large cost overruns and under-performance 
that have characterised many government IT investments. Yet the vision needs to be clear about the 
outcomes sought and the potential range of data that will be captured. 
Government social services agencies and other participants will need to have realistic expectations about 
the timeframe in which the benefits of investments in a social services data infrastructure will be realised. 
MSD, for instance, has taken 15 to 20 years to build the database that now underpins its Investment 
Approach. While Estonia’s X-Road services supported only 8 million enquiries in 2004, the number had 
grown to 290 million by 2013 (REISA, 2015). 
Getting the benefits of data sharing sometimes involves radical reorganisation of business arrangements as 
some providers take advantage of new opportunities and others fail to do so (Mansell, 2015). Past 
experience in other service industries such as music recording, retail, taxis and publishing, shows that there 
will likely be resistance to change.  
New social services data-sharing initiatives require transparent governance arrangements to maintain the 
trust and confidence of service clients, providers and citizens. Transparency will help clients to see the value 
in sharing data, be confident that they have a good level of control over the use of their personal data and 
trust that the risks are being well managed. The governance arrangements will need to fit with other social 
services organisational developments, for instance in the commissioning architecture (Chapter 5) and 
service delivery models (Chapter 6). 
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Analytical and IT skills are in high demand globally (NZPC, 2014a). Their limited availability in New Zealand 
will act as a constraint on the speed at which a wide-access, client-centred, social services infrastructure can 
be designed, built and used. 
The Wise Group has identified limited availability of information skills as an issue that needs to be 
addressed in the health sector: 
[There is a need to] initiate a programme of work to continue to develop and foster ‘information 
competence’ through all levels of the health sector. (Wise Group, sub. 41, p. 4) 
Government social services agencies need to develop strategies to increase analytic information and 
technology skills more widely in the social services. 
Benefits of investing in a wide-access, client-centred, social services data 
infrastructure 
An investment in building a wide-access, client-centred, social services data infrastructure will enable the 
social services system to learn and innovate and become more effective. Data and analytics will help 
channel resources to a diverse range of services and providers to improve outcomes for clients and get a 
better ROI. Commissioning organisations, providers and clients will be able to cost-effectively monitor and 
evaluate provider performance in real time, shaping choices about which services it is best to use and how 
to develop services to better meet needs.  
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9 Investment and insurance approaches 
Key points 
 The Government’s Investment Approach is an attempt to increase the effectiveness of social 
services through better investment and targeting of investment (Chapter 3). It is also about 
providing information and incentives to support early intervention, rather than waiting for a crisis. 
 The Investment Approach adopts investment and insurance tools to prioritise clients and select 
interventions based on the expected reduction in future welfare liability (FWL). This liability is a 
proxy measure for future net social benefits. While the proxy is imperfect, the Investment 
Approach is a significant improvement on traditional approaches. 
 FWL identifies the people for whom the gains might be greatest, but provides no guidance on 
effective interventions. Reliable information on interventions, including their cost and effectiveness, 
is also essential to apply an investment approach. 
 There is scope to refine the Investment Approach and to apply it more widely. 
 A further extension is to assign the financial risks associated with poor social outcomes to 
organisations that are better placed than government to manage and reduce those risks. Such an 
“insurance approach” might offer strong incentives for timely and value-adding interventions. 
 Social insurance is an insurance scheme organised by the state with compulsory membership, and 
in which premiums are related to the ability to pay. Some non-government organisations have the 
potential to become social insurers for enrolled populations. This model should be further 
investigated. 
 
“Prepare rather than repair.” A simple and catchy idea: that well designed and targeted early interventions 
can reduce or eliminate adverse consequences at a later date (Chapter 2). Ideally, individuals, their families 
and the social services system should act whenever they expect net benefits over time. But that will only 
happen if the relevant parties have the information and resources required and face the right incentives.  
Further, the social services system will be most effective if decisions about what services are provided, who 
they are provided to and when they are provided, are made so as to maximise the net social benefit from 
the funds expended. This requires a common measure of social benefit that applies across the social 
services system. The Government’s Investment Approach is a first step towards such a measure 
(section 9.1). 
Insurance is a common theme in social services, reflecting that people would like to be “insured” against 
adverse events outside their control (section 9.2).59 Private insurance can be useful to this end, but its 
limitations typically leave government holding the “residual” risk. 
An “insurance approach” to social services is one that assigns the financial risks associated with poor social 
outcomes to organisations that are better placed than government to manage and reduce those risks. Such 
an approach might offer strong incentives for timely and value-adding interventions (section 9.3). 
9.1 The Investment Approach 
The Government’s Investment Approach is an attempt to increase the effectiveness of social services 
through better investment and targeting of investment (Chapter 3). It is also about providing an incentive 
for early intervention. 
59 Insurance is paying a premium to an insurer with the expected consequence of a compensation payment should specific adverse circumstances arise. 
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The Investment Approach adopts investment and insurance tools to prioritise clients and select 
interventions based on the expected reduction in future welfare liability. This liability is an imperfect proxy 
measure for future net benefits. However, it is a significant improvement on traditional approaches and 
there is scope for further improvement. 
Many submitters commented on the Investment Approach (Box 9.1). 
FWL identifies the people for whom the gains might be greatest, but provides no guidance on effective 
interventions. Information on interventions, including their cost and effectiveness, is also essential. 
Collecting this information is a crucial component of the investment approach, and allows service targeting 
based on return on investment (ROI). Box 9.2 explains ROI and targeting, and how they support an efficient 
allocation of resources. 
Box 9.1 Submissions about the Investment Approach 
Manawanui believes that an investment approach to social services spending will lead to a better 
allocation of resources and better social outcomes. (Manawanui, sub. 8, p. 13) 
[An investment approach] definitely would not lead to a better allocation of resources and better 
social outcomes. It is dependent on measuring outcomes where you can be certain what and 
which intervention caused these outcomes. It is very rare to be able to ascertain this in an open 
diverse community; and it sends perverse signals to service providers. (Auckland District Council 
of Social Services, sub. 55, p. 8) 
We could be concerned if the analysis failed to measure the value of family care, and 
strengthened the incentive for the system to free-ride on unpaid family carers. If family care is 
regarded as a free service under an investment approach, it would be easy to imagine the level of 
paid care for people with illnesses or disabilities being reduced when the long-term cost is 
crystallised. That could be a very negative outcome. (Carers New Zealand, sub. 71, p. 8) 
An investment approach to social services would certainly lead to a better allocation of resources 
and better social outcomes. The concept of maximising long term social return would provide the 
focus required to support the delivery of tangible and definable outcomes which make a real and 
lasting difference to society. Any investment mechanism will need to align both the social and 
financial return to risk in order to attract the investment and deliver social return in the areas 
providing the greatest benefit to society. (Wise Group, sub. 41, p. 32) 
The investment approach has significant ethical and practical limitations … using clinical cut-offs 
for establishing who receives assistance, better data on how the client is doing, tracking their 
alliance with the practitioner, and actually listening and working with the client’s ambitions will 
achieve far more than the investment approach. (Methodist Mission, sub. 4, pp. 21–22) 
Box 9.2 Investment approach concepts 
Return on investment 
ROI is a measure that compares the expected return and cost of an investment. For example, an 
investment with an expected return of $250 on a cost of $100 has an ROI of 2.5. Investments with a 
higher ROI should receive priority, all else equal. And investments with an ROI of less than one should 
be avoided. Expected returns can be measured in different ways. Examples include direct financial 
returns, reductions in future financial liability, and social returns (which includes benefits to people 
other than the investor). 
Targeting 
Targeting is the process of matching services to clients. Done well, it maximises total benefits within a 
budget limit. Optimum targeting requires a calculated ROI for each feasible service for each client, 
and then matching clients to services so as to maximise aggregate ROI. 
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A significant advantage of using FWL is that changes in individual liability can be aggregated into a 
performance measure. This allows for benchmarking across programmes, teams and agencies. 
Benchmarking can put pressure on low performance, and highlight where to seek information on better 
performance. 
FWL is a narrow measure that compares the current fiscal cost of services with the future fiscal savings. It 
confines benefits and costs to fiscal impacts. These are important and much easier to estimate than wider 
social benefits and costs, but the narrowness of this approach is a potentially serious limitation (Chapple, 
2013). 
There are four important questions to consider. 
 Is FWL a good proxy for what society really cares about? 
 Is FWL a better proxy than what it replaces? 
 Is FWL better than feasible, alternative proxies? 
 Can FWL be usefully refined and improved? 
Is future welfare liability a good proxy for what society really cares about? 
There are good reasons for believing that FWL is strongly correlated with what society does care about, at 
least for the social services to which it is currently applied – primarily employment services. The service is 
aimed at getting people into work, and people who get and stay in work will likely have lower future welfare 
costs.  
Further, being employed is strongly correlated with better social outcomes (Chapter 15). The Welfare 
Working Group (WWG) called for recognition of the value and importance of paid work to social and 
economic wellbeing: 
Enabling people to move into paid work reduces the risk of poverty, improves outcomes for children 
and supports social and economic well-being. (WWG, 2011, p. 1) 
The information requirements for optimum targeting are significant. The relevant information needs to 
be underpinned by high-quality research and evaluation. Well-designed and targeted programmes 
can offer large returns to government: 
… funding for specialist social services for [children and young people with serious conduct 
problems] is most effectively utilised when an investment approach is taken, concentrating funds 
in evidence-based programmes which are carefully integrated into the New Zealand cultural 
context. There is good evidence from the Washington State Institute of Public Policy that 
investment in early interventions which research has demonstrated lead to improved outcomes, 
leads in turn to reduced costs to the state over time and safer communities. For example, for 
every dollar spent on Functional Family Therapy for young offenders, there is an estimated net 
benefit to the Washington State of US$8.88. (Youth Horizons, sub. 67, p. 1) 
Better information on the likely success of services is also a good thing for clients and their families. 
Presumably few clients would want to miss out on a service with a high chance of success, or receive a 
service that had a low chance of success. 
Efficient allocation of resources 
ROI also provides a basis for the allocation of funds across social services agencies. A risk of inflexible 
agency budgets is that a low-ROI programme in one agency might be funded at the same time as a 
high-ROI opportunity in a different agency is missed. An efficient allocation would favour high-ROI 
programmes over low-ROI ones, regardless of which budget funded those programmes.  
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Liability calculated at the level of an individual can be interpreted as a budget. That is, how much would it 
be worth spending to reduce this person’s liability to zero? This “budget” may be hundreds of thousands of 
dollars for many clients.60 This will likely be significantly larger than the amount that government has been 
willing to spend on such clients in the past.  
The approach may therefore justify higher overall levels of welfare spending. Whether it does or not 
depends on the availability of services that can cost effectively reduce FWL. 
Reduced FWL frees resources for other social services, both now and in the future. In addition, explicit 
recognition of future liabilities provides a basis for understanding inter-generational fiscal transfers that, if 
too imbalanced, undermine inter-generational equity (Evans & Quigley, 2013). This is not an unimportant 
issue – the Government’s FWL was recently estimated at $69 billion (Taylor Fry, 2015).61 
Is future welfare liability a better proxy than what it replaces? 
We can only speak for home support (DHB, ACC and disability). An investment approach would be an 
improvement on what currently exists. (Home and Community Health Association, sub. 114, p. 20) 
Simplistic measures, such as how many people have moved off benefit, do not tell the whole story. Has 
the move off benefit meant an improvement in the person’s social and economic well-being? Is it 
sustainable? (Inclusive NZ, sub. 32, p. 5) 
The Investment Approach is driving strongly-directed ROI-based targeting within MSD. Results to date 
suggest that improved targeting has been very successful in reducing FWL. MSD implemented policy and 
operational changes during 2013/2014 that were responsible for a $2.2 billion of a total $7.5 billion 
reduction in the FWL (Taylor Fry, 2015). In the previous system, according to the WWG, “the annual 
appropriations process encourage[d] a focus on those easiest to move off benefit, and away from those with 
greatest disadvantage, where investment based on managing a long-term cost would make the greatest 
difference” (WWG, 2011, pp. 130–131).  
It would appear that the Investment Approach is likely to be strongly correlated with what society does care 
about, and its wider adoption would lead to substantial improvements in targeting (relative to the status 
quo). 
The large scope for getting better outcomes by applying an investment approach more consistently across 
the social services is evident. Chapter 2 documents how opportunities for early intervention are being 
missed. At the same time, there is a focus on introducing new programmes rather than continually testing 
the value of the large stock of existing programmes. The Better Public Service (BPS) targets attempt to 
direct effort towards the most important result areas. Yet decisions on resource allocation are only loosely 
related to the targets. 
Mansell (2015) argued, moreover, that the use of targets can have perverse effects. For instance, the BPS 
target “of getting 85% of 18 year olds achieving NCEA [National Certificate of Educational Achievement] 
level 2 … encourages schools to focus on those students who are already close to achieving NCEA level 2 
and assist them to achieve it” (p. 48). Mansell pointed out that this gives schools little incentive to raise the 
achievement of the better students who will easily achieve NCEA level 2, or very weak students who have 
little chance of doing so. Over the years of schooling, weak students fall progressively behind, making 
success ever more distant, and increasing the risk of other poor outcomes. Moving to an investment 
approach would improve schools’ incentives to raise the achievement of the full spectrum of students.  
 
 
 F9.1  Decisions made using the Investment Approach are likely to be significantly correlated 
with what citizens care about, for those services and clients where the approach is 
applicable. Its wider adoption would likely lead to substantial improvements in the 
targeting of social services. 
 
60 The average lifetime cost of current income support clients was $107 000 as at 30 June 2014 (Taylor Fry, 2015). 
61 $69 billion was the predicted future cost of income support and associated administrative costs for clients who received income support in 2013/2014. 
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Is future welfare liability better than feasible, alternative proxies? 
Chapple (2013) suggests that a cost–benefit analysis (CBA) is a more appropriate tool to prioritise 
interventions, as it explicitly incorporates the costs and benefits incurred by wider society. 
Social Service Providers Aotearoa argued for an investment approach to be supplemented by a CBA: 
We acknowledge the need for an investment approach to social services but submit that the forward 
liability model that emerged from the Welfare Working Group’s benefit review and reforms is flawed in 
that it assumes that a reduction in fiscal costs of welfare will maximise employment and social 
outcomes. … We submit that this approach emphasises risk rather than benefit … it needs to be 
balanced by a cost-benefit analysis. In the context of social services, the agencies concerned must be 
tasked to improve social outcomes, not merely reduce the forward liability. This will look more 
positively at “risk” as an area for management but is also essential to innovation. (Social Service 
Providers Aotearoa, sub. 129, p. 6) 
CBA has many uses, and can be considered the “gold standard” aid for guiding government decision 
making: 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is a technique for evaluating collective decisions that hinges on the 
comparisons of the costs of a proposal to its benefits, where costs and benefits are valued in monetary 
terms. In essence (and abstracting from the relevant technicalities), cost-benefit analysis asks whether 
the sum of the amounts the individuals who comprise the community at issue would be willing to pay 
for the project to proceed exceeds the costs of that project. (Ergas, 2009, p. 1) 
However, CBAs are expensive and typically conducted on a one-off basis by skilled staff: 
CBAs often require a good knowledge of economics, consideration of the issues from first principles, 
experience with other CBAs and practical knowledge of how to apply the various techniques discussed 
in this guide. Most government agencies will not have a sufficient flow of CBAs to justify the 
maintenance of sufficient in-house expertise to carry out a good quality CBA, and should therefore 
consider the engagement of outside consultants. (New Zealand Treasury, 2015, p. 13) 
CBAs are typically applied at the programme level rather than at the individual client level. The Treasury’s 
Guide to Social Cost Benefit Analysis pointed out that partial CBA techniques may be appropriate to rank 
projects within a fixed budget: 
‘Cost utility analysis’ and ‘cost effectiveness analysis’ are kinds of partial CBA that may be appropriate 
in situations where projects have to be ranked within a fixed budget and benefits can be quantified but 
not expressed in dollars (monetised). An example is the practice of Pharmac, which estimates the 
benefits of pharmaceutical drugs in ‘qalys’. A qaly equals (change in health-related quality of life) times 
(change in quantity of life). Because of the fixed budget, it is sufficient for projects to be able to be 
ranked, and funded up to the point where the budget runs out… More generally, cost effectiveness 
analysis can refer to analyses where cost data is expressed as a ratio of some kind of effectiveness data. 
(New Zealand Treasury, 2015, p. 12) 
The Investment Approach is a form of “cost effectiveness analysis” as described by the Treasury. MSD is 
using it to determine which projects to fund, based on a quantified benefit. Projects are ranked by ROI, and 
then funded within an overall budget constraint.62 
The Investment Approach is a partial CBA technique that is being applied appropriately. A full CBA 
approach would be unnecessarily costly for this purpose. 
Can future welfare liability be usefully refined and improved? 
Slavish application of an investment approach might lead to perverse outcomes. For example, some studies 
suggest that obesity might reduce future health costs as obese people die more quickly (van Baal et al., 
2008). A health system that sought only a reduction in future health costs might therefore do little, if 
anything, to discourage obesity. 
62 In this comparison, a “project” is the combination of a client and an intervention. The “cost data” is the expected ROI (the expected reduction in FWL 
divided by the cost of the intervention). 
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Such examples miss the point that the purpose of an investment approach is improving overall social 
outcomes. Should a particular choice of proxy promote perverse outcomes, then that is an argument for 
refining the proxy rather than abandoning the approach. 
Targeting purely on ROI to government does not generalise well to all social services. Extending the 
investment approach to aged care, for example, would require a different measure of return. Such a 
measure might, for example, reflect improvements in quality of life. 
The New Zealand Council of Trade Unions pointed out that the sustainability and quality of employment, 
from the client’s perspective, was ignored by the investment approach: 
The initial findings from the investment approach shows that there has been a decrease in the number 
of beneficiaries and the Government has welcomed this as this is one of the Better Public Service 
targets. But the glaring omission from the initial evaluation is an evaluation of outcomes (such as decent 
jobs) for the beneficiaries themselves. The evaluation found a significant churn between employment 
and people going onto other benefits rather than off benefits. Missing from evaluation was any focus 
on the type and quality of employment that people are going into and how sustainable it is and the 
impacts from the beneficiaries ‘point of view – in the end, the crucial point. (sub. 103, p. 18) 
While an estimate of FWL on an individual basis should be sensitive to the sustainability of employment, it 
does not explicitly incorporate the client’s perspective of employment quality. In theory that could be done 
by extending the model to incorporate private costs and benefits to the client. A simple, but perhaps 
worthwhile, response would be to add the expected value of future income tax receipts to the reduction in 
FWL.63 This would tilt the system towards finding better paid jobs, all else equal. Alternatively, employment 
quality issues might be better dealt with via other policy mechanisms.  
Including future tax receipts in the measure of return has benefits beyond being a proxy for employment 
quality. It would move FWL closer to being a government-wide future liability measure, supporting better 
cross-government resource allocation. A similar case could be made for adding education and health costs 
into the measure. 
There is much potential for improvement in the proxy measure of social return, as noted by the Wise Group: 
Gaps currently exist in both the definition and capture of data to support the measurement of social 
returns on investment. Outcomes are often inherently difficult to define. However an investment 
approach would focus the need to address these definitions and stimulate innovative techniques for 
measurement. Often surrogate and associative measures can provide a pragmatic avenue for assessing 
the effective delivery of outcomes. (sub. 41, p. 32) 
The potential for improvement of the FWL measure is a positive feature of the Investment Approach, and 
such improvements should be pursued. 
 
 
 R9.1  The Investment Approach could usefully be applied more widely. Future welfare liability 
– its underlying proxy for social return – should be further refined to better reflect the 
wider costs and benefits of interventions. 
 
 
Extending the investment approach to improve allocation decisions 
The Investment Approach as currently implemented applies within a single programme area (Work and 
Income within MSD). It is logically one of a larger group of “investment approaches” (Table 9.1). 
 
63 Assuming that tax receipts are a reasonable proxy for income, and that income is a reasonable proxy for employment quality. 
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Table 9.1 A family of investment approaches  
Level Applies Effects 
Current Investment Approach – 
within programme 
Across clients Improved client targeting within programmes; improved 
programme key performance indicators  
Investment approach – 
whole of agency 
Across programmes Plus improved resource allocation within agencies 
Investment approach – 
whole of government 
Across agencies Plus improved fiscal allocation across agencies; could 
add in future tax revenue 
Investment approach – 
full inter-temporal version 
Across time Plus improved fiscal allocation across time 
Insurance approach – Allocates financial risk to improve incentive alignment 
 
There is significant scope to extend the Investment Approach towards the more expansive approaches 
further down Table 9.1. 
Investment approach – whole of agency 
Expanding the Investment Approach to include a wider range of programmes within MSD could improve 
that agency’s resource allocation across those programmes. MSD is currently investigating the feasibility of 
applying the Investment Approach to the social housing system (Edwards & Judd, 2014). The Government 
has asked the recently appointed Modernising Child, Youth and Family Expert Panel to consider the 
development of an investment approach for Child, Youth and Family (MSD, 2015c). Expanding the 
Investment Approach within an agency could involve using a common outcome metric across programmes 
and making allocation decisions across programmes, or it could involve treating different programmes 
separately. Using a common outcome metric and making decisions across programmes will lead to a 
greater improvement in the allocation of resources than treating different programmes separately. 
Providers are a necessary part of the relevant data collection, which will involve some additional costs: 
To utilise an investment approach would require significant resource to be put into the gathering of 
evidence and research into the outcomes and impacts of different services. (Social Sector Trials, 
sub. 126, p. 25) 
An investment approach to social services spending has the potential to lead to better allocation of 
resources and social outcomes. But it will require robust data collection and analysis. (Supporting 
Families in Mental Illness NZ, sub. 49, p. 13) 
For ROI-based allocation to work across programmes, providers will also need access to the relevant client 
information and ROI information. Data collection and sharing issues are further discussed in Chapter 8. 
It is important that this approach is applied to the stock of existing programmes as well as to new initiatives. 
Existing programmes represent a large proportion of expenditure, and therefore are likely to be a larger 
source of gains from improved resource allocation. 
Investment approach – whole of government 
An investment approach should lead to better long-term outcomes and efficiencies across the system 
in the longer-term. (National Services Purchasing, sub. 111, p. 13) 
[Gaps in the investment approach might be improved by factoring] in the full/hidden lifetime costs – 
e.g. Family Violence/Children in poverty/not succeeding in school/health/justice/welfare/personal and 
system costs. (Presbyterian Support New Zealand, sub. 76, p. 21) 
A risk of the current Investment Approach (and indeed of the wider social services system) is that it is largely 
blind to the most cost effective intervention where that intervention sits in another administrative silo. For 
example, health, education and other problems often co-exist with employment problems. Applying an 
investment approach within an employment context might overlook the savings to the health and education 
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parts of the system and vice versa. Not recognising these savings, the individual parts of the system might 
under-invest. 
A first step towards better allocation decisions would be to calculate the future liability of individuals (or 
families as appropriate) at an agency level. The second step would be to share that information across 
agencies. The final step would be to combine this with cross-agency ROI information on suitable 
programmes, enabling better cross-agency prioritisation of programmes.  
Developing common outcome measures across agencies and programmes, and considering investment 
decisions in a common framework would support the greatest improvement in the use of resources. A 
comprehensive, client-centred data infrastructure that spans social services provision would help predict 
outcomes for different types of clients (Chapter 8). The greater the time span of data available the more 
accurate the predictions would be. Measures of actual outcomes compared to predictions would help 
identify the effectiveness of interventions and guide resourcing decisions. 
Decisions on allocating resources will need to fit within the government’s preferred commissioning 
arrangements (Chapters 5 and 6). Finer-grained decisions could be devolved to improve responsiveness 
and flexibility. Even so, it would be desirable to maintain a broad decision-making framework across the 
social services. A broad framework is needed to guide resources to types of service and types of clients 
where, looking across the social services, the ROI is highest. 
 
 
 R9.2  The Investment Approach should be extended to operate at a cross-programme, cross-
agency level.  
 
Investment approach – full inter-temporal version 
An investment approach naturally brings in a time dimension, as future costs are used to prioritise spending 
decisions made in the present. 
An investment approach should also generate the information necessary to justify the optimal transfer of 
funds across time (ie, inter-temporal transfers). The information generated by the Investment Approach in its 
present form might, for example, identify some interventions that offered a significant ROI but could not be 
made within current budget limits. Such information might be used to support an ad hoc budget bid to 
fund those interventions. 
More generally, an investment approach could be extended to operate across multiple budget periods. 
An investment approach that takes a broad-based, long-term view of government spending and its 
resulting benefits, rather than an approach which relies on short-term savings and short-term outcomes, 
would be welcomed. The difficulties that relate to a long-term approach, within a short-term political 
cycle, are however acknowledged. (New Zealand Educational Institute Te Riu Roa, sub. 40, p. 39) 
New investment which generates positive social returns may well be funded through reduced levels of 
social support funding in the longer term. This is likely to be easier to achieve than attempts to redirect 
existing social support funding in the short term. (Wise Group, sub. 41, p. 32) 
In principle, transfers might be required in either direction. Concern about transferring the liability for 
current citizens to the future might justify borrowing (fiscally) from the future to reduce the (human) cost in 
future. But incurring too much public debt could hamper the ability of future generations to fund their own 
social services. The expected costs of demographic change (Chapter 2) might justify the opposite – public 
saving now to fund future expected costs.64 
Borrowing now to fund investments that will reduce welfare liability is correct in principle. But it does run 
the risk of burdening future generations with debt, leaving them less able to meet the costs of their own 
64 Whether or not a government actually borrows to fund a particular activity depends on its net cashflow for the year in question, which in turn reflects its 
wider revenue and spending decisions. For simplicity, this section ignores this when referring to “borrowing” and “saving”. 
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social services. A higher burden of proof should apply to the current generation to justify such inter-
generational transfers, relative to spending funded from current income.  
 
 
 F9.2  Borrowing now to fund investments that will reduce future social welfare liability is 
good in principle, but has risks in practice. A higher burden of proof is required to 
justify such borrowing, relative to spending funded from current income. 
 
 
An “insurance approach” 
The effectiveness of the investment approach is crucially dependent on organisations using reductions in 
FWL (or an improved proxy) as a performance measure that strongly influences behaviour and allocation 
decisions. That is, the organisation and those in it need to face strong incentives to maximise that 
performance measure. The benefits of an investment approach will not be realised if these incentives are 
weak. 
Institutional architectures affect the form and strength of incentives. While the investment approach was 
developed in the context of top-down control, it could also be applied in decentralised architectures 
(Chapter 5). 
Under top-down control, the Government carries the financial risks of FWL. Assigning some or all of that risk 
to organisations would create strong incentives for those organisations to take actions that reduced that 
liability. Should those parties be more responsive to those incentives than would government, they may be 
a better holder of that risk. 
Further, some organisations may be better placed than government agencies to manage such risks. This 
could be because they have close social connections with clients or are better placed to influence client 
behaviour. 
An “insurance approach” is one that assigns part of all of the financial risk of poor outcomes for specific 
clients to other organisations. Section 9.2 discusses the links between insurance and social welfare. Section 
9.3 explores insurance approaches. 
Contracting for outcomes and social bonds 
Contracting for outcomes (Chapter 12) and social bonds (Chapters 3 and 6) can be seen as short-term and 
medium-term versions of an insurance approach respectively, where the outcome measure is chosen to 
proxy the change achieved in long-term liability. In each case, the contracted party carries financial risks that 
the specified change in the outcome measure will not be achieved. 
If well designed, payment terms should reflect the change in future liabilities achieved by the contractor 
through well-chosen investment during the contracted period. But measurement difficulties and financial 
risk combine to make such contracts costly to negotiate, limiting the application of these approaches. An 
insurer carrying the long-term risks does not face these pre-contract negotiation costs. 
9.2 Insurance and social welfare 
Individual choices – including the use of private financial and insurance markets – can assist people to 
improve their social welfare. But there are many reasons why people fail to make good choices or do not 
take advantage of private markets. Similarly, there are reasons why private financial and insurance markets 
do not exist for particular purposes, even in the presence of private demand for such services. 
An understanding of these reasons is important background for understanding government involvement in 
“social” insurance. 
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People may not make optimum investments in themselves 
Many individuals invest in themselves, with or without the support of their families.65 But, there are many 
reasons why people may not make optimum investments in themselves. 
One reason is that a lack of information or inadequate access to finance can lead to private under-
investment.  
A further reason is that individuals may underweight the costs of present actions to their future selves. For 
example, they may prefer to consume more today and defer saving for retirement until tomorrow. Yet 
tomorrow, the same logic applies. The consequence of such thinking is lower-than-ideal savings. 
The presence of free or subsidised social services reduces the incentives for self-investment and self-
insurance. 
Financial markets have limitations 
People might want to invest in themselves, but lack the money to do so. This problem might be alleviated if 
they could borrow – however those in most need may have little ability to borrow from private lenders. 
Government-backed loan schemes can alleviate this problem in some cases (eg, Box 9.3). 
 
Private insurance markets have limitations 
Individuals and their families are too small to pool the risks of random, infrequent events:66 
…disability itself is largely a random event, unable to be planned for in advance through 
saving/budgeting and life adaptation. This applies to congenital disabilities as well as those caused 
through injury/accident. The consequences of such events can be life-changing for individuals and 
families. Insurance before the event is often not an option. Even when there may exist private insurance 
mechanisms, the longer term repercussions of a disability are not always adequately covered. Moral 
hazard and adverse selection add to the inefficiencies of relying upon private insurance for funding. 67 
Ultimately and understandably, for many of the more serious disabilities, New Zealand’s choice has 
been social insurance funded from general taxation or a special levy – as in the case of ACC. 
(New Zealand Disability Support Network, sub. 47, p. 4) 
65 Invest, in this context, means incurring a cost now with an expectation of a return over the longer term. An example is staying a year longer at school 
(and therefore forgoing some income) with the expectation of a higher income overall over one’s working life. 
66 Insurance schemes are built on the principle that outcomes for a large sample of policyholders are predictable whereas for the individual they are not. 
Individual policyholders benefit by pooling their risk, and so insuring them against the occurrence of some contingency with high or catastrophic financial 
costs. 
67 Moral hazard is the tendency of people with insurance to reduce the care they take to avoid or reduce insured loses. Moral hazard is one of the design 
issues that need to be taken into account in the design of social services more generally. Co-payments and deductibles are traditional approaches to 
reducing moral hazard (see Appendix F). 
Box 9.3 Borrowing to fund tertiary education 
A teenager may be confident that their future earnings will receive a substantial boost from tertiary 
education. From their perspective, it would make sense to borrow money now and repay it from future 
(increased) earnings. 
However, private financial organisations such as banks may be reluctant to lend. The teenager typically 
has no assets to borrow against, nor do they have a credit record. Their success at university and 
subsequently attracting a higher-paying job is uncertain. And a bank might fear adverse selection (ie, 
the less-talented or motivated students take out more or larger loans) or moral hazard (ie, having got 
the loan, the student puts in less effort to their studies). 
These risks to lenders make the private supply of student loans expensive. Recognising these 
problems, governments in New Zealand, Australia and other countries have created public student 
loan schemes.  
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Private insurance markets are effective at pooling risk, but they have their limitations.  
 Those most affected may not get the chance to participate (eg, an individual does not get the option of 
purchasing disability insurance before their birth).68 
 The government in many cases covers the residual risk; that is, it covers the costs of claims from the 
uninsured. Knowing this, many will choose not to take out private insurance. Insurers face an adverse 
selection problem – insurance is most attractive to those with higher risks.69 This pushes premiums 
higher, making the insurance even less attractive to the wider population. 
 Problems of moral hazard and adverse selection make it uneconomic for insurers to offer all desirable 
insurance products. 
Individual choices may not result in the best social outcomes 
Private choices as to the optimum level of self-investment also differ from socially optimum choices where 
there are significant spill-over effects. For example, while an individual benefits directly from vaccination, 
the unvaccinated in their community also benefit indirectly due to them having a reduced chance of coming 
into contact with an infectious individual (Fine, Eames & Heymann, 2011). If only private benefits are taken 
into account, then too few people may choose to be immunised relative to the social optimum. 
9.3 An insurance approach 
Early intervention can prevent future costs. If those costs (suitably discounted) exceed the cost of 
intervention now, then it is socially optimal to make that intervention. But there are reasons why a less-than-
optimal amount of early intervention might occur if the costs and benefits of intervention accrue to different 
parties. 
Similar considerations apply to service quality. Fee-for-service arrangements might tempt providers to 
skimp on quality. Conversely, cost-plus arrangements might encourage overly high-quality services. An 
insurer has the incentives to choose a level of quality that minimises their long-term cost. 
The government can transfer risk, but carries residual liability 
Reflecting citizen expectations, the Government has accepted responsibility for a significant number of the 
personal risks faced by its citizens. These include accidents, disability, hospital care and old age. 
In this sense, the New Zealand Government is a big insurance company, and all citizens are “members” of 
an insurance scheme. Citizens pay their premiums through the tax system. 
The Government faces the question of whether it is better to carry risk itself or transfer it to other 
organisations. Transfer only makes sense if another organisations can better manage those risks. Better 
management might arise for many reasons, including that the organisation: 
 has close connections to, and better information about, a defined population; 
 is better able to positively influence the behaviour of a defined population; or 
 faces stronger incentives to manage those risks. 
If better risk management by other organisations can reduce the total liability, and that reduction exceeds 
the transaction costs involved in the risk transfer, then there is an economic case for the Government to pay 
premiums to such organisations for them to assume and manage the Government’s risk. 
68 Their parents could purchase such insurance, but this is outside the control of the individual in question. 
69 Adverse selection is the tendency of people who seek to buy insurance to have higher than average expected claims for their risk class because of risk 
factors known to them but unknown to the insurer (see Appendix F). Adverse selection undermines risk pooling, and can make private insurance 
infeasible. In such cases, compulsory insurance is an option. 
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Government cannot transfer its liability completely. Should, for example, an insurer fail, the Government 
may be left with discharging the insurer’s responsibilities to its members. The costs of carrying residual 
liability should be factored into the economic case. 
Social insurers 
Social insurance is an insurance scheme organised by the state with compulsory membership, and in which 
premiums are related to the ability to pay.70 
This definition distinguishes social insurance from private insurance, where membership is voluntary and 
premiums are set without reference to a member’s ability to pay. 
The social insurance models discussed in this section generally involve the Government paying premiums 
on behalf of those insured.71  
Reasons for compulsory social insurance 
Private insurers might find certain classes of consumer to be unprofitable to insure, and therefore not serve 
that market. Alternatively, they might only serve those consumers at such a high price as to exclude those 
lacking the necessary financial resources. Alternatively, some consumers might opt not to take out insurance 
even when they can afford to. In such circumstances compulsory insurance, with some or all public funding 
or provision, can be important for ensuring equity of access, and reducing any undesirable social costs from 
consumers having inadequate insurance (Barr, 2012). 
These problems might be addressed by a social insurance model. In such a model, all citizens are enrolled 
with an insurer. Based on the member’s risk profile, the insurer receives a premium from the Government 
each year, and social services costs (“claims”) are paid directly by the insurer. The insurer can calculate an 
expected future claim cost for every member, and is incentivised to make any and every early intervention 
that will reduce the expected future claim cost by more than the cost of the intervention. Similarly, the 
insurer is incentivised to make good decisions about service delivery as they bear both the current costs of 
excess quality and the future costs of poor quality. 
A potentially difficult issue for social insurance is establishing the state-funded entitlement for each 
individual. For instance, in the Netherlands compulsory health insurance model, the Health Insurance Act 
sets out broad entitlements and insurance contracts specify precise entitlements (van de Ven & Schut, 
2008).  
 
 
 F9.3  A social insurance model aligns the long-term incentives of insurers and their members. 
Because social insurers face the long-term costs of service decisions, they have the 
incentives to make sound decisions about early intervention and service quality. 
 
 
To work properly, social insurance models require that: 
 the insurer faces all relevant claim costs; 
 the insurer is able to borrow against future cost savings; 
 all citizens are members72; and 
 the insurer has the financial resources to underwrite the risk of claims exceeding premiums over time. 
The Government cannot contract away the residual risk of poor outcomes for its citizens, and therefore 
faces the possibility of having to bail out a failed insurer or otherwise support its members. This limits the 
premiums that the Government is willing to pay to non-government insurers to a level lower than the 
70 This definition is based on that in Connolly and Munro (1999), with the additional requirement of compulsory membership. 
71 The Netherlands compulsory health insurance scheme is a partial exception (Box 9.7). 
72 This would clearly need a set of supporting rules. For example, babies might be enrolled at birth with their mother’s insurer. Similarly, there might be a 
default insurer for immigrants, or a mechanism to allocate them among existing insurers. 
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Government’s expected future cost. A social insurance system with non-government providers would need 
to generate sufficient benefits above and beyond direct government coverage to meet this difference. 
National insurers 
In theory, government could create a single insurance agency with responsibility for social insurance for a 
wide range of social services. In practice, however, such an organisation could be bureaucratically unwieldy. 
More practical arrangements involve national insurers, each with national responsibility for a relatively 
narrow service area (or condition type). Yet such a system can limit the potential for improved service 
integration and resource allocation across service areas. 
The Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC), for example, operates on this basis (Box 9.4). 
ACC is investing in early intervention programmes (Box 9.5). 
 
 
 
 
Box 9.4 The Accident Compensation Corporation 
ACC is the Crown entity that manages and delivers the Accident Compensation Scheme. The Scheme 
delivers injury prevention initiatives and no-fault personal injury cover for everyone in New Zealand. 
ACC collects revenue to pay for its services, through levies paid by employers, employees, and motor 
vehicle owners and drivers, and also receives government funding (sub. 30).  
ACC is effectively contracted to mitigate the effects of injuries and they therefore have an incentive to 
mitigate efficiently, including by investing now to reduce costs down the track. 
The Accident Insurance Act 1998 also returned all accounts under the scheme to a fully-funded 
rather than a pay-as-you-go system. (ACC, 2014a). 
Box 9.5 ACC early intervention programmes 
ACC spent $34 million on injury prevention in 2013/14 (sub. 30, Appendix One). Over recent years it 
has conducted education, information, research and training programmes on injury prevention – 
covering sports, workplaces, farms, and on the road and at home. 
ACC adopted a new approach in 2014, covering six areas: falls, work, road, treatment injury, sport, 
and sexual and family violence. Together these areas represent 85% of new costs to the ACC Scheme. 
They also have wider social and economic costs. For example, the Treasury estimates the cost of 
sexual violence to the economy is $1.2 billion each year.  
Other specific prevention programmes include the Ride Forever training programme for motorcyclists, 
which offers learner, returning and experienced rider training. ACC piloted a “Mates and Dates” 
awareness programme in eight secondary schools in 2014. 
ACC provides levy discounts for employers to join workplace health safety and injury management 
programmes. 
Source: ACC, 2014b; pers. comm. 17 April 2015. 
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ACC takes actions to reduce the future costs of accident claims (Box 9.6). 
Box 9.6 ACC actions to reduce future costs 
The Commission heard two examples of how ACC reduces the future costs of accident claims through 
the ways it chooses to interact with the health system. 
 Where a health condition is preventing an ACC claimant from getting back to work, but treatment 
in the public health system is likely to be delayed, ACC may pay for the claimant to receive 
treatment from private health providers. 
 ACC pays for accident victims with suspected spinal injuries to be helicoptered directly to one of 
two specialist spinal injury treatment units in the country, as early expert treatment can lead to 
substantially better medical outcomes. 
The first example was contrasted with the situation for those clients of employment services who have 
health problems that prevent them from working. The social services system lacks the incentives and 
mechanisms for coordination between MSD and MoH to resolve this problem. 
The second example was contrasted with the previous arrangements, where such patients might have 
spent a week or two at a non-specialist hospital before being transferred to a specialist unit. 
ACC is an example of a successful social insurer with relatively narrow responsibilities.73 New Zealanders 
generally regard this to be a superior way of organising accident compensation.74  
National insurers in other countries 
National Insurance in the United Kingdom dates back to 1911. It has many of the features of social 
insurance. Workers and employers make contributions towards the costs of specific state benefits. The 
scheme is tightly integrated with the national tax and welfare systems. 
Australian National Disability Insurance Scheme 
Australia’s National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) is another example of a national insurer covering a 
particular client group (Chapter 3). The Scheme takes an actuarial approach to make the best use of 
resources to support people with disabilities over their lifetime: 
The NDIS is insurance not welfare. 
The importance of the insurance model to the NDIS is crucial to understand. 
Any one of us, rich or poor, can have our life turned upside down by a severe and permanent disability. 
Individually, the risk of being severely or profoundly disabled before the age of 65 is low, but the 
consequences for those unfortunate enough to be so can be catastrophic. 
But by paying premiums to the NDIS through the Medicare Levy and general taxes, Australians are now 
sharing the risk and helping each other. Pooling the risks make them affordable for all. 
And by operating like an insurance scheme, using rich data to make continual actuarial assessments of 
costs and effectiveness, the NDIS is able to continually improve… 
Because it calculates and seeks to minimise the cost of supporting participants over their lifetimes 
rather than just twelve months, as part of annual budget cycles, the NDIS is able to invest in people 
with disability, as well as support them… 
Examples to date include a … young man with a spinal cord injury needed the support of two carers 
per day to assist him in and out of bed and to help with daily activities. Under the NDIS a ceiling track 
hoist was installed in his home which immediately reduced his dependence, while also reducing the 
costs of supporting him by more than $1 million over his lifetime. (Bonyhady, 2014b, pp. 9–10) 
73 The Earthquake Commission (EQC) is another example of a state insurer, funded from levies on private insurance contracts. 
74 This is not to say that all New Zealanders are satisfied with the way that ACC has dealt with their claims.  
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Multiple social insurers 
A single insurer with compulsory membership may face the right incentives. Some further requirements 
apply if there is more than one insurer. An enrolment mechanism is needed to allocate citizens to insurers. 
Citizen choice – based on the specialisations and reputation of insurers – is preferable to administrative 
allocation (Chapter 11). A default allocation mechanism may be required for anyone failing to make a 
positive choice. 
In theory, citizens could make a one-time election of their insurer. This would, however, erode the 
incentives of insurers to take good care of their existing members. It would also be unreasonably restrictive 
on members whose circumstances change. For example, members form and exit relationships with those 
who might belong to other insurers, and might reasonably want their whole family to share a common 
insurer. People also change personal affiliations over time and move within the country, and may wish to 
choose another insurer that better matches their updated affiliations and location. 
Incentives for insurers 
Allowing members to change insurers has a potentially negative effect on insurers’ incentives. The insurance 
approach works by providing incentives for insurers to make investments that minimise the long-term costs 
of providing services for members. These incentives are muted in many private insurance markets. For 
example, private health insurers lose the benefits of early investments should members choose not to renew 
their policy. Insurers under-invest, anticipating such non-renewals. 
For insurers to face the correct incentives in a multiple insurance models, it is necessary that members: 
 can only claim from one insurer; and 
 cannot swap insurers, without a system of cross-payments reflecting earlier interventions. 
Such an arrangement is a feature of compulsory health insurance in the Netherlands (Box 9.7). 
Cream skimming and parking 
Cream skimming or cherry picking refers to the behaviour of insurers that actively recruit the clients on 
whom they can make a profit, or avoid those on whom they expect a loss (see Chapter 6). 
Parking refers to the behaviour of insurers who leave difficult clients “on their books”, doing the minimum 
to continue receiving a premium yet not enough to achieve a desirable outcome for those clients (see 
Chapter 6). 
Social insurance schemes require careful design to reduce the incentives for these behaviours. 
Multiple social insurers in other countries 
There are many social insurance schemes in European countries involving multiple insurers. Germany, for 
instance, has a long tradition of not-for-profit (NFP) sickness funds, often based on professions or on 
regions. The Netherlands provides a particularly interesting example (Box 9.7).  
Box 9.7 Compulsory health insurance in the Netherlands 
The Netherlands moved to a new system of universal compulsory insurance in 2006, with consumers 
having a choice of non-government insurers. Insurers compete to provide a legally prescribed benefit 
package. 
The Netherlands previously had a social insurance system with regionally based NFP sickness funds for 
those on low and middle incomes covering almost 70% of the population. It was funded from a mix of 
compulsory payroll contributions and general taxation. The rest of the population was free to make 
their own arrangements with private insurers or by simply paying health expenses out of pocket.  
Under the new system, consumers can change their insurer each year. About 4% of consumers do so. 
Insurers must accept each applicant at a community-rated premium and without excluding coverage of 
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Social insurance proposals in New Zealand 
In the mid-1980s the Government commissioned a health benefits review. Among the options canvassed by 
the review was “a regulated, competitive system of health maintenance organisations” offering health 
insurance (Health Benefits Review, 2006, p. 104). One potential problem identified by the review was that 
the New Zealand population might support only a limited number of insurance firms. Another was that a 
move to an insurance model for health services would be a major change, with potential difficulties making 
the change. 
The Government of the early 1990s contemplated health consumers being able to choose “health care 
plans” from non-government insurers, as an alternative to government-provided services (Box 9.8). This 
aspect of the 1990s health reform proposals was not implemented. Amongst other problems, the 
government found it difficult to specify the core entitlements that were needed to underpin the insurance 
approach. Moving from a system that rationed health services to one that offered entitlements would have 
made it more difficult to contain costs.  
Barrett (1997) reported strong Mäori interest in the 1991 proposal for healthcare plans:  
Mäori were quick to recognise the opportunity inherent in healthcare plans. A hui held at Takapuwahia, 
near Wellington, in 1992, established Te Waka Hauora to initiate a Mäori healthcare plan. The directors 
were Mason Durie, Areta Köpu, and Mänu Paul. There were difficulties with the concept of health care 
plans, however, and Government abandoned them soon after the health reforms were instigated. 
Interest in a Mäori healthcare plan waned. (p. 3) 
 
75 An insurer must offer the same premium to each customer for the same type of insurance contract. The premium may vary by the province in which the 
customer lives (van de Ven & Schut, 2008). 
pre-existing conditions.75 Consumers also pay income-related contributions into a government-held 
fund. Regulation includes a sophisticated system of inter-insurer transfers and government subsidies 
funded by the income-related contributions. Transfers and subsidies match the patient risk pool of 
each insurer to the funds derived from premiums. Private providers deliver health care (van de Ven & 
Schut, 2008).  
Competition for market share triggered a rapid consolidation of the health insurance market. By 2011, 
the four largest insurers had a joint market share exceeding 90% (Schut, Sorbe & Høj, 2013). As a 
result, regulators have concerns about the level of competition. Insurers have so far had little visible 
impact on raising quality, partly because it has taken time to develop indicators of quality. Insurers 
have focused more on competing on price to attract clients (Schut, 2010). Waiting times, already low, 
have been further reduced since 2006 (Schut, Sorbe & Høj, 2013). All health insurers are NFPs. 
90% of consumers purchase supplementary health insurance for benefits that are not included in the 
mandatory basic insurance (van de Ven & Schut, 2008).  
Box 9.8 The 1991 proposal for healthcare plans 
Your health & the public health, a 1991 statement of government health policy, set out a proposal for 
health care plans that health consumers could choose as an alternative to government health services: 
Once Regional Health Authorities (RHAs), Crown Health Enterprises (CHEs) and community trusts 
are fully established, people who would prefer a different approach to health care delivery from 
that offered by their RHA will be allowed to leave it and obtain all their health services through 
another health care plan of their choice. 
 People will be able to take their entitlement to Government funding for health care with 
them from the RHA to pay the annual fee of their healthcare plan. 
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The Ministry of Health has since looked at social insurance models again, without concluding that they 
should be pursued in New Zealand (Ministry of Health, 2002). A working group set up by the Ministry 
concluded: 
Given New Zealand’s history and present tax-funded system, there would need to be a very strong case 
for shifting the health system to a social insurance model. Such a shift would be disruptive and would 
run counter to the trend of social insurance models [in other countries] adopting more of the features of 
tax-financed systems. (Ministry of Health, 2002, p. 21). 
New Zealand governments have also looked at opening accident compensation insurance to multiple non-
government providers, either generally (in the late 1990s) or for workers accident compensation (in 2011) 
(Reid & MacKessack, 2011). 
Summing up: multiple social insurers 
There are good reasons for believing that a multiple insurer model would out-perform a single government 
insurer. Benefits would arise from specialisation to particular population groups and competitive pressure to 
find innovative ways to increase quality and reduce costs. 
Yet implementing a multiple social insurer model needs to address a number of difficult issues. These 
include defining entitlements in a way that manages overall costs and providing insurers with the right 
incentives to make sound decisions about early intervention and service quality. Managing the transition 
from a tax-funded to a social insurance system would also be challenging. Even so, other countries, such as 
the Netherlands, have managed to successfully implement a social insurance model with multiple insurers 
(Box 9.7). 
 
 
 F9.4  A social insurance model with multiple non-government insurers has good 
opportunities and incentives for innovation, and may out-perform models with a single 
government insurer. Such models face difficult design and transition issues. 
 
 
 Those who have higher-cost health needs will take a larger entitlement to funding with them, 
to encourage plans to take the sick as well as the healthy. 
 Health care plans will manage the total health care requirements of their clients. They will be 
obliged to offer to all their clients affordable access to the same range of services as RHAs. 
This compulsory range of services, “called core health services”, will be specified. 
 Health care plans may take various forms. They may provide some health services 
themselves, but will contract with other health care providers – including CHEs and 
community trusts – to deliver core health services for their clients. 
 Health care plans may specialise in meeting the health care needs of particular groups. Plans 
may be established around union health centres, group general practices, networks of 
general practices or multi-speciality groups. Community-based plans might be built around 
community trusts. Health insurers may wish to move into providing comprehensive managed 
health care – by establishing plans. Large firms may want to underwrite a health care plan for 
their employees. 
 Iwi authorities and other Maori organisations will be able to establish health care plans 
concentrating on Maori health needs, addressing Maori concerns about how health services 
are delivered. This will offer Maori a vehicle for taking greater control over the resources 
used for health services for Maori. 
 To protect clients of the health system, and to contain health care costs, health care plans 
will operate within limits set by regulation. 
 Choice of health care plans will be phased in so as to allow time for development of the skills 
and experience required for this type of managed care. 
Source:   Minister of Health, 1991, pp. 61–62.  
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A more practical question is what sort of organisations might become non-government social insurers under 
such a model. Existing organisations that might have the capacity and interest to expand into social 
insurance include: 
 for-profit (FP) and NFP health insurers; 
 FP and NFP life insurers; 
 iwi; and 
 unions. 
It is also possible that purpose-built organisations may enter such a market. As noted by the Wise Group: 
There is enormous potential to direct private investment toward social outcomes … Trusted 
mechanisms and investment vehicles which provide a realistic financial return relative to risk need to be 
established quickly and efficiently. The appropriate sharing of risk between providers, investors and 
underwriters is a key to success. (sub. 41, p. 4) 
A government-owned and operated social insurer might form a useful role during a transition to a multi-
insurer model, and indeed may be a permanent feature should it be sufficiently responsive to member 
interests. 
 
 
 Q9.1 
 
What non-government organisations have the potential to become social insurers for 
enrolled populations? What are the potential advantages and problems of a multiple-
insurer approach? 
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10 Service integration 
Key points 
 Integrated services offer clients a coordinated mix of services that address multiple needs in a 
timely, convenient and effective way. 
 The fragmentation of social services to the detriment of clients with complex needs is a long-
standing issue that has proven difficult to resolve despite many attempts. Fragmented delivery is 
usually a symptom of problems in the way social services are commissioned, and the institutions 
and contracting practices that support commissioning. 
 From a system point of view, the Government should seek the combination of integrated and 
single-focused services with the highest net benefit. The key question is the extent and form of 
integration. It is possible to have too much integration, or the wrong kind of integration. 
Integrating one activity may fragment behaviour elsewhere. Organisations need to weigh up the 
costs and benefits when deciding the extent of integration. 
 Integration is more likely to be beneficial where:  
- services are linked together as a chain of services; 
- clients, families or communities experience clusters of related problems; and  
- the people doing the integrating are willing to work together and trust each other. 
 Institutional architecture and service models can support integration in different ways. 
- Provided it is done judiciously, government agencies exercising top-down control over services 
can merge government agencies, link contracting or service teams, or merge multiple 
contracts.  
- When government devolves commissioning responsibilities to providers, those providers have 
more scope to take the lead on integration by, for example, establishing multi-service teams, 
creating alliances or merging. 
- The “shared goals” service model empowers and facilitates providers to coordinate service 
delivery.  
- Client-directed service models allow clients to select the best package of services for them. 
Essentially the client is the service integrator. 
 Service integration should be improved by: 
- empowering clients and families to have a say in the way services are packaged; 
- providing opportunities for bottom-up integration; 
- addressing organisational culture and incentives across the social services system; 
- providing wider access to data; and 
- making budget processes more conducive to integrated services. 
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This chapter discusses the challenge of delivering social services to people with multiple service needs. It 
discusses how funding, commissioning and contracting arrangements can be improved to ensure that 
people with multiple needs receive the best mix of services, and to ensure efficient and effective 
performance at a system level.  
10.1 What is integration? 
Definition 
Integrated services offer clients a coordinated mix of services that address multiple and related needs in a 
timely, convenient and effective way. 
Submitters commented that integration takes many forms: 
It is acknowledged that integration takes many forms, and may include (at one end of the spectrum) a 
shared plan, or co-location of services, but may also extend to be an integrated delivery approach (with 
joint planning and joint delivery). (Social Sector Trials, sub. 126, p. 14) 
The integration of services should be focused on the needs of the person accessing the services. As Durie 
noted: 
Integrated development is not simply a bringing together of separate sectors; rather, its starting points 
are people, balancing individual interests with group values, and the application of consistent 
approaches to human needs and aspirations. (Durie, 2001, p. 255) 
However, integration also needs to address the motivations of people in organisations that provide social 
services, and enable different organisations to maintain their sense of identity while working in a larger 
system. In relation to this, Stand Children’s Services noted: 
Service integration does not mean that the independent identity and value of each component is lost; 
rather each type of component or service is a valuable element in the interwoven fabric of care. 
(sub. 127, p. 20) 
When fragmentation is a problem 
As noted in Chapter 3, service integration is an important part of making social services more seamless, 
convenient and effective for clients. 
Governments, providers and clients frequently call for more integration in response to the problem of 
fragmentation in the current system of social services. The strong lines of vertical accountability from 
providers and departments up to ministers and Parliament divert attention and energy away from horizontal 
coordination between departments and services (Chapter 4). 
Several government reports and inquiry submissions note the problem of fragmented services. The 
Taskforce on Whänau-Centred Initiatives, for example, noted: 
…lack of coherence between sectors, and even within sectors, has led to multiple separate contracts, 
each with different reporting requirements and expectations that have precluded an integrated 
approach to service delivery. (2010, p. 20)  
Alzheimers New Zealand’s submission considered that in the health sector, “there is very little collaboration 
or integration in provision at either a private or community organisation level” (sub. 27, p. 4). 
Fragmented services are a particular problem where a client needs several services to address their needs. 
This emerges commonly in the management of chronic disease. Another example is services for older 
people with multiple long-term conditions. 
Stevens, Sanders and Munford highlight the need for multiple services where clients have complex needs, 
and the challenge of coordination and communication between those different services. As part of this 
work, a research team recently reviewed summaries of case files from 79 young people aged between 12 
and 17 years who were users of New Zealand social services. The review revealed that: 
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Multiple agency involvement was evident in many of the case file summaries; families/whänau with 
more complex needs tended to have more services involved. Some case summaries demonstrated 
concerted efforts by a range of agencies to work together to provide services to young people and 
their families/whänau. Several of these examples occurred when integrated agencies (i.e. those who 
provided multiple services themselves such as family counselling, youth counselling or therapies and 
advocacy services) became involved with or led interventions with young people. In one example, an 
agency who provided a young person with residential services and individual therapies and also worked 
to support the family/whänau, provided monthly emails to the other services involved to communicate 
progress and to invite services to be in touch with one another. In other cases, justice services 
contacted young people’s workers or their families/whänau to advise them if known offenders were to 
be released and to work on safety plans together. Several cases demonstrated schools working very 
hard alongside other services to retain young people in school despite often challenging behaviour and 
circumstances. (Stevens, Sanders & Munford, 2014, pp. 33–34) 
The case file review also revealed that the need for a high degree of coordination is particularly challenging 
if no one is designated to take the lead: 
[C]ase file summaries also provided examples of agencies disagreeing between themselves over who 
should take responsibility for providing services to families/whänau and many of these disagreements 
related to service criteria or thresholds for accepting clients. Analysis of file summaries suggested that 
such disagreements and strained relationships between services sometimes resulted in a lack of 
information sharing or miscommunication. Debates about whether young people met particular 
thresholds for service were commonly held between child protection and mental health services, and 
between social services and schools or special education services. (Stevens, Sanders & Munford, 2014, 
pp. 33–34) 
 
 
 
 F10.1  Coordinating the provision of multiple services to the same client is unlikely to work 
without agreement on what services the client is eligible for and which provider will 
take the lead. The lead can come from a service provider, a navigator, the service user 
or a service professional such as a lead maternity carer.  
 
 
The Dunedin Community Law Centre’s submission provided a reminder that fragmentation in the social 
services sector is not a new problem: 
The 1982 report from the New Zealand Planning Council, entitled ‘Who Makes Social Policy?’ noted a 
‘compartmentalised approach to social policy’ in New Zealand. It recommended ‘greater 
interdepartmental cooperation in the exchange of information and in research efforts, which would 
recognise the inter-relationships and interdependence’. (Dunedin Community Law Centre, sub. 28, 
p. 2) 
John Angus made a similar observation, noting that in his experience “the discourse on coordination, 
cooperation and collaboration across government departments in the social services sector, in particular 
around families and children, has gone on in Wellington for at least 30 years” (John Angus, sub. 109, p. 7). 
Similarly, Te Rünaka o Ötäkou noted: 
Integration has long been an outcome that is promoted by the public sector. Its failure is noted in the 
obvious fact that the public sector is unable to model what integration will look like. (Te Rünaka o 
Ötäkou, sub. 110, p. 5) 
In fact, one can go back almost as far as one likes for evidence of fragmentation in public services (Box 
10.1). 
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 F10.2  The fragmentation of social services to the detriment of clients with complex needs is a 
long-standing issue that has proven difficult to resolve despite many attempts.   
 
Integration as a response to fragmentation problems 
Chapter 3 describes integration initiatives that have responded to fragmentation problems. The first 
initiative is the Canterbury Clinical Network, a consortium of healthcare leaders. The Network has sought to 
bring together budgets, information systems and staff that previously operated in relative isolation from 
each other. A second related initiative is the collective impact approach to integration, developed in the 
United States and promoted in many countries as a successful framework for addressing complex social 
problems. However, Chapter 3 also notes that organisations such as the Wise Group provide integrated 
services as part of their business as usual. 
Box 10.1 Timeline of fragmentation concerns 
1910 
If there is one thing about which those who have made a special study of the difficult problems 
connected with the administration of charity are agreed upon it is the need of co-ordination and 
co-operation. (The Dominion, 1910, p. 6) 
1920 
A brief examination of the present position shows that destitute and dependent children are dealt 
with in a somewhat haphazard manner. There is no controlling authority, and an utter lack of co-
operation and co-ordination even between Government Departments, without including the work 
carried out by Charitable Aid Boards and the social services agencies of the various Churches. 
(Officer in charge of Special Schools Branch, 1920, p. 13) 
1950 
It is safe to say that we of the State services had long regarded ourselves as the only pebbles on 
the beach, and we knew little or nothing of the good work being carried out by the Salvation 
Army and other church and civic agencies. David Marsh [an English professor, speaking to a 1950 
conference] was provocative and merciless. He made us give a faithful account of what we were 
doing and what we weren’t, and almost literally made us rub noses with every other agency … I 
found the whole experience most vitalising and I’m sure this early conference set the basis and 
tone for such [an] understanding and co-operation between social workers in New Zealand as may 
never have been known. (Lorna Hodder; in McDonald, 1994, pp. 50–51) 
c1958 
In its own initiatives the Social Security Department found that one family could be visited by a 
number of social workers from other departments, none of them aware of what the others were 
doing. (McClure, 1998, p. 148) 
1972 
There is also a need for a reasonable degree of coordination between the State services and 
those of voluntary organisations themselves, if only to ensure that money given by the 
community, either from taxation or from private contributions, is not wasted, and that the 
manpower available is used to good advantage. But a strict degree of co-ordination is unlikely to 
be reached, nor would it necessarily be beneficial. (Royal Commission of Inquiry on social security 
in New Zealand, 1972, p. 380) 
1976 
The lack of co-ordination in the provision of social services in New Zealand was frequently pointed 
out to members of the Taskforce … The lack of co-ordination is not limited to interaction between 
Government departments: it is even more in evidence between departments, local bodies and 
voluntary agencies. (1976 Taskforce on Economic and Social Planning; quoted in New Zealand 
Council of Social Service, 1978, pp. 38–39)  
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When separate services are desirable 
While clients may experience the separate delivery of more than one service as a problem in some cases, 
this is not always the case. In some instances a client may receive two services that are quite unrelated, for 
example support to prepare meals at home and home visits from a health professional to change dressings 
on a cut (Appendix E). Aside from ensuring that the timing of appointments does not clash, there may be 
little need for the providers of these two services to coordinate their support. The cost of additional effort 
to integrate services would not be worth the additional benefit. 
One way to distinguish between clients who would and would not benefit from further integration of 
services is to assign clients in a population into categories of need. This is done by District Health Boards 
(DHBs) providing support to older people at home. Older people receiving home-based support in Nelson 
and Marlborough are categorised into different levels of service complexity from preventative maintenance 
(assisting with tasks such as vacuuming) to complex high or complex very high services (Appendix E). Such 
complex services may entail multiple services and changing needs over time, calling for integration. 
10.2 Deciding the level and extent of integration 
Assessing the relative benefits and costs of integration 
Service integration has a range of potential benefits and costs depending on the type of integration and 
how well it is put into place. It is possible to have too much integration, or the wrong kind of integration. 
Organisations involved in social services need to weigh up the benefits and costs before deciding on the 
extent and type of service integration. 
The principal benefit of service integration comes in the form of improved effectiveness for clients and the 
cost effectiveness for the funders of achieving desired outcomes. Integration can increase the efficiency of 
services, for example by integrating information systems to reduce duplication. 
The costs of service integration take many forms. For example, two service providers that agree to work 
together will need to take time to meet each other and update each other on services to clients. If the two 
services want to share client information, this may require investing in new information technology (IT) and 
developing policies to ensure client privacy rights are protected. There are up-front costs in changing 
performance measures and reporting arrangements to ensure that the Government measures the success of 
integration and the downstream benefits in terms of better outcomes for clients. 
The need to assess the costs and benefits of coordination and integration is a theme that comes through in 
the Commission’s previous inquiries (Figure 10.1). The lessons from these inquiries provide useful insights 
into the types of costs and benefits that organisations might expect from integration. 
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Figure 10.1 Lessons on coordination and integration from previous Productivity Commission inquiries 
 
 
 
 F10.3  Integrating services has costs as well as benefits. The challenge is to weigh these up so 
as to make a judgement about what type and how much integration is optimal.  
 
When integration is more likely to be beneficial 
Previous Commission inquiries provide insights into when integration is likely to be beneficial. First, 
integration assists in cases where services are linked together as a chain of services (NZPC, 2012a, p. 34). 
Linked chains of services are readily apparent in health services for frail older people, where the type of 
service that is required changes as the process of ageing occurs. While initially a frail older person may 
need assistance at home with household tasks and personal care, if their health declines the person may 
require more specialised medical care. Integrating the provision of health services for older people provides 
health funders and providers with an opportunity to enhance the client’s experience of continuity of care. It 
also encourages funders to consider whether complementary services such as fall-prevention programmes 
may avoid more costly hospital services down the track. The Canterbury Clinical Network (CCN) is a good 
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In discussing the political risk to 
councils in the UK from shared 
services, Deloitte (2009) notes: 
“Failures are often drawn out in 
the public domain. If the 
consequences of failure include 
reputational damage, as well as a 
loss of organisational autonomy, 
shared services tend to face 
significant political scrutiny”. 
(NZPC, 2013, p. 12)
[T]he precise gains from 
cooperation are unique to 
each circumstance. (NZPC, 
2013, p. 9)
Integration of government services can involve considerable redesign 
of systems when values and preferences differ between countries … 
and so opportunities for joint provision need to be selected carefully. 
(APC & NZPC, 2012, p. 34)
Cost savings can arise through 
the more efficient use of 
capital, greater purchasing 
power, and through councils 
specialising in the provision of 
a particular regulatory service. 
(NZPC, 2013, p. 9)
[C]ollaboration – to the extent 
that it enables smaller 
businesses to capture some of 
the benefits of larger size –
may foster innovation. (NZPC, 
2014b, p. 136)
[Coordination between two 
governments] can reduce 
compliance costs for trans-Tasman 
businesses, enable more effective 
regulation of business activity that 
crosses borders and, in the case of 
joint bodies, increase economies of 
scale (APC & NZPC, 2012, p. 159).
Cooperation on regulatory 
functions can assist councils to 
access specialist skills. (NZPC, 
2013, p. 10)
Potential costs
[Costs of cooperative 
arrangements can include] the 
commitment of internal 
resources to negotiations with 
potential partners … possible 
service disruptions while in 
transition to a new cooperative 
arrangement … legal and 
consulting fees associated with 
establishing new governance 
structures and training to 
familiarise staff with new 
systems or processes. (NZPC, 
2013, p. 12)
[Coordination between two 
governments can] impose 
administrative costs and reduce 
local accountability and 
flexibility. (APC & NZPC, 2012, 
p. 159)
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example of funders and providers working together to integrate services to achieve this type of benefit 
(Chapter 3). 
Second, integration can be beneficial in instances where clients, families or communities have a “complex 
set of social needs that typically occur in clusters” (NZPC, 2012b, p. 216). In this case, responding to one 
problem such as sub-standard housing may be futile if other related social problems such as poor health 
and poverty are not also addressed. 
Third, a lesson from submissions to this inquiry is that integration is unlikely to be successful until the 
relevant people and organisations are willing to work together, and trust each other. It is hard to measure 
willingness and trust, but they seem to be essential ingredients for successful integration: 
A study of the experience of mergers and integrated care in Quebec … found that merging 
organisations could not facilitate integrated care unless they were desired by all players and involved all 
players in an appropriate way to deal with service problems, otherwise they triggered conflicts and 
mistrust. (Association of Salaried Medical Specialists, sub. 85, p. 11) 
All successful models are built on the development of trusting, collaborative relationships which take 
time and effort to evolve. (Bay of Plenty Community Response Forum, sub. 53, p. 3) 
The aftermath of the Canterbury earthquakes saw increased trust and an open disclosure approach 
taken by the DHB, where providers felt comfortable discussing problems as they arose and learning 
from errors. This experience needs to be shared nationally, as it shouldn’t require a major disaster to 
elicit collaboration. (NGO Health & Disability Network, sub. 70, p. 4) 
The Children’s Team set up in Marlborough in response to the Vulnerable Children Act 2014, is an 
example of planning and collaboration between providers working well. Relationships of trust are 
developing amongst the members of this network, as a deeper understanding of participant’s roles and 
activities has developed. (Supporting Families in Mental Illness New Zealand, sub. 49, p. 6) 
Collaboration does work well – for example the approach taken in Marlborough in response to the 
Vulnerable Children Act 2014. The Children’s Team process is getting everyone on the same page 
really quickly. There is an opportunity to learn from others and information is easily transferred and 
shared. Innovation can occur in a collaborative setting, where there are relationships of trust in place. 
(Supporting Families in Mental Illness New Zealand, sub. 49, p. 14) 
 
 
 F10.4  Integration is more likely to be beneficial where:  
 services are linked together as a chain of services; 
 clients, families or communities experience clusters of related problems; and  
 the people doing the integrating are willing to work together and trust each other. 
 
 
10.3 Deciding how to integrate 
Integration as a high-level design issue 
Submissions to the inquiry suggest that when fragmented delivery is a problem, this is often a symptom of 
problems in the way social services are commissioned, or in the institutions and contracting practices that 
support commissioning. 
The lack of a framework (such as collective impact modelled in the UK) to facilitate a more efficient way 
of working together has resulted in services being co-located and meeting more frequently but 
continuing to operate largely independently. (National Committee for Addiction Treatment, p. 3) 
Siloed funding streams continue to be a hindrance to working in integrated and family centred ways 
where providers are only able to deliver what is specified in their contract despite being well placed to 
address a range of needs for a family. (Alliance Health Plus Trust, sub. 119, p. 3)  
Over-specification of contract deliverables drives people to remain only within the scope of the 
contract, which may not encourage integration. For example, the differentiation of primary and 
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secondary health spend - it may be better to allow a percentage of spend more frequently to flexibly 
work in the margins between the two. (Platform Charitable Trust, sub. 45, p. 17) 
Getting to the point of implementing service integration is the challenge, with the time constraints put 
on organisations to consider anything apart from service delivery. (Palmerston North Community 
Services Council, sub. 125, p. 9) 
Chapters 5 and 6 describe the different forms of institutional and commissioning arrangements for social 
services. These different arrangements can support integration in different ways. 
Provided it is done judiciously, government agencies exercising top-down control over services can seek to 
integrate these services by changing the way government operates. An example of such a change was the 
2006 merger of Child, Youth and Family into the Ministry of Social Development (MSD). Government can 
also change its contracting arrangements to promote integration. For example, MSD has established 
integrated contracts, where all of the contracts with one provider have been merged into a single contract. 
Integrated contracts can reduce contract administration costs for funders and providers, but do not 
necessarily reduce fragmentation for service users. 
The need to be judicious arises in part from the difficulties that arise for providers and clients when the 
Government pursues too many integration attempts at the same time. 
When government devolves commissioning responsibilities to non-government organisations, these 
organisations have more scope to take the lead on integration by, for example, establishing multi-service 
teams, creating alliances or merging. An example of devolved integration is phase two of the Whänau Ora 
programme, where commissioning agencies purchase a mix of existing services or commission new services 
(Appendix C). 
The “shared goals” service model empowers and facilitates providers to coordinate service delivery. An 
example of this model is health alliances between DHBs, Primary Health Organisations and other local 
health providers. Chapter 3 discusses the CCN’s use of this model. 
Service models embodying client choice allow clients to select the best package of services for them. 
Essentially, this means the client is the service integrator (Chapter 11).  
Providers may also pursue mergers on their own initiative. Green Cross’s recent acquisition of Access 
HomeHealth was motivated in part by Green Cross’s objective of providing more integrated healthcare 
(Green Cross Health, 2014). Richmond Services NZ Ltd, a mental health services provider, and Recovery 
Solutions, a provider of addiction and social-housing services, have announced they are merging on 1 July 
2015 to form an NGO that provides mental health, addiction, disability and social-housing services across 
New Zealand. 
The drawbacks of ad-hoc integration initiatives  
A common phenomenon is governments undertaking multiple and overlapping integration initiatives, 
resulting in confusion, frustration and strain on scarce resources.  
John Angus considers that there has been “a succession of new cooperative initiatives with aspirational 
programmes and even more aspirational names” (John Angus, sub. 109, p. 7). The available evidence 
supports that view. A review of ministerial speeches and media announcements from 2000 to 2014 
identified 27 separate government initiatives that were partly or wholly aimed at integrating social services 
or improving coordination, collaboration and cooperation (Figure 10.2). This amounts to roughly two new 
initiatives each year. 
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Figure 10.2 Government integration initiatives announced since 2000  
 
Source: Ministerial speeches and media releases on beehive.govt.nz; Family and Community Services, n.d. 
 
Running more than one integration initiative is problematic when these initiatives overlap. If two initiatives 
are attempting to integrate the same social services, there is the potential for two competing timeframes for 
integration, two sets of acronyms to master and turf wars between groups running the initiatives. 
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Youth Development Strategy
Set of government initiatives aimed at delivering effective, 
integrated services to youth and increase their 
participation in decision making
Heartland Services
Synchronise government staff visits to remote towns once 
or twice a month as part of an "outreach" service
Primary Health Strategy
Framework for improved coordination between primary 
healthcare providers and secondary providers of services
New Directions plan for Child, Youth and Family
Create a more seamless, integrated department and 
increase collaboration with communities
Circuit Breaker teams
Take some long-standing and difficult problems and hand 
them over to cross-agency teams on the ground in the 
regions for some original thinking
Changes to community employment assistance delivery
Improve the delivery and coordination of government 
services to community groups
Action Plan for young people
Provide integrated services to prevent problems from 
happening where possible, and, if a problem does arise, to 
stop it from escalating
Early Years package
Build on existing services and make them more effective 
by improving their coordination and helping families to 
access them
Community Link
Provide a range of services under one roof
Whänau Ora
Provide navigators to help whänau to access seamless 
health and social services, and establish integrated 
contracts
Community Response Fund
Support providers to remove duplication, merge back 
office functions, work together, join services up where 
synergies exist and share best practice
Ministry of Health Integration Programme
Ensure the provision of wrap-around services for older 
people
Children’s Teams
Integrate the best of what works and provide a common 
framework to follow
Investing in Services for Outcomes
Make changes, including a single contract and a 
streamlined approval, monitoring and report framework
Achieving Inter-generational Change approach
Weave strands of work together into an integrated, 
cohesive approach to ensure people are given the support 
they need to turn their lives around
Funding for Outcomes
Improve collaboration between government agencies 
funding the same provider
Mosaics guide
Road map for good practice in regional coordination and 
integrated service delivery
Merger of Department for Courts and Ministry of Justice
Improve coordination between the agencies that make up 
the justice sector
Youth Transitions Services
Government and community groups working to deliver 
integrated services to youth at risk of missing out on work, 
training, or further education when they leave school
Family Safety Team pilot initiative
Teams involving Justice; Police; Child, Youth and Family 
and community sector organisations
Integrated Contracts
Aimed to bring together multiple contracts into one single 
document that focuses on shared outcomes, and cut down 
on administrative compliance
Better, Sooner, More Convenient primary healthcare 
Health agency partnerships including multi-disciplinary 
teams and greater cooperation with hospitals
Family-Centred Services Fund
Encourage providers to work together to reduce 
duplications and gaps in services and to enable more 
innovative and integrated frontline services that respond 
to local needs
Local Area Coordinators
Work with people with disabilities to identify family and 
community resources
Social Sector Trials
Better coordinate health, police, education, social 
development and justice to address big challenges
Streamlined contracting with NGOs
Create a contract management framework that is suitable 
for bilateral and integrated contracting arrangements
Te Hiku Social Development and Wellbeing Accord
Nine government agencies working alongside Te Hiku to 
determine the interventions needed in the community, 
before collaborative work begins
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These problems are evident in practice. Whänau Ora is one of many programmes attempting to integrate 
service delivery and use a navigation/lead practitioner approach (Appendix C). Children’s Teams and Social 
Sector Trials are two other prominent examples. It was put to the Commission that if the government is 
going to take a joined-up or “whole-of-government” approach, it ought to be one approach in one place. 
In relation to Social Sector Trials, the Minister for Social Development recently noted: 
With a view to adopting permanent structures, over the next twelve months we will take a close look at 
what is effective in the trial areas and analyse how the trials can work alongside other initiatives such as 
Children’s Teams and Whänau Ora, in the changing social sector landscape. (Minister for Social 
Development, 2015a) 
Te Roopu Waiora Trust’s submission takes the opportunity to find humour in the situation: 
Minister Adams recently announced the formation of a high level ministerial group to coordinate every 
intervention in the family violence space using a single point of reference. However with housing, 
health and disability sectors taking a similar approach on specific and critical issues, the need to then 
coordinate coordination becomes apparent. (Te Roopu Waiora Trust, sub. 97, p. 6) 
 
 
 F10.5  A common phenomenon is governments undertaking multiple and overlapping 
integration initiatives, resulting in confusion, frustration and strain on scarce resources.  
 
Getting the design right 
The solution to achieving integration will not usually lie in imposing another integration initiative from the 
top down. It will usually lie in choosing the right institutional design for the problem the service is aimed at, 
and for the commissioning organisation to choose the right service model. Shared goals, managed markets 
and client-directed service models have favourable incentives for realising the optimal extent and form of 
integration. 
 
 
 R10.1  Governments and service-commissioning agencies should consider whether service 
fragmentation is a symptom that could be most effectively dealt with by changing their 
institutional-design and commissioning choices.  
 
 
Efficient boundaries  
The government agencies with responsibility for delivering social services have each defined geographic 
boundaries for their field administrations, as suited to their own service-delivery. Policing areas, for 
example, likely have little relation to DHB district boundaries. The coordinator for the Hutt Valley Justice 
Sector Project – a collaboration between five agencies – commented that the project was made much easier 
by the rather unusual coincidence of agency boundaries in the Hutt Valley.76 The project would have been 
much more complex in other locations – and may not have been realisable in some. 
 
 
 Q10.1 
 
Should the government seek to align the geographical boundaries used by its social 
delivery agencies for defining service responsibilities? What are the advantages and 
disadvantages of aligning boundaries? 
 
 
10.4 Five design themes for improving integration 
Involving clients and their families in service design and delivery 
Chapter 11 argues that there is good evidence to suggest that empowering clients to make choices about 
the services they receive can improve the responsiveness of service providers to client needs and improve 
76 Driven by the strong geographic features of the Hutt Valley. 
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client wellbeing. It outlines different ways of providing clients with greater choice, including client-directed 
budgets and voucher systems. 
To the extent that clients are able to purchase their own services through personal budgets, these clients 
should also be able to choose the best mix of services to suit their needs. As one submitter noted: 
Self directed supports such as Enabling Good Lives … allows people to integrate their funded supports 
into one package, and use the combined funding to create a seamless and highly effective service for 
themselves or their family. With the model that Manawanui run, it doesn’t matter where the funding 
comes from – it can be combined into one budget and allow complete integration in a self directed 
and self determined manner. Currently 75 of our clients access services through multiple funders, for 
example: MoH and ACC; MoH and Ministry of Social Development funding or Enabling Good Lives. 
This has become an example of successful service integration across funders. In its role as Host 
Provider, Manawanui is instrumental in managing those relationships and funding interfaces on behalf 
of the IF client. (Manawanui, sub. 8, pp. 7–8) 
In a similar way, the government’s Whänau Ora initiative enables whänau to set the outcomes for their 
interactions with service providers and, through the whänau planning process, increase their exercise of 
choice about what services they access or other actions they will take to achieve those outcomes (Appendix 
C). Whänau also benefit from navigator staff working directly with whänau on planning their aspirations and 
helping them to access services. Evidence from the Commission’s case study of this initiative suggests that 
navigators are instrumental in integrating services for whänau. The Social Sector Trials pointed to the value 
of a staff person responsible for coordinating a client’s services and working across different service 
providers and agencies (sub. 126). 
In addition to involving clients and their families in the delivery of services, these people can be consulted 
as part of the design of services. This provides an opportunity for clients and families to identify aspects of a 
service that could lead to fragmentation. 
Chapter 6 discusses client consultation and recommends that commissioning organisations should involve 
clients and their families in service-design decisions. 
Providing opportunities for bottom-up integration 
Submitters have argued that bottom-up integration of services is effective in harnessing client and provider 
motivations, resources and information: 
Where integration does appear to have produced benefits (in terms of quality of care and patient 
satisfaction, rather than any economic effects), it has tended to involve programmes initiated by 
clinicians and often focused on particular patients groups or specialties, such as through clinical 
networks. (Association of Salaried Medical Specialists, sub. 85, p. 12) 
SST leads have noted the following key factors as important success factors: local ownership, 
community buy-in for the concept, fit for purpose integration, and “by community, for community”. 
Where local opportunities are identified and there is integration support locally and centrally, there 
have been positive outcomes noted. (Social Sector Trial, sub. 126, p. 14) 
There are examples of successful integration where the Government has consciously stepped back from 
taking a controlling role, even though the integrated services are government programmes. Mental health 
and addiction services provider Wise Group reports on a different sort of merger in its submission to the 
inquiry. This merger is between two government-funded programmes:  
Over the last three years Te Pou and Matua Raki have merged. Both these programmes were 
contracted separately under the Ministry of Health, Te Pou to lead on mental health and disability, 
Matua Raki to lead on non-addictions. The senior leaders from both organisations worked together to 
carefully plan how both entities would merge and gain benefits from each other’s experience as well as 
how to communicate this to stakeholders. (Wise Group, sub. 41, p. 15) 
The Wise Group noted that “this merger was instigated by the leaders of our programmes, not the funder, 
and this helped make the transition smoother” (p. 15). 
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The danger of relying on government leadership in integrating services is that the Government collectively 
tends to introduce multiple and overlapping initiatives to improve integration, which causes confusion and 
undermines credibility. As Te Roopu Waiora Trust noted: 
From the perspective of whänau, sector based coordination or locality case management merely shifts 
service fragmentation to another level and serves no real purpose. With Whanau Ora offering a similar 
approach through navigation, the aim of all these initiatives is to manage whanau through an array of 
complex, fragmented service interventions. The focus and resource investment is therefore channelled 
towards navigation or coordination; instead of addressing the reason why such approaches are needed. 
(Te Roopu Waiora Trust, sub. 97, p. 6) 
In light of these problems, the Government should adopt a cautious approach to instigating programmes of 
service integration. A better approach often is for those commissioning services to devolve responsibility to 
clients, navigators or service providers to decide on the extent and form of service integration. 
 
 
 R10.2  The Government should adopt a cautious approach to directing service integration from 
the centre, and should instead focus on ensuring that institutions and commissioning 
arrangements provide opportunities for bottom-up integration.  
 
 
Addressing organisational culture across the system 
A prominent theme from submissions was the importance of organisational culture in integrating services. 
Several submissions pointed to aspects of government and provider culture. 
In our view, the success of the Government’s change to funding for outcomes with integrated contracts 
depends on achieving a complete change of culture in the funding agencies and the providers of 
Family Start. This will take some time and good, consistent leadership. (Myra Harpham & Jennifer 
Coote, sub. 106, p. 16) 
Within health and social care services, organisational leadership is fundamental to achieving a shift in 
culture that will lead to effective integrated models of commissioned care. The focus of change efforts 
must be on improving outcomes and not on changing organisational structures, however where 
structural change is required, commissioning agencies must be able to support/resource those changes 
to occur. (Alliance Health Plus Trust, sub. 119, p. 3) 
The very particular and unique cultural makeup of our community is also drawn to the attention of the 
Productivity Commission. This gives us a richly varied community, committed to collaboration and the 
common good, which is also significantly underprivileged in terms of income, housing, qualifications 
and employment – in short, we score very highly in all the factors that are measured in the Deprivation 
Index. (South Waikato Social Services Collective, sub. 7, p. 4) 
A sense of why culture is important to integration can be gleaned from the Commission’s investigation of 
organisational culture in its previous inquiry into regulatory institutions and practices. In this inquiry, the 
Commission noted that culture can be likened to a “psychological contract” that lays out the unwritten rules 
that govern how people within an organisation are expected to act, think and feel and how they can expect 
others to act, think and feel. In this way, culture plays a key role in the internal interaction of staff and in how 
the organisation adapts to changes in its external environment (NZPC, 2014b, p. 78). 
A barrier to internal coordination of staff is the presence of strongly different subcultures: 
Subcultures can lead to a “silo mentality” where members become inwardly focused and detached 
from the organisation’s core principles, values and strategy. Such silos can restrict the flow of 
information through the organisation, reduce organisational flexibility and create an external perception 
that the regulator is inconsistent in its interpretation of regulations. Silos can also create unhealthy 
tension between groups within an organisation. (NZPC, 2014b, p. 88) 
It is plausible that the “silo mentality” that submitters detect among government departments is as much a 
matter of governmental subcultures as it is a matter of divisions in budgets and lines of accountability. 
Submissions also point to differences in culture between government agencies and providers.  
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To the extent that differences among subcultures in the social services system impede integration, the 
remedial measures the Commission identified for regulators could equally apply to the social services 
system.  
 Ensure that corporate values and mission are effectively communicated to all areas and office locations. 
Use locally relevant examples and stories to communicate the corporate values and mission to regional 
staff. This will increase the extent to which they are perceived as relevant (rather than just something 
coming out of “head office”).  
 Foster a “professional culture” by promoting common language and processes throughout the 
organisation. 
 Encourage teams to share their perspectives, assumptions and pre-existing beliefs with others in the 
organisation. This will help reduce misconceptions and overcome misunderstandings arising from the 
use of different language. 
 Expose middle managers and staff to different working environments by mixing teams and encouraging 
short-term “job-swaps”. 
 Provide opportunities for formal and informal interaction between teams and staff from different 
locations.  
 Make a conscious effort to include regional groups in significant discussions impacting on the success of 
the organisation. Promote a sense of inclusion for these groups by devoting time to visit regional 
offices. 
 
 
 R10.3  Efforts to integrate social services should be attentive to organisational cultures that 
promote or impede integration, and should address problems through remedies, 
including promoting a common language and values across the system and providing 
opportunities for formal and informal interaction between organisations. 
 
 
Providing wider access to data 
As part of investing in a better data infrastructure and data sharing for social services, the Government 
should assist providers to access and use operational data to improve service integration. Greater access to 
information enables providers to identify where services overlap, understand the extent of service use for 
different client groups, and test the efficacy of different degrees and forms of integration. 
Submitters noted the importance of planning and information systems in facilitating integration. Careerforce 
made the case for more joined-up workforce planning to identify workforce skills that cross sectors (sub. 50). 
IT system improvements included a shared care record and the ability for different providers to securely 
message each other about a patient (Pharmacy Guild of New Zealand, sub. 11), national and local outcome 
indicators, a data dictionary, standardised datasets, and system and service performance measures (The 
Impact Collective, sub. 130), and streamlined online databases and directories of health and social service 
providers (NGO Health & Disability Network, sub. 70). 
Likewise, the Commission’s case study of home-based support found that service coordination benefits 
from ensuring different service funders and providers are well informed about other services (Appendix E). 
Chapter 8 argues that, among other benefits, better use of linked cross-agency data would support better 
integrated, tailored services for clients. It recommends work on the design of institutions and processes to 
develop a comprehensive, wide-access, client-centred data infrastructure accessible to commissioning 
agencies, providers, users and researchers of social services. 
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 R10.4  The Government should assist providers to access and use operational data to improve 
service integration as part of investing in a better data infrastructure and safe data 
sharing for social services. 
 
 
Making budget processes more conducive to integrated services 
Chapter 5 notes that governments typically favour narrowly specified budget appropriations, prescriptive 
service specifications and close, top-down control. The drawback of this approach from an integration 
perspective is that it can reduce coordination between agencies and limit flexible adaptation to client needs 
and local circumstances. If, on the other hand, funding is devolved to a commissioning agency, a trusted 
provider or to clients themselves – with enough flexibility – then they can use it to purchase integrated 
services “at the coal face”. Chapter 5 discusses budget appropriations (Section 5.5). 
10.5 Fragmentation – seeing the symptoms and tackling the 
causes 
Fragmented delivery is usually a symptom of problems in the way social services are commissioned, and the 
institutions and contracting practices that support commissioning. The origins often lie with the top-down, 
centralised commissioning of social services and the siloed nature of many government agencies. Public-
sector accountability requirements, aversion to political risk and narrowly specified budget lines all 
contribute to the problem. Organisational cultures and professional and data silos are also barriers to more 
integrated approaches. 
In the Commission’s view, too many attempts to improve integration simply attack the symptoms and not 
these causes. The first place to look to improve integration is often the chosen, or historically inherited, set 
of institutional and commissioning arrangements. Commissioning agencies need to scrutinise these 
arrangements to assess whether other service models would be more conducive to integration. The models 
that do this are usually more devolved. They empower clients (or those acting on their behalf) to choose the 
best mix of services for them. Further support for integration needs to come from access to the right data, 
and the funding and accountability arrangements. 
This chapter has suggested five ways in which the system can be tailored to improve integration: 
 empowering clients and families (and/or their agents) to have a say in the way services are packaged; 
 providing opportunities for bottom-up integration; 
 addressing organisational culture across the social services system; 
 providing wider access to data; and 
 making budget processes more conducive to integrated services. 
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11 Client choice and empowerment 
Key points 
 Chapter 6 highlighted the need for commissioning organisations to carefully consider the model of 
services delivery best suited to the characteristics of the services and its client base. In every 
model, choices are made about: 
- what services to deliver;  
- who will deliver the services; 
- when the service will be delivered; 
- where the service will be delivered; and  
- how the service will be delivered. 
 Depending on the model, clients may have relatively little or relatively more control over these 
core choices. 
 There is good evidence that, for some types of social services, empowering clients to make core 
choices significantly improves their wellbeing. Yet, many services in New Zealand operate under 
top-down control, in which in-house provision or contracting out are the dominate service models 
(Chapter 5). 
 Changes to existing arrangements are required if clients are to be empowered to make core 
choices and if the choices of clients are to influence service quality and the efficiency of the 
system.  
 Shifting the power balance from the organisations that commission and deliver social services to 
clients would achieve better outcomes. For this to occur, client choices need to influence the 
allocation of public money to providers. Government departments must ease their grip on the 
reins of central control to allow the necessary power shift. 
 There are services for which choice is not an appropriate model of service delivery. These include 
services involving the coercive power of the state and where services are being provided to people 
experiencing psychological trauma, or acute physical trauma. 
 Where choice is appropriate, government agencies need to invest time and resources into 
designing and implementing the mechanisms. In particular, clients must be able to make informed 
choices, and government agencies must give providers the flexibility to meet the diverse needs of 
clients. 
 Designing and implementing a practical and efficient choice mechanism requires a deep 
understanding of alternative design options, and of the incentives and fiscal implications of 
choosing one option over another. For example, to avoid cream-skimming, payments to providers 
need to reflect the complexity of individual client need. 
 Shifting to a client-directed service model will require a significant change in mindset for many 
officials and providers. Evidence shows it takes time (and resources) to learn how to work under 
new systems, and to develop structures and processes that fit the new way of working. 
 
This chapter looks in detail at the client-directed service models (CDSMs) introduced in Chapter 6. The 
chapter begins by explaining different types of choices and then explores the potential benefits of 
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expanding client choice through CDSMs. The chapter outlines the concerns expressed to the Commission 
about expanding client choice before exploring the available evidence around these concerns. Finally, the 
chapter looks at services for which expanding client choice may be desirable.  
11.1 Types of choices 
Chapter 6 introduced seven generic models of service delivery: in-house provision, contracting out, 
managed markets, trust, shared goals, and client-directed budgets and vouchers. In all these models, core 
choices need to be made concerning: 
 what service to deliver;  
 who will deliver the service; 
 when the service will be delivered; 
 where the service will be delivered; and  
 how the service will be delivered.  
Of course, the core choices are not necessarily independent. For example, who a client chooses as their 
service provider can be influenced by when or where the service is available. Further, different components 
of the social services system will face different types of core choice. For example, Parliament (led by the 
government of the day) uses the budgetary process to choose the level of funding allocated to broad areas 
of social services (such as health, education and social development).  
This chapter will address the core choices that impact the interface and experience that a client has with the 
social services system. 
Figure 11.1 Examples of core choices  
 
11.2 Who is best placed to make core choices? 
The social services system will work best when people with the right information, incentive, capability and 
authority make core choices (Chapter 2). And when there is enough flexibility in the system to give people 
real choice between alternatives. 
who provides a service 
Choice of the person delivering 
home care services, choice of 
general practitioner, choice of 
medical specialist or consultant, 
choice of early childhood educator, 
choice of youth service worker.
what services are provided
Choice between different health 
treatments, choice of activities 
undertaken by homecare 
providers, choice of training 
courses to boost employment 
prospects.
how a service is delivered to a 
client
Group or individual counselling, 
face-to-face counselling or phone 
or web-based counselling.
when a service is delivered
Choice of appointment time with 
a counsellor, choice of which days 
of the week to attend early 
childhood education, choice of 
which group counselling session 
to attend, choice of when to seek 
help for a specific problem or 
personal issue.
where a client receives a services
Choice of having a service 
provided at the home or at a 
provider’s premises, choice of 
hospital, choice of public or 
private schools.
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Information 
Clearly, no one person or group within the social services system has all the information necessary to make 
the system run efficiently. Clients know their own preferences and circumstances, but without assistance of 
professionals may be unaware of their treatment or services options. Professionals understand the service 
and treatment options, but have little information about client preferences or the combination of treatments 
that will work best for specific individuals. Government officials know the outcomes they wish to achieve, 
but lack information on whether the services they fund are achieving these outcomes.  
Incentives 
A complicated set of rules (institutions) constrain and shape the conduct of government officials, providers 
and clients. These rules include both formal and enforceable rules (such as regulatory requirements and 
contractual provisions) and informal rules built on social and cultural norms of behaviour.  
The social services system will work best when the incentives created by these institutions align with the 
objectives of meeting the client needs in an efficient, effective and timely manner. Where clients are 
empowered to make core choices, they have a strong incentive to make decisions that meet this objective. 
However, while providers and government officials often have the best interests of the client at heart, they 
can face multiple incentives, at least some of which can conflict with the objective of meeting client needs 
(Chapter 5).  
For example, a government agency may face pressure to minimise the political risk arising from the 
provision of a service. The agency may respond by seeking to minimise political risk through specifying the 
core choices in their contracts with providers (Chapter 4). Providers, faced with tightly-specified contracts, 
may have to provide a service in a manner that meets the conditions of the contract but not the needs of 
the client. The client, in turn, may be discouraged from using the service and their needs may go unmet.  
Appendix F provides a detailed economic analysis of the factors impacting the incentives of government 
officials, providers and clients. 
Figure 11.2 Elements needed for good decision making 
 
Capability 
Individuals with the information and incentive to make core choices also need the capability to do so. The 
capability of some clients to make core choices will be limited. For example, someone in severe 
psychological distress may, in the short-run, not be in a position to make core choices. Other clients may 
need a carer or family member to assist them in making choices.  
The need for specialised skills can also affect the capability to make core choices. For instance, a heart 
surgeon will be more capable of selecting a surgical procedure than a patient. 
Importantly, there is a difference between someone having the information and capability to make core 
choices in the interest of the client, and their having the incentive to do so. For example, a medical 
Information to 
make good 
decisions
Incentive to 
make good 
decisions
Authority to make 
decisions
Capability to 
make good 
decisions
Empowering 
clients to make 
core choices
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specialist may have an incentive to recommend surgery at a private clinic rather than a public hospital, even 
though to do so would place the client under considerable financial pressure.77 
Authority  
Having the information, incentive and capability to make core choices means little without the authority to 
do so. In the social services system, the institutional setting determines who has the authority to make core 
choices.  
The Commission has heard of cases where providers have the information, incentive and capability to 
supply a service that meets a client’s needs, but contractual obligations prevent them from doing so. For 
example, there are instances in which contracts specifying home visits have conflicted with client feedback 
that home visits would increase the client’s risk of physical abuse. This situation illustrates the problems that 
can arise when the authority to make core choices is made by parties with incomplete information. 
11.3 Who makes core choices in New Zealand’s social services 
system? 
The party making core choices varies greatly between different social services. Some services operate under 
a client-directed model of service delivery where clients (or their representatives) choose the types of 
services they access and how the service is delivered, including who delivers the services and when.78 
Examples include early childhood education (ECE), general practitioners and some disability support 
services.  
An important characteristic of CDSMs is that government funding follows the choices made by clients. For 
example, parents choose the ECE centre they send their child to, and funding from the Ministry of 
Education follows the choices made by parents. Parents also choose the days of the week that their child 
will attend ECE. Similarly, government subsidies for visits to general practitioners follow the client’s choice 
of doctor (who). Clients also choose (subject to availability) their appointment time and, in some cases, they 
may have the option of treatment at home (ie, house calls) or at a medical surgery. Section 11.6 provides a 
more detailed discussion of CDSMs. 
However, many services in New Zealand operate under top-down control, and are provided using the in-
house provision or contracting out service model (Chapter 5). For simplicity, this chapter refers to these 
approaches as agency-directed. Client choice (if it exists) is limited to choosing between alternative 
providers. Once a client has chosen their provider, the services they receive are limited to those specified in 
the provider’s contract with the Government.  
In other instances, clients have limited choice of provider because the market will only support one or a 
small number of providers.  
Commonly, for many categories of disability services, there are a limited number of providers – often 
only one – in particular localities and specialties and the incentives for others to enter the market are 
often weak, or virtually non-existent. Thus, disabled people often have little or no choice of provider. 
(New Zealand Disability Support Network, sub. 47, p. 3) 
Volunteers New Zealand highlights the limited choice of providers in smaller centres. 
The focus on client choice assumes there are multiple providers available for a particular service. In 
many places there is no choice or service users have to travel to something out of the region, even for 
very basic services. As a corollary, smaller centres are likely to generate cooperation through necessity. 
They may develop models of service delivery that are quite different from larger urban cities. 
(Volunteering New Zealand, sub. 86, p. 13) 
 
77 In such a situation, profession, culture and ethics provide an alternative incentive to act in the interest of the patient. Even so, the example is illustrative 
of conflicting incentives that exist in the system. 
78 The concept of client-directed care should not to be confused with “person-centred therapy” (a form of talk-psychotherapy developed by Carl Rogers 
in the 1940s and 1950s).  
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Table 11.1 Who typically makes core choices? 
Core choice Who typically makes core choice 
who provides a service Client has choice where alternative providers are operating; however, the availability of 
alternatives can be limited in the case of isolated communities and highly specialised 
services. Providers generally choose when staff will be available and therefore which 
professional or carer a client will work with.  
what services are provided Government agencies most commonly choose the services provided (eg, through 
specifying services in contracts or legislation). Clients often have choice within a menu 
of services selected by the government agency or service provider. 
when a service is delivered Typically, the government agency or service provider selects when services will be 
available. Services are often scheduled to give clients a choice of pre-determined 
times.  
where a client receives a 
service 
Typically, government agencies or service providers select the physical location for 
delivering the service. Clients may have choice where there is more than one provider 
or where providers operates from multiple locations.  
how a service is delivered 
to a client 
Typically, service providers choose how they deliver services. However, government 
contracts can limit provider choice (eg, by specifying, say, the number of home visits 
that a provider must make). 
 
11.4 Problems with who currently makes core choices 
The social services system will work best when the core choices are made by people with the information, 
incentive, capability and authority to choose the combination of services (and service delivery methods) that 
best meet the needs of clients. 
Problems with who currently makes core choices include the following: 
 authority to make core choices often rests with those that lack information on client needs; 
 core choices are not made in a coordinated manner across the system, leading to overlaps and 
inconsistency; 
 institutional incentives rarely reward (and can work against) making core choices that meet the client’s 
needs; and 
 a lack of authority to make core choices disempowers clients. 
Authority and information 
With some notable exceptions, New Zealand’s social services system is dominated by the use of the top-
down control approach. Under this institutional architecture, government agencies retain authority for 
choosing what, where and how services are delivered. These choices are then formalised in contracts with 
social service providers.  
However, client needs are not homogeneous. Rather, needs are derived from a complicated interaction of 
personal circumstance, socio-economic conditions and cultural backgrounds – factors that clients and their 
families/whänau (rather than government officials) are best placed to understand. 
Government officials cannot possibly hope to understand the complex and dispersed needs of thousands of 
clients. As such, while one-size-fits-all contracts will meet the needs of those whose circumstances and 
needs align well with the choices made at the centre, they commonly fail those with more complicated 
needs. Healthcare of New Zealand Holdings Ltd (HCNZH) noted: 
Service models defined by funders are inevitably constraining in their attempt to define the best 
solution. Inevitably a system wide approach to design where the funder defines the service to be 
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provided leads to some people being allocated services as a solution that don’t meet their needs as 
well as another potential option or configuration. (sub. 51, pp. 6–7) 
Flexible contracts (eg, contracts for outcomes) address this problem to some degree by placing core 
choices closer to the client. However, even with flexible contracts, authority is still in the hands of those with 
less information about the client’s needs than the client (ie, providers). Chapter 4 discusses this issue.  
 
 
 F11.1  Contracting out and in-house provision are common service models in New Zealand. 
These models give clients few choices around the what, who, when, where and how of 
service delivery. 
 
 
Core choices are not made in a coordinated manner 
Chapter 10 discussed how government agencies commission services in separate administrative silos, with 
each agency having authority over core choices for specific services. The result is that agencies make core 
choices for different services independent of each other. Chapter 10 also noted that people often face 
interlocking and mutually reinforcing problems, and that solving one problem in isolation often makes little 
difference, as the remaining problems simply cause it to re-occur. Haldenby (2014) provides a clear 
example: 
…imagine a person out of work, in debt, and depressed. Debt drives their depression. Depression 
keeps them out of work. Depression thrives on unemployment. Unemployment drives their debt. It is a 
vicious cycle. Unless public services can take a coherent approach to tackling all three problems at the 
same time, they make no progress, and money. (p. 21) 
Evidence suggests that approaches that address a client’s various needs in an integrated way lead to better 
quality care. For example, models that integrate mental health and primary care lead to better depression 
outcomes for people with medical co-morbidities (Narasimhan et al., 2008). 
The problem of making core choices in isolation further compounds the inefficiencies that arise when 
choices are made with inadequate information.  
Little reward for meeting client needs  
One drawback of the current agency-directed approach is that in many instances good providers do not 
benefit directly from attracting additional clients, and poor providers do not bear the direct costs of losing 
clients. On the contrary, under some block-funded contracts, good providers bear the cost of servicing 
clients who leave a previous provider.79 At the same time the poor providers see their costs decline, 
particularly if the client’s needs were difficult or costly to meet. This reduces the incentive for providers to 
be innovative and responsive to client needs.  
Of course, consistently poor providers run the risk of not having their contracts renewed (an indirect cost) 
and the Government can reward good providers with additional funding in the future (an indirect benefit). 
However, in practice these indirect incentives are less reliable than when clients directly choose providers 
because it is difficult for commissioning agencies to observe the quality of service provision (see Chapter 6). 
Also, funding decisions are frequently based on political and bureaucratic processes rather than historical 
performance (see Chapter 4).  
 
 
 F11.2  In-house provision and contracting-out models can provide little reward for providers 
that are responsive to the needs of clients. Under some contract structures, providers 
may be disadvantaged by providing a better service. 
 
 
79 In this context, a block-funded contract is one where providers receive a fixed payment, irrespective of the number of clients they service. 
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Clients are often disempowered 
The current allocation of core choices often forces clients to be passive recipients of services rather than 
active participants in decisions that impact their lives. This can be very disempowering.  
As people start to exercise choice, they increase control over their lives. Such control has intrinsic value, 
particularly for poor or socially marginalised individuals who would otherwise lack the resources or status 
needed to negotiate better services (Chapter 3). Inspiring Communities et al. noted: 
…focusing not just on what social services are delivered but HOW is key to improving social service 
outcomes. Key elements of the ‘how’ include engaging and working with people in empowering, 
strengths based ways to enable them to become agents of their own change rather than be passive 
recipients of services. (sub. 58, p. 2) 
 
 
 
 F11.3  The allocation of decision rights under in-house provision and contracting-out models 
often casts clients as passive recipients of services, rather than active participants in 
decisions that impact their lives. 
 
 
11.5 Benefits of empowering clients to make core choices 
Increasing client choice can have benefits at both the individual and system level, a point widely 
acknowledged in submissions to the inquiry. For example, the Palmerston North Community Service 
Council noted: 
We don’t all want to go to the same supermarket, so why should clients be expected to all go to the 
same provider. Different services often come from a different cultural perspective which is important for 
the client…providers can offer a different level of service, eg. Some budgeting services offer a 
budgeting service where you can obtain advice on how to manage your own budget and yet there are 
other budget services that will actually take over your finances and manage them for you whilst 
resourcing you to take back the financial management of your finances at a later date. Both have 
advantages and are necessary in different circumstances. (sub. 125, p. 12) 
Similarly the Wise Group commented: 
Clients need choice. They need to be able to choose between providers based on culture, the services 
they deliver and whether it best meets their unique needs. Where and who a client receives services 
from is usually decided by a government agency and client choice is not readily supported. (sub. 41, 
p. 25)  
At an individual level, vesting the authority to make core choices with clients changes the traditional power 
relationship between clients and the institutions that design and deliver social services, and provides a 
mechanism through which clients can negotiate with, influence and hold accountable institutions that affect 
their lives (World Bank, 2001). The Palmerston North Community Service Council highlighted the link 
between client empowerment and choice. 
Provider diversity brings about empowerment and choice. In any sector, when this is taken away it 
disempowers the client. (sub. 125, p. 14)  
For disabled people, the quest for greater choice has occurred in parallel with a quest for greater social 
inclusion and the pursuit of human rights (see Appendix D). The importance of choice to client wellbeing 
should not be under-estimated. The submission from Manawanui highlights the empowering impact of 
choice in disability services. 
The choice, control and flexibility offered by self direction enables and empowers people to live 
ordinary and fulfilling lives. Barriers to normality often experienced by people and families with 
disabilities are removed through self direction and this enables them to make very real community 
contributions. The downstream effects of this are positive outcomes for individuals, families and entire 
communities. (Manawanui, sub. 8, p. 1) 
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Empowering clients to make core choices can enable a better fit between client needs and the service they 
receive (Duffy, 2007). The better fit occurs because in most cases the client (rather than government officials 
or providers) will have the: 
 best understanding of their individual needs and circumstances; 
 strongest motivation to get the services they require;80 
 best chance of integrating government-funded services with support from family, friends and whänau;  
 most complete understanding of any relevant risks; and (consequently) 
 best understanding of the combination of services that are most likely to work for them.  
 
 
 F11.4  In many instances clients, rather than government officials, have the best understanding 
of their individual needs and the combination of services they require. Clients are also 
often in the best position, with the support of family, friends and whänau, to integrate 
the services they receive. 
 
 
A better fit between services and client needs means more public money would be spent on the services 
that clients value, and less on those they do not. This is important because opportunities to improve 
wellbeing go unrealised when funding flows to low-value uses.  
The experience in the disability sector has shown that the ability to take a client-directed budget and 
design a bespoke solution from scratch can allow clients and the people who support them to achieve 
outcomes that would be impossible under a traditional model of procurement, thereby improving value 
for money. (Healthcare of New Zealand Holdings, sub. 51, pp. 6–7) 
New Zealand Disability Support Network notes the link between choice and being able to tailor services to 
the needs of individuals. 
Client-directed budgets, in being person-centred and allowing choice, empower people with 
disabilities and their families so that it becomes easier to tailor support to individual needs and goals. 
Implicit is a recognition that individuals, in fact, usually know what is best for them and that it is a 
positive, enriching experience for them to be in better control of their own lives. (sub. 47, p. 10) 
Unsurprisingly, clients will often require help to ensure they make informed choices. Indeed, uninformed 
choices can have serious negative consequences for clients. 
 
 
 F11.5  Giving clients choice and control over the what, who, when, where and how of service 
delivery leads to a better fit between client needs and the services they receive. A 
better fit means that more public money is spent on services that clients value, and less 
on those they do not. 
 
 
At a system level, empowering clients puts pressure on providers to be responsive to client needs and to lift 
the quality of the services they offer. All things being equal, clients will choose providers of high-quality 
services over providers that deliver low-quality services. Of course, what constitutes “high” quality and 
“low” quality can be contentious (see New Zealand Educational Institute Te Riu Roa, sub. 40).  
While the desire to retain clients can motivate quality improvements, choice can impact the quality of 
services in more subtle ways. For example, providers may notice patterns in the choices made by clients, 
such as the low uptake of a particular service. This may prompt the provider to investigate the low uptake 
and modify the service accordingly. In this way client choice provides an important feedback loop on 
service performance (see Chapter 6). 
80 This may not be the case for services that involve the coercive powers of the State. 
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Similarly, choice can strengthen the incentives on providers to look for innovative ways to deliver services 
and provide a mechanism through which both provider and client can experiment with, and learn from, 
trying different approaches to service delivery (see Chapter 6). 
Finally, choice can be a catalyst for integration of government services. For example, CDSMs that pool 
funds from across different government agencies can allow interlocking and mutually reinforcing problems 
to be addressed in a holistic manner. 
However, such integration is not an inevitable benefit of choice. Rather, integration is highly dependent on 
the institutional framework that supports the provision of choice. Chapter 10 provides a detailed discussion 
of service integration. 
 
 
 F11.6  Giving clients choice and control over the what, who, when, where and how of service 
delivery provides a mechanism through which both providers and clients can 
experiment with, and learn from, trying different approaches to service delivery. 
 
 
 
 
 F11.7  At a system level, giving clients choice and control over the what, who, when, where 
and how of service delivery creates an incentive for providers to be responsive to client 
needs and to lift the quality of the services they offer. 
 
 
 
11.6 Different ways to empower clients with core choices 
There is growing international interest in the use of CDSMs to social service provision. CDSMs can differ 
greatly in their design elements, that is: 
 the payment mechanism; 
 the level of authority that clients have over the core choices; 
 the breadth of the choices available to clients; and 
 the level of administrative and decision support that client’s receive. 
While precise classification is difficult, CDSMs can be broadly grouped under two headings: client-directed 
budgets and voucher systems. 
Client-directed budgets 
Client-directed budgets are referred to by several names, including personal budget, individual budget, 
and individualised funding (IF). Service needs are expressed in terms of a fungible unit (typically hours of 
service or dollar value of service) and pooled to form the client’s service budget. Typically, the client works 
with a professional to develop a service plan based on the outcomes the client is looking to achieve. In 
some systems, government agencies monitor adherence to the plan (monitored approaches). In others, 
plans are a non-binding tool aimed at helping clients to make good choices (assisted approaches). The 
Ministry of Health (MoH)’s IF programme is an example of this approach.  
Cash payments are a form of client-directed budgets where the clients receive payments in lieu of publically 
provided services. Typically, cash–payment schemes give wide discretion around how the clients can use 
funds. Clients employ people or purchase services themselves. 
Voucher systems 
Under voucher systems, clients receive subsidised access to a defined service (European Union, 2013). The 
client is able to access the service through providers approved or licensed by the Government. The 
Government provides a physical coupon for services (explicit voucher), pays a provider directly for services 
(implicit voucher) or reimburses the client for expenses on approved services (reimbursement voucher).  
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11.7 Client-directed models in New Zealand and internationally 
Various forms of CDSMs operate in New Zealand. However, many of these give clients few real choices 
around the service they receive. A notable exception is the MoH IF programme, which has operated since 
the early 2000s. This programme gives (eligible) disabled people the option of developing a personalised 
plan of services. People receive assistance in developing their plan from an intermediary known as an 
individual funding host. Box 11.1 provides an overview of the IF programme. Appendix D provides more 
detail on the history and performance of the programme. 
In 2011, a first-principles review of government support for people with disabilities recommended 
significant changes in the way services were delivered. Among other things, the report Enabling Good Lives 
recommended empowering disabled people and their families with greater choice and control over the 
services they receive. Importantly, the report recognised the need for “cross government 
individualised/portable funding” (Minister for Disability Issues, 2011, p. 6).  
In September 2012, the Ministerial Committee on Disability Issues agreed to the approach set out in 
Enabling Good Lives (EGL) and a vision and long-term principles for changing the disability support system. 
The following year a demonstration of the EGL approach commenced in Christchurch. A review of this 
demonstration released in 2014 indicated wide support for the EGL approach and for expanding the level 
of choice and empowerment of clients (see Appendix D). 
A second EGL demonstration in the Waikato kicked off in 2013 with the appointment of a leadership group 
consisting of three local forums representing providers and disabled people and their families. In the 2014 
budget the Government confirmed funding for the demonstration ($3.8 million over two years).  
While the demonstration is in its early stages, there are signs that agencies have learnt some lessons from 
the Christchurch EGL demonstration. For example: 
 the demonstration will be open to a wider group of disabled people and cover more services; 
 the responsible government agencies are considering alternative approaches that will reduce the 
reliance on existing government systems and processes; and 
 the disabled persons’ organisations have a closer involvement in the design of the programme. 
81 All NASC providers contracted with the MoH are members of the Needs Assessment and Service Coordination Association – a NFP organisation for 
people that manage NASCAs. 
Box 11.1 Ministry of Health’s individualised funding programme – how it works 
Individualised Funding (IF) is available for home and community support services. These are services 
that assist people to live at home and include: 
 help with household management, such as preparing meals, washing clothes and house cleaning; 
and 
 help with personal care, such as eating, dressing and getting out of bed.  
People wanting to use IF have their needs assessed via the Needs Assessment and Service 
Coordination service. These services are provided by organisations (generally referred to as NASCs) 
contracted by MoH to:81 
 faciliate the needs-assessment process aimed at determining a person’s eligibility for ministry-
funded support services; 
 coordinate the services, which includes:  
- giving information about service options that are available to the person; 
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International examples of client-directed service models 
There are a number of international examples of CDSMs. These range from cash payments for the purchase 
of home-care disability services, to client budgets for aged-care services, to vouchers for services and 
equipment. Table 11.2 provides a brief summary of some of the more notable programmes used overseas. 
In addition, there is a description of the Australian National Disability Insurance Scheme in Chapter 3.  
Table 11.2 International examples of client-directed service models
Country Programme development Description 
United 
Kingdom 
Cash payments introduced in 1988. 
Direct payments introduced from 
1997. 
Individual (social care) budgets (IB) 
piloted 2005–07 and subsequently 
rolled out. Personal health budgets 
(PHB) piloted 2009–12, with plans for 
further rollout. 
The Independent Living Fund supports adults with disabilities who live 
at home. Funding was expanded under the direct payments policy to 
include younger people, people with mental health conditions and the 
elderly. 
For people who have long-term care needs. Plan to have all council-
funded service users and carers on PHBs by 2015. PHBs are piloted 
mainly for individuals with a range of long-term conditions. 
IBs are usually used to purchase mainstream services, employ personal 
assistants and pay for leisure activities; they are sometimes used for a 
wide range of one-off purchases. PHBs are used to employ personal 
assistants or purchase goods or services that contribute to health goals in 
a personal plan. IBs are not used to pay for GP services or emergency 
health services. 
Belgium Personal assistance budget (PAB) 
introduced 1997 in Flanders region. 
Personal gebonden budget piloted in 
2008. 
As long as they apply before they are 65 years old, assistance is 
available to people with any major long-term impairment (disability). A 
PAB can be used to employ a personal assistant and purchase services 
from a choice of providers. At least 95% of the budget must be used to 
pay salaries. 
82 There are currently three levels of service. The percentage of the package a host received is determined by which level of service a person selects. 
- planning and coordinating the supports in a support plan; and 
- allocating some Disability Support Services; and 
 manage budgets: NASCs must manage the Ministry-funded Disability Support Services in a fair 
and cost-effective way. 
The NASC determines whether a person is suitable for IF. The NASC then refers those that are suitable 
to the person’s preferred IF host – organisations contracted by MoH to help clients use IF. The hosts 
assist the person to develop an Individual Service Plan (ISP). The client chooses the type of assistance 
that the host will provide. Hosts are paid a percentage of the package that a person receives. The 
more services the host provides, the higher the percentage.82 
After the plan is established, the disabled person receives the specified service (usually via a separate 
organisation that is on contract to MoH). People using IF are required to keep records of the services 
they use and report to hosts on a fortnightly basis about their use of those services.  
Unlike traditional support services, IF support is allocated on a yearly rather than weekly basis. This 
gives clients greater flexibility as they are able to “bank” unused hours for use at some time in the 
future.  
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Country Programme development Description 
France Cash for care (L’allocation 
personnalisée àl’autonomie) piloted 
in 1994–95; made national in 1997. 
Expanded in 2002. 
For people aged over 60 who need care because of a physical disability 
or mental illness. Reduces the burden on care homes. Increases the 
individual’s independence and autonomy. Funds can be used to 
purchase specific care packages, and/or to employ a personal assistant. 
Germany Cash payments for care introduced in 
1995 and extended in 2008 (to 
include mental illness). Personal 
budgets piloted 2004–2008, with 
intention to start roll-out in 2008. 
For all people who “frequently or to a considerable extent” need care 
because of a physical, psychological or mental illness or disability during 
their daily activities, or for a period of at least six months. Funds are 
used to purchase transport, nursing, assistance at workplace, leisure 
activities, therapy costs, support equipment, etc., and services provided 
by health insurance/care insurance, when needed regularly and on a 
supplementary basis. Cannot be used to pay GP costs. 
The 
Netherlands 
Personal budgets introduced in 1996. 
Scope and eligibility significantly 
scaled back from 2012. 
For people who have a disability, chronic illness, psychiatric problems or 
age-related impairments. By 2014, only those who would otherwise have 
to move into care or a nursing home will be able to keep/apply for a 
budget. Funds can be used to buy personal care for help with daily 
living, nursing care, support services (eg, day-time activities), and short 
stay and respite care for short holidays/weekends. Cannot be used to 
pay for alternative treatments, medical treatments, or treatment by allied 
health professionals. 
Austria Cash payments introduced in 1993. 
Covers home care and institutional 
care, and covers the whole 
population. All state support for 
home care is through cash 
allowances. 
For those aged over 3 who need long-term care (requiring 50+ hours of 
care a month), due to physical disabilities and/or mental illness. A 
medical assessment of need is done. The programme promotes 
autonomy, choice and market-driven developments. Largely used to 
compensate family members for informal care. 
US Cash and counselling piloted 1998–
2002. Some states developed client-
directed care for adults with serious 
mental health conditions. In 2012, the 
majority of states started to offer 
client direction through Medicaid 
programmes. Some states allow for 
client direction in non-Medicaid 
elderly assistance programmes and 
for some veterans services. 
For older people and people with disabilities who need home and 
community-based long-term care. Some programmes support 
individuals with serious mental health problems. Cash and counselling 
varies between programmes. Can employ personal assistants and 
purchase care-related services and goods. States control the range of 
services and equipment that can be purchased. Some programmes 
include purchasing some elements of healthcare, such as skilled nursing 
and long-term rehabilitative therapies. Some programmes include 
clinical recovery services for people with serious mental health 
conditions. 
Canada Started in 1997, individualised quality 
of life pilot launched in Toronto. 
Rolled out from 2000. Similar 
initiatives in other provinces. 
For people with developmental disabilities who need support. Funds are 
used to purchase disability-related supports. Funds cannot be used for 
costs related to medical supplies or equipment, home renovations, 
electronic equipment or leisure, recreation and personal/family costs. 
Australia Individualised funding introduced in 
Western Australia in the 1990s; 
Victoria introduced Individual Support 
Packages in 2003 and direct 
employment in 2012. National 
Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) is 
currently being implemented. 
Client-directed disability support through planning and personalised 
funding is most advanced in Western Australia and Victoria, although 
elements of such programmes have been introduced throughout 
Australia. See Chapter 3 for details about NDIS. 
Source: Gadsby, 2013; Cortis et al., 2013; Productivity Commission. 
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11.8 Submitter concerns about client-directed service models 
This section highlights some of the concerns raised by submitters about the use of CDSMs. The following 
section looks at the evidence and experience with CDSMs in New Zealand and internationally to assess 
whether these concerns are justified.  
The Council of Trade Unions (CTU) highlights an overarching concern about the need to understand the 
implications of moving to CDSMs.  
In the United Kingdom it is the “choice model” that has been increasingly favoured and embedded - 
though elements of the other models remain. The New Zealand situation is similar with policies and 
practices leaning towards the “choice model”. But there are a multitude of issues that have not been 
analysed or fully understood about this so-called “choice model”. We are very concerned about 
moving in this direction without a full appreciation of the implications of this model. (sub. 103, p. 5) 
“Client-directed service models reduce service quality” 
One of most commonly expressed reservations of submitters was the perception that CDSMs result in a 
decline in service quality. For example, the submission from the New Zealand Educational Institute Te Riu 
Roa commented on the link between client-directed budgets and the quality of education services.  
Education already has client-directed budgets in that a very large proportion of funding to centres and 
schools is roll-based. When a child moves to a new service or school, they take their funding with them. 
This creates a high level of competition between providers, which can undermine the provision of high 
quality education… (sub. 40, p. 30) 
HCNZH emphasised the risk involved in allowing clients to employ people without adequate training. 
…client-directed budgets can encourage employing informal staff from the person’s own networks, 
where this happens there is a risk that people performing key functions/roles are not adequately trained 
to perform their duties. (sub. 51, p. 7) 
The Otago Youth Wellness Trust questioned the ethics behind placing choice above quality. 
The focus should always be on Provider quality and effectiveness. Diversity or “choice” for choice sake 
that knowingly results in multiple Providers delivering poor quality services is unethical. (sub. 73, p. 12) 
“Some people can’t make choices” 
Some submitters were concerned that many clients are not able to make choices due to the nature of their 
illness or impairment. For example, the Spectrum Care Trust Board noted: 
People with an intellectual disability are less able to do that and require additional supports. People 
who have communication difficulties are less able to articulate their needs. Many people with an 
intellectual disability are not able to rationalise their funding or prioritise or even fully understand the 
range of services available. For the same reasons, those affected by acquired brain injury, dementia 
and related illnesses are less likely to benefit from individualised funding and are more exposed to 
exploitation by those managing funds on their behalf. (sub. 90, p. 8) 
Carers New Zealand expressed similar concerns. 
Our main reservation about individualised funding is that it works best for the “able-disabled” who are 
in a good position to benefit from the empowerment opportunities available. Where the person with a 
disability or illness is not in a good position to benefit from the empowerment opportunity (e.g. they 
are a child, or have an intellectual disability) the responsibility for spending the funding and arranging 
the care tends to fall on the family. (sub. 71, p. 4) 
“Client-directed service models make vulnerable people more susceptible to abuse” 
Some submitters expressed concern that CDSMs expose vulnerable clients to abuse. The submission from 
HCNZH is typical of the views expressed to the Commission: 
…the risk of abuse (emotional, physical and financial) exists in relation to both formal services and the 
types of informal arrangements that exist around client-directed budgets. In the case of client-directed 
budgets people can be vulnerable to abuse because there are no formal checks and balances of the 
quality of the support/service they are receiving. If family members are both the beneficiaries of 
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funding (employees) and the key people supporting decisions there is a significant conflict of interest 
that can lead to abuse. (sub. 51, pp. 6–7) 
Aged Care New Zealand expressed similar concerns. 
If control was put into the hands of a carer or family member, there is the risk that the carer or family 
member may abuse their position. (sub. 100, p. 5) 
“People don’t want to shop around for providers” 
A number of submitters commented that clients simply do not want to shop around for providers and that 
the benefits of switching providers may be low relative to the costs (such as filling in paperwork or breaking 
relationships with trusted professionals).  
New Zealand Disability Support Network noted:  
Clients with, say, an intellectual or sensory disability – or even those who just lack confidence – may be 
at a particular disadvantage in making good choices and even when someone else (such as a family 
member) acts as an agent for them, there can be problems. Often, it may come down to trial and error 
but, nonetheless, it can be cumbersome, awkward and distressing for a disabled person to change to 
another provider, assuming there exists the option of an alternative provider. (sub. 47, p. 4) 
“Client-directed service models can lead to people becoming isolated from their community” 
There was concern in some submissions that CDSMs can result in clients interacting less in the community, 
leading to isolation and an associated loss of wellbeing. 
Individualisation or personalisation can lead to isolation for the person by disconnecting them from 
group supports and the person being seen in isolation from their family/community. (Inclusive 
New Zealand, sub. 32, p. 6) 
“Client-directed service models place financial pressure on providers” 
Many providers voiced concerns about the financial implication of CDSMs. For example, Inclusive 
New Zealand noted: 
Providers have no guarantee of income. This makes it difficult to plan, ensure that adequate staffing 
ratios are maintained and that the organisation can run efficiently and sustainably. There is still a need 
for core or baseline funding. (sub. 32, p. 6) 
The submission by Workbridge goes further, suggesting that without core funding some providers risk not 
being financially viable under client-directed budgets. 
With client-directed budgets and outcome-based contracts, providers have no guarantee of income. 
This makes it difficult to plan, ensure that adequate staffing ratios are maintained and that the 
organisation can run efficiently and sustainably. There is still a need for core or baseline funding…With 
the lack of funding increases in the past 10 years for Vocational Services in the disability community 
many providers are using their reserves to provide services, are close to insolvency within the next 1-2 
years and cannot accommodate client-directed budgets and outcome-based contracts without an 
increase in core or baseline funding. (sub. 102, p. 11) 
“Client-directed service models are more open to fraud and misuse of funds” 
Some inquiry participants have expressed concerns that CDSMs are more prone to fraud and misuse than 
traditional agency-led approaches. For example, the Association of Salaried Medical Specialists noted that 
programmes overseas have had “problems with fraud” (sub. 85, p. 32).  
“Client-directed service models are harmful for workers” 
While supportive of the general intent of client direction, some submissions cautioned that CDSMs can have 
adverse impacts on workers.  
The submission from the CTU noted: 
We support the concept of the consumer having choice in the employment of their support worker but 
advocate for it to be managed through an organisation that is accountable for managing the 
employment and the health and safety requirements (which are significant) to the level of the Home 
and Community Support Standards and other relevant legislation. (CTU, sub. 103, p. 19) 
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The CTU went on to comment that “[t]he development of home-based services in providing more choice 
and reducing institutionalisation has been at the expense of the workforce” (p. 16). 
The Public Service Association (PSA) expressed similar views. 
The PSA supports the intent of this programme but we are deeply concerned about the approach taken 
in New Zealand where the person with a disability is the employer of staff. This approach: 
a) Diminishes the skills and contributions of the disability support workforce 
b) Undermines meaningful workforce planning and development and national standards of 
service delivery 
c) Places considerable responsibility on the person with a disability to manage the obligations of 
being an employer 
d) Will increase insecurity in employment and expose the workers to health and safety risks (we 
note the exemption being considered under the Health and Safety Reform Bill). (New Zealand 
PSA, sub. 108, p. 17) 
The submission from HCNZH also noted the risks to staff. 
The key risks associated with client directed budgets include … unsafe employment practices – where 
the client is responsible for employing staff there is a risk that they will not be a good employer in terms 
of ensuring a safe workplace and meeting their legal obligations to their employee. (sub. 51, pp. 6–7) 
11.9 What do evidence and experience suggest? 
This section examines the evidence around the advantages and disadvantages of CDSMs. 
Any discussion of “evidence” will inevitably raise questions around the methodological credibility of the 
studies examined, and the type of information that the Commission considers credible evidence. This 
section draws its evidence from: 
 systematic literature reviews conducted by academic researchers within universities; 
 programme evaluations commissioned by government agencies both in New Zealand and overseas; 
and 
 the Commission’s review of articles in peer-reviewed journals and published reports. 
Collectively, these sources cover over 100 journal articles and published evaluation reports. Submissions to 
the inquiry and anecdotal evidence collected during engagement meetings also inform the section.  
There are clearly some shortcomings in the available research on CDSMs. Arksey and Kemp (2008) highlight 
a number of methodological issues within the existing literature. 
 Studies often focus on a specific programme, so that meaningful comparisons with traditional agency-
led approaches cannot be made. 
 Many studies suffer potential selection effects in that clients self-selected to be part of the programme 
under review. Few studies involved randomised assignment of clients into treatment and control 
groups. 
 Studies commonly measure client perceptions and experiences rather than more objective assessments 
of programme performance. 
 Most studies assess the success of a programme at a point in time, rather than over the longer term. 
It is also important to note that the literature covers programmes with different designs and different 
supporting institutions. This makes comparisons difficult. Notwithstanding these methodological difficulties, 
the Commission believes that a lot can be learnt from the available literature on CDSMs.  
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Most clients report higher wellbeing and satisfaction with services 
The strongest conclusion from the available literature is that CDSMs improve client satisfaction with 
services, feelings of wellbeing and quality of life (Gadsby, 2013; Gadsby et al., 2013; Crozier et al., 2012; 
Bennett & Bijoux Ltd, 2009). 
Evaluations of CDSMs in the United States, England and Australia have reported increased levels of 
satisfaction after moving from agency-directed to client-directed models of support (Alakeson, 2008; 
Alakeson, 2010; Gray et al., 2009; Shenet al., 2008; Benjamin et al., 2000; Carlson el al. 2007; Fisher & 
Campbell-McLean, 2008; Foster et al., 2003; Gordon et al., 2012; Tyson et al., 2011; Wiener, Tilly, & 
Cuellar, 2003; Forder et al., 2012).  
Further, comparisons of clients directing their own services with those receiving agency-directed support 
show that clients directing their own support usually: 
 are happier with the availability of services they receive (Carlson et al., 2007; Cook et al., 2008); 
 feel they are making more progress towards meeting their goals (Cook et al., 2008); and  
 are more likely to feel that their needs are being met (Alakeson, 2007). 
Glendinning et al. (2008) conducted an evaluation of the IB pilot programme across 13 pilot sites in the 
United Kingdom. The evaluation found: 
 mental health service users “reported significantly higher quality of life than those in the comparison 
group” (p. 17); and 
 physically disabled adults “were significantly more likely to report higher quality of care” (p. 18). 
The same study, however, suggested that for some clients, choice may create anxiety and lower wellbeing.  
Information from the qualitative interviews with service users and their proxies indicated that many 
older people supported by adult services do not appear to want what many of them described as the 
‘additional burden’ of planning and managing their own support. (p. 27) 
Notwithstanding this “additional burden”, Gadsby (2013) concluded that: 
[t]he overall success of personal budget initiatives in terms of improving individuals’ satisfaction with 
their care, and aspects of their quality of life, is established in international research. (p. 17) 
 
 
 
 F11.8  International evidence suggests most clients experience an increased level of 
satisfaction after moving from agency-directed to client-directed models of social 
services provision. 
 
 
Positive health outcomes are reported, but the evidence is weak 
While some studies have reported positive health outcomes (Stainton & Boyce, 2004; Carlson, et al., 2007; 
Fisher & Campbell-McLean, 2008; Cooper, 2010), there is only weak evidence that CDSMs lead to better 
health outcomes than traditional agency-directed services (Gadsby, 2013; Gadsby et al., 2013; Crozier et 
al., 2012).  
Conversely, there is little or no evidence in the published literature to suggest that CDSMs lead to worse 
health outcomes than agency-directed services. Indeed evaluations in the United States comparing client-
directed and agency-directed approaches to home care suggest little difference in health outcomes 
(Benjamin et al., 2000; Wiener et al., 2007; Alakeson, 2010; Benjamin et al., 2007; Brown et al., 2007).  
These results are consistent with evaluations undertaken of the PHB programme in England. Forder et al. 
(2012) found that the programme had no (statistically) significant impact on health status or mortality rates, 
and that clients did not report significant differences in health-related quality of life compared to the control 
group. 
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 F11.9  Some studies have reported positive health outcomes when clients shift from agency-
directed to client-directed service models. However, in general the evidence for such 
health improvements is weak. 
 
 
Most clients can and do exercise choices given the opportunity 
The available evidence suggests that in most cases, with the right tools and support, clients are indeed able 
to exercise choice when given the opportunity. Inclusive New Zealand suggests that disability is not an 
obstacle to exercising choice.  
We are concerned about the statement in the paper that ‘some clients may have medical conditions or 
disabilities that limit their ability to make informed choices… services can be designed to allow choices 
to be made on their behalf.’ Disability support providers have worked hard to ensure that people using 
their services are able to make informed choices. It is our experience that most people are able to 
make their preferences known when they are communicated with in the correct way, and a range of 
good practices, such as Circles of Support, have been developed. (sub. 32, p. 6)  
Many programmes allow clients to nominate a representative to assist them in making choices, or to choose 
on their behalf. Mahoney et al. (2007) highlight this as one of the six critical issues involved in designing 
CDSMs. In reference to the US Cash and Counselling Programme they noted: 
In the course of the original experiment, states learned that many individuals who were capable of 
expressing important preferences but not able to manage an individualized budget on their own (e.g., 
persons with some developmental disabilities or persons with Alzheimer’s disease) could profit from the 
flexibility afforded through the Cash and Counselling model if they were allowed to appoint a 
representative to assist them. Others, especially among the elderly, just felt more comfortable having a 
representative at least at the start. Whereas states have made good progress developing criteria for 
when representatives are needed and how they should be monitored, these policies need to be 
evaluated and refined. (p. 557) 
 
 
 
 F11.10  If good practices are used, most clients of social services programmes can and do 
exercise choice when given the opportunity.  
 
There is little evidence that client-directed service models lead to a decline in quality  
Available research does not support the idea that CDSMs reduce service quality. While anecdotal evidence 
of quality decline is available, the quality of support provided under CDSMs has largely been evaluated as 
at least as high as under agency-directed models (Gray et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2006; Young & Sikma, 2003) 
and in some instances is greater (Gaynor et al., 2012).  
 
 
 F11.11  There is little evidence to support the claim that client direction leads to a decline in 
the quality of services that clients receive.  
 
Fraud and misuse of funds is no higher than agency-centred approaches 
The most notable (and commonly cited) instances of fraud have occurred in the Netherlands. While in 
monetary terms the losses from fraud in the Netherlands were not large, they generated considerable 
media attention and public debate (van Ginneken et al., 2012). 
In New Zealand, available evidence suggests that fraud and misuse of funds are no greater (and are 
probably less) than under tradition agency-led arrangements. Manawanui Incharge noted: 
… Our statistics indicate that clients are more likely to underspend against their allocations than 
overspend…The fraud rate with all of the self directed approaches in NZ is 0.4%. This is extremely low 
compared to some international estimates that put potential fraud at 5%… we believe this is even more 
positive when traditional service provider fraud is considered as a comparison. (sub. 8, p. 9) 
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 F11.12  There is little evidence to support the claim that client direction is any more or less 
open to fraud or misuse than agency-directed models of social service delivery.  
 
Client-directed service models can be more expensive than agency-led models 
Results from overseas evaluations tend to suggest that CDSMs can be more expensive than agency-
directed services (Alakeson, 2010; Barczyk & Lincove, 2010). A commonly cited reason for the additional 
cost is that clients using client-directed programmes tend to use their full entitlement, while clients of 
agency-directed services did not (Alakeson, 2010).  
This finding is consistent with early financial evaluations of the MoH’s IF programme conducted in 2010. 
The evaluation found that allocations for clients who moved from agency-led to client-directed funding 
increased by an average of 14.9%. The report suggested that the increase was largely due to clients having 
their needs reassessed as higher than they were previously. Some overseas studies have deemed this the 
“wood work effect” where people whose needs were not being met by traditional services were able to 
receive a greater level of support through personal budgets, but with the results that budgets increased. 
Rather than abandon the approach, governments in Sweden and the Netherlands subsequently applied 
tighter assessment and eligibility criteria and used more stringent financial accounting. 
Another cost is the set-up of introducing CDSMs.  
…individualised funding models require significant administrative investment, particularly upfront. In 
both Australia and New Zealand the costs associated with individualised funding were underestimated; 
forcing host agencies to work to unrealistic schedules… (Wise Group, sub. 41, p. 16) 
There is evidence from the Netherlands, however, that: 
…the value of a personal budget is 25 per cent lower than the equivalent cost of care in kind, on the 
grounds that there will be fewer overheads … On top of this, each year 10-15% of budget holders 
repay some of their annual allocation… (Gadsby, 2013, p. 20). 
Gadsby also made the point that the movements towards establishing PHBs across the world: 
…have been supported by the belief that they could be an effective means of curbing or even driving 
down the costs of health and social care … and by enabling a reduction in the use of expensive 
residential or acute care. (Gadsby, 2013, p. 20). 
This is difficult to establish in practice. An evaluation of the IBs in England concluded that there is some 
evidence that IBs are more cost effective in achieving overall social care outcomes (Glendinning et al., 
2008). A clear message from the literature is that measuring cost effectiveness is very challenging due to the 
lack of robust and consistent data. Essentially the jury is out on whether CDSMs are cost effective over the 
long term. 
 
 
 F11.13  Available evidence indicates that client-directed models can be more expensive than 
agency-directed models, especially if they are not well planned and executed.  
 
Impact on the workforce of client-directed service models is mixed  
Most studies of CDSMs primarily focus on the outcomes for clients and their families. As a result, there are 
few studies that look specifically at the impact of CDSMs on workers. Moththorpe et al. (2011) captures 
many of the problems with the available evidence: 
…few studies looked in depth at the employment relationship from the perspective of care and support 
workers, especially where the employee was a family member... At best, employment relationships and 
the significance of them were marginal considerations in many studies and reports; others had small 
samples or were unclear about their sources of evidence. Furthermore, there was some difficulty in 
establishing whether some authors meant family members giving informal care, or paid care and 
support workers, when using the term ‘carer’. (p. 202) 
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The evidence that does exist presents a mixed picture. For example, some people worry that CDSMs 
reduce demand certainty for existing providers and therefore create a disincentive to invest in worker 
training and career development. On this point Cortis et al. (2013) noted: 
Evidence to substantiate concerns about falling demand for formal care services in the United Kingdom 
has been mixed... The evaluation of the Individual Budget pilots found, for example, that take-up of 
personal budgets by some groups was low, with older people the least likely to ask for changes in their 
services. For these groups, care organisations retained significant roles as service providers... Where 
individual budget holders continued with pre-existing service arrangements, services needed to adapt 
only by invoicing service users rather than local authorities... As such, there was little effect on the 
workforce. On the other hand, service providers which did experience a loss of service users found it 
frustrating as they had invested in recruiting and training service delivery staff, who were no longer 
required... This last effect, of course, is likely to have wider negative impact, in that loss of investment 
can act as a disincentive to further investment in staff. (p. 25) 
Further, some international studies show that client-directed budgets have increased workforce uncertainty 
and led to reduced security of tenure and pay (Rubery & Urwin, 2011, Cunningham & Nickson, 2010, 
Wilberforce et al., 2011). Conversely, Leece and Peace (2010) reported that some care workers prefer, and 
have benefited from, client-directed budgets as they allow them more time to undertake tasks, making 
them feel less rushed and under pressure.  
Similarly, early studies of personal assistants in the United Kingdom found conflicting evidence of reduced 
pay and conditions but higher job satisfaction as well as greater user satisfaction (Carr & Robbins, 2009). 
These studies commonly attribute low pay rates to programme design and shortfalls in funding. Clients 
employing personal assistants reported that the total amount of money received through direct payments 
was insufficient to meet their support needs and this resulted in diminished training and education 
opportunities for personal assistants (Adams & Goodwin, 2008).  
In the United Kingdom, workforce changes include increased direct employment of personal assistants by 
clients and greater demand for the services of intermediary organisations (for profit and not-for-profit), 
especially assessment, planning and brokerage expertise. Cortis et al. (2013) also noted changes to the mix 
of skills required by frontline workers.  
…individualised funding in the UK was also perceived to change the mix of skills required from frontline 
workers. This has included requirements for higher level health skills in the direct care workforce; more 
multi-skilling across health, housing, leisure and employment issues among those in frontline roles; and 
a downgrading of trained and qualified social care practice to focus on personal advocacy, brokerage, 
risk assessment and navigating among multiple through the service system... (p. 27). 
In Victoria, a small trial of the impact of the direct employment approach showed that participants with 
previous professional or other experience, such as bookkeeping, accounting or business ownership that 
helped them perform the employer role effectively, were likely to benefit most from this approach (HDG 
Consulting, 2010). 
Appendix E discusses workforce conditions in home-based support for older people. 
The Commission is interested in hearing from people with first-hand experience working under CDSMs, 
such as the IF programme operated by the MoH. The inquiry team is also interested in hearing about any 
specific studies into the impact of CDSMs on workers in New Zealand. 
 
 
 F11.14  There is limited evidence on the impact that client-directed budgets have on workers. 
Available evidence suggests that impacts will be highly dependent on the design of the 
programme and on the level of government funding available. 
 
 
 
 
 Q11.1 
 
The Commission is interested in hearing from people with first-hand experience working 
under Individualised Funding and Enabling Good Lives. Have any specific studies been 
undertaken into the impact of these two programmes on workers? 
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Conclusion from the evidence and experience 
Table 11.3 provides a summary of what the literature says about the concerns raised in section 11.8. 
Table 11.3 Literature on concerns about client-directed service models  
Concerns Conclusions and themes from literature  
CDSMs reduce service quality There is little evidence to support that CDSMs lead to a reduction in 
service quality. There is strong evidence to suggest that CDSMs 
increase wellbeing and client satisfaction with services. There is little 
evidence to suggest that (objectively measured) health outcomes are 
any better or worse using CDSMs than using agency-directed 
approaches. 
Some people cannot make choices There are ways to assist clients with communication impairments to 
make choices. Evidence suggests that the use of representatives allows 
people to benefit from choices even when they are not able to 
communicate all preferences.  
CDSMs open vulnerable people up to 
abuse 
Measures to protect vulnerable clients are vital under any approach to 
the delivery of social services. There is little evidence to suggest that 
the risk of abuse is higher or lower using CDSMs than using agency-
directed approaches.  
People don’t want to shop around for 
providers 
While data is scarce, there is some evidence to suggest that when 
given the choice clients select different services (or models of delivery) 
than previously available under agency-led models.  
People are most likely to value choice when they see real differences in 
the services that providers offer.  
There is generally strong uptake of choice once it is made available to 
people. 
CDSMs can lead to people becoming 
isolated from their community 
There is little evidence to link client direction to increasing or 
decreasing levels of social isolation.  
CDSMs are more costly for government 
agencies 
There is some evidence that the budgetary costs of CDSM can be 
larger than alternatives. This is particularly evident when assessment 
and eligibility criteria are poorly designed, and where there is latent 
demand in the system.  
CDSMs are more open to fraud and 
misuse of funds 
Overseas programmes have experienced incidences of fraud. In 
New Zealand there is little evidence to suggest the instance of fraud is 
higher under CDSMs than under agency-lead models. There is some 
evidence to suggest that fraud is lower under CDSMs in New Zealand.  
CDSMs are harmful for workers Available evidence of the impact on the workforce is limited and shows 
mixed results, reflecting the different client-directed models used. 
 
11.10 Which additional services may benefit from client choice? 
This section looks at the types of services that may benefit from increasing client choice.  
Submitter views on where client-directed service models have potential 
In the inquiry issues paper published in October 2014, the Commission asked participants which client-
directed models were suitable for CDSMs (specifically client-directed budgets). Subsequently, many 
submissions to the inquiry suggested areas where the client-directed approaches may be suitable. 
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There was wide, but not unanimous, support for extending the use of client-directed budgets in 
New Zealand. The services most commonly mentioned in submissions and during engagement meetings 
were: 
 disability support services; 
 home-based support of older people; 
 respite services; 
 family services (eg, counselling and budget services); and 
 drug and alcohol rehabilitation services. 
Other suggestions include preventive healthcare services (such as vaccinations) and housing services. Yet, 
several submitters warned against viewing CDSMs as a panacea for improving services. For example, the 
NGO Health and Disability Network noted: 
Client-directed budgets or ‘individualised funding’ should not however, be seen as an overarching 
solution that is applicable to all clients and families. It works best and will only really work for individuals 
and families who are willing and competent to put the time and effort into making arrangements 
independently to ‘purchase’ the services they require. Individualised funding, while having many 
advantages, transfers significant responsibilities from the funder to the individual; e.g. getting value for 
money, assuring quality of service, etc. (sub. 70, p. 6) 
These submitters suggested that clients should have access to a continuum of options that will be needed 
in many cases. 
Some submitters highlighted services they felt were not suitable to client-directed budgets. The 
New Zealand Disability Support Network suggested that client-directed funding is not appropriate in cases 
where people are convicted of an imprisonable offence. 
A few services, however, are not suited to client-directed budgets. These would include behavioural 
support services, as well as services to support the administration of the Intellectual Disability 
(Compulsory Care and Rehabilitation) Act 2003. The Act provides for the compulsory care and 
rehabilitation of individuals with intellectual disabilities that have been either, i) found unfit to stand trial 
or, ii) convicted of an imprisonable offence. There are two different levels of care – Secure Care 
(hospital level or community based) and Supervised Care (community based). Care is in designated 
secure or supervised facilities, respectively, and the care recipient is required to remain in the 
designated facility, other than for periods of approved leave. (sub. 47, p. 10) 
Submitters also stressed the need to consider the immediate circumstances facing a client and their 
psychological state. 
The psychology of clients is also an important consideration. The time when clients decide upon 
services is frequently in the early days of meeting Blind Foundation criteria which is stringent enough 
that the sight loss is severe at this point. Sight loss is a traumatic event and often a deeply emotional, 
life altering time. Whether clients want to have choice during this time is debateable. In many cases it is 
more likely that clients and families would choose to be pointed to experts who can offer assessment, 
services and counselling in a single package rather than shopping around. (Blind Foundation, sub. 16, 
pp. 24–25) 
Others stressed that the system was already working well for some clients. 
While we acknowledge that there is a place for client-directed budgets international experience has 
shown that it is not the right option for everybody. It is important to acknowledge that the current 
system is working well for some people. (Workbridge, sub. 102, p. 10) 
 
 
 
 Chapter 11 | Client choice and empowerment 239 
Box 11.2 Submitter comments on the use of client-directed budgets 
Te Rünaka o Ötäkou 
The home-based care and disabilities sectors are directly suited for client-directed budgets. This 
principle needs to be taken further utilising a Co-Production model for commissioning across all 
service purchasing areas…  
In an ideal world all services and purchasing arrangements would follow the client and be co-
ordinated across a defined community. (sub. 110, p. 6) 
Home and Community Health Association 
Providers involved in IF for under 65s have commented that they can see how it could work in 
individual over 65 cases. It could suit, for example, situations where families wish to keep their 
older family member in the home, and can use a mix of family and employed support, by using 
available allocated funding.  
We think that there needs to be a great deal more flexibility around respite care, and suggest that 
client directed budgets could be effectively applied in relation to that element of community 
support. (sub. 114, p. 10) 
Presbyterian Support New Zealand shared their experience with client-directed budgets for older 
people. 
Client directed budgets for Older People have been in place for a small number of clients in 
Otago hosted by Presbyterian Support Otago. In terms of outcomes clients identify the following 
advantages of Individualised Funding over more traditionally funded services: 
• greater flexibility around care arrangements 
• ability to employ staff directly and more stable workforce with less turnover 
• greater ability to fund a range of services that are not available through mainstream 
funding 
• greater sense of control and autonomy over the service being provided 
• ability for IF to be more responsive to changing needs. (sub. 76, p. 7) 
Pharmacy Guild of New Zealand 
There are a number of services that community pharmacy provides that are well suited to a client-
directed budget: 
• Preventative health interventions e.g. vaccinations 
• Healthcare monitoring e.g. Community Pharmacy Anti-Coagulation Management Service 
(CPAMS) 
• Managing in the home e.g. weekly preparation and delivery of medication packs. 
(sub. 11, p. 4) 
Platform Charitable Trust 
Budgeting, counselling, youth services, whänau ora navigation/pathway, social housing, health, 
justice etc. Longer-term rather than shorter term individual services. (sub. 45, p. 17) 
Healthcare of New Zealand Holdings Ltd 
Client-directed budgets are likely to be successful in areas where – the client (or their family) has 
the best information about what interventions/services will improve their quality of life, there is a 
defined amount of funding that they are entitled to (the client directed budget), an adequately 
objective process exists for determining that entitlement, adequate support is available to assist 
them to make decisions and plan expenditure, and there is an effective market of service 
providers for them to work with. (sub. 51, pp. 6–7) 
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Principles for successful client-directed service models  
Experience with CDSMs in New Zealand and overseas suggests that the model will be most beneficial 
where: 
 the benefits of the service are experienced primarily by the client (ie, the broader costs to society of 
making a wrong decision are small); 
 the costs of making a wrong decision are not catastrophic or lead to irreversible harm for the client (ie, 
there is an opportunity to learn and experiment with the mix of services); 
 it is possible for clients (or their representative) to be given enough information to make informed 
decisions; 
 there are multiple service providers (or the potential for new providers to offer services), allowing clients 
real choice; 
 the cost to the individual of switching between services providers is not excessive or harmful to the 
client; and 
 there are potentially several ways that providers could deliver services.  
In contrast, services may be less amenable to client choice (or at least fewer choices) in situations where: 
 the choices made by clients have broader implications for society or would create a significant risk to 
society; 
 services primarily involve the use of the coercive powers of the state; 
 the number of providers is limited (or there are significant barriers to new providers forming); 
 delivering a service to a consistent national standard is important; 
 clients do not want choice, or are happy to have decisions made for them; 
 the individual is experiencing acute and chronic psychological/physical trauma; 
 the preferences of clients are relatively uniform and the potential for scale economies exist (ie, large 
economies of scale can be achieved without a greater loss in demand-side allocative efficiency); and 
 the allocation of uniform services to all clients is important for social equity. 
Applying the principles to selected services 
Table 11.4 provides a summary of the expected benefits and disadvantages of applying client-directed 
budgets in four areas: home-based support of older people, respite services, family services and drug and 
rehabilitation services. 
Auckland District Council of Social Services 
Probably addiction services like alcohol or gambling; combatting obesity; severe mental illness; 
very limited intellectual capacity; risk related services generally because of limitations in the 
understanding of the client or of their appreciation of the changes they ought to make. (sub. 55, 
p. 6) 
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Table 11.4 Applying principles to selected social services  
Question Home-based care 
for older people 
Respite services Family services1 Drug and alcohol 
rehabilitation 
services 
Are the benefits of the 
service are experienced 
primarily by the client? 
Yes Indirectly (via the 
wellbeing of carers 
or family) 
Yes (there are also 
positive benefits to 
society) 
Yes (there are also 
positive benefits to 
society) 
Do clients face 
interlocking and mutually 
reinforcing problems? 
Yes No  Typically yes Typically yes 
Are the costs of poor 
decisions catastrophic or 
irreversible? 
Generally not 
(assuming service is 
within legislated 
standards) 
Generally not 
(assuming service is 
within legislated 
standards) 
Generally not 
(assuming service is 
within legislated 
standards) 
Generally not 
(assuming service 
meets a minimum 
standard) 
Can clients make informed 
core choices?  
Generally yes. Some 
may need support 
Yes Generally yes. Some 
may need support 
Generally yes, but 
will depend on 
psychological state 
Are there multiple 
providers or the potential 
for new providers? 
Generally yes. May 
be few providers in 
small or isolated 
areas 
Generally yes. May 
be few providers in 
small or isolated 
areas 
Generally yes. May 
be few providers in 
small or isolated 
areas 
Generally yes. May 
be few providers in 
small or isolated 
areas 
Is the cost of switching 
excessive or harmful?  
Generally not 
(however relationship 
can be important) 
No Would depend on 
relationship 
established – 
continuity can be 
important 
Maybe, depending 
on the circumstance 
Are there several ways the 
service could be 
delivered? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Is it easy for new providers 
to enter the market? 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: 
1. Includes services such as counselling and budget services. 
 
 
 
 R11.1  When commissioning services, the Government should look to empower clients where 
such empowerment would not be detrimental to the client or the broader interests of 
society. Disability support services, home-based support of older people, respite 
services, family services, and drug and rehabilitation services are good prospects. 
 
11.11 Designing client-directed service models 
New Zealanders will not benefit from a poorly designed and implemented CDSM.  
Designing and implementing a practical and efficient CDSM requires a deep understanding of alternative 
design options and the incentives and fiscal implications of choosing one option over another.  
Designing a client-directed programme is a complex exercise. It takes time and resources for officials, 
clients and providers to understand the implications of a new approach. It also takes time and resources for 
providers to learn how to work under the new system, and to develop organisational structures and 
processes that fit with the new way of working. For example, the National Disability Insurance Scheme in 
Australia will take 10 years to implement from the original conception of the idea. 
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The existing institutional setting is an important consideration for the design of any new approach. These 
institutions determine the fundamental conditions that the approach will operate in and have significant 
impact on the outcomes achieved.  
Existing formal institutions impacting the design of CDSMs include legislation such as the Public Finance 
Act 1989 and the Human Rights Act 1993. These formal institutions often set boundaries around the use of 
public money or the procedures that officials must follow when public money is used. Those designing the 
system need to have a good understanding of the impact of institutions so that either: 
 CDSMs can be designed within the boundaries of existing institutions; or  
 reforms to existing institutions can be identified and implemented. 
Informal institutions such as society’s values, customs, norms and cultures also need to be understood and 
considered. Client-directed models can often challenge the underlying assumptions of sections of society 
(including the culture of government agencies). This can lead to resistance from groups that feel threatened 
by the change in approach (Chapter 13). 
Experience to date suggests some key design questions are: 
 What service will the scheme cover? 
 Who will assess client needs and how will they do the assessment? 
 Will there be restrictions around the types of services that a client can access? 
 Which government agencies will fund the programme? Will funding be pooled? If so, how? 
 What price will be paid to providers for their services? How will the price incentivise good performance? 
 Who will measure performance (and how)? 
 What roles will different agencies play? How will these roles be coordinated and governed? 
 Is the design consistent with existing government institutions and frameworks? Where are the likely 
sticking points? How can sticking points be overcome? 
 Are there missing institutions or functions? If so, what new institutions does the Government need to 
create? What will be the form and function of these institutions? Who will fund the new institutions?  
 What are the transaction costs that the different players in the system are likely to face? How can 
transaction costs be minimised? 
 What will the role of the community be in designing the new approach? 
 How will change be managed? 
Appendix D provides some guidance on the design of CDSMs, based on experience in the area of disability 
services. 
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Figure 11.3 Key design elements of client-directed service models  
 
11.12 Summary – choice can improve outcomes 
The social services system will work best when the core choices are made by people with the information, 
incentive, capability and authority to choose the combination of services (and service delivery methods) that 
best meet the needs of clients. In many instances, this will be the client. Yet within New Zealand’s social 
service system there are many instances in which clients have little say in who provides services, and in 
what, how and when services are provided. Problems with the existing arrangements include: 
 authority to make choices often rests with those that lack information on client needs; 
 choices are not made in a coordinated manner across the system, leading to overlaps and 
inconsistency; 
 institutional incentives rarely reward (and can work against) making choices that meet the client’s needs; 
and 
 a lack of authority to make choices disempowers clients. 
Changes are required if clients are to have greater choices and if their choices are to influence service 
quality and the efficiency of the system. Mechanisms for selecting and funding services need to change to 
allow client choice to impact the flow of public money to providers. For this to happen, government 
agencies need to loosen their grip on the reins of central control. 
 
 
 
Who can provide 
services? 
How will the payment 
system incentivise 
good outcomes?
How will performance be 
measured (and the 
vulnerable protected)?
How will change 
be managed?
What services are 
covered by the 
scheme?
How are 
budgets/needs  
determined?
What are the rules 
around how a budget 
can be spent?
How much decision 
support is provided? 
...and who pays for it?
Key design 
elements
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12 Better purchasing and contracting 
Key points 
 Government agencies have several thousand contracts for delivering social services with thousands 
of not-for profit and for-profit organisations.  
 This chapter primarily relates to the contracting-out service model described in Chapter 6, and to a 
lesser extent in other models. The Commission anticipates that contracting out will continue to be 
an important service model, and sees significant scope for improvement. 
 Contracts between a principal (in this case usually the government) and an agent, which delivers an 
objective on behalf of the principal, typically cannot cover every contingency. The principal has 
incomplete information about the agent’s performance; and there are incentives to shift risk and 
for opportunistic behaviour. To cope with these challenges, contracts take many different forms. 
 There are various sources of official guidance about how to design and administer contracts. 
Official guidance should be harmonised. Government agencies should ensure relevant employees 
and providers are aware of official guidance. 
 Submitters to the inquiry (dominated by service providers) consider that contract design and 
administration need to be improved. Reviews that preceded this inquiry reached the same 
conclusion. 
 To improve contracting practice, agencies should face new requirements to: 
- undertake reasonable consultation with providers and clients during the pre-contract phase;  
- report whether they have met tendering timelines; 
- look for further opportunities to standardise contracts; 
- develop a risk management framework, in consultation with providers, which identifies risks 
and how best to allocate them; 
- use the risk management framework to help them set the length of contracts, and explain 
publicly how they did this; 
- adopt a risk-based approach to monitoring contracts; and 
- explore the potential for contracting for outcomes, but only apply it under favourable 
circumstances. 
 Government should improve the capabilities of agencies to contract for outcomes, ideally with 
payments for outcomes achieved in those contracts. 
 
Choosing the service model best suited to a social service and its intended clients is one of the important 
tasks in commissioning a social service (Chapter 6). Government agencies purchasing social services from 
non-government organisations is a typical – and important – approach in New Zealand, and central to the 
terms of reference of this inquiry. While some of the recommendations of this report, if adopted, could lead 
to a decline in this approach, it will likely remain important in the long term for services that suit this 
approach. 
This chapter therefore focuses on government purchasers contracting out services to non-government 
providers. Purchasing and contracting are central features of the contracting-out service model. They are 
also central to managed markets, but of lesser relevance to the other service models.  
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The Commission has not found complete and reliable data on the number and value of government 
purchases of social services from non-government providers. However, government agencies have several 
thousand contracts for delivering social services with thousands of not-for profit and for-profit organisations. 
(Chapter 2).83 New Zealand Treasury (2013) estimated that the social sector accounts for approximately 
$12.4 billion of procurement expenditure to third parties used for the acquisition and delivery of goods, 
services and construction. However, the Treasury did not indicate the proportion of this procurement that 
took place through contracts. 
This chapter begins by describing the challenges in designing and administering contracts (section 12.1). 
Section 12.2 explains the public accountability framework within which government purchasers operate, and 
the main guidance material that is available. Section 12.3 summarises the views of inquiry participants about 
how well contracting works. Contracting is controversial: most submissions commented on it. A few 
opposed contracting in principle, usually because they felt that creating a commercial relationship between 
the government and not-for-profit (NFP) organisations undermined the reasons why these inherently non-
commercial organisations exist. However, most submissions suggested improvements in one or more of: 
 contract guidance material; 
 the competitive tendering process,  
 contract design; and 
 contract management. 
The final section explores options for making improvements in these areas.  
12.1 The challenge of designing and administering contracts 
A contract is a formal agreement between two or more persons or entities, involving a promise to do 
something in return for a payment. Effective contracts impose clear obligations, and reward performance 
that is measured against these obligations. Specification matters for the purchasing agency, to provide 
assurance that it is not wasting money, and for the contractor, so that it can prove that it has fulfilled the 
contract. 
This section describes features of contracts that influence their design and administration. Appendix F 
provides more details. 
The principal–agent relationship  
The principal–agent relationship is a useful framework for analysing many contracts. The principal in a 
contract engages an agent to undertake a task or perform a service to advance a desired outcome. In 
general, the principal and agent have differing incentives and information. To encourage the agent to act in 
the principal’s interests, the principal needs to:  
 specify the required objective and outcomes; 
 design incentives to align the agent’s interests with their own; usually by rewarding the agent for 
achieving the objective or by penalising failure; 
 negotiate contract terms and conditions with the agent, including the required objective and mutually 
acceptable incentive arrangements; and  
 monitor whether the objective is being achieved, based on observable information. 
83 Information supplied by Martin Jenkins and based on data covering four government agencies: the Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Social 
Development, the Ministry of Justice and Te Puni Kökiri. 
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Ideally, payment is made in exchange for achieving a clearly specified and measurable outcome. However, 
this ideal is difficult to achieve. More often, payment is made for achieving inputs or outputs, rather than 
outcomes: 
…it is very important to distinguish between ‘contracting for outcomes’ and ‘outcomes focused 
contracts’. When we refer to contracting for outcomes in this paper, we refer to funding that is linked to 
performance or results. Outcomes focused contracts, on the other hand, are still specified in terms of 
inputs or outputs, but there is an emphasis on how an activity improves higher level population or client 
outcomes. (New Zealand Treasury, 2014, p. 2) 
Outcome focused contracts are predicated on an anticipated link between the inputs or outputs and 
outcomes. If this link is weak or absent, “providers are not rewarded according to how good their service is, 
but whether they enact certain processes” (Haldenby, Harries & Olliff-Cooper, 2014, p. 30). 
Negotiating and administering contracts involves transaction costs, such as legal fees to draft and check the 
contract, the cost of setting up and running a disputes resolution procedure, and reporting requirements. 
These costs are incurred to improve contract operation. For example, careful legal drafting can specify 
events that trigger actions, and the specific actions that the principal and/or agent are required to take.  
The Government is often the principal but not the direct recipient of the services.84 Rather, it purchases 
services that are then made available to, for example, an unemployed person or a person with a disability. 
Ideally the Government will gather information about the needs of the recipients on whose behalf it is 
acting, although this may be less likely to happen when contracts – as in the case of some that are 
administered by Ministry of Social Development (MSD) – do not even collect information about the types of 
individuals receiving services. 
Collecting and analysing information about client needs and preferences is costly. There is less need for the 
Government to bear these costs in the client-directed service models discussed in Chapter 11. In such cases 
this information is generated through clients dealing directly with providers: if a provider does not meet a 
client’s needs, the client is usually allowed to switch to a provider who does. Indeed, in such cases providers 
may be the agents of more than one principal (ie, the Government and the client). Providers have to 
compete between themselves for clients – a form of competition that is often absent when the Government 
contracts with providers on behalf of the final user of the service. 
Challenges in contract design and management 
Contract design needs to take account of inherent features of the principal–agent relationship, including: 
 contracts are usually incomplete; 
 each party has incentives to shift risk to the other; and 
 incentives for opportunism. 
Incomplete contracts 
Contracts are normally incomplete, because they do not specify remedies for all possible future 
contingencies. It is usually not feasible to identify all risks, and even the best drafting will not eliminate all 
risk that the principal will not get exactly what they want.  
The implications for design are evident in New Zealand practice (section 12.4 provides examples) and 
include that contracts may: 
 distort behaviour as the parties focus on contracted elements while ignoring others that may also affect 
the intended outcomes, but are relatively difficult to observe focus on inputs, about which there is 
usually more complete information, rather than on outputs or outcomes (Box 12.1);  
84 The picture is further complicated by the fact that the Government comprises multiple, hierarchical principal–agent layers (Appendix F). 
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 become outdated if providers change their service to meet evolving client needs, but contracts are 
rolled over rather than amended; and 
 may become more personal over time, in the sense that trust and loyalty matter more. 
Box 12.1 Specifying contracts for providing social services 
Typically, contractual obligations are specified in one of several ways (Figure 12.1). Moving from left to 
right across the Figure, obligations match more closely to desired objectives but are typically more 
difficult to measure. 
Figure 12.1 The continuum of contractual obligations 
 
More specifically:  
 input-based obligations specify the resources a provider must expend in delivering the service (eg, 
the number of trainers that must be present at a training course);  
 process-based obligations specify the process or methods that a provider must use when 
supplying a service (eg, the content and method of instructing a training course); 
 output-based obligations specify the amount of services that a provider must supply (eg, the 
number of attendees that complete a training course);  
 results-based obligations specify the impact that the purchaser expects the provider to have (eg, 
the percentage of trainees that were able to find work); and 
 outcome-based obligations specify the objectives the purchaser expects the provider to deliver 
(eg, a reduction in youth unemployment). 
 
Some problems caused by incomplete contracts will be less serious if there is mission alignment between 
principals and agents. “Mission orientation” refers to the values and objectives of organisations, workers or 
social services clients – relating not just to the exchange of goods or services, but also their availability to 
clients, and the means by which they are produced. The closer the mission alignment between principal and 
agent, the less risk that the agent will exploit the contract by under-delivering on elements that are less 
easy to observe. Alignment of mission orientation can substitute to some degree for the use of incentives in 
contracts to reduce the risk of quality shading (Appendix F). 
Managing risk 
Efficient contracts allocate risks (eg, of cost overruns, unexpected changes in demand or provider under-
performance) to the parties who are in the best position to manage them. The challenge is to design 
contracts that anticipate risks without unnecessarily hindering beneficial risk-taking and innovation. 
The aim should be to achieve an optimum – rather than a maximum – transfer of risk away from the 
Government. However, if ministers and government agencies expect to be held accountable for the failures 
of providers, they may seek to reduce their exposure by controlling what the provider does. They might do 
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so by using highly specified contracts that describe the inputs to be used, the processes to be followed and 
the outputs that are to be produced. This can, however, reduce providers’: 
 incentives and room for innovation; 
 flexibility to respond to changes in clients’ needs or in the environment; and 
 scope to work together and to supply integrated bundles of services (Spiller, 2008). 
Moreover, trying to transfer risk to providers can backfire on the Government, which may in any event bear 
the cost of inappropriately transferred risk through higher service charges or increased likelihood of default.  
Ultimately, providers will not bear risks that they cannot control. They may agree to. They may attempt 
to. However, in the final analysis, if providers lack the levers to mitigate their risks, they will fail, and 
hand the risk back to the state. Therefore, it is in government’s interest to do all it can to ensure the 
level of risk it is asking providers to take on is appropriate and manageable. (Haldenby, Harries & Olliff-
Cooper, 2014, p. 35) 
There are ways to manage risks without introducing excessive prescription. These include tying payments to 
the delivery of services or to quality performance criteria (to avoid quality shading); imposing obligations on 
suppliers to have adequate financial reserves or insurance cover; and tying contract renewal to contract 
performance.  
Incentives for opportunism 
Both parties usually incur costs if they leave a contract, particularly if they have invested in specific assets 
that have value in a particular use or in the context of a particular relationship but less value in other 
uses. This creates incentives for opportunistic behaviour, because one party can “hold up” the other party 
to the value of that specific commitment. For example, the Government might change the interpretation of 
the contract or other things it controls, including regulation, after a contract has been signed. To protect 
themselves against such opportunism, private contractors may seek contract specificity, commit to investing 
in fewer and smaller specific assets, and favour forms of rewards that are more difficult for the principal to 
appropriate. Opportunism can also happen on the other side of the contract. For example, a contractor 
could seek to exploit the aversion of governments to public failure by bargaining for additional payments to 
avoid such a perception.  
Relational contracts 
Relational contracts rely on informal agreements and self-enforcement based on the parties agreeing to 
contract variations without formal renegotiation or litigation. They can be particularly useful where 
dimensions that are hard to measure are important and exchanges recur.  
Long-term relationships form the basis of many private sector contracts. These relationships can span 
multiple contract periods – creating an incentive for both parties to cooperate (as their actions can impact 
their likelihood of securing future contracts). The arrangements can take different forms. The “keiretsu” 
system used in Japanese industry (eg, by Toyota) is illustrative. Under this approach, procurers maintain 
relationships with a small set of suppliers, combining information sharing, close monitoring and limited 
competition (Aoki & Lennefors, 2013). There are also alliance relationships, based on a collaborative 
approach to project risk, project management and the adoption of mutual objectives and outcomes, and 
which tend to be used in infrastructure projects (Regan, n.d.).  
Such relational contracts allow for adjustments to service delivery, when unforeseen or unexpected 
circumstances arise, to occur without renegotiation. This reduces the cost of administering the contract 
(Baker, Gibbons & Murphy, 2001; Spiller, 2008). The Blind Foundation argues that successful relational 
contracts can occur where there is consistent and personal contact between the two parties and relationship 
managers are empowered to modify and adjust the contact or how it works (sub. 16, p. 22).  
Relational contracts do not fit easily within the public sector accountability framework. To avoid the risk of 
cronyism and favouritism, administrative rules limit the discretion of contract managers to make ad hoc 
adjustments to service delivery, and annual funding cycles reduce the certainty of future contracts (and 
therefore the incentive to cooperate). 
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The High Trust Contracts initiative, introduced by MSD in 2009, attempted to move towards relational 
contracts. It recognised that stable and established providers with a good track record pose less risk and 
that, as a result, inflexible contract terms could be removed. However, the Commission heard examples of 
contract managers introducing conditions into High Trust Contracts that made them indistinguishable from 
highly specified contracts. 
Submissions did not provide many examples of relational contracts, although National Services Purchasing 
suggested that:  
Relational contracts are best when there are close, trusting, and highly communicative relationships 
between funder and provider at governance and operational levels, with stable personnel and 
organisational cultures. (sub. 111, p. 9) 
The Public Health Association, however, appears to have a different view of the extent of relational 
contracting, noting that “gold standard” commissioning has been compromised by, among other things, 
“suspicion of relational contract management” (sub. 122, p. 6).  
The Treasury noted that many short-term contracts roll over after 12 months. This could be consistent with a 
relational approach to contracting. However, it pointed out that: 
… it is not clear what the shared benefit of 12 months contracts is other than risk control for the 
government agency. The question is whether this is an efficient and effective way of managing risk 
given the high costs it creates for those providing the service? To our knowledge no analysis of this has 
been attempted by any government agency. (New Zealand Treasury, 2013, p. 22) 
Around 10% of MSD’s Community Investment contracts are actually agreements for grants rather than 
contracts for services. These contain minimal specifications, and are less formal. MSD’s grant funding is 
typically for one-off projects or provider development (pers. comm. 17 March 2015). ) 
Using competitive tendering to improve contracting 
Competitive tendering for contracts can improve the efficiency of service delivery in four ways. 
 Specifying the objective and incentive arrangements, including performance measurement, can 
enhance accountability. 
 Open tendering reveals the prices at which providers are willing to provide specified services.  
 Allowing entry by new providers and encouraging poor performers to reform or exit can stimulate 
efficiency and innovation. This is provided that tenders are not held so frequently that providers expect 
they will not secure the gains from innovation, or so infrequently that providers feel they are insulated 
from competition. 
 Opening itself up to competition from external providers can stimulate improvements in government 
service delivery.  
However, the design and implementation of tenders is complex. 
Impacts on quality 
Tenders based on lowest price are well-suited to procuring simple goods or services whose characteristics 
are easily specified in advance and for which there is little risk of changing specifications post-tender. 
However, when quality is important and is difficult to measure, competitive tenders can result in quality 
shading unless providers care at least as much about quality as does the procurer, or expect their 
reputation for providing a quality service to be a determinant of whether they are re-appointed. 
Frequency 
Aligning the length of tendered contracts with the investment horizon of the providers should reduce hold-
up risk. However, if providers still feel that they are exposed to this risk, they may make fewer or less-
specific investments. Frequent changes in providers can cause undue disruption for clients. 
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Other features 
Appendix F discusses other features of the tendering process, such as the information structure; disclosure 
of project information; the capabilities of public sector tendering end enforcement institutions (eg, 
regulatory bodies); and the credibility of commitments by public bodies. It notes that stronger mission 
alignment in NFPs supports non-monetary incentives for quality provision, but that this advantage relative 
to for-profit (FP) firms must be weighed against the ability of the latter to pay more and so attract more able 
workers, as well as reputational concerns of FP firms supporting a commitment to quality. 
Section 12.3 demonstrates that many NFPs feel that tenders impose excessive costs, can reduce quality, 
and are too frequent. Section 12.4 puts forward proposals for addressing these problems. 
12.2 The framework for contracting out government service 
provision in New Zealand 
Government agencies that fund non-government providers need to operate within the public accountability 
framework that applies to all expenditure of public funds (Box 12.2). The pressure for accountability that this 
framework creates may have encouraged the use of contracts (OAG, 2006, p. 15). This section describes 
Government guidance about how to undertake contracting. 
 
Contracting guidelines  
Two core documents are the Treasury’s Guidelines for Contracting with non-government organisations for 
services sought by the Crown (New Zealand Treasury, 2009) and the Office of the Auditor-General (OAG)’s 
Principles to underpin management by public entities of funding non-government organisations (OAG, 
2006) (Box 12.3). The Treasury and OAG Guidelines were developed when the focus was on sound 
management of public finances. More recently, the focus has been on rules about good procurement 
practice. A recent review by the Treasury considers that its Guidelines have weaknesses (section 12.4).  
Box 12.2 Public sector accountability framework 
Ministers are accountable to Parliament for the manner in which public funds are spent, and public 
servants are subject to public law and administrative requirements designed to ensure that public 
funds are used in a lawful, transparent and accountable manner. 
The main elements of the public sector accountability framework are:  
 overarching “machinery of government” statutes – for example, Constitution Act 1986, State-
Owned Enterprises Act 1986, State Sector Act 1988, Crown Entities Act 2004, Public Finance Act 
1989, Local Government Act 2002; 
 sector- or entity-specific legislation – for example, Education Act 1989, Children, Young Persons 
and Their Families Act 1989, New Zealand Public Health and Disability Act 2000, Vulnerable 
Children Act 2014; 
 rights-related legislation – for example, New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, Human Rights Act 
1993, Privacy Act 1993; 
 oversight and accountability legislation – for example, Local Authorities (Members’ Interests) Act 
1968, Ombudsmen Act 1975, Official Information Act 1982, Local Government Official Information 
and Meetings Act 1987, Protected Disclosures Act 2000, Public Audit Act 2001; and  
 ethical and administrative guidelines that include the Cabinet Manual 2002 and the State Services 
Commission’s Public Service Code of Conduct.  
Source:  OAG, 2006; Productivity Commission.  
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Some government agencies also set out guidance, policies or procedures. The OAG notes that this 
guidance “usually” aims to be consistent with the Treasury and OAG guidance, and that MSD and the 
Ministry of Health (MoH) adopt this approach (OAG, 2006).  
Funding guidelines 
The Department of Internal Affairs (DIA) has published a voluntary Code of Funding Practice (DIA, 2010), 
which aims to assist government and non-profit organisations when entering into government funding 
arrangements. 85 The Code sets out seven code areas: respect; cultural context; transparency; open 
communication; flexibility and innovation; integrity; and accountability. It provides criteria for each code 
area and recommends performance indicators. 
85 The Code is primarily aimed at the funding relationships between government agencies and the non-profit sector, although its general principles “may 
apply to a wider range of funding arrangements” (DIA, 2010, p. 7). 
Box 12.3 Guidelines 
Office of the Auditor-General’s guide for managing funding arrangements 
This guide explains six principles that the OAG “expects public entities to consider — and act in 
keeping with — to manage funding arrangements with non-government organisations”: 
 lawfulness; 
 accountability; 
 openness; 
 value for money; 
 fairness; and 
 integrity. (OAG, 2006, pp. 9–10) 
The guide contains four scenarios showing how the principles might be applied, and how they 
interact. 
Treasury guidelines for contracting with non-government organisations for services sought by the 
Crown 
These guidelines, first issued in 2001 and revised in 2009, are intended to encourage better 
contracting practices. As the OAG pointed out, the Treasury “has a responsibility to ensure that all 
government departments and Crown entities are aware of, and take into account, best practice 
principles in the management of public resources” (OAG, 2006, pp. 7–8). 
The guidelines are underpinned by principles of good contract management and cover all aspects of 
the contract lifecycle: 
 planning; 
 selecting a provider; 
 negotiating the contract; 
 managing the contract;  
 review and evaluation; and 
 starting over.  
                                                     
252 DRAFT | More effective social services 
According to the DIA, the Code “does not duplicate the advice provided by the Treasury or the Office of 
the Auditor-General, but rather embodies a common understanding of, and mutual commitment to, 
specified principles and minimum standards that may be used by both government and non-profit 
organisations” (DIA, 2010, p. 7). However, the Code does seem similar to the other guidelines.  
Compliance with the Code is not monitored or reported. Indeed, the Commission is not aware of reporting 
against any contracting guidelines.  
The streamlined contracting project 
In March 2013 Cabinet directed the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) to lead the 
“Streamlined Contracting with NGOs” 3-year project (2013–2016). The project aims to reduce inconsistency 
in, and duplication of, contract management practices across government agencies, to reduce compliance 
costs for non-government organisations (NGOs). The project includes six government agencies (ie, MSD, 
Health, Justice, Education, Corrections and Te Puni Kökiri). 
The project, which is being undertaken in partnership with NGOs, with oversight from the cross-agency 
Social Sector Purchasing Steering Group, has created a suite of contract, contract management and 
decision-making tools, collectively referred to as the Contracting Framework. This is designed to increase 
consistency across government agencies that contract with NGOs and to improve coordination between 
agencies and reduce duplication of audit-related activities.  
MBIE expects the benefits of the framework to include: 
 standard terms and conditions for contracts to enable NGOs to focus on service delivery; 
 tools and templates to support more consistent management of contracting arrangements; 
 an enhanced ability for NGOs to work collaboratively with and across multiple government agencies, 
using a common language based on a common understanding/approach; 
 reduced training and up-skilling requirements for personnel moving between government agencies 
and/or NGOs as the Contracting Framework is standard across agencies; 
 reduced requirements for input from legal specialists; 
 greater availability of data and information, including identification of opportunities for more 
collaborative contracting; 
 less duplication of contract management activity, such as audit and monitoring; 
 an increased focus on identifying and measuring improvement in client outcomes through the use of 
Results Based Accountability (RBA); and 
 the ability to streamline reporting through use of shared performance measures across programmes. 
(Procurement.Govt.NZ, 2014) 
Some next steps are noted below. 
 Continue to move contracts with providers over to the new outcome agreement template. Current 
forecasts indicate that government agencies will enter into about 900 contracts using the Contracting 
Framework by 1 July 2015, with a further approximately 1240 contracts currently planned for transition 
in 2015/2016. These contracts make up approximately 60% by volume of government agency contracts 
with NGOs. The intent is that all contracts with NGOs will be migrated to the Contracting Framework 
when their current contracts expire, renew or are replaced with new services (pers. comm. 7 April 2015). 
 Test the suitability of the framework within the District Health Board (DHB) contracting environment. A 
decision on any roll-out and the timing of any roll-out in DHBs will be made once trial work is completed 
(pers. comm. 7 April 2015). 
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 Set up an MBIE-managed contracts register. 
 Provide agencies with access to a software application as a single repository in which to store RBA 
information from NGO providers. 
The Social Sector Purchasing Steering Group has a wider programme of streamlined work, including the 
harmonisation of audit, approval and accreditation standards and practices. MSD’s information technology 
system for approvals is being developed as the initial technology platform for coordinating audits across 
agencies, providers and programmes.  
Procurement rules 
MBIE has also issued procurement rules and in February added 103 Crown entities to the 29 government 
agencies already mandated to apply the rules. However, agencies acquiring certain types of public health 
services, education services and welfare services, which appear to cover many social services covered by 
this inquiry, are able to opt out of applying these rules. They are expected to conduct their procurement 
according to procurement principles and other procurement good practice guidance (MBIE, 2014). 
Implications 
There are many advisory documents. There is a risk that, when confronted with so many documents whose 
roles may be difficult to distinguish, agencies may ignore them all if they are unsure about which ones to 
follow. Further, guidelines by themselves will not deliver the desired outcome. They need to be 
accompanied by staff training in how to apply them and by the resolve of senior management to apply 
them consistently. Guidelines developed outside an organisation are less likely to be “owned” by it. 
The Treasury considers that in spite of the large number of improvement projects, further progress is 
required.  
There is a long history of initiatives in this area and a number of new projects underway which are all 
attempting to improve the performance of the social service market. Many talk about a focus on 
outcomes, but very few seem to be moving towards contracting for outcomes, or performance-linked 
funding. (New Zealand Treasury, 2013, p. 5) 
12.3 Issues raised by participants 
Submissions, most from non-government providers of social services, covered many aspects of contract 
design and management. 
Some providers are concerned that competition for contracts discourages trust and collaboration between 
non-government providers, or undermines their independence and advocacy role.86 Most participants, 
however, focused on four issues: 
 the tendering process; 
 contract design; 
 contract administration, including the complexity of reporting; and 
 various impacts of contracting. 
The tendering process 
Tendering can improve the efficiency of service delivery, but needs to be carefully designed. Submissions 
tended to focus on problems with the administration and frequency of tenders (and therefore transaction 
cost), and their differential impacts on providers. 
86 Submitters with this view include the Methodist Mission (sub. 4), Restorative Justice Aotearoa (sub. 28), Barnardos (sub. 12), the Disability Support 
Network (sub. 47) the Dunedin Community Law Centre (sub. 48), the Public Services Association of New Zealand (sub. 108), Relationships Aotearoa (sub. 
56), the Tauranga Budget Advisory Service (sub. 57) and the Waves Trust (sub. 83). 
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Administration 
Health Care of New Zealand Holdings (HCNZH) considered that the quality, accessibility and usefulness of 
information provided by funders during contestable processes is highly variable, inadequately prepared and 
can increase the time and effort required to prepare a Request for Proposal (RFP). It has also observed a 
secretive approach to answering questions during the procurement process (sub. 51). The Salvation Army 
pointed to “baffling” tendering decisions, and indicated that it had very little confidence in a tendering 
process it was involved in (sub. 104). Whakaata Tohu Mirror Services noted that: 
Crown entities are very limited in their contracting skills, generally manage small budgets and don't 
seem to have the infrastructure in place for contracting. Reporting processes are rushed and there is no 
auditing process in place. These contracts seem to be administered on a who knows who basis. 
(sub. 23, p. 3) 
Some providers commented that the Government does not adhere to its own timetable in tender 
processes. This could mean, for example, that a provider might not know until after contract expiry whether 
it was to be renewed, which would make it difficult to keep on staff. Spectrum Care Trust Board criticised 
this and other aspects of a tender it was involved in. 
The national BSS contract exemplifies the MoH’s inability to adequately control a project. Like most of 
its tendered offerings, the timelines, rules, communication undertakings and RFP protocols are 
sometimes severely compromised. MoH has attracted little confidence from the sector in terms of its 
credibility, leadership and competency. This RFP process lacked credibility from the outset with many 
providers believing the decision was ‘fait accompli’ from the beginning of the process. (sub. 90, p. 2) 
Other submissions acknowledged recent attempts to improve tendering processes, such as MBIE’s 
Contracting Framework. However, Te Rünaka o Ötäkou observed that, in the health area:  
Government’s recent streamlined contracting initiative and commitment to reduce the audit burden are 
welcome moves, but so far they have only impacted on a very small number of providers. As long as 
DHBs and other government agencies are not part of the streamlined approach, the burden of 
compliance will not reduce significantly for non-profit health providers. (sub. 110, p. 10) 
Short-term contracts 
A common view is that tenders are too frequent, and that short-term contract periods increase costs and 
reduce service integration, innovation, and the ability of providers to retain staff and premises. 
The Wise Group noted that: 
...most contracts tendered are short-term, never greater than three years and for many now one year 
agreements; this despite their definition being for essential services. This is certainly the case in 
specialist mental health and addiction services where in one DHB area all of the group’s contracts are 
for one year. Longer term agreements, five years minimum, would reduce the cost of contestability. 
A similar example is year on year contracts which are continuously re-issued. For example, in one DHB 
area we have had 12 one year contracts over 12 years! (sub. 41, p. 23) 
The Wise Group considered that the cost to the Crown, to the Group and to other tenderers is difficult to 
justify, particularly given that contracts are often re-issued. The Group also considers that contestable 
processes have been used to bring about changes to service models that could have been given effect at 
lower cost through negotiation and contract variation (sub. 41). 
The Southland Interagency Forum worries that frequent changes to tendering rules increase cost, pointing 
to: 
...protracted and resource draining contract negotiations, onerous audit requirements for all (even if the 
contract value is less than $10,000), continual threat of either tendering contracts on the open market, 
or changing the rules and accepting of tenders that don’t meet original “Request for Proposal” criteria, 
all of which have come about in the last two years. (sub. 29, p. 1) 
Relationships Aotearoa considered that as well as imposing excessive costs on bidders, excessively frequent 
tenders discourage partnerships between providers: 
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Forming mutually beneficial partnerships takes time, and often the contestable funding processes are 
managed within very short timeframes. This is not conducive to forming partnerships for the purposes 
of delivering integrated cross agency services. (sub. 56, p. 8) 
Supporting Families in Mental Illness (sub. 49) and Restorative Justice Aotearoa (sub. 28) note that short-
term contracts create uncertainty and stifle innovation. Care NZ points out that “year to year contracts make 
planning difficult” (sub. 99, p. 5), while the Auckland Council of Social Services considers that short-term 
contracts also reduce the incentives for providers to share good practice, reward staff and advocate policy 
or practice changes (sub. 55). Community Networks Aotearoa (CNA) observes that short-term contracts 
make it difficult to retain staff or premises (sub. 31). With many 3-year contracts tied to an electoral cycle, 
“after every election, new ideology can change everything that an organisation has been requested to do” 
(p. 8). 
Impact on providers of different sizes 
There are two views on provider size. The first is that in the small New Zealand market, it may be efficient 
for the Government to contract with a small number of service providers. The second is that the tendering 
process discriminates between providers. 
An example of the first view is Carers New Zealand: 
Attempting to introduce competition among service providers where there is not sufficient capacity or 
capability tends to damage the limited capacity or capability that is available, with a corresponding 
decrease and disruption to the quantity or quality of the services available. There are real examples 
where this has happened in the last few years. (sub. 71, p. 7) 
Similarly, Youth Horizons’ view is that: 
… for target populations which have complex and hard to treat conditions the country should invest in 
a small number of providers which can scale up evidence-based interventions, implemented with high 
model fidelity, and with the capacity to build ongoing data collection and quality improvement 
systems. We recommend that government agencies make a strategic decision to take a targeted 
investment approach on the basis that this will create the conditions which facilitate strong 
organisations delivering interventions which yield strong investment returns via reduced costs of crime 
and other social harms to the state and private sectors. (sub. 67, p. 14) 
On the other hand, several submitters argued that the tender process disadvantages small providers and 
that price and provider size should not be the only determinants of contract outcomes (Box 12.4). 
Box 12.4 The tender process and small providers 
CNA argued that the system of tendering on-line for social services is “deeply flawed” and “is not a 
level playing field. Local NFPs cannot compete with large organisations who have resources to employ 
contract lawyers” (sub. 31, p. 8). The Community Care Trust considered that the tendering process 
favours larger providers who can employ professionals to write tender documents (sub. 96). 
Inclusive NZ argued: 
Smaller community organisations … have less resource and capacity and are at a disadvantage 
when competing with larger and for-profit providers who have experience and funds to invest in 
tender bids. Tender processes that are awarded on the strength of a tender document and do not 
take into account an organisation’s relationship with its community also place these organisations 
at a disadvantage. (sub. 32, p. 8) 
The New Zealand Red Cross noted:  
All parties contesting a contract are generally required to complete all steps in the tendering 
process. This represents a significant duplication of effort particularly for smaller organisations. A 
simple staged process to shortlist contenders may enable interested parties to provide a high 
level expression of interest, and be selected to progress to detailed design on a needs basis only. 
(sub. 94, p. 4) 
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Participants commented on: 
 payment terms; 
 performance measurement (particularly outcomes); and 
 prescription in contracts. 
Payment terms  
Terms can include payment in advance or after delivery; the length of time before invoices are paid; the 
price paid; and how payments are structured. 
Many submitters complained that contract prices are inadequate to cover their costs. This issue is explored 
in Chapter 6. 
The Delta Community Trust complains that payments can be late. 
Payment mechanisms for CDHB contracts are complex and we often need to chase up payment (to our 
cost) and sometimes spend a fair amount of time getting the correct payment. (sub. 13, p. 2) 
Contracting for outcomes 
Contracting for outcomes involves payments to agents for achieving outcomes. Desired outcomes are 
specified in the contract, and there is a risk of losing the contract if those outcomes are not achieved. This 
approach has both supporters and critics among the submissions.  
Supporters argued that it focuses activity on what matters, helps innovation, encourages flexibility, allows 
for culturally specific responses, and facilitates relational contracts. Manawanui (sub. 8) and the Blind 
Foundation (sub. 16) noted that it is outcomes that matter to clients. 
Outcomes are more important than processes and inputs. Contracts need to be refocused on how 
people’s choices have improved their lives and the lives of those around them, and how the supports 
and services have contributed to these outcomes. (sub. 8, p. 2) 
Outcomes are the only truly reliable measures that matter for clients, and in establishing return on 
investment, and value to the wider population. (sub. 16, p. 29) 
Similarly, the Wise Group considered that while defining outcomes is challenging, activity-based contracts 
focus attention on less important activities, by creating: 
…unhealthy pressure to focus on the immediate service delivery via contact hours at the expense of 
workforce development, community development, quality improvement and a focus on outcomes 
which demonstrate a higher value than being busy. These contracts set services up to ‘hit a target, but 
miss the point’. (sub. 41, p. 18) 
Footsteps (sub. 42), the Methodist Mission (sub. 4) and HCNZH (sub. 51) suggested that measuring 
outcomes helps innovation and flexible service delivery. 
Te Rünaka o Ötäkou observed that: 
Contracts that co-design outcomes rather than specified outputs allow for a much more culturally 
specific response to human need. Narrowly defined outputs produce a silo that capture human 
experience inhumanely, as data and diminishes their status as citizens. A broad focus on outcomes, 
value added and strong communities requires contracts that reflect these complexities. I am struggling 
here to find an example of one. (sub. 110, p. 6) 
Alzheimers New Zealand considered that measuring outcomes facilitates the development of relational 
contracts: 
Presbyterian Support New Zealand observed that the “cost and complexity” of the tender process 
“will concentrate the sector and potentially exclude niche providers” (sub. 76, p. 14). 
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High trust contracts rely on a sense of mutual value in the relationship and high levels of professional 
judgement, supported by strong outcome measures and reporting. The current purchasing model for 
services for people living with dementia is based on low cost and easy to count/capture aspects. 
A shift to relational contracting would require significant investment in the development of outcome 
measures to be used across service providers and in relation to different health or social matters, 
together with the professional capability required to develop and manage the necessary relationships. 
(sub. 27, p. 4) 
The Department of Corrections provided an example of a trial involving a contract in which part of the 
payment to providers is based on measured outcomes. The initial success of this trial has led to the 
programme being extended to more difficult cases (Box 12.5). Youth Services and Whänau Ora are also 
examples of contracts involving payments for outcomes (Chapter 3; Appendix C).  
 
Some other participants, however, consider that contracting for outcomes is not practicable. They made six 
related points. 
First, some participants, such as the Auckland Council of Social Services (sub. 55) and Presbyterian Support 
New Zealand (sub. 76), argued that only some services have measurable outcomes. 
Second, other participants (eg, Jane Lee, sub. 60; New Zealand Education Institute, sub. 40) considered 
that outcomes for some services are only observable in the long term, beyond the duration of normal 
contracts.  
Box 12.5 Department of Corrections’ Out of Gate programme 
An example of the Department’s approach to contracting with third parties is a new programme, 
Out of Gate, designed to improve the prospects for successful re-integration into the community 
of prisoners who have served prison sentences of less than two years. 
The five service providers, selected as a result of a contestable process, make contact with 
referred prisoners before they leave prison. When they are released from prison, providers help 
them find accommodation, prepare for employment, meet health and wellbeing needs and 
benefit from life skills training. The providers are paid 85% of their fee for these services (inputs). 
The remaining 15% of the service fee is dependent on them achieving reduced re-offending 
outcomes. 
The contract specifies the outcomes and some outputs, but otherwise leaves the providers free to 
apply their expertise and experience to achieve the outcome and so maximise their fee income.  
To enable providers to compare their performance, all data for each provider on referrals, 
offender status and the achievement of participants is shared with all providers. This helps drive 
performance and enables the Department to evaluate provider performance on an ongoing basis. 
The data is collated and published monthly. 
Governance meetings of all five providers with representatives of the Department are held 
quarterly. These meetings provide an opportunity for collaboration and the exchange of ideas 
among the providers. They also provide an opportunity for providers and the Department to talk 
about any weaknesses in the delivery model and the incentive structure, and to suggest 
improvements. This forum could be used to review whether the required outputs are essential to 
achieving the desired outcome, and if not, whether they should cease to be compulsory and/or 
be replaced by another output that might have more impact on outcomes. 
The success of the original programme has led to it being extended to a more demanding subset 
of short-serving prisoners. The real-time evaluation of the service has enabled the Department to 
expand the programme more rapidly than would have been possible if the expansion had been 
reliant on a post-trial evaluation. 
The provider contracts are for an initial term of two years. Over the longer term, it may be 
desirable to have longer-term contracts to avoid the inevitable loss of provider focus towards the 
end of contract as staff become anxious about the continuity of their employment. (Department of 
Corrections, sub. 21, pp. 1-2) 
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Third, the limited measurability of outcomes reduces the scope for contracting for outcomes. For example, 
the Disability Support Network pointed out that “cost data are few and outcome measurement is largely 
absent. …information flows are almost entirely restricted to processes rather than outcomes” (sub. 47, p. 9).  
Fourth, some outcomes cannot be attributed to a particular service. The Auckland Council of Social Services 
observed that: 
For building community resilience a great many services come together each with varying but 
unmeasurable effectiveness so the proportionate role of each input which led to the outcome usually 
can’t be determined. (sub. 55, p. 4) 
This can be particularly problematic when a number of agencies work together (Superu, sub. 82). 
Fifth, some participants (eg, Jane Lee, sub. 60; Sue Johnson, sub. 3; NZCTU, sub. 103; Salvation Army, 
sub. 104) suggested that contracting for outcomes can create opportunities for providers to divert 
resources from the most difficult (and costly) cases.  
We understand that other commercial private training establishments are ensuring their survival by only 
taking clients onto their programmes who are very likely to succeed. We submit that many of this type 
of client would succeed without government funded interventions. The Salvation Army will not leave 
clients behind and we will continue to take the neediest clients despite the pejorative impact these 
clients have on our outcomes/success statistics. (sub. 104, pp. 5–6) 
It should be possible to design more sophisticated measures of outcomes that pick up the value added for 
each client, to stop the types of behaviour that participants identified. However, submissions generally did 
not discuss the design of outcome-related payments. 
Sixth, Carers New Zealand noted that contracting for outcomes: 
…shift the risk for performance on to the service provider, when the result or outcome will probably be 
beyond their control. It is also inconsistent with the objective of NGOs and government agencies being 
in a partnership or collaborative relationship if the responsibility and risk associated with the desired 
outcomes is shifted on to the service provider. (sub. 71, p. 5) 
The extent of prescription in contracts 
Submissions provided many examples of prescriptive contracts. For example, the New Zealand Disability 
Support Network: 
…frequently hears concerns about government contracts being unnecessarily restrictive – to the 
detriment of disabled people … Commonly, there are complaints about contracts that prescribe set 
hours for client contact with support people. For example, MSD vocational services can only be 
delivered between 9:00am – 5:00pm on weekdays. Logistically, however, there are some educational 
activities that would be more conveniently scheduled in the evening or weekends – yet such 
arrangements are not possible under the contracting regime. (sub. 47, pp. 12–13) 
The Pharmacy Guild of New Zealand noted that: 
Community pharmacy has experience with a DHB contract that in some areas has been so specific as to 
restrict those patients with complex needs access to a higher level pharmacy care. (sub. 11, p. 6)  
The Dunedin Community Law Centre observed that prescriptive contracts can disadvantage vulnerable 
clients who require continuity of care (sub. 48). 
There are more examples of prescriptive contracts in the discussion of innovation later in this section. 
Concerns about the impacts of contracting on innovation and the dampening effect of prescription on 
innovation appear to be widespread. 
Contract administration 
The burden of reporting and auditing obligations, particularly against prescriptive contracting requirements, 
drew most comments from submitters. 
The Wise Group attached to its submission a report by PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) that: 
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…evidences significant duplication [in reporting and audit requirements] that comes at an avoidable 
cost to the Crown and the group as a provider. Importantly the report also identifies the ease with 
which an integrated audit could be developed and adopted, creating significant savings in both time 
and money. (sub. 41, p. 35) 
The Southland Interagency Forum refers to its “punitive and overtly dictatorial reporting requirements” 
(sub. 29), while the National Council of Women of New Zealand observes that its responding members 
suggested that: 
…too much time was wasted filling in forms while the real, often urgent work of a service had to wait. 
Some members reported instances of rushed or skewed reporting by agencies to secure the next round 
of funding. (sub. 20, p. 2) 
One reason for the complexity is the large number of reports that some contracts require. The National 
Committee of Addiction Treatment (sub. 98) observes that many large providers are audited numerous 
times against the same standards. Relationships Aotearoa (sub. 56) notes that one major contract requires 
that it write about 35 narrative reports each quarter for different funding streams. 
Departments’ different reporting requirements also cause complexity. Whakaata Tohu Tohu/Mirror Services: 
…report to MSD, SDHB & MOH which each have different timeframes and requirements. The MOH & 
SDHB contracts do not have templates for narrative reporting making it very difficult to provide the 
required information. Our organisation now uses many more resources than before to complete the 
required reporting. (sub. 23, p. 3) 
Barnardos (sub. 12) and the Laura Ferguson Trust (sub. 10) have a similar concern: 
A key problem at the moment is the wide variety of outcomes, results, goals and measures that are 
used by different agencies – both government and non-government. Identifying outcomes that are 
valid and meaningful, measuring them and learning from them is hugely resource intensive. (sub. 12, 
pp. 7–8) 
Like many social service agencies we hold multiple service delivery contracts administered by a range 
of Crown-funded agencies. Inevitably there is a compliance burden associated with each contract. In 
practice this is far more onerous when the contract is in place as reporting expectations (even 
timeframes) and audit requirements do not align, even in cases where the service delivered is very 
similar and the need for multiple contracts is because of the demographic of the client receiving the 
service. (sub. 10, p. 1) 
A further cause of complexity is the large number of small contracts with differing reporting obligations that 
are neither aligned with management reporting systems nor related to contract importance. Hokianga 
Health Enterprise Trust: 
…holds over 80 Government contracts, each on the whole defining a narrow, mostly inflexible range of 
service outputs and often detailed but inconsistent, reporting requirements. The level of reporting 
across these contracts is varied and relatively arbitrary and do not appear to reflect the relative public 
sector performance risks. …  
Feedback on reports is also very arbitrary with some detailed and regular responses and concerns 
expressed by the funders for small contracts and in contrast, entirely absent feedback for larger and 
riskier contracts for over twenty years. … 
There is also an increasing trend to introduce more outcome based reporting within these contracts, 
but instead of reducing output reporting, they add another layer of expectation and compliance upon 
the provider.  
The organisational cost of compliance of meeting the reporting and auditing requirements is 
proportionally extremely high for our relatively small organisation and unbalanced with the level of 
performance risk. It would be somewhat more efficient if the external reporting and quality compliances 
aligned with the Trust’s own internal need for management reporting and quality assurance, but 
unfortunately they are often entirely unaligned. (sub. 44, pp. 1–2) 
Some impacts of contracts 
Participants commented on the impacts of contracts on integration, innovation, and on local communities. 
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Impact on integration 
There were mixed views about the impact of contracting on integration. According to the Youth Wellness 
Trust: 
The siloed and piecemeal purchasing/commissioning approach currently used actually fragments 
services. At its worst Providers are then told to collaborate in effect to re-join the fragmented services 
into a “whole” that is meaningful for the client; all at the cost of the Provider (and client). (sub. 73, 
p. 10) 
On the other hand, the Accident Compensation Corporation (ACC)’s (sub. 30) contracts for integrated 
services combine services in a single package, with clients and providers able to determine how these 
services are allocated. However, the ACC noted that the Commerce Act 1986 prohibits contracts, 
arrangements, or understandings that substantially lessens competition, and discourages joint purchases 
(and therefore the integration of some services). 
CNA noted that integrating different services can lead to the loss of all services if one contract is 
terminated. 
Many NFP have multiple contracts with multiple government departments. Especially in rural regions 
where one organisation provides all the community services. When through this process they lose their 
main contract and they end up closing, the community loses all the other services that organisation 
provided. (sub. 31, p. 8) 
Impact on quality 
While contestable processes can improve quality if this is valued by the tenderer and rewarded through 
contract payments, submissions focused on two ways that contracts can reduce quality. First, the Southland 
Interagency Forum pointed out that this can happen if providers are selected on the basis of the cheapest 
bid, and if this encourages under-bidding (sub. 29). Second, the Disability Support Network suggested that: 
…the separation from the funder and provider that is a hallmark of the contemporary era of 
deinstitutionalisation has enabled government to distance itself from the adverse effects of its 
underfunding, including any concerns about quality standards, as well as the poor wages and 
conditions of workers. (sub. 47, p. 7) 
Impact on innovation 
As shown in Chapter 7 (Box 7.3) many participants considered that prescriptive contracts stifle innovation. 
MSD recognises that “at risk clauses and tight service specifications can enhance accountability but there is 
a risk that they could stifle innovation by limiting the ability of providers to tailor services to clients” 
(sub. 72, p. 5). However, the Health and Disability Network (sub. 70) and HCNZH (sub. 51) argued that the 
Government does not consider the scope for innovation or value experimentation when drafting contracts. 
And Wesley Community Action comments that detailed reporting requirements also hold back innovation: 
An example is Family Start – aimed to engage those Whanau most at risk of poor outcomes, yet there 
is no flexibility in the manner or number of visits by a Whanau worker. The lack of flexibility and lack of 
understanding the individual issues of each Whanau means a one size fits all approach which is risk 
adverse and thereby restricting innovative opportunities. (sub. 6, p. 2) 
Impacts on rural and remote communities 
The ACC (sub. 30) uses contracting processes to ensure that clients in smaller centres and rural areas have 
access to a choice of providers. For example, ACC’s vocational rehabilitation contract requires providers to 
deliver services throughout one or more defined geographical areas. These areas are defined to ensure that 
a choice of service provider is available to all New Zealanders. For example, Northland is included within 
the same area as Auckland, which means that providers who apply to deliver services in Auckland must also 
do so in Northland.  
Some providers, however, are less positive. For example, the National Council of Women’s Organisations 
suggests that when a few larger organisations are contracted nationally they may “cherry-pick contracts”, 
leaving the remaining areas to subcontractors who are poorly resourced and reviewed (sub. 20, p. 3). Both 
they and Barnardos (sub. 12) called for additional funding to meet the higher costs of servicing smaller 
communities.  
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Implications 
Providers are dissatisfied about the compliance burden of contracts and some suggest that contracts 
impede, rather than encourage, desired outcomes. While there were relatively few submissions from 
government agencies, the Commission’s consultations with them gave a more favourable impression about 
how well contracting is working, although they also see scope for improvement. 
Some dissatisfaction with contracts could be due to contracts being used where the commissioning 
organisation should be using another service model (Chapter 6). However, the deficiencies identified in this 
section indicate that there are opportunities to improve contract design and administration. The next 
section sets out recommendations that, if implemented as a package, could generate considerable benefits, 
given the large number of contracts and the identified weaknesses in current processes. Further, with best 
contracting practices in place, choices between contracting out and other service delivery models could be 
based on their intrinsic merits.  
12.4 Opportunities for improvement 
Improving guidance material 
Section 12.3 pointed out that DIA, MSD, MBIE, OAG and the Treasury have all published guidance on 
contracting with non-government organisations. However, the impression left by submitters is that some 
agencies and providers make little use of this advice. One possible explanation is that they find the array of 
guideline documents confusing, and do not understand the documents’ respective roles. 
The Health and Disability Network considers that government purchasing processes would be “vastly 
improved if government agencies adhered to the three core funding guidance documents that already 
exist” (sub. 70, p. 10). Platform Charitable Trust goes further, suggesting that the Government should 
develop one set of agreed rules for how all government and Crown agencies must engage with, contract 
with and fund NGOs, and that the three framework documents should become the rules, rather than 
guidelines, for engaging with the social sector (sub. 45). 
Contracts would most likely be improved if agencies and providers made more use of up-to-date 
guidelines. However, the guidelines are living documents that can be improved with experience, rather than 
rules. As the Treasury points out, they are not a manual on how to write contracts and “do not diminish the 
need for Government agencies to exercise informed judgement about the arrangement that may be 
appropriate in their own circumstances” (New Zealand Treasury, 2009, p. 2). Consequently, the Commission 
disagrees with the Platform Charitable Trust’s view that the guidelines should become rules. However, it 
does agree that there should be a single document (or set of consistent and clearly related documents 
located in one place) to which agencies and providers can refer.  
The existing documents are a useful starting point for a single source of advice, although their weaknesses 
need to be addressed. For example, a recent Treasury paper has pointed out that the Treasury guidelines:  
 are too simplistic as they assume contracting processes are based on negotiating price and payment, 
while price may not form part of a provider’s tender bid; 
 do not provide advice on how to approach risk sharing, even though this is a very important issue; and 
 do not adequately address contracting for outcomes (New Zealand Treasury, 2013, pp. 20–24). 
Now that the Treasury has identified problems with its own guidance material, it is not ideal that some 
agencies may still be using it. The necessary process of bringing this guidance up to date provides an 
opportunity to rationalise this advice with the other government guidance that is available, especially the 
procurement rules. The Government should give one agency the task of updating and combining the 
current large number of sources of advice. That agency should provide training about the revised guidelines 
to other relevant agencies and providers. 
Providing improved guidance material does not ensure that agencies and providers will actually use it. To 
address this, once the new guidelines are available, the Government should: 
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 require agencies entering a contract to sign a declaration that they have used the guidelines; and 
 assess agencies’ management of contracts with non-government providers in the Performance 
Improvement Framework reviews of agencies. 
  
 
 R12.1  The Government should give an agency the task of developing a single set of up-to-
date guidelines for agencies entering into contracts with non-government providers of 
social services. That agency should provide training on these guidelines to other 
agencies and providers. 
To encourage agencies to use the guidelines, the Government should: 
 provide training about the revised guidelines to relevant agencies and providers; 
 require agencies entering a contract to sign a declaration that they have used the 
guidelines; and 
 assess agencies’ management of contracts with non-government providers in the 
Performance Improvement Framework reviews of agencies. 
  
 
Improving the tendering process 
Submitters highlighted several areas that need improvement, including: 
 information provision during the tendering process; 
 timeliness; 
 taking account of past experience when selecting providers; 
 standardisation; and 
 excessive frequency of tenders (contracts are too short). 
Information 
Some providers complain that tendering agencies are unwilling to provide additional information after 
inviting a tender. However, those managing the tender have to manage the tension between not giving 
information to a single provider that would give it an unfair advantage, and withholding advice that would 
improve the quality of the bids. Ways to manage this tension include: 
 ensuring that RFPs are informative; 
 holding briefing sessions for all bidders at which questions can be answered in a way that provides 
information equally to all; and 
 requiring bidders to commit questions about the tender in writing, with the answers circulated to all 
bidders. 
Some providers might want more information during the tendering process so that they can avoid making 
unnecessary bids. Multi-stage tenders, which enable shortlisting to occur in the early stages, can address 
this problem. They are more likely to be useful in complex tenders, which are costly to prepare; where the 
outcomes being sought are difficult to define or there are several solutions; and where there are security or 
quality reasons for reducing the number of tenderers (Industry Commission, 1996, pp. 338–39). 
Timeliness  
Agencies need to allow sufficient time for tenderers to develop adequate bids and for the agencies to 
assess them. The time required is likely to vary between tenders. Agencies have an incentive to plan 
effectively and to keep to their timetables, in order to maintain service delivery. However, it appears that 
this is does not always happen, as the Commission has heard that agencies do not always comply with their 
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own tendering timetables. This could cause significant problems if, for example, providers do not hear 
whether contracts have been renewed until after they have ended, leaving them without funds to pay staff 
or meet other obligations. Clearly, the tendering process needs to start early enough for it to be concluded 
before existing contracts expire. 
Options that would strengthen an agency’s incentives to run timely tender processes include: 
 imposing penalties on an agency that misses deadlines; 
 transparent tracking and reporting of tender processes; and  
 more frequent OAG audits of contracting processes. 
Penalising an agency for not meeting timelines would require establishing a process and authority for 
determining that a penalty is payable, and perhaps an appeal process. It would also be necessary to 
provide one agency with the authority to penalise another agency. Funding would need to be considered: if 
penalties could be paid out of the appropriation for the delayed program, their burden would fall on service 
providers and their clients rather than on the agency. Further, an agency might simply set up longer initial 
timelines to avoid the risk of being penalised. 
Better reporting of the timeliness of tender processes could occur along a spectrum, from an annual report 
through to sophisticated real-time tracking and reporting systems. Any approach would need to take into 
account that providers may cause some delays. 
The evidence does not so far indicate that the problem is serious enough to justify the cost of installing a 
penalty system or sophisticated tracking systems. However, the Commission considers that agencies 
should, as a minimum, implement a low-cost option: reporting yearly on their compliance with the timelines 
set out in tendering processes. They can, of course, choose to implement more sophisticated tracking. 
Failure to take account of past performance when selecting providers 
Some providers have told the Commission that tendering agencies do not take into account the past 
performance of providers when assessing bids. For example, CNA considers that: 
The system of tendering on-line for social services is deeply flawed. Although a representative of CNA 
was assured by MBIE staff that ‘blind’ committees (where the history and identifying features of the RFP 
writer are kept secret) are against best practice, it is widely known in the Sector that these committees 
exist. (sub. 31, p. 6) 
While past performance is not necessarily a guide to future performance, it is difficult to understand why it 
would not be considered in a bidding process. The Treasury considers that, after price: 
…performance information is the next best source of information to make judgements about what 
services to purchase from whom to get the best outcomes most efficiently. … However, from the 
providers we spoke with it seems that past performance information is not commonly asked for by 
government when applying for a new tender. (New Zealand Treasury, 2013, p. 13) 
Further, if providers know that their past performance will not be considered in future tender rounds, this 
removes a significant incentive to perform well. 
One possible reason for not using past performance information could be to encourage new providers into 
the industry. However, there are more direct ways to achieve this, such as restricting tenders to new 
providers. There may also be concerns that panel members may make biased decisions if they rely 
excessively on their knowledge of the past performance of bidders. These concerns could be reduced by 
measures – some already in use – such as requiring panel members to declare conflicts of interest; having a 
mixture of panel members with and without knowledge of the bidders; and publishing the reasons for 
decisions. 
The Commission considers that the past performance of bidders should be factored into tendering 
decisions, unless agencies have a good reason for not doing so. Therefore, agencies that decide not to take 
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past performance into account should publish at the start of the tendering process why they are doing this, 
and why the advantages of this approach outweigh any disadvantages. 
Standardising tender requirements 
Several participants suggested that standardising tender requirements would reduce tendering costs by 
standardising information requirements and reporting, and enabling more use of IT (Box 12.6). 
However, HCNZH considers that standardisation has disadvantages as well as advantages: 
 … moving every NGO provider across all of government to a single set of “framework terms and 
conditions” risks paving over important differences in contracting arrangements and creating 
additional complexity. 
 The streamlined contracting framework developed with MBIE has in our experience made it more 
difficult to have discussions with funders about mutually acceptable terms and conditions since 
funders now lack the discretion to make changes that are in our shared interest and that of our 
clients. (sub. 51, p. 4) 
As described earlier, MBIE is two years into a 3-year project to streamline contract management. 
Standardising terms and conditions should also simplify tendering processes, although it will not necessarily 
address all of the concerns outlined above. There is also a Cross Government Accreditation Working Group 
(CGAWG), whose aims include reducing the compliance burden for providers by reducing the duplication 
of accreditation activity for agencies. During the course of its work, the CGAWG has become aware that the 
burden of compliance extends well beyond accreditation, with monitoring and reporting requiring “large 
amounts of provider resource”. It suggests that these functions should be approached from the 
perspectives of providers rather than those of agencies (sub. 132, p. 3). 
The Commission agrees with MSD’s view that “more work is needed to streamline contracting across 
government” (sub. 72, p. 4). At the same time, standardisation should not be mandatory, as this would rule 
out negotiation of case-specific arrangements that meet the shared interests of the parties. It could also 
Box 12.6 Standardised tender requirements 
Barnardos suggested that: 
It would be very useful if all RFPs from government agencies use a standardised template 
(questions and lay-out) and submission process. Slight variations in the way questions are asked, 
the order of questions and the processes for submitting information lead to significant amounts of 
time and effort without any real benefit in the quality of information provided. 
Government agencies should also consider the costs of the process they ask for. When RFPs insist 
that multiple copies of responses are provided in bound folders with dividers for each section as 
well as on USB sticks this creates significant cost for us. There are also costs associated with 
couriering these packages. Are there more options for responses to RFPs to be provided 
electronically in order to be able to reduce these costs? (sub. 20, p. 12) 
Similarly, Relationships Aotearoa supported standardised expressions of interest, requests for 
information, and tender and RFP templates (sub. 56, pp. 10–11). According to the Wise Group, “there 
is little or no adoption of technology that would streamline procurement processes”, and there should 
be “a standardised, secure, online proposal site that respondents populated. In the absence of this 
most government agencies operate paper based systems” (sub. 41, p. 23). 
The Blind Foundation, while acknowledging some improvements, noted that: 
…different departments require different information creating redundancies and inefficiencies. 
Integrated contracting would be a big improvement on this. Ideally ACC, MSD and MoH would 
get together and create consistency of questions, quality measure and Outcome contracts based 
on RBA. The focus should be on measuring quality in addition to the Public Finance Act 
requirements for efficiency based reporting. Examples of these are measuring the return on 
investment such as savings through diminished uptake of rest home requirements, medical 
interventions etc. (sub. 16, p. 30) 
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have unintended side effects, such as encouraging additional use of schedules to contracts, containing 
prescriptive terms and conditions that are not included in the standard contract forms and leading to more, 
rather than less, variation between contracts. 
Less frequent tenders through longer-term contracts 
Contracts with social service providers often have a one-year duration and many providers consider that 
contracts are too short and tenders too frequent. The Tauranga Budget Advisory Service proposed that 
there be: 
…longer term contracts (at least three years like High Trust) subject to annual monitoring. Too many 
good staff are lost especially to the state sector due to insecurity of work tenure, career progression 
and poor pay. (sub. 57, p. 2) 
The Wise Group considers that long-term relationships and contracts – with built-in flexibility to adapt to 
service environments which change over time – are a critical success factor for effective commissioning and 
contracting (sub. 41). Care NZ believes that longer-term contracts must be considered, especially if 
providers are performing well and are able to demonstrate effectiveness (sub. 99). Community Wellbeing 
North Canterbury Trust believes that multi-year contracts assist with service delivery and workforce 
continuity (sub. 112). The Treasury’s discussions with providers suggested that short-term contracts are an 
important barrier to achieving better investment in outcomes (New Zealand Treasury, 2013). 
Longer-term contracts are, however, not always better. Rather, the appropriate length depends on factors 
such as: 
 the service to be delivered; 
 the views and track record of the NGO that will deliver the service; 
 the lifecycle of the relevant policy;  
 the contracting capability of the government agency; 
 negotiation costs; and  
 value for money (New Zealand Treasury, 2009). 
The life of the capital equipment used to provide the service, the staff training required, and the extent to 
which capital and training are specific to the service, should be considered. It is also likely, as the Wise 
Group suggests, that longer-term contracts could be developed when there is “high trust” (sub. 41, p. 3).  
The brevity of many contract terms does not prove they are all too short. However, as noted earlier, 
agencies may be attracted to short-term contracts to reduce their risk exposure. Further, the tendency to 
introduce new programmes creates a reluctance to make long-term contracts, because agencies do not 
know what will be coming next. And because agencies are usually the only purchasers, with several vendors 
to choose from, they can impose some costs of short-term contracts (such as additional staff turnover and 
training costs) on service providers and their clients. This could result in shorter-term contracts than would 
emerge if bargaining strength were more evenly balanced.  
Mandating a default contract period of, say, three years, with an obligation on agencies to publish reasons 
for choosing shorter periods, would lengthen contract periods. However, pushing contracts towards a 
standard that is selected arbitrarily may not be efficient, even if contracts are too short (on average) at the 
moment. 
A preferable option, which would set consideration of contract length in a broader context and avoid 
arbitrary standards, would be for the Government to require agencies to develop an explicit risk 
management framework, in consultation with providers. Indeed, this is inherent in MBIE’s contracting 
framework, although it is easily overlooked.  
The Australian Productivity Commission has suggested that developing risk management frameworks would 
help to build a common understanding of the risks involved in providing services, and provide clarity about 
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who bears those risks. It would also clarify the appropriate tools for managing risks, only one of which is 
contract duration, and would help to identify the risks of short-term contracts. For instance, contracts that 
are not matched to the length of period required to achieve outcomes create a risk of non-delivery.  
Agencies that develop risk management frameworks are likely to improve their management of risk, and 
less likely to rely on instruments such as short-term contracts to manage it. As noted above, agencies 
should also take into account factors such as those outlined by the Treasury, as well as the incentives of 
providers to invest in staff capabilities and capital equipment that are relevant to supplying the contracted 
services involved, when determining contract duration. 
 
 
 R12.2  To improve tendering practice, government agencies should face new requirements to: 
 undertake reasonable consultation with providers and clients during the pre-
contract phase;  
 report yearly their compliance with tendering timelines; 
 take account of the past performance of bidders when assessing bids. If agencies 
intend to ignore past performance, they should publish at the start of the tendering 
process the reasons why they are doing so; 
 consider standardising tendering requirements, but standardisation should not be 
mandatory; 
 develop, in consultation with providers, a risk management framework that identifies 
risks and how best to allocate them; and 
 set contract duration in the context of their overall risk management framework, and 
taking into account factors such as providers’ incentives to invest in relevant 
capabilities and equipment.  
Government agencies should publish their reasons for selecting a particular contract 
duration.  
  
 
Contract design 
This subsection considers opportunities to improve contract design through contracting for outcomes; 
increasing the use of payment for outcomes; imposing penalties for under-performance; reducing the 
complexity of reporting; and encouraging investment in innovation. 
Contracting directly for outcomes 
It is more feasible to design contracts around outcomes if the outcomes can be identified, measured and 
attributed. Section 12.3 demonstrated the diversity of views about whether it is possible to do this. 
The Treasury Guidelines noted that contracting for outcomes is possible where: 
 the service provider controls the outcome and can be held accountable for achieving it; 
 there is a good working relationship with a provider NGO with a good track record; 
 the purchasing agency has the contractual and policy expertise to manage this type of approach; and 
 there is high-quality information to support the contract (New Zealand Treasury, 2009). 
However, the Treasury has recently adopted a more positive view about the potential for contracting for 
outcomes: 
Literally applying this [2009] guidance when considering contracting for outcomes will rarely lead to the 
conclusion that a true outcomes contract is appropriate. Government needs to recognise and 
acknowledge that attribution to a single NGO would be near impossible. Outcomes do need to be 
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able to be realistic for the NGO, and contribution to final outcomes does need to be measurable. 
Outcomes of this nature are not impossible to work through, despite attribution issues. However, the 
significance of this process shouldn’t be understated. What the outcomes being sought are and what 
level of contribution can be expected from NGOs towards these outcomes, will both need to be 
determined. (New Zealand Treasury, 2013, p. 24) 
There is considerable effort underway to make contracts more outcome-focused. The combined use of 
different measures – including outcomes – is a feature of MSD’s RBA framework (Box 12.7). In addition to 
the RBA framework, as part of its Community Investment Strategy, MSD is conducting trials with a small 
number of providers to develop an outcomes framework and performance measures. The trials cover some 
existing services in the following areas: budget services, social workers in schools, Family Start, functional 
family therapy, integrated health and social services for families (building on Plunket well child services), and 
intensive wrap-around family social work. (MSD, 2014c)  
The purpose of the trials is to develop standard methods and models for definitions and measurements, 
and methods of data collection and management. Measuring outcomes and explaining changes in them is 
not easy where there are multiple variables that could contribute to a particular outcome. Experiments such 
as these trials are useful to test how well existing services contribute to the outcomes sought. Youth 
Services is another example of contracting for outcomes where payment for performance has been 
introduced (Chapter 4).  
 
Notwithstanding such activities, PwC recently observed that, while service providers in New Zealand are 
motivated by what they are trying to achieve (their outcomes), this is not always formalised in their 
management systems: 
… most service providers do not have intervention logics or defined outcomes, let alone the 
measurement tools and systems which will allow them to track progress against those outcomes. (PwC, 
2014, p. 7) 
PwC considers that contracting for outcomes will be most appropriate where: 
 client issues and needs are relatively homogenous; 
 services are highly targeted; 
 services are evidence-based, in the sense that the relationships between inputs, outputs and client 
outcomes are relatively well understood; 
 services providers are sufficiently diversified that they can absorb delivery risk; and 
 exogenous factors do not prevent or inhibit outcomes. (PwC, 2014, pp. 7–8) 
This last condition appears excessively restrictive if “inhibit” is interpreted to mean any degree of influence, 
even quite minor. 
Providers point out that moving towards contracting for outcomes would require additional resources, time 
and data (Box 12.8). 
Box 12.7 Results-Based Accountability 
RBA involves two types of accountability (population and performance) and three types of 
performance measures (how much did we do? / how well did we do it? / is anyone better off?). It 
employs a variety of means, such as customised meeting agendas, team performance 
development and reviews, and strives to follow the overarching goal of ‘always doing better than 
our own history’. This system of performance measurement has been in place in social service 
contexts in New Zealand as well as internationally, and has been successful in organisations of 
varying size, from large government agencies to small community groups and recreational 
programmes. (Dunedin Community Law Centre, sub. 48, pp. 6–7) 
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Contracting for outcomes could increase the benefits from social services, while also reducing detailed 
prescription in contracts and its dampening effects on innovation (Chapter 7). The MSD trials are important, 
and the Department and other social service agencies should monitor their progress closely. They also 
should explore the potential for developing contracting for outcomes in their own portfolios, considering 
factors such as those listed by PwC. These trials should also help to reveal the costs of developing outcome 
measures; how these costs can be managed; and the types of circumstances (eg, where outcomes cannot 
be attributed) in which contracting for outcomes is not effective. Looking at the costs and benefits of such 
contracts will help agencies to focus on introducing them where they are most likely to yield net benefits. 
Box 12.8 Moving towards outcome measurement and contracting 
Supporting Families in Mental Illness considered that this approach is new for many organisations, 
which would need additional resources to implement it (sub. 49, pp. 12–13). The Platform Charitable 
Trust suggested that moving to contracting for outcomes would require time and cultural change, as 
well as extra resources: 
… some existing contract reporting requirements may no longer be necessary or useful in an 
outcomes based contract, in which case organisations will need to be given time to transition their 
staff and their IT systems to accommodate a new way of reporting.  
Such a significant shift in approach will also require a significant shift in mind-set. The 
establishment of an outcome-focused health and social sector will rely on major culture change at 
multiple levels in all parts of the sector. The government will need to be prepared to invest in a 
significant change management process that includes training and support for those community 
providers that have not had the benefit of being involved in the implementation of Results based 
Accountability (RbA) agreements funded by the Ministry of Social Development. (sub. 45, 
pp. 9-10) 
The Blind Foundation argued that improved data collection is needed to facilitate outcomes reporting: 
Outcomes measured in terms of population benefit based on data provide the assurance that 
services (offered through programmes) are working toward the betterment of the whole 
community. Regular data acquisition from rest homes, hospitals, social groups, hospitals, et 
cetera, can inform outcomes. For example, Blind Foundation rehabilitation can significantly 
reduce the incidence of accidents for our clients. This can be measured through ACC data and 
hospital reports. (sub. 16, p. 32) 
The Health and Disability Network noted the differences and challenges of defining outcomes in the 
health and social services sector (compared to say engineering or manufacturing), and that a “one-
size-fits-all” approach should not be imposed on all providers (sub. 70, p. 4). Relationships Aotearoa 
suggested that the focus should be on client outcomes and should recognise the synergies between 
different services: 
We recommend the ongoing use of a RBA framework as good practice, however there is a missed 
opportunity to take a truly client centred approach without compromising accountability. This 
could be achieved by reporting client outcomes across all contributing contract partners, as it is 
often the synergies of different pieces of work with a client or family that produce the greatest 
positive results. (sub. 56, p. 9) 
Homebuilders Family Services, on the other hand, considered that outcome measures need to be 
localised:  
Successful evaluation recognises differences between people, places and programmes. The 
requirement of differentiation raises doubts over the efficacy of a single common outcome 
framework such as RBA promoted by the current government. Outcome goals and measures 
should be developed and established where the delivery takes place. It should be based on 
effectiveness of service delivery or a determinant of programme shortcomings as the basis for 
improvements and not just as a reporting tool. Reporting with this framework can create 
considerable work for the provider without the benefit of activating any real learning and 
improvements in service delivery. (sub. 38, p. 2) 
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In some cases where the costs of developing contracts based solely on outcomes exceed their benefits, 
there may be scope for a mixed approach. The Treasury argues that in these circumstances a mixed model 
or contracts for inputs and outputs may be more appropriate. Stepped funding for outputs on the path to 
outcomes can also be explored depending on the circumstances. However: 
[w]hen an outcomes contract is not feasible, it may also be appropriate to come back to the previous 
question of whether government should contract out for the delivery of the outcome or deliver directly. 
(New Zealand Treasury, 2013, p. 24)  
Developing outcome measures and building them into contracts requires new capabilities and costs that 
may not be warranted for small contracts. This points towards focusing efforts on larger contracts, and 
amalgamating smaller contracts so that moving them to an outcome basis becomes worthwhile. Further, 
experimentation around what achieves outcomes would be encouraged by forms of agreement that allow 
changes over time in what is measured, and a greater degree of trust, with measures to encourage sharing 
of what has been learned. 
 
 
 R12.3  Departments, agencies and non-government providers should expand the use of 
contracting for outcomes where it is efficient to do so.  
 
Structuring contract payments 
Given the level of funding, how these funds are paid to providers will affect their incentives. Payments made 
for delivering inputs encourage service availability, but do not necessarily achieve desired outcomes. 
Payments for outputs such as training courses encourage the provision of such courses, rather than securing 
an outcome such as placing people in jobs.  
Payments for outcomes provide strong incentives, and can be a useful feature of contracting for outcomes. 
However, even these, can be poorly designed. For example, paying job search providers for the number of 
unemployed people placed in jobs for three months encourages them to concentrate on easy-to-place 
people who might have found jobs without assistance, and to “park” those who have difficulty finding work 
without assistance, or to help them to find jobs that might last little longer than three months. As 
mentioned above, the solution to this problem is to reward providers for the value added for individual 
clients, taking account of their differences. For example, a more useful outcome indicator may be 
“sustained work in a role the economy requires on a wage sufficient to provide for a family” (Haldenby, 
Harries & Olliff-Cooper, 2014, p. 31). 
Further, payments should be structured to encourage providers to achieve the desired outcomes, and to 
avoid incentives for them to park difficult clients. Experience in other areas (eg, in employment services in 
Australia, as described in Appendix B), suggests that structuring payments is a significant ongoing task. 
Some agencies will need to build their capability to structure outcome-related payment arrangements. This 
could be achieved in several ways, including, for example, through a central department (such as the 
Treasury) or through an agency that administers many contracts (such as MBIE or MSD). Or each agency 
that administers contracts could develop its own expertise, perhaps using some improved government-wide 
guidance material. The proposed Office of Social Services (Chapter 14) could advise the Government about 
the best arrangement and how often it should be reviewed. 
 
 
 R12.4  The Government should improve the capabilities of agencies to contract for outcomes, 
ideally with payments for outcomes achieved in those contracts.  
 
Reducing unnecessary reporting 
As noted earlier, providers are concerned about the number and complexity of performance reports. The 
Treasury Guidelines noted that ways to reduce unnecessary costs while still receiving assurance about the 
effective use of public money include: 
 realism about the number of reports required from NGOs; 
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 simple and meaningful performance indicators; 
 standard reporting templates; 
 structuring monitoring arrangements according to risk, as indicated by factors such as the nature of the 
service, the track record of the NGO, the amount of money involved and perceptions of risk; and  
 timely feedback on monitoring to NGOs, to help them understand its use (New Zealand Treasury, 2009, 
p. 39). 
The Guidelines point out that agencies should make their own informed judgements about monitoring 
arrangements, but should document the basis for their assessments.  
Some providers, on the other hand, support a standardised approach. The Wise Group proposes that “a 
project should be undertaken to review, standardise, simplify and reduce the volume of reporting for the 
NGO sector” (sub. 41, p. 3). Similarly, Barnardos supports a standardised approach to several dimensions of 
contracts, including reporting: 
It would also be good if there were common, standardised systems and tools that support multiple 
purchasing options across all government agencies. This includes having common templates and 
processes for: invoicing – how it occurs and the information required reporting and monitoring – 
standardised templates, standardised questions, common ways of collecting and reporting client data 
and information a common approach to outcome measurement. (sub. 20, p. 12) 
Given that many reporting costs are borne by providers, agencies may seek more reports than are justified 
by the risks they seek to mitigate. Barnardos advocates a risk-based approach to monitoring, and more 
emphasis on sharing the lessons across providers of similar services (sub. 20, pp. 19–20). The Commission 
agrees with Barnardos and with the Treasury’s view that agencies should structure their monitoring 
arrangements according to assessments of risks and document the basis for their assessments (New Zealand 
Treasury, 2009). Therefore, the Commission proposes that government agencies should be required to: 
 adopt a risk-based approach to monitoring contracts as part of their risk management framework; and 
 publish the basis for their assessments of monitoring arrangements, including an analysis of the costs 
and benefits to all parties. 
 
 
 R12.5  Government agencies should: 
 adopt a risk-based approach to monitoring contracts as part of their risk 
management framework; and 
 publish the reasons for their chosen monitoring arrangements, including an analysis 
of the costs and benefits to all parties. 
 
 
 
Improving capabilities 
Government agencies that run tenders and design and manage contracts need many skills. These include 
cost-benefit analysis, risk management, needs analysis, development of performance management 
frameworks (including outcome measurement), contract design, running tendering processes, setting up 
and operating monitoring systems, and evaluation. They also need financial and legal expertise.  
The environment within which contracts are negotiated is becoming increasingly complicated. This is 
placing a premium on contracting skills that are also in demand in the private sector, posing a retention 
challenge for the government. To maintain and develop contracting capability, the Government should 
ensure that contract management is a career path that is valued and respected. It should also consider 
building a community of practice arrangement, which is committed to building and sharing good practice 
across the social services system. Chapter 14 discusses responsibility for leading this arrangement. 
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The State Sector Act makes State Services Commissioners and agency chief executives responsible for 
developing senior leadership and management capability throughout the state sector, and the Crown 
Entities Act obliges Crown entities to include in their statement of intent information about “how the entity 
proposes to manage the organisational health and the capability of the entity” (s 141). Within this legislative 
context, the Commission has previously proposed that the State Services Commission (SSC) should develop 
a set of minimum expectations for promoting regulatory capability, and require that the statements of intent 
from Crown entities demonstrate how they will meet those expectations (NZPC, 2014b). 
Given the significance and number of contracts that agencies manage, this proposal also has merit for 
contract management. In this case, the SSC could develop expectations that agencies need to 
demonstrate, such as: 
 the steps they are taking to ensure staff stay up to date with developments in contract management, 
including access to training and accreditation opportunities; and 
 how they are developing a career path in contract management. 
 
 
 R12.6  The State Services Commission should develop a set of minimum expectations around 
the promotion of contract management capability, and require the statements of intent 
of relevant agencies to demonstrate how they will meet those expectations. 
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13 The Mäori dimension 
Key points 
 The objectives Mäori as a client group have for social services are broader than just effectiveness 
and efficiency – social services have an important role to play in “Mäori succeeding as Mäori”. In 
this context it includes Mäori being able to exercise duties of care that arise from tikanga.  
 Mäori are disproportionately represented in the client base of services that target and aim to help 
those at risk of poor outcomes. Although some other groups also have poor outcomes, the Treaty 
of Waitangi dimension adds weight to empowering Mäori groups.  
 The development aspirations of Mäori, the desire to improve the outcomes of whänau, and the 
tikanga around manaakitanga, whänaungatanga, and rangatiratanga mean that iwi and other Mäori 
groups are obvious candidates for further devolution of the commissioning of social services. 
 Enabling greater rangatiratanga within social services inherently requires the Crown to step back 
from “deciding for” and often “doing for” Mäori. Yet if the Crown steps back too far, or in the 
wrong way, then it risks inappropriately leaving iwi to deliver the Crown’s article three duties. What 
matters here is not so much whether any given activity is a kawanatanga or rangatiratanga 
responsibility, but instead who should hold mana whakahaere over that activity (translated 
variously as the power to manage, governance or authority) to achieve the objectives of both 
parties. 
 There are a number of steps involved in commissioning social services. In the examples considered 
by this inquiry different Mäori groups preferred to be involved in some steps but not others. 
Although there is some interest, in practice it may take some time for such involvement in 
commissioning to be fully realised. It is appropriate that Mäori determine the pace and extent of 
their involvement. 
 It is important that the process of determining who the Government should partner with in social 
services is an open one. It needs to allow for the various claims to representation and influence 
from Mäori organisations to be heard and considered fairly.  
 One process that has been used is the Treaty settlement process. However, the Treaty settlement 
process is too inflexible and too narrow to realise the potential for devolving commissioning to 
Mäori effectively. A better process needs to be based on: 
- the government providing a standing opportunity to Mäori groups to propose how they might 
like to be involved in commissioning; 
- the nature of the proposed process coming from Mäori, rather than being a model that Mäori 
groups are co-opted into, or have imposed on them; and 
- the constraints that government places on what is possible need to be reasonable. 
 Data analytics may hold some particular promise for Mäori to achieve greater involvement in 
commissioning because future welfare liability, though an unpalatable language for some, opens 
up new possibilities for negotiating funding transfers. 
 There may also be a case for some devolution to existing self-identified Mäori communities – 
although care needs to be taken not to split up the available funding too much. 
 There are many difficult issues to be worked through to determine how to fund devolved 
organisations, but several broad options are available. 
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This chapter continues on the strong theme in this report of empowering clients. It extends this theme to 
empowering Mäori groups. Chapter 4 noted that an effective social services system needs to be responsive 
to the aspirations and needs of Mäori and Pasifika people. The objectives that Mäori groups have for social 
services are broader than just effectiveness and efficiency – social services have an important role to play in 
“Mäori succeeding as Mäori”. In this context it includes Mäori being able to exercise duties of care that 
arise from tikanga. 
In this chapter: 
 section 13.1 outlines some of the social outcomes that Mäori experience, and describes the shift from a 
“deficit” approach to an empowerment or development approach; 
 section 13.2 briefly discusses the importance of the aspirations of both individuals and collectives; 
 section 13.3 describes briefly the duties of care within tikanga Mäori; 
 section 13.4 discusses the range of Mäori organisations that operate in social services; 
 section 13.5 outlines the Treaty dimension in social services; 
 section 13.6 introduces the case for creating more opportunities to devolve social service 
commissioning to Mäori; 
 section 13.7 examines some of the ways that iwi have chosen to be involved in the commissioning of 
social services; 
 section 13.8 discusses some ways that data analytics may enable better negotiations about devolving 
commissioning; and 
 section 13.9 concludes with some preliminary observations on funding options to support greater 
devolution of commissioning to iwi and Mäori. 
13.1 From deficits to empowerment 
Mäori are disproportionately represented in the client base of services that target and aim to help those at 
risk of poor outcomes. This means they are clients of particular interest to the inquiry. MSD (2014, p. 25) 
noted that Mäori make up: 
 50% of children in the custody of the Chief Executive 
 60% of young people in a youth justice residence 
 48% of young people on Youth Payment or Young Parent Payment 
 46% of sole parent support recipients 
 34% of job seeker support recipients. 
This is despite Mäori making up only 14.9% of the New Zealand population in the 2013 census. The 
similarity is stark in how two reviews 24 years apart described the poor social outcomes that Mäori 
experience (Figure 13.1). 
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Figure 13.1 Characterisations of Mäori social outcomes, 1986 and 2010  
 
Source: Ministerial Advisory Committee on a Mäori Perspective for the Department of Social Welfare, 1986; Taskforce on Whänau-
Centred Initiatives, 2010. 
Focusing on “deficits” alone though ignores the strengths that exist within Mäori communities to create 
change for themselves. The Whänau Ora approach (discussed further in Appendix C) is explicitly based on 
achieving Mäori development through building on the strengths of whänau. 
A recent report on the experience of Australian Aboriginal peoples and Torres Strait Islanders came to a 
similar conclusion: 
The objectives of overcoming deficits, disadvantage and poverty immediately invoke the standard tools 
of the welfare state: top-down government intervention through income transfers and passive service 
delivery. Individual, family and collective agency is relegated to the sidelines, displaced by the 
strategies, rules and procedures of the bureaucracy. Failure to achieve progress is taken as evidence of 
the need for increased funding, further government intervention and better ‘coordinated’ programs. In 
contrast, with development as the goal, the solutions are fundamentally different… 
Instead, a development approach foregrounds the role of individual, family and collective agency and 
responsibility—the role of Indigenous empowerment. Development is impossible without expanding 
individual choice, responsibility and capability. The practical implications of this are that all policies and 
programs must support efforts to build capability, self-reliance, aspiration and opportunity, and 
increased choice. (Empowered Communities: Empowered Peoples, 2015, p. 13) 
Although some other groups within New Zealand also have poor outcomes, the Treaty dimension adds 
weight to empowering Mäori as a group. Historically, the power imbalance between state-led provision and 
Mäori communities has had negative consequences for Mäori culture. Social services often interact with 
people in the most sensitive, personal, or intimate parts of their lives. Who is empowered to make decisions 
in these contexts is immensely important for Mäori groups. For example: 
 education services shape how young people see the world, and explore questions of identity; and 
 child protection, especially where children are removed from their family and placed in the care of 
another group, can have important consequences for cultural transmission.  
Taken together, the importance of enabling Mäori to exercise tikanga, the potential for a more effective 
response to negative social outcomes, and the need for decision-making processes to better reflect the 
We have been disturbed at the extent 
to which Social Welfare institutions and 
indeed the courts, have a clientele 
which is predominantly Mäori. 
(Ministerial Advisory Committee on a 
Mäori Perspective for the Department 
of Social Welfare, 1986, p. 7)
There is no doubt that the young 
people who come to the attention of 
the Police and the Department of 
Social Welfare invariably bring with 
them histories of substandard housing, 
health deficiencies, abysmal education 
records, and an inability to break out of 
the ranks of the unemployed. (p. 8)
However, full participation in society 
and the economy eludes many 
whänau and is reflected in higher 
unemployment rates especially for 
school leavers, as well as higher rates 
of employment in low-paying jobs. A 
critical determinant of employment 
and societal participation is 
educational success, but Mäori 
educational outcomes at secondary 
school level are disappointingly low, 
particularly for Mäori boys. The 
impacts of poor educational 
achievement are multiple and include 
overrepresentation in the criminal 
justice system. (Taskforce on Whänau-
Centred Initiatives, 2010, p. 16)
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Treaty partnership, make a strong case for empowering Mäori communities through providing opportunities 
to exercise greater decision rights. 
13.2 Individual and collective aspirations 
Most of this chapter will focus on the involvement of Mäori groups in decision making. It is important at the 
outset though, to acknowledge the place of individual and whänau choices.  
Like all people, Mäori have many different kinds of association (such as professional, personal, religious, and 
cultural) that shape their identities and choice of lifestyle. The diversity of identities that Mäori people can 
hold, and therefore of the identities they express, is part of what can generate innovation in the kinds of 
governance arrangements used to create opportunities to participate in decision making (section 13.7 
outlines some of these arrangements). The Mäori Statistics Advisory Committee (MSAC) made a similar 
point in its submission to the New Zealand Data Futures Forum (NZDFF): 
The NZ Forum needs to understand the complexity of what it means to be Mäori in modern society; the 
notions of Mäori public and private; urban Mäori; whakapapa, and so on. In short the understanding of 
Mäori needs to be in a sophisticated and nuanced manner.  
This type of nuanced understanding of Mäori would allow the Forum to understand the cultural 
construction of the individual versus the collective as determined by various Mäori communities.  
The debate about agreements needed in relation to Intellectual Property and Cultural Rights would fall 
out of the nuanced understanding of Mäori and the various Mäori communities. (MSAC, n.d., pp. 1–2) 
The social services system needs to enable Mäori people to make choices about how they wish to engage 
with social services. It needs to have a focus for Mäori that is broader than just engaging with groups at a 
governance level, but also enables Mäori people to make choices about what options are right for them – 
which can include engaging in Te Ao Mäori.  
Although this chapter is largely focused on involving Mäori communities in social services decision making, 
earlier commentary in this report about the importance of client choice is also relevant (Chapter 11). 
Enabling clients to have more say in decision making about social services that affect them is, for instance, 
consistent with a Whänau Ora approach to building whänau rangatiratanga. 
13.3 Duties of care within tikanga Mäori  
A number of duties of care arise from tikanga that Mäori communities wish to be able to express effectively 
through social services. The key concepts or duties that were raised with the Commission were: 
 whänaungatanga; 
 manaakitanga; and 
 rangatiratanga. 
These terms are briefly explained below.87  
Whänaungatanga 
The Waitangi Tribunal has explained whänaungatanga as a broad kinship concept that acknowledges inter-
connectedness between people and the environment, through whakapapa (2011, p. 17). It is from this inter-
connectedness that specific obligations of care arise. Importantly, these duties are not just to direct kin; 
they can arise also through the inter-connectedness of all people in Mäori cosmology. 
Manaakitanga 
Manaakitanga is “the process of showing respect, generosity and care for others” (Te Aka Online Mäori 
Dictionary, n.d.). It has an overtone of hospitality towards those outside a group you identify with. In its 
87 Different iwi or röpu may have a different understanding or use of these terms. The discussion is intended to be descriptive for readers unfamiliar with 
the general concepts – rather than definitive. The Commission makes no attempt to define these terms on behalf of Mäori. 
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simplest definition (hospitality), all Mäori groups or whänau will exercise manaakitanga at some time. In the 
case of groups that represent mana whenua, they may feel an extra obligation to those who live within their 
rohe (area), regardless of whether they are part of their iwi or hapü:88 
Mana whenua has a role distinct from service provision. It is one that monitors the quality of services 
provided to all whanau in their rohe. It carries obligations and expectations that government agencies, 
urban Maori mataawaka groups or mainstream organisations do not have; that broadly incorporates 
whanau and environmental wellbeing. The kaitiaki and manaaki responsibility of Mana Whenua is 
intersectoral and intergenerational, carried by their ancestors as well as their future descendants. (Te 
Roopu Waiora, sub. 97, p. 4) 
Of course, it would be unfair and unrealistic to suggest that urban iwi alone are responsible for the 
wellbeing of mataawaka populations.89 The bonds of whakapapa mean that iwi retain an interest in their 
members who live outside their rohe (often referred to as taurahere populations). Particularly in the case of 
urban populations, there will also be other groups, such as Mäori urban authorities, that take an interest in 
the wellbeing of mataawaka populations. And of course the Crown retains its Article Three duties. 
Rangatiratanga 
Rangatiratanga can be translated by words such as leadership and sovereignty. For social services, the 
definition of rangatiratanga that is most relevant may be the one used in the Wai414 report by the Waitangi 
Tribunal. The claim was in the context of social services. The Tribunal found that: 
Rangatiratanga, in this context, is that which is sourced to the reciprocal duties and responsibilities 
between leaders and their associated Mäori community. It is a relationship fundamental to Mäori 
culture and identity and describes a leadership acting not out of self-interest but in a caring and 
nurturing way with the people close at heart, fully accountable to them and enjoying their support. A 
Mäori community defines itself by a relationship of rangatiratanga between its leaders and members; 
rangatiratanga gives a group a distinctly Mäori character; it offers members a group identity and rights. 
But it is attached to a Mäori community and is not restricted to a tribe. The principle of rangatiratanga 
appears to be simply that Mäori should control their own tikanga and taonga, including their social and 
political organisation, and, to the extent practicable and reasonable, fix their own policy and manage 
their own programmes. (The Waitangi Tribunal, 1998, p. xxv) 
Working with the definition of rangatiratanga used in Wai 414, mana whenua groups will exercise 
rangatiratanga for their community. This will give them a particular interest in how services and programmes 
are delivered to their population. Although not necessarily formally recognised by government, the claim 
that mana whenua groups (often iwi rünanga mandated through the Treaty settlement process) hold 
rangatiratanga, is relatively uncontroversial. But the definition of rangatiratanga used in Wai414 envisages 
that groups other than mandated Treaty settlement rünanga can exercise rangatiratanga, as it derives from 
Mäori communities rather than particular organisations as well. 
At different times, and in different ways, Mäori organisations relevant to social services may wish to exercise 
some of these duties. Section 13.4 below describes briefly these organisations. 
13.4 A diverse range of Mäori organisations are involved in social 
services 
The last 30 years of Mäori service delivery development has changed the provider landscape significantly: 
…devolution policies, accompanied by a separation of funder and provider roles and greater 
contestability among providers, resulted in a major transformation that has generated new systems of 
health care, education and social work. The advent of a greatly expanded Mäori workforce in schools, 
hospitals, prisons and welfare agencies has significantly altered standards of practice and made services 
more responsive to Mäori. Mäori provider organisations have also emerged so that there is greater 
choice. Whänau can now opt for Mäori language immersion education, Mäori health care providers, 
Mäori social services – or for mainstream providers. (Taskforce on Whänau-Centred Initiatives, 2010, 
pp. 19–20) 
88 The iwi or hapü who are recognised as deriving mana (authority/status) from their ancestral connection to that particular stretch of land or coast. 
89 Refers to the Mäori population in one area that is connected to an iwi or hapü who holds mana whenua somewhere outside that area. 
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There is now a wide range of Mäori organisations relevant to social services for Mäori. Not all of these are 
“service providers” as such. As Dame Tariana Turia pointed out in the context of Whänau Ora: 
…Whänau Ora does not need to be delivered by a service provider… there are other organisations, 
family collectives, family trusts and marae who already deal with people in family settings who could be 
doing really important jobs. (Hon. Tariana Turia; quoted in Bootham, 2014)  
Within this range of organisations it is possible to see some loose categories. 
 Mandated iwi rünanga: These are tribal governance entities that have received a legal mandate to 
negotiate Treaty settlements with the Crown. They may have social service provider arms attached to 
them. 
 Iwi rünanga, Mäori or tribal trust boards that are not Treaty settlement bodies: These are tribal 
governance entities established for a variety of purposes other than settlement negotiations. Some have 
been established by Acts of Parliament (such as Mäori Trust Boards). 
 Non-aligned Tangata Whenua service providers: Some social service providers have developed to a 
considerable size, serving the needs largely of a particular population group connected by whakapapa. 
These service providers may not be formally connected to the tribal authority. 
 Mataawaka (including urban Mäori) organisations: There are some Mäori communities and associated 
management structures that have developed to serve the needs of mataawaka populations – commonly 
groups of urban Mäori outside the rohe of their iwi, and who may no longer know who their iwi is.  
 Other organisations in Mäori civil society: These can include organisations such as those referred to by 
Hon. Tariana Turia above. 
These organisations either provide social services to Mäori communities, or represent those communities. 
Often, the same organisations can reasonably be said to do both. The principle of rangatiratanga means 
that Mäori should be the ones to choose who represents them in decision-making processes (see the 
definition in section 13.3).  
There is no consensus within Mäoridom about the relative roles of iwi and other organisations. Some take a 
strong line that it is the role of iwi rünanga to lead, and their role alone. Others see opportunities for a 
range of Mäori organisations to exhibit leadership in social services.  
This debate is one to be resolved among Mäori. It does, however, leave government agencies with some 
challenges in the meantime. Those agencies can sometimes find themselves having to pick between the 
claims of different Mäori organisations to leadership.  
13.5  What is the Treaty dimension? 
Kawanatanga and good governance 
The debate about commissioning and delivering social services to Mäori is often shaped in Treaty 
language. This can make it hard to distinguish between Mäori challenges to government because of the 
latter’s poor processes, and specific actions that need to be taken due to the Treaty. Where good process is 
adhered to, there will generally be greater clarity about any specific actions that need to be taken to 
address Treaty concerns. For example, good consultation involves: 
 identifying affected parties (including communities); 
 providing them with sufficient information about the proposal under discussion; 
 consulting with them before a decision has been taken (ie, with an open mind); and 
 allowing sufficient time to consult, and providing consultation forums appropriate to the group being 
consulted (for Mäori, this may include recognising the importance of körero kanohi ki te kanohi).  
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Good consultation should occur as a matter of good practice – although the partnership embodied in the 
Treaty is a powerful argument both for better practice and potentially for further actions as well. Where 
there is some uncertainty about how Treaty duties can be met, often good process is a starting point from 
which Crown agencies can proceed. In one sense, this is the Crown exercising kawanatanga under Articles 
One and Three of the Treaty effectively. Where the Treaty motivates particular actions, such as consulting 
when a government agency might otherwise not have, these duties are in addition to, rather than a 
substitute for, ordinary good process.  
 
 
 F13.1  Where the Treaty places duties on the Crown to take particular actions in social services 
in relation to Mäori, these duties are in addition to, rather than a substitute for, ordinary 
good process. 
 
 
Further actions to address Articles Two and Three 
Starting from the foundation of good process, additional actions relevant to social services can be 
considered on the basis of Articles Two and Three of the Treaty. 
The Waitangi Tribunal has not yet determined through its inquiries the application of Article Two to social 
policy. Nor does the Commission intend to undertake such a task. Inquiry participants, however, did have 
some expectations of how Article Two is relevant to the delivery of social services. 
The Principle of Active Protection of Mäori Interests by the Crown arises from Article Two. Failure to provide 
this active protection, leading to loss of täonga (including natural resources and culture) are the basis for 
much of the redress through the Treaty settlement process. But active protection is also a forward-looking 
duty, and may include Mäori interests in their own development (both social and economic). 
Article Two also guarantees the protection of tino rangatiratanga in the Mäori version of the Treaty, 
commonly translated as self-determination. The ability of Mäori to determine their own social and economic 
development is therefore sometimes couched as a Treaty right under Article Two. 
Article Three requires that Mäori receive equal rights and privileges. In this case, Article Three has been 
seen to create duties on the Crown to provide equal access to services, and consideration for further 
assistance where poor outcomes or potential opportunities warrant it. The debate around Article Three 
mirrors the debate about “equality” in New Zealand generally – does it refer to equality of opportunity, or 
equality of outcome? At this stage, there is no clear path through that debate. Typically, the Crown’s duty 
of active protection of Mäori interests under Article Two is used to make the particular case for improving 
Mäori social and economic development. 
The Commission has not attempted to address all possible Treaty issues in social services. As well, 
reiterating the point made in Chapter 2, the Commission does not advocate that financial redress through 
Treaty settlements in any way changes government responsibilities for funding or delivering social services. 
The particular issue examined in this inquiry is providing for the aspirations of iwi and Mäori to be involved 
in the commissioning of social services. This issue has an important Treaty dimension − the balancing 
kawanatanga and rangatiratanga in decision making on social services. 
The commissioning challenge – making space for rangatiratanga 
As iwi and other structures within Mäoridom have increased opportunities to lead their own economic and 
social development, boundary issues arise between the role of iwi and the role of the state. In particular, 
enabling greater rangatiratanga within social services inherently requires the Crown to step back from 
“deciding for” and often “doing for” Mäori. Yet if the Crown steps back too far, or in the wrong way, then it 
risks inappropriately leaving iwi to deliver the Crown’s Article Three duties.  
Social services systems that are publicly funded or based in the institutions of government will serve a 
mixture of both kawanatanga and rangatiratanga interests (which is consistent with New Zealand being a 
partnership). However, sometimes the debate can get stuck on whether a particular role, activity or 
responsibility is a kawanatanga or rangatiratanga responsibility. 
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The Treaty means that the Crown will always hold ultimate liability for its Article Three duties. But separate 
to those duties is the range of activities and structures the Crown uses to fulfil them. Sometimes, iwi might 
see playing a role in managing those activities as facilitating their own aspirations for development, or 
useful for discharging their duties of manaakitanga, rangatiratanga, or whänaungatanga. What is at issue 
here is not so much whether any given activity is a kawanatanga or rangatiratanga responsibility, but instead 
who should hold te mana whakahaere (translated variously as the power to manage, governance or 
authority) to achieve the objectives of both parties (again, consistent with New Zealand being a 
partnership). 
Where the Crown has exercised te mana whakahaere, its Article Three duties have received emphasis but 
rangatiratanga has not always flourished. Creating opportunities for Mäori groups to exercise mana 
whakahaere in delivering social services has the potential both to improve outcomes and lead to more 
effective exercise of rangatiratanga. This supports creating a trend towards more devolution of 
commissioning decisions to Mäori. 
13.6 Devolving the commissioning of social services to Mäori 
The Commission has advocated in previous chapters for increased devolution (where appropriate) in 
commissioning social services. Devolution can increase the empowerment of the users of social services, or 
communities that have a high interest in social services. The case for community empowerment is strongest 
where some aspect of how social services are delivered disempowers an identifiable population group, or 
where the outcome sought (such as changes in social attitudes toward unhealthy lifestyles) requires 
community action for change.  
The development aspirations of Mäori, the desire to improve the outcomes of whänau, and the tikanga 
around manaakitanga, whänaungatanga and rangatiratanga mean that iwi and other Mäori groups are 
obvious candidates for further devolution of the commissioning of social services. 
13.7 Existing iwi involvement in commissioning social services 
There are a number of steps involved in commissioning social services. Mäori groups may prefer to be 
involved in some but not others. By looking at some existing examples we can see what has currently been 
possible, and gauge what further opportunities the devolution recommendations in this report might hold. 
Ngai Tühoe – mana motuhake 
Ngai Tühoe have a strong interest in taking full responsibility for decision making about social services. This 
arises from their desire for mana motuhake (explained in Box 13.1) 
Box 13.1 How Ngai Tühoe define mana motuhake 
Mana Motuhake is the acceptance of obligations, duty and responsibility to the full in order to be 
deserving of all the rights, entitlements and privileges that ensue. Mana Motuhake is a ‘collective 
action’ grounded mechanism, not individual, therefore it comes in to view with hapü and their 
whänau behaviour, attitude and actions. 
Mana Motuhake is the politic of being Tühoe. The integrity of Tühoetanga relies upon the 
dedication of Tühoe people to be self-governing, paying and earning their own way, not 
beholden to others, not enslaved by another ideology. The raising of whänau, hapü stature 
strengthens the iwi. The tribal authority will be the conduit by which the ideology and principles 
are restored to whänau and hapü. 
Mana Motuhake is a political stance that supports the retention and restoration of power and 
control by Tühoe over all matters pertaining to Tühoe. This confirms the validity of hapü political 
systems and rights to exercise leadership authority pertinent to decision-making that is based on 
Tühoetanga. The freedom to determine how Tühoe will live, how they will raise their children and 
mokopuna, how they will keep traditions alive, how they will celebrate who they are, how they will 
preserve and maintain their language and cultural values and ultimately how they will prosper and 
continue. 
Source:  Tühoe Establishment Trust, 2011, p. 12. 
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There are several critical components to the social service provisions that the Crown has developed with 
Ngai Tühoe through the Treaty settlement process. 
 The relationship statement Nä korero Ranatira ä Tühoe me Ta Karauna (2 July 2011). It was significant 
because it included an acknowledgement by the Crown of the mana motuhake of Tühoe, and 
acknowledgement by Tühoe of the mana of the Crown (Sapere, forthcoming, p. 11). It led to the 
development by the Crown and Tühoe of a 40-year Service Management Plan (SMP). 
 The Service Management Plan (November 2012). The SMP is structured as a series of bilateral 
agreements between the participating agencies and Tühoe (Sapere, forthcoming, p. 12). It is overseen 
by a Social Service Taskforce, comprised of officials from the agencies party to the agreement (MBIE, 
MinEdu, and MSD). 
In Tühoe’s view “the SMP is a Crown document and a Crown responsibility and while they would attend the 
Taskforce meetings they were not part of the Taskforce” (Sapere, forthcoming, p. 12). The Taskforce has not 
met since November 2013 (Sapere, forthcoming, p. 11). 
MSD continues to work with Tühoe to give effect to its mana motuhake in the delivery of social services. 
There is some way to go to determine the best model to achieve mana motuhake, but the aspiration to be 
self-governing is a strong one. 
Te Hiku grouping – the social development accord 
The Te Hiku Social Accord is described in Chapter 3. Box 13.2 briefly outlines how the Te Hiku 
Development Trust describes the Accord.  
 
The Commission met with representatives of the Te Hiku Iwi Development Trust. Unlike Tühoe, the Trust do 
not wish to engage in service delivery or purchase decisions. Instead, they see their role as being at the 
governance level only, influencing the direction of social policy within their collective rohe. This could be 
described as participating in commissioning to give effect to the manaakitanga and rangatiratanga duties of 
mana whenua for the social wellbeing of their people and others residing in their rohe. 
Ngäti Tüwharetoa’s Agreement in Principle 
Ngäti Tüwharetoa is different again. Rather than seeking to achieve formal inclusion in commissioning 
through the Treaty settlement process, they have instead used the process to get an undertaking from the 
Box 13.2 Te Hiku Social Development and Wellbeing Accord 
The Te Hiku Development Trust explains the Accord as being: 
[A]bout empowering whanau living in Te Hiku o Te Ika [the part of the Far North District that is 
north of the Hokianga] and helping them to improve the quality of their lives. The Accord was 
Signed by the Prime Minister and his Ministers in Waitangi 5th February in 2013.  
The Accord is about Crown agencies working collaboratively with Te Hiku iwi on the co-design of 
solutions for our whänau and community in Te Hiku. Te Hiku has been and will continue to meet 
regularly with Government Departments to ensure they are meeting their obligations to remove 
disparities and create socio-economic equity for our iwi, hapü and whänau. 
The approach being pursued is a multi-agency one, which requiring a significant paradigm shift in 
the way departments have historically operated and serviced the needs of the Te Hiku 
community. 
The work will be founded on sound evidence and data, with jointly agreed measures between the 
Crown and Iwi. The Accord will seek best out [sic] practice, help to achieve cost effectiveness and 
real results in terms of outcomes for the people, not just for Mäori but for the whole Te Hiku 
community. 
Source:  Te Hiku Iwi Development Trust, n.d. 
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Crown to provide them with the information necessary to directly negotiate projects with the relevant 
Crown Agencies. Box 13.3 outlines the relevant section of their Agreement in Principle. 
Although not a formal co-governance arrangement for involvement in commissioning social services, this is 
still an example of an iwi seeking to exercise rangatiratanga in social services. 
Te Waipounamu iwi – Te Pütahitanga 
The nine iwi who hold mana whenua in Te Waipounamu (the South Island) have formed a limited 
partnership, creating Te Pütahitanga o Te Waipounamu. Te Pütahitanga successfully tendered to be the 
Whänau Ora Commissioning Agency for Te Waipounamu. The iwi partners form a shareholder council 
known as Te Taumata, which has appointed an independent governance board to direct Te Pütahitanga. 
This structure involves iwi as owners of the organisation that will be commissioning services for the whänau, 
and therefore gives them a stronger ability to hold that organisation to account than if it were a government 
agency. It gives the iwi of Te Waipounamu greater influence over part of the government apparatus, while 
maintaining their distinctiveness and without requiring a large commitment of their capability.  
This is a particular example where iwi have elected to become involved in commissioning social services 
within the apparatus of a government initiative. Te Puni Kökiri’s commissioning function has been 
contracted out to a joint venture, rather than being devolved to the iwi directly.  
Te Pou Matakana 
Te Pou Matakana, was established in 2014 by the National Urban Mäori Authority (NUMA), which is its 
principal shareholder and appoints the board of independent directors. It won the tender to become the 
Whänau Ora Commissioning Agency for Te Ika o Mäui (the North Island). 
In contrast to Te Pütahitanga, Te Pou Matakana has its roots in urban Mäori which NUMA represents. 
NUMA is a national umbrella organisation with seven affiliate Urban Mäori Authorities (UMAs), which 
provide approximately 300 services to whänau in five main centres (Whangarei, Auckland, Hamilton, 
Box 13.3 Cultural and social wellbeing section of the Ngäti Tüwharetoa Agreement in Principle 
6.56 The Crown acknowledges that Ngäti Tüwharetoa aspire to work with Crown agencies on 
projects to enhance the education, health and living standards of Ngäti Tüwharetoa 
people, and to improve their cultural and spiritual wellbeing. The 2013 Census shows that 
Ngäti Tüwharetoa people have suffered significant social and economic deprivation, which 
is illustrated by the following statistics: 
 6.56.1 Ngäti Tüwharetoa people had a median income of $21 900 (compared to a 
national average of $28 500, and a national Mäori average of $23 700); 
 6.56.2 32.2% of Ngäti Tüwharetoa had received income support in the 12 months prior 
to the census; and 
 6.56.3 55.3% of Ngäti Tüwharetoa lived in rental accommodation (17.9% of which was 
provided by Housing New Zealand). 
6.57 Beyond the settlement, Ngäti Tüwharetoa aspire to support Mäori landowners in their area 
of interest to develop their lands and resources for the benefit of their people. Ngäti 
Tüwharetoa consider that there are significant opportunities for sustainable development 
of their lands, forests, farms, fisheries and other natural resources. This would make a 
significant contribution to whänau and hapü of Ngäti Tüwharetoa, and also to the district, 
regional and national economies. 
6.58 The Crown will, outside of this settlement, work with Ngäti Tüwharetoa to develop a socio-
economic data profile for Ngäti Tüwharetoa members prior to the deed of settlement. 
Ngäti Tüwharetoa will then approach Crown agencies in relation to any issues identified by 
the profile. 
Source:  Office of Treaty Settlements, 2015. 
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Wellington and Christchurch). The services cover education, health, housing, justice, and social-work related 
services.90 The UMAs were set up in response to the migration of Mäori to cities over two generations 
during the 20th century, recognising that “by the mid-1980s nearly 80% of Mäori lived in cities” (NUMA, 
2009).  
Te Pou Matakana has as its kaupapa “supporting successful families” through a three-pronged approach:  
 applying the collective impact model (see Chapter 3); 
 providing direct support to whänau through its “Whänau Direct” programme; and 
 co-investment with partner organisations (Te Pou Matakana, 2014).  
Through its collective impact approach, it aims to design and deliver initiatives and new services that are 
best targeted to whänau who need them. One of NUMA’s affiliates, Te Whänau O Waipareira Trust 
provides backbone or back-office support and is trialling an ICT-based whänau assessment tool to help 
monitor and report progress against Whänau Ora outcomes. Whänau Direct is an initiative to develop 
whänau capability and capacity. Te Pou Matakana is conducting a pilot with 22 Whänau Ora provider–
collectives throughout the North Island for this purpose. 
Of the three Whänau Ora Commissioning Agencies, Te Pou Matakana serves the largest population to (see 
Appendix C). Structured as it is, it navigates between the competing claims for representation discussed in 
section 13.4, both as a Commissioning Agency, and then choosing between the service providers it 
commissions. In the latter case, it makes choices using as its criteria: 
 experience; 
 relationships with the local community; 
 geographic reach; and 
 track record in delivery of integrated social services.  
This mirrors the discussion in section 13.5 – that following principles of good process will go a long way 
towards navigating the different aspirations and areas of interest of different groups. 
Observations from the examples 
This section makes observations on both the nature of involvement in commissioning that the example 
groups have sought, and on the process used to achieve that involvement. 
Observations on the nature of involvement 
There are some examples where iwi can and are making some choices on how they would like to be 
involved in commissioning social services. Figure 13.2 shows graphically where the examples have chosen 
to be involved with commissioning.  
90 The seven UMAs are: Otangarei Trust, Te Whanau O Waipareira Trust, Manukau Urban Mäori Authority, Te Runanga O Kirikiriroa, Te Kohao Health 
Trust, Te Roopu Awhina ki Porirua Trust and Te Runanga O Nga Maata Waka.  
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Figure 13.2 Choices made by the five example iwi groups on how they wish to engage with 
commissioning  
 
Source: Sturgess, 2012; Productivity Commission. 
These choices may have been made within constraints that are not readily apparent outside the 
negotiations themselves. That said, the tendency in these examples is towards involvement in 
commissioning while maintaining some distance from responsibilities historically held by the Crown. 
This suggests some caution in advocating devolved commissioning models as “the solution” to delivering 
social services for Mäori. Although there is some interest, in practice it may take some time for these 
models to be fully realised. It is appropriate that Mäori/iwi determine the pace and extent of the process 
and their involvement in it. 
Observations on the process for achieving involvement 
The process used to decide which Mäori organisations to engage with, and over what, can potentially have 
undue influence over the outcome of who is selected. Good governance (or kawanatanga), means it is 
important that the process of determining who to partner with in social services is open. It needs to allow 
for the various claims to representation and influence from Mäori organisations to be heard and considered 
fairly. Anything less than an open process is likely to lead to a sub-optimal involvement of particular 
communities in the decisions that affect them. 
The process most commonly used in the examples has been the Treaty settlement process. This raises 
questions such as: 
 Does the Treaty settlement process, which is aimed at achieving full and final settlements, include 
sufficient flexibility to cope with emerging needs and aspirations in the future? 
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 Does the primacy of the Treaty settlement process potentially exclude from consideration organisations 
– such as urban authorities and non-aligned tangata whenua groups – who could otherwise usefully be 
involved further in commissioning?  
The answer to these questions is probably that the Treaty settlement process is too inflexible and too 
narrow to realise the potential for devolving commissioning to Mäori effectively. A better process needs to 
be based on: 
 the government providing a standing opportunity to Mäori groups to propose how they might like to be 
involved in commissioning; 
 the nature of the proposed process needs to come from Mäori, rather than be a model that Mäori 
groups are co-opted into, or have imposed on them; and 
 the constraints that government places on what is possible need to be reasonable. 
Box 13.1 outlines the relationship of these ideas to Treaty principles. 
 
 
 
 F13.2  The Treaty settlement process is not well suited to exploring opportunities for Mäori 
groups to have greater involvement in social service commissioning, especially as New 
Zealand moves into a post-settlement era. 
 
 
 
 
 R13.1  The Government should create a standing opportunity for Mäori groups to initiate 
negotiations to increase participation in commissioning social services, outside the 
Treaty settlement process. 
 
Section 13.9 discusses some of the design issues in relation to the devolution of commissioning to Mäori 
organisations. 
13.8 The potential for data analytics to assist in achieving Mäori 
aspirations 
The New Zealand Data Futures Forum has already undertaken consultation and analysis on the potential for 
data to empower Mäori (Box 13.5). This inquiry therefore has not replicated that work. 
 
 
Box 13.4 The Treaty context of Crown-Mäori negotiations on social services 
 Some Mäori organisations exercise rangatiratanga for their communities. They may wish to further 
exercise this in social services. 
 The Crown has a duty to actively protect Mäori interests (including rangatiratanga), so the 
opportunity for greater involvement needs to be an active rather than passive one. 
 Neither kawanatanga nor rangatiratanga are absolutes in the context of partnership – both are 
constrained by the reasonable needs of the other. This means that not all expressions of 
rangatiratanga may be possible, and, where the Crown does constrain rangatiratanga, those 
constraints need to be reasonable. 
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In the social services context, the objectives that government agencies appear to have been most 
interested in are the potential to use data: 
 for better “targeting” or prioritisation of types of client; 
 to better match the most effective interventions to the clients who will respond best to them; and 
 to better measure the benefits of social services and to make stronger cases for resourcing. 
Mäori social service providers may also share this enthusiasm. Data, such as student educational data by iwi, 
can be used to advocate for improvement programmes where necessary. Data can serve as a “critical 
friend”, so that Mäori service providers can improve their own performance without reference to formal 
contract monitoring. The Whänau Ora Commissioning Agencies place considerable emphasis on building 
the evidence base of their work. One Agency in particular was developing an information system that could 
form part of its backbone infrastructure for interacting with the providers it contracts with. The same agency 
was working on a social-cost calculator. 
On the other hand, some expected benefits of data analytics may seem less important where iwi, Mäori and 
kaumatua may know similar things but from different knowledge bases:  
Information technology is essential as a tool for development. Data in its own right is unhelpful but to 
be effective must only ever be one tool of analyses and not an end point or rationale. (Te Rünaka o 
Ötäkou, sub. 110, p. 9). 
The promise of data analytics for government is that it gives the centre the potential to know things that it 
has not been able to know before, given its relative distance from clients and service delivery. This will be 
Box 13.5 New Zealand Data Futures Forum discussion of using data to empower Mäori 
During our discussions with Mäori, we heard many of the same themes as we heard elsewhere. 
However, we heard strongly that Mäori want to be involved in the use of the data about them. 
 Mäori use and control of Mäori data are important to support Mäori goals. This is about 
Mäori business. It’s also about whanau, iwi, urban Mäori, whakapapa and the ability to 
exercise tikanga, such as manaakitanga and kaitiakitanga. 
 Many Mäori do not perceive themselves as having benefited much from the collection and 
use of data. 
− They perceive a real and immediate risk of greater data availability being used for 
ethnic profiling, to their detriment. 
− Despite widespread demands on them for data in the past, the data seems to be rarely 
used in ways that might benefit them. 
− There is a vicious circle in which negative statistics reinforce poor outcomes and 
negative perceptions, which in turn yield more negative statistics. 
− Mäori are often denied access to data they have provided and data about them, or it is 
collected or used in ways that do not meet their needs. 
− Collection, storage and use of data often occur in ways that do not respect Mäori 
tikanga. 
Government’s data about Mäori should not be hidden away in various state sector silos, especially 
as there is enormous potential to use the data to identify and respond to opportunities and 
support Mäori development. Examples of projects that would deliver value for Mäori communities 
include understanding preventable mortality in the Auckland region, building on the Sensing 
Cities work and sustainable land-use data for development of Mäori enterprise. There are 
undoubtedly many other examples. We recommend a much stronger effort to work with Mäori to 
ensure data for and about Mäori is used in collaborative projects that create value for Mäori 
communities. 
Source:  NZDFF, n.d., pp. 42–43.  
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less relevant where whakapapa and whänaungatanga mean that particular client needs and amenability to 
different kinds of intervention are broadly known within iwi and Mäori communities.  
The Mäori Statistics Advisory Committee has identified broadly where and how data can be used within the 
processes of tikanga: 
For Mäori, the approach to this kaupapa should be enshrined in processes of tikanga. Eg, 
manaakitanga is based upon data showing how we assist our own and carry out this deep-seated 
obligation to all peoples; kaitiakitanga needs data to show how we add value to care for the 
environment and control use of resources so they are fully available for future generations – which 
means using past and future generations data to exercise that duty. 
This means that the kaupapa starts with the relationship of the personal to the collective and vice-versa: 
descent from whakapapa is where this relationship starts and it affects everything in Te Ao Mäori 
stemming out for instance to wahi tapu. (MSAC, n.d., p. 1) 
This also raises a related point – much of our statistical information is on an individual basis but, in the 
context of Te Ao Mäori and empowering Mäori communities, being able to understand the situation within 
whänau and hapü is important. Some of the potential for data to aid Mäori development is in 
understanding the dynamics and strengths within hapü and whänau. This can help both identifying potential 
underlying causes of issues and also hapü and whänau resources that can be drawn upon to address those 
issues.  
Data analytics may hold some particular promise for Mäori: 
 because government is more responsive to data, it becomes a powerful language for bargaining; and 
 future liability, though an unpalatable language for some, opens up new possibilities for negotiating 
funding transfers. 
There appears to have been no shortage of ideas for improving outcomes amongst social services to Mäori. 
Getting traction on these ideas has proven more difficult, especially where the benefits of, say, a housing 
initiative, are likely to show up for government as a reduction in expenditure in a different Vote such as, say, 
health or education. As well, the politics of ethnicity in New Zealand means that Mäori-led or visibly Mäori 
“branded” initiatives will often receive greater than usual public scrutiny. Combined with a culture of risk 
aversion in government agencies (Chapter 4), this can make it particularly hard for Mäori to get government 
support for new initiatives in social services. 
Measurements of reduction in future liability create a powerful argument for the benefits of programmes 
that accrue to all taxpayers – regardless of who is leading the initiative. They may also be a way to avoid 
criticism of the merits of taking a Mäori approach. Measurements of future liability have the potential to 
cross funding silos. As such, Mäori might find it more possible to negotiate for support from government 
where previously individual agencies would refuse. 
These benefits are best realised if Mäori have access to these kinds of data analytics, as envisaged in 
Chapter 8. 
13.9 Issues for designing further devolution to Mäori 
To which kinds of communities might commissioning be devolved? 
There are two broad choices for the kind of communities to which commissioning might be devolved or 
delegated: 
 devolve to an existing self-identified Mäori community (the rangatiratanga argument); or 
 delegate/contract on the basis of an administrative distinction (potentially to avoid capture by any 
particular community). 
Whänau Ora appears to have gone down the “administrative distinction” path, by using North Island Mäori 
and South Island Mäori as the relevant communities to devolve to. As discussed above, Te Waipounamu iwi 
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have found a way to exercise some rangatiratanga through that process. There may also be a case for some 
devolution to existing self-identified Mäori communities, although care needs to be taken not to split up the 
available funding too much.  
Funding and devolution 
Previous attempts to empower communities, such as Whänau Ora, have struggled to achieve devolution of 
service delivery funding. The practicalities of devolving funding receive some discussion in Chapter 5. This 
section considers the specific challenge of devolving funding on the basis of population group or 
community of interest. This challenge is relevant to some of the other institutional architectures and service 
models discussed elsewhere in the report. However, given that moving funding to support policies (such as 
in Whänau Ora) to involve Mäori groups much more in decision making has proven so problematic in the 
past, it warrants specific discussion here. 
The Commission has observed three specific challenges that need resolving before funding can be 
devolved on the basis of population group or community of interest: 
 difficulties in pricing the entitlement or proportion of funding being spent on any particular group (and 
therefore determining the amount to be devolved); 
 potential mis-matched allocation between funding and clients (eg, where a provider is funded to 
support a client, but that client chooses to access services from other, unfunded, providers); and 
 rights-based challenges to moving funding for an individual’s entitlement under one system to another 
system (if it restricts the client’s choice of provider).91 
 
 
 Q13.1 
 
Has the Commission adequately understood the challenges of devolving funding on the 
basis of a population group or community of interest?  
 
Devolving funding is inherently difficult. To start the conversation on how this might best occur, the 
Commission discusses four broad options below. This is in no way intended to be a “roadmap” for 
achieving greater devolution of funding, but instead is a “starter for ten” for submitters to consider.  
Basic funding options 
There are four basic options for funding devolution of social services to Mäori groups: 
 An enrolment approach: In an enrolment approach, clients choose their commissioning organisation 
and/or provider, enrol with them, and bring a funding entitlement with them. Where funding is 
devolved in this way, the funding would follow the client from the existing system of service provision.92 
 Top slicing general funding: Top slicing means taking an arbitrarily set proportion of funding from 
existing programmes, and transferring it to the devolved organisation.  
 A shared-savings approach: A shared-savings approach uses data to establish forward welfare or social 
service expenditure liability for a population. It then funds a commissioning organisation or provider 
either in advance on the basis of expected liability reductions resulting from their activities, or after the 
reductions have been demonstrated. 
 Devolving any tagged funding: Some funding is specifically tagged for Mäori providers or programmes. 
This funding can look like an obvious candidate for devolution.  
The advantages and disadvantages of different approaches are discussed below. 
91 “Rights-based” in this context refers to individual common law and statutory rights, including entitlements to benefits. 
92 Some social insurance arrangements also require enrolment (see Chapter 9). 
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Enrolment approach 
An enrolment approach is the best option for addressing the rights-based challenges. This is because it is 
based on clients choosing where there funding will be allocated, rather than shifted on the basis of, say, 
their statistical risk profile or their iwi affiliation. However, enrolment approaches face several other 
problems: 
 Pricing challenges: This approach faces the greatest pricing challenges, as it requires the ability to 
clearly identify the client entitlement that is being shifted to the devolved commissioning organisation. 
Many social services systems are not currently funded on an individual “entitlement” basis, making 
establishing the relevant price difficult. 
 Potential restriction of client choices: There can also be issues about how much movement between 
commissioning organisations is allowed (discussed in Chapter 9), and how individual choice of the 
organisation that eventually provides the service is preserved. Clients may have enrolled with one 
organisation, but prefer a specific service or provider that is not funded by the organisation with which 
they are enrolled. This restrict client choice without a funding transfer mechanism, which could be 
administratively expensive. 
Top slicing general funding 
Top-slicing avoids the challenges of identifying the relevant existing spend that needs shifting, by arbitrarily 
choosing an amount to move. The main objection to top-slicing is that it is indiscriminate – it curtails both 
good and poor existing programmes. Some existing providers may be unviable with reduced funding. This 
can have undesirable knock-on effects, particularly if other providers rely on being able to refer clients to 
that provider. 
Social Sector Trials have partly used a similar approach, by transferring the control of relevant contracts to 
Trial leads. The final evaluation of the trials noted some challenges with this approach (Box 13.6). 
 
Shared-savings approach 
A shared savings approach uses data to establish forwards welfare or social service expenditure liability for 
a population. It then funds a commissioning organisation or provider either in advance on the basis of 
expected liability reductions resulting from their activities, or after the reductions have been demonstrated. 
Although potentially fiscally neutral, this model faces several drawbacks: 
 It suffers from the same attribution issues that arise whenever changes in outcomes are being measured.  
 Depending on how the outcome is specified, there may be problems with gaming and quality shading 
(see Chapters 5 and 6). 
 If the devolved commissioning organisation is reliant on this approach for funding then it may have a 
bias to short term options (where savings are made soon and can be redirected to fund it quickly).  
Box 13.6 Integration of funding activities 
Integration of in-scope government contracts into a single appropriation is a key feature of the 
Trials design, with the intention of giving Trial leads flexibility in using the funding to best meet 
local needs. However stakeholders report that integrating funding had proven to be a significant 
challenge for the Trials and it has not been fully achieved. Reasons given for this were:  
 a number of government contracts were not included because they were not strictly in scope  
 the limited leverage available to government agencies that have a devolved operating 
model (eg Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education) to influence the way funding is used in 
particular communities  
 difficulty in separating out funding intended for small Trials sites when contracts are funded 
for service provision across wider regions.  
Source:   Centre for Social Research and Evaluation, 2013. 
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Shifting tagged funding 
Funding expressly tagged for Mäori is often capability funding for Mäori providers. For example, Whanau 
Ora capability funding was introduced to encourage providers to collectivise, and help cover their costs of 
doing so.  
Some tagged funding is programme specific (eg, E tu Whänau). Shifting such funding would mean ending 
or re-purposing those programmes. This may be undesirable, or politically hard to achieve.  
Concluding thoughts on funding 
The shared-savings approach has the potential to redirect money in the least disruptive way. However, 
especially if it is going to be paid in arrears, it would require seed funding. Notably, Social Sector Trials 
have required both seed funding and the ability to redirect funding in a manner similar to top-slicing (Box 
13.7). 
 
Whänau Ora Commissioning Agencies were funded through tagged funding initially (Whänau Ora funds 
from Te Puni Kökiri). Using the incentive-payment approach – currently being trialled by Whänau Ora 
Commissioning Agencies (Appendix C) – may provide good evidence to determine whether a shared-
savings approach could be used to expand funding to devolved commissioning agencies. 
 
Box 13.7 Social Sector Trials funding 
Social Sector Trials (SSTs) have used a “top-slicing” mechanism to integrate their budget, which allows 
decision-making at the local level but with the approval of the Director SST who sits at the centre:  
Access to integrated funding (through the transfer of relevant contracts previously managed by 
individual agencies to SST management and an integrated appropriation within Vote: Social 
Development) ensures Trial leads can then use this funding to continue key programmes, 
reconfigure these programmes, or end these programmes and re-contract for something else, 
depending on what best fits local needs. The integration of the funding within the SST 
appropriation ring-fences the spend for SST use, and scope statements ensure it’s able to be used 
(within appropriate legal limits) for SST-directed initiatives without the limits individual Vote 
appropriations require (including restricted age range targets, outputs, or outcome areas). (Social 
Sector Trials, sub 126, p.8). 
They also have a defined seed funding allocation within the SST appropriation: 
The opportunity to apply innovative approaches through the use of seed funding provides greater 
flexibility and collaboration in a timely way that is more responsive to community needs and very 
different to typical social service provision. It is integrated funding in a SST ring-fenced 
appropriation, meaning it isn’t bound by any other agencies NDOE rules. It is available for 
allocation within legal limits, with the Director: SSTs agreement to the spend. It is able to be 
quickly contracted and is therefore responsive to local needs. It is allocated for communities in 
advance of the financial year, meaning each SST knows its available funding source in advance, 
and then has the ability to secure other funding as needed. (Social Sector Trials, sub 126, p. 8). 
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Part Three: Making it 
happen 
Part Three describes a way forward to implement the significant changes that the Commission is 
recommending. The proposed reforms to roles and responsibilities, commissioning, the use of client-
directed and other devolved approaches, an expanded investment approach, and improved contracting are 
big. If implemented they will disrupt current arrangements and roles. It will therefore be necessary to 
proceed with care, with excellent leadership, at the right pace, the right degree of consultation, and the 
right sequencing. It will be important to learn about what works along the way and make appropriate 
adjustments. Chapter 14 proposes how the Government could set about implementing the reforms in a way 
that has these desirable features. 
Chapter 15 supports the case for change by indicating the types and orders of magnitude of the economic 
and social benefits achievable with system reform. 
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14 Implementation 
Key points 
 Achieving the step up in performance of the social services system by following the Commission’s 
recommendations will require big shifts in roles and behaviour by ministers, delivery agencies, 
providers and clients. The question is how best to make this happen. 
 Implementing the Commission’s recommendations will require ministerial responsibility to set 
strategic direction and adjust it as needed in the light of experience.  
 The Government should draw on advice and support both inside and outside the public service to 
enable it to develop and implement a reform strategy for social services. 
 To focus the effort of its agencies and support ministers, the Government should establish an 
“Office of Social Services”, within the government central agencies, to: 
- provide a strong, influential centre of thought leadership with a committed, whole-of-system 
orientation; 
- help ministers to develop the overall reform strategy; and guide its implementation; 
- develop whole-of-system data and analysis; 
- undertake research on system-wide issues and provide advice to the Board of Chief Executives 
and through that board, to the relevant ministers; 
- undertake evaluations of the performance of the social services system; 
- provide advice and design guidance for agencies engaged in commissioning; and 
- promote continuous improvement across the system. 
 The Office of Social Services would need clear terms of reference that steer it towards favouring a 
strong customer focus, a wide-access and comprehensive data infrastructure and whole-of-system 
thinking. 
 Measures that would help sustain reform and build in incentives for continuous improvement 
include: 
- a process for independent review of the implementation of the reform programme; 
- establishing a rolling review of social services programmes against specified criteria; and  
- seeking beneficial opportunities to undertake international benchmarking of social services, 
including their cost effectiveness, such as through participating in the Australian Report on 
Government Services. 
 
This chapter discusses how to achieve effective implementation of the report’s recommendations to 
improve the delivery of social services. The report has been written at a time when the Government is 
pushing ahead on several fronts to improve the effectiveness of social services. The recent announcement 
of a modernising review of Child, Youth and Family and the Minister of Finance’s recent speech describing 
the application of social-investment principles in this year’s budget are two examples93. The Commission’s 
recommendations go further than the current agenda, yet are congruent with this direction of travel. If 
93 See Minister for Social Development (2015b) and Minister of Finance (2015) 
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implemented along with other initiatives that the Government is considering, the proposals would make up 
a significant long-term reform agenda involving considerable change that must be led by ministers and 
senior public servants.  
However, the approach to implementation needs to manage a challenging dilemma. While the centre of 
government and portfolio departments need to play key roles in creating the framework, capabilities and 
environment for change, many of the Commission’s proposals would alter, sometimes significantly, their 
role and influence.  
For example, the report expects better availability and use of data to enable the current, predominantly 
top-down approach to commissioning social services to shift towards a more decentralised approach – with 
service providers having more freedom, but more responsibility for improving outcomes. It also envisages 
clients increasingly being able to choose providers (facilitated by client-directed service models). The 
Commission anticipates customer choice would empower clients, reduce service fragmentation and 
increase pressure on service providers to improve their performance,  
The Government would still set system goals and standards; develop the data infrastructure; monitor 
performance and overall progress against outcomes; oversee evaluation; and promote changes suggested 
by evaluations. But responsibility for commissioning would be increasingly devolved. The challenge in 
bringing about such a shift is to develop a change-management strategy within government, involving 
devolution of some decision-making responsibility that presently sitting with government agencies. 
Significant forces work against change. Earlier chapters have identified that: 
 various approaches to funding and steering the system have been tried, but agreement on roles and 
business processes has not been reached; 
 there is no general agreement on the various roles in the social services system and who should do what 
work;  
 little attention has been paid to the informal solutions used by most families and communities to 
address issues without the support of government services – and whether there is a gain to be made in 
learning more about how those informal channels can be supported and strengthened; 
 much of the change effort has focused on the relationship and roles of government agencies and 
providers – there is little information on which to base a more customer-centred approach; 
 the top-down control culture of government agencies and the mission-driven culture of the provider 
sector have struggled to build a common platform for action – more often than not, change has resulted 
in compromise to preserve the “relationship” or the mission; and 
 the skills and capabilities to carry out a range of new tasks are only partly present.  
Reform will require driving changes that may sometimes be uncomfortable for the ministers and their 
departments that would normally implement many of the report’s recommendations. 
The system will need to change some of its DNA. Old customs, competencies, power structures, 
assumptions, and jobs will need to change. This is why these kind of changes generally do not happen 
spontaneously from within the status quo. Everybody in positions of power within the status quo has a 
vested interest in their competency in managing the status quo. Why would I let go of the data? Give 
up my monopoly? Learn new tricks? (Mansell, 2015, p. 21) 
Further, the report has presented evidence that current decision-making responsibilities and incentives can 
lead to decisions with a short-term focus, which are not based on genuine experimentation, and which are 
designed to minimise cost rather than meet the needs of clients for an integrated package of services. 
There is also a tendency to maintain programmes beyond their use-by date. 
This chapter argues that achieving reform in the face of such headwinds is more likely if:  
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 the Commission’s proposals are set within a broad, long-term strategy that takes a whole-of-system 
approach, and are implemented in a deliberate way (section 14.1); 
 responsibility and authority for implementation are clearly allocated, with the ministers responsible for 
strategic direction receiving effective support from an influential new Office of Social Services (section 
14.2); and 
 an external advisory board is set up to independently review reform progress, supported by measures 
that would help to sustain reform and build in incentives for continuous improvement (section 14.3). 
14.1 A long-term strategy for change 
Long-term focus 
An early task for the Government is to develop a strategy for implementing those recommendations that it 
accepts. A strategy provides coherence and direction and establishes a framework for purposive action. 
The strategy could be developed quickly, but needs a long-term focus: the short-term focus in the past may 
have hindered sustainable improvement: 
Government, however, has to take responsibility for starting and then failing to follow through on so 
many strategies (usually because of a change of minister and/or administration). Whatever the reason, 
the lack of a long term sustainable strategy is inimical to partnerships and working with communities 
because it meant all too often the government side had no lasting goals, no operating principles and 
no security that it would not all change. (John Angus, sub. 109, p.11) 
The strategy’s time horizon needs to be long enough to enable the proposed initiatives to be implemented; 
to provide confidence that the strategy is working as intended; and to enable the role of the centre to shift 
from “command and control” to an ongoing change-management and stewardship role. 
Strategic themes 
Categorising the Commission’s recommendations into seven themes provides a framework that could 
become the basis for a strategy. 
Theme 1: Improve system stewardship 
There is currently little conscious oversight of the social services system as a whole, encompassed by the 
idea of system stewardship. Government has a unique role in the social services system. It is the major 
funder of social services, and has statutory and regulatory powers unavailable to other participants. 
Government is the only participant that can take on responsibility for system stewardship and for making 
considered decisions that shape the system (Chapter 5). 
Theme 2: Improve capability and tool development 
Capability gaps cause system failure. For example, Chapter 12 described poor procurement practice, and 
Chapter 6 described how this sits within a wider failure in commissioning. Transforming the delivery of 
government services will require new capabilities within government in areas such as commissioning and 
managing contracts. Those involved in commissioning, for example, will need to use multiple frames of 
reference to oversee and deliver on data development; to be able to build an investment approach; to 
understand pricing methodologies; to be able to develop outcomes measures; and to have skills in 
stakeholder consultation, culture change, and public communications (Chapter 6). Providers will also need 
new and enhanced skills. For example, some providers will need to learn assessment skills, to enable them 
to help some less capable clients to make effective choices in client-directed service delivery models 
(Chapter 11). Initiatives implemented before the capabilities exist to deliver them are likely to fail. 
Improving capabilities involves:  
 identifying required competencies; 
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 developing a plan for how these competencies will be sourced from within the system, or grown 
through training and development, followed up by systems that reinforce new behaviours and allow 
them to adapt further; and 
 ensuring that there is an accessible “bank” of knowledge so that capability can continue to develop. 
Several recommendations involve developing new tools and capabilities. Such recommendations are likely 
to feature early in the reform process, because they are a pre-requisite for implementing other changes. 
Examples are better commissioning skills (recommendation 6.6), supported by well-resourced 
demonstration projects designed to build awareness of, and capability in, commissioning (recommendation 
6.7; skills in data technologies and analytics (Chapter 8); and the proposal that agencies engaging non-
government providers of social services should develop a risk-management framework that enables them to 
identify and allocate risks (recommendation 12.2).  
Theme 3: Make better use of data 
Developments in data technology and analytics have transformed many service industries, and can reduce 
the barriers to developing the more devolved, yet more integrated, approaches to delivering social services 
that are supported by this report. The same developments could support new business models in social 
services that will substantially improve effectiveness. This report supports: 
 more use of data to measure and monitor programme outcomes;  
 the development of a comprehensive, wide-access, client-centred data infrastructure accessible to 
providers, service users and researchers;  
 government social services agencies working to coordinate operational data-sharing; 
 partnerships with non-government organisations and academia, to use data sharing and analysis to 
create new solutions to difficult-to-solve social problems; 
 government assistance to providers to access and use operational data to improve service integration. 
Delivering this agenda will be challenging. There will be technical issues to resolve; privacy and security 
considerations to work through; new organisational structures to be developed; new skills and capabilities 
required; and new analytical models to be developed. 
Theme 4: Shaping incentives through choice and transparency 
Placing the power of choice in the hands of the customers of social services would strengthen the incentives 
to drive providers to continuously improve their services. Aided by a new wide-access and comprehensive 
data infrastructure, providers would have opportunities and incentives to work directly with clients and 
government agencies to come up with innovative, integrated and effective service packages. These are 
powerful incentives. 
This report also contains recommendations designed to strengthen specific incentives for good practice by 
government agencies and by non-government providers. For example, recommendation 12.2 is that all 
agencies that contract with non-government providers should report yearly on compliance with tendering 
timelines. Recommendation 12.5 would require agencies to adopt a risk-based approach to monitoring 
contracts and require them to publish their assessments of monitoring arrangements, including an analysis 
of the costs and benefits. 
The challenge is to develop incentives that target the activity to be encouraged or discouraged; have 
sufficient force, but are not excessively costly to apply; and that sustain and indeed expand the momentum 
for movement towards new models of delivering social services. Box 14.1 provides an example from the 
health sector, which also shows how better data enables a more devolved approach to service delivery and 
the incentive framework that drives this approach. These incentives not only motivate better performance, 
they would also create a group of supporters for the new approach who are motivated to foster and 
develop it by the prospect of a more financially and professionally rewarding working environment. 
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Theme 5: Reshaping roles and responsibilities  
The Government should develop new institutional arrangements, which provide the framework and 
incentives for implementing the strategy. This includes establishing which ministers are responsible for 
implementation, clarifying their roles and responsibilities, and identifying who will support them. This is 
discussed below. Setting up the arrangements for more devolved commissioning and client empowerment 
(Chapters 6 and 11) should also be an early priority. These arrangements need to be supported by 
mechanisms, described in section 14.3, which would sustain the new models for delivering social services as 
envisaged by this report. 
Theme 6: Embed continuous improvement 
Social services have, with some exceptions, lagged behind many other services in adopting innovative 
productivity-enhancing business models, including those enabled by developments in information and 
communications technology. Innovation involves introducing new or significantly improved services or 
business processes, to improve the results from available resources. 
Social services are complex and dynamic. Continued experimentation is needed and will require: 
 clear goals around improving the return on investment in social services;  
 encouragement to find, and the flexibility to try, new ways of doing things; and  
 information flows that provide ongoing feedback to decision makers about what is working.  
The role of government agencies in a reformed learning system would change from providing and 
purchasing services, to clearly defining desired outcomes and monitoring progress against them; setting 
quality standards; regulating providers; and setting overall budgets and high-level funding allocations 
across services. This will require a shift from the “command and control” approach to a more responsive 
system that monitors change and can quickly experiment with adaption, select what works and keep 
moving. The freedom to experiment will need to be matched with a requirement to share new ideas. 
Box 14.1 Integrated incentive and performance framework for the health system 
This framework, which has been proposed by the Expert Advisory Group, seeks a balance between the 
local responsibility and discretion needed for innovation and quality improvement, and accountability 
for performance in meeting sector-wide national health goals. The framework relies upon system-level 
performance measures that are set nationally and provide the basis for assessing local performance, 
against goals that are set locally. The national goals are set at a high level and districts are required to 
choose measures that contribute to the national goals in ways relevant to local circumstances. A 
dictionary of contributory measures is being developed so that common definitions are used for 
service delivery and accountability purposes. The framework anticipates an environment of high trust, 
in which local relationships set the agenda for quality improvement, within the overarching goals set 
by nationally consistent system measures. 
These measures would be reported for the population as a whole, but must also have the capacity to 
be reported for disaggregated groups. This will require the development of new sources of data. 
System measures would be assessed yearly so as to categorise providers according to their 
performance. The system provides for four levels of achievement: breakthrough, excellence, 
improvement and entry/pre-requisite. Incentives for good performance vary between groups, but have 
professional and financial components, including through providing pathways for trusted referrers to 
have rapid access to key services, enabling trusted and experienced professionals to have their 
expertise acknowledged and rewarded professionally; direct payments; greater freedom to manage 
services and capability; and capacity support. Groups that do not meet minimum standards would, 
after an opportunity to improve, be subject to increased monitoring and intervention or, ultimately, 
face the withdrawal of contracts.  
Source:   Expert Advisory Group, 2014. 
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Mechanisms are needed to manage a flow of ideas from the margins of the system, so that lessons from 
successes can spread across the whole system. While the importance of evaluation for continual 
improvement in the design and delivery of social services is widely acknowledged, in practice evaluation is 
absent, deficient, or not given enough weight in decision making (Chapter 7). 
Government agencies should explore initiatives to encourage innovation in social services. These could 
include innovation funds, prizes and in-house innovation labs. A shift to more contracts for outcomes could 
also encourage innovation by giving providers the freedom to experiment with different approaches 
(recommendation 7.3). Superu should develop and adopt a set of principles for good evaluation and 
provide guidance to support those principles. Government contracts for social services evaluation should 
require adherence to those principles (recommendation 7.6). 
Theme 7: Encourage consultation 
The literature about the leadership of change (Kotter, 1995; Tomson, 2009) asserts that change is facilitated 
by:  
 setting clear goals for the system (at the level of purpose, not targets); 
 clear communication of the costs of the status quo, and of the benefits of new goals; 
 involving stakeholders in all aspects of design and implementation; 
 encouraging buy-in at all stages; 
 actively and openly identifying and responding to challenges;  
 measuring how things are going – “holding up a mirror” to the system; and 
 continuing to do these things over a consistent period of time to build trust and confidence. 
Consultation between the users and providers of government services, and between government agencies 
and non-government providers, is an essential feature of change programmes. Genuine consultation may 
require involving a range of parties in strategic planning or in the governance of a project. Consultation 
should be ongoing, but needs to be particularly intensive when new initiatives are being considered. For 
example, moving from central provision to a client-based approach to delivering a social service would fail 
without extensive consultation.  
There are obvious partners and allies for change in the social services area. Iwi, providers, local interests 
such as local government, and businesses and private funders have told the inquiry that they see 
opportunity for change, and have ideas about how that can happen. These allies should be consulted about 
and enrolled in change. Their roles should be formally recognised in institutional design through advisory 
groups and standing consultative groups at each stage of design and implementation. 
Turning the strategy into action 
A strategy sets out the broad direction and sequence of tasks, but requires further refinement to assign 
responsibilities and drive actions, including:  
 confirming that those responsible for tasks have the necessary authority, capability and resources; 
 ordering the tasks, depending on factors such as whether they are one-off or need to be supported by 
complementary measures, or require earlier actions to be taken before they can be effective; 
 monitoring progress towards task delivery;  
 identifying areas of risk and seeking to resolve issues; 
 reporting regularly on actions to address these risks or other barriers to progressing reform; and 
 making recommendations about additions and/or deletions to the initial list of reform proposals. 
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14.2 Responsibility and authority for implementation 
Moving from a top-down approach to managing the delivery of social services, to a more networked, 
devolved and dynamic system, will require changes in roles, skills and culture, and long-term sustained 
commitment from those leading those changes. Different players will share in decisions about what gets 
tried and what is supported for longer development. New ways of working together will be needed to 
ensure wide diffusion and uptake of ideas. 
Ministerial responsibility 
Implementing the Commission’s recommendations will require ministers to be responsible for setting the 
strategic direction and adjusting it if needed in the light of experience.  
Within this broad, long-term strategy, implementation will require that many tasks are carried out across the 
government sector. Implementation is unlikely to succeed unless ministers ensure arrangements are in place 
to: 
 develop an integrated strategy for improving the social services system and translate this into specific 
responsibilities and actions; 
 allocate tasks to those who are best placed to carry them out; 
 ensure that those who are allocated tasks have the capability and incentives to carry them out;  
 monitor whether the tasks have been completed; and 
 evaluate how well the changes are working, and adjust the reform programme as necessary on the basis 
of experience. 
Which ministers? 
The ministers leading implementation need to collectively adopt a whole-of-system perspective, have a 
deep knowledge of particular social services, and be willing to move away from the status quo.  
One option is to allocate responsibility for implementation to the social services portfolio ministers, 
supported by their departments that will also implement many individual recommendations. However, 
these departments rightly focus on their particular portfolio roles, rather than looking across the social 
services system as a whole. Yet it is this broader perspective that will be required. A theme in this report is 
that the conventional approach to contracting with non-government providers to deliver social services is 
not always best.  
The report supports more focus on client-directed budgets and other ways of empowering users; 
encouraging approaches to service delivery that devolve decision-making and transcend traditional 
departmental boundaries; and increasing competition among providers. The report also argues that new 
information and data technologies can re-configure the role of the centre, so that agencies undertake much 
less top-down contracting. With many changes requiring a “whole of social services system” perspective, 
relying on individual service delivery departments to achieve them through acting independently of each 
other seems unlikely to succeed. 
A second option is to allocate responsibility to a central-agency minister, with an economy-wide 
perspective. However, excluding portfolio ministers and their departments from developing the strategy for 
reforming social services would weaken their commitment to change and would not draw on the knowledge 
of those who are actually involved in delivering social services. Effective implementation of a broad system-
wide reform programme seems unlikely to be achieved by an approach driven exclusively by a central 
agency.  
A better option is to allocate responsibility to a committee of ministers drawn from relevant service-delivery 
and central portfolios, to encourage a broader perspective while also taking account of portfolio 
responsibilities. The Cabinet Social Policy Committee already exists. However, this has more than 20 
ministers on it, and is not well suited to driving a big reform programme. Rather, what is needed is a 
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Strategy Committee for Social Services Reform – a smaller and more cohesive group of ministers, including 
the Minister of Finance, the Minister of State Services, and the senior Ministers holding the social-services 
portfolios. 
What should be their responsibilities? 
The committee’s purpose would be to deliver the Government’s objectives for reforming the social services 
system. It would need clear terms of reference and responsibility for delivering the improvement 
programme. Its focus would be on developing and implementing the long-term strategy. Responsibilities 
could include: 
 setting strategic objectives for improving the social services system as a whole; 
 strategic prioritisation of effort; 
 specifying and allocating tasks for improving the delivery of social services across the portfolios that are 
responsible for service delivery and central agencies that have broader responsibilities; 
 building capability; and 
 promoting continuous improvement and spreading good practice where any service models chosen are 
not well adapted to promoting these internally. 
 
 
 R14.1  A small and cohesive committee of ministers drawn from relevant service delivery and 
central portfolios should be responsible for leading the Government’s reform of the 
social services system. 
 
 
What departmental support is needed? 
The reform programme involves many tasks and people from across the public service would be called on 
to implement them, frequently working with non-government service providers. Specific task allocation 
would need to be worked out on a case-by-case basis. The ministers responsible for the reform programme 
would need departmental support to help them to develop the overall strategy, to translate this strategy 
into actions and oversee their implementation.  
While this support could be spread across portfolio departments, this could lead to reforms being looked at 
through a portfolio lens rather than through a wide-angle lens that takes in the social services system as a 
whole. In the past, a portfolio-based approach has held back the implementation of system-wide 
improvements. A new approach is needed. 
The Commission is therefore proposing that an “Office of Social Services”94 is established, possibly in a 
central agency. The Office would be required to take a whole-of-system approach. It would: 
 help the ministers to develop the overall reform strategy; oversee its implementation and publish 
reports on progress; and refine and improve the reform strategy in the light of lessons learnt during 
implementation; 
 develop whole-of-system data and analysis – both performance data and diagnostics identifying 
priorities (eg, to support judgements required for investment approaches to social services); 
 undertake research on system-wide issues and provide advice to the Social Sector Board of Chief 
Executives and, through that Board, to the Ministers on the Strategy Committee for Social Services 
Reform;  
 undertake evaluations of the performance of the social services system;  
 provide advice and design guidance for agencies engaged in commissioning; and 
94 The Commission does not have a view about the appropriate title for this Office. 
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 promote continuous improvement including the development of commissioning and contracting 
capability across the system. 
The Office of Social Services would need clear terms of reference that steer it towards favouring 
client-centred, devolved, and data-rich approaches and whole-of-system thinking, in effect becoming the 
guardian of those principles. The roles of the Office should be specified so as to ensure a clear division 
between its system-wide responsibilities and the portfolio responsibilities of the social services 
departments. For example, while departments develop their own commissioning and contracting capability, 
the Office would encourage the sharing of capability across the public sector as a whole, perhaps by 
developing a “community of practice” facility, through which practitioners from different agencies and 
providers could learn from each other by sharing their experiences. 
 
 
 
 R14.2  The Government should establish an Office for Social Services, preferably within a 
central agency, to: 
 help ministers to develop the overall reform strategy and oversee its 
implementation; 
 develop whole-of-system data and analysis – both performance data and 
diagnostics identifying priorities; 
 undertake research on system-wide issues and provide advice to the Social Sector 
Board of chief executives and to the relevant ministers; 
 undertake evaluations of the performance of the social services system; 
 provide advice and design guidance agencies engaged in commissioning; and 
 promote continuous improvement and the development of capability across the 
system. 
The Office would need clear terms of reference that steer it towards favouring 
customer-centred, devolved and data-rich approaches and whole-of-system thinking. 
  
 
14.3 Strengthening the incentives for implementation and 
sustained improvement 
Establishing ministerial responsibilities and a new Office of Social Services to support the ministers does not 
fully address the dilemma outlined at the start of this chapter: that a government agency (even a new one) 
may be conflicted if given the task of driving change that transforms and potentially reduces the role of 
government. This section suggests measures that would help to sustain, reform and build in incentives for 
continuous improvement: 
 a process for independent review of the reform programme; 
 removing unnecessary barriers to reform; 
 building in incentives that reward improvement; 
 transparently reporting the return on investment in social service programmes; 
 establishing a process for reviewing existing social service programmes; and 
 performance benchmarking. 
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Independent progress review 
Reform of social services needs to be informed by perspectives from outside government, particularly 
providers, their clients and independent experts. This is particularly important given that many proposals 
involve role changes that the public service may find uncomfortable. Four years ago, the Government used 
the Welfare Working Group, made up of expert academics, employers and community leaders, and 
supported by international experts, to provide it with advice about key aspects of the welfare system. This 
external advice and its transparency, and the continuation of the Group’s advice through the Work and 
Income Board, were instrumental in achieving the radical changes contained in the Investment Approach, 
described in Chapter 9. Other examples are the Biosecurity Ministerial Advisory Committee and the 
Minister for Social Development’s proposal to establish a “Modernising Child, Youth and Family Services 
Expert Panel” (Box 14.2). 
 
A similar expert group (or Ministerial Advisory Board) could help to maintain the momentum of the 
proposed programme for improving the delivery of social services, by independently reviewing the 
Government’s progress. Unlike the proposed Modernising Child, Youth and Family Expert Panel (CYFEP), 
the proposed Panel would not develop the Business Case. The Commission has already in this report 
prepared the foundations for this business case, and the proposed Office of Social Services would be 
responsible for developing it further into specific reforms suitable for implementation. However, the 
proposed Ministerial Advisory Board would perform the second role of the CYEFP, and would advise the 
Committee of Ministers on progress with implementing the reforms. It could be required to undertake 
public consultation to inform its reviews, and to publish those reviews on its website. It would need support 
from the Office of Social Services, but would report to the Committee of Ministers. Its effectiveness would 
be increased if the Government was obliged to respond to its reviews. However, its recommendations 
should not be binding on the Government, which is responsible for determining the pace and direction of 
change.  
The Ministerial Advisory Board could use the progress reports prepared by the Office of Social Services as 
its starting point, and would need to establish or be given a set of criteria against which to assess the 
Government’s progress. Given the concerns outlined in this report, it could be asked to review the progress 
in implementing reform by assessing progress towards: 
Box 14.2 Ministerial Advisory Committees 
Two examples of ministerial advisory committees that include members from outside government are: 
Modernising Child, Youth and Family Expert Panel 
The Minister of Social Development has proposed that this panel be established to oversee the 
development and implementation of the Modernising Child, Youth and Family (CYF) Business Case. 
The Minister received the first draft of the CYF Business Case in December 2014, and considered that 
it was a good starting point but needed development. The Minister therefore decided to establish an 
Expert Panel, to: inject fresh thinking into the development of the Business Case; incorporate much 
greater external expertise; and provide her with greater assurance on the development and 
implementation of the Business Case. The Minister proposes that the Panel will be supported by an 
MSD-based secretariat, and that Cabinet will direct social and justice sector agencies to comply with 
the secretariat’s information requests. The Panel and secretariat will be funded from within MSD 
baselines. 
Biosecurity Ministerial Advisory Committee 
This committee provides the Minister for Biosecurity with independent advice on the performance of 
the overall biosecurity system. Its roles include helping the Minister to identify opportunities to 
improve the system by adopting a whole-of-system approach and to advise the Minister and 
department on strategies and policies covering the end-to-end biosecurity system.  
Source:  Office of the Minister of Social Development, 2015; Ministry for Primary Industries, 2010. 
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 evaluating existing programmes; 
 refreshing or removing programmes which evaluation has shown to be defective; 
 encouraging integration where appropriate; 
 facilitating worthwhile experimentation, learning and innovation; 
 devolving decision making; and 
 avoiding undue focus on short-term decisions. 
Transparent reporting by this group to Parliament and to the public could help build common 
understanding, and discourage watering down of change by successive governments. 
Removing unnecessary barriers to reform 
Ongoing reform would be facilitated by identifying and removing features of current arrangements that 
make it more difficult to improve the delivery of social services. Some examples are given below. 
 Capability gaps, as noted above, impede improvement in areas such as commissioning and contracting. 
They need to be addressed. 
 Chapter 5 noted that multi-category rather than specific budget appropriations can help to remove 
what might otherwise be a barrier to worthwhile integration of service delivery. However, the 
Commission has heard that little use has been made of multi-category appropriations, although the 
reasons for this are not clear. The Committee of Ministers could usefully commission an assessment of 
whether and how the current approach to appropriations is unnecessarily impeding integration of 
service delivery and, if it is, how the impediment could be removed. 
 Chapter 11 reported gaps in complaints mechanisms. Users of social services may oppose moving to 
more devolved approaches to providing social services if they are concerned about inadequate 
procedures for handling their complaints about the price or quality of social services.  
Build in incentives that reward good practice 
Reform can be enhanced by building in incentives that reward good practice and that build up support for 
the reform direction.  
 Box 14.1 explained the Expert Advisory Group’s proposal that in the health sector professional and 
financial incentives could be used to reward good practice at the local level and to build momentum for 
increasingly devolving decision making away from the centre, albeit within a framework of centrally 
determined national goals. The appropriate structure and combination of incentives will probably vary 
between social services, but this example illustrates the significance of building careful design of 
incentive structures into proposals for improving particular areas of social services. 
 Chapter 6 suggested that commissioning should take into account how different models of service 
delivery build in incentives that reward good practice. Training in commissioning skills and building 
career paths in commissioning would also be helpful. 
 Chapter 12 proposed that incentives to improve contract management would be enhanced by building 
a career path around this discipline within the public sector, by improving training and the exchange of 
knowledge within the public sector, and by building effective contract management into the reviews of 
agencies undertaken through the Performance Improvement Framework. 
Increase reporting of the return on investment in social programmes 
Chapter 9 set out some benefits from measuring and reporting the return on investment in social 
programmes. Such reporting would highlight progress on improving the performance of particular 
programmes. Their desire to avoid criticism for slow improvement or deterioration in rates of return would 
encourage governments to persevere with the broad improvement strategy.  
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Review social service programmes 
Chapter 2 described a general reluctance to end outdated programmes. The beneficiaries of these 
programmes may resist changes they expect to make them worse off, even if there are now better ways to 
deliver a service or the need may have changed. However, persevering with outdated programmes holds 
outcomes below their potential, and would impede the reform proposed in this report, by making it 
necessary to “work around” existing programmes. 
The Government could reduce this resistance to change by initiating comprehensive and transparent 
evaluations of existing social service programmes against specified criteria, which might include whether: 
 they have a clearly specified, relevant, objective and desired outcome;  
 they are achieving their objectives and outcomes; 
 there is evidence of innovation in service delivery through the programmes; 
 they are appropriately integrated with other programmes; 
 they adopt an approach that matches the time duration of the problem that is being addressed; and 
 the programme has already been evaluated. 
Given the large number of programmes, the cost of reviewing them all would be substantial. Options to 
manage this cost include only assessing programmes that exceed a threshold level of expenditure; or 
prioritising the reviews according to criteria such as expenditure and the length of time since they have 
been evaluated. Costs could also be managed by providing a range of review models that enables the 
depth and sophistication of reviews to be proportionate to the significance of the programme being 
reviewed. 
The evaluations could be conducted by, for example, the department sponsoring the programmes, with 
oversight by the proposed Office for Social Services. While evaluations of programmes undertaken by their 
sponsoring departments would not be independent, this concern could be reduced by departments: 
 establishing independent steering committees to ensure quality control, made up of people who take 
an economy-wide perspective and are drawn from outside the department; 
 publishing initially the terms of reference for each review and the approach to be taken, and 
subsequently the evaluation itself; 
 enabling public consultation during reviews; and 
 making reports available for external assessment.  
Performance benchmarking 
As has been argued earlier, outcome reporting from government programmes is not well done, and does 
not tend to encourage reporting across portfolio lines.  
In Australia, the Australian Productivity Commission (APC) undertakes performance benchmarking of 
government services through the report on government services (ROGS), which compares the efficiency and 
effectiveness of Commonwealth and State/Territory Government services such as education, health, justice, 
emergency management, community services and housing. Until 2010, the New Zealand Ministry of Social 
Development produced The Social Report yearly. This document reported 43 indicators in 10 key policy 
areas such as health, economic standard of living, and safety and social connectedness (Ministry of Social 
Development, 2010). The Social Report included similar information to the ROGS, although the ROGS 
includes a more detailed range of performance indicators in a wider range of policy areas.  
In their 2012 joint study on “Strengthening trans-Tasman economic relations”, the two Commissions 
suggested that the Australian and New Zealand Governments should determine an appropriate approach 
for New Zealand to participate in the ROGS (Australian Productivity Commission and New Zealand 
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Productivity Commission, 2012). While this would not directly measure the Government’s progress in 
reforming social services, it would strengthen the incentives to improve the performance of social services 
in general. 
 
 
 R14.3  To strengthen the incentives for reforming the social services system, the Government 
should: 
 establish a Ministerial Advisory Board to report publicly on the Government’s 
progress in reforming the social services system;  
 remove unnecessary barriers to reform; 
 provide positive incentives for improvement; 
 expand the measurement and public reporting of the return on investment in social 
services programmes; 
 establish a programme for reviewing social service programmes against specified 
criteria; and 
 seek beneficial opportunities to undertake joint benchmarking of social services, 
such as through participating in the Australian Report on Government Services. 
The government agencies responsible for social services programmes should 
commission the reviews. Reviews should be overseen by independent steering 
committees, published and subject to assessment by the Ministerial Advisory Board; 
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15 The size of the prize 
Key points 
 If implemented well, the recommendations in this report can move the social services system 
closer to the well-functioning system described in Chapter 1.  
 For New Zealanders, moving closer to a well-functioning system would create more value from the 
tens of billions of dollars that the Government spends on social services each year, greater 
confidence that services will be available when they need them, and more assurance that the 
system is meeting their expectations around access and care for society’s most vulnerable. 
 For current clients, moving closer to a well-functioning system would mean services better 
matched to their individual circumstances, greater information about the service options, less time 
wasted on bureaucratic processes, and greater empowerment and choice between service 
providers.  
 For service providers, moving closer to a well-functioning system would improve clarity and 
certainty around government funding, reduce money spent on government processes and allow 
greater flexibility to innovate, and tailor services to client needs.  
 For government social services agencies, moving closer to a well-functioning system would mean a 
better understanding of their role as system stewards, being better able to demonstrate the value 
that services are creating, and greater clarity around the service interventions that work and those 
that do not.  
 For the government, moving closer to a well-functioning system would mean being better able to 
demonstrate their achievements, reduced political risk from under-performing services, and more 
transparency around the relative returns from different uses of public money. 
 
This chapter aims to provide insights into the type and magnitude of benefits that reform can deliver. The 
chapter begins by discussing what moving closer to a well-functioning system would mean for different 
participants in the system. It then illustrates the type of benefits, and some indications of orders of 
magnitude, that reform could bring. 
15.1 A system that meets the needs of all participants 
This inquiry seeks to identify measures that will lead to a well-functioning social services system. The report 
makes a number of findings and recommendations on how to achieve this goal. The key themes of the 
findings and recommendations are set out below. 
 Better measurement of the value and cost-effectiveness of social services is essential. 
 Defining desired outcomes and taking them seriously is crucial. 
 Many system weaknesses trace to problems in institutional design and service commissioning.  
 Smarter and more deliberate institutional design and commissioning are needed. 
 Commissioning organisations should select from a broad portfolio of service models – including, in 
particular, models that increase client choice. 
 More experimentation, learning and innovation are needed at all levels of the system. 
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 Investment in, and making good use of, a comprehensive, client-centred data infrastructure, data 
analytics and safe data sharing will yield high returns. 
 Devolving services and service design can empower providers, whänau and individuals, unlock 
innovation and improve system performance. 
 The centre should focus on the vital role of system steward.  
If implemented well, the reforms in this report can move the social services system closer to the well-
functioning system set out in Chapter 1.  
For New Zealanders this would mean a system that creates more value from the tens of billions of dollars 
that the Government spends on social services each year. It would mean greater confidence that services 
will be available when they need them. And it would mean greater assurance that the system is meeting 
their expectations around access and the effective care of society’s most vulnerable.  
For clients, moving closer to a well-functioning system would mean accessing services better matched to 
their individual circumstances. It would empower them by means of better information about the service 
options available to them, and more choice among providers of services. And it would mean less time 
wasted on multiple bureaucratic processes.  
For service providers, moving closer to a well-functioning system would mean greater clarity and certainty 
around government funding. It would mean less money spent on government processes and greater 
flexibility to tailor services to meet the needs of clients. And it would mean more scope for innovation and 
greater rewards for innovation. 
For government social services agencies, moving closer to a well-functioning system would mean being 
better able to deliver needed services to clients. It would mean being able to show that the system is 
operating efficiently, and that the agencies are creating value from the use of public funds. Agencies would 
be better able to focus their efforts on high-value areas due to greater clarity around the service 
interventions that work and those that do not. And it would mean government agencies have a well-defined 
role as system stewards and a better view of the performance of their contractors. 
Finally, for the Government, moving closer to a well-functioning system would mean being better able to 
demonstrate its achievements to voters and Parliament. It would mean a reduction in political risk caused by 
under-performing services. And it would mean more transparency around the relative returns from different 
uses of public money. 
15.2 Illustrating the benefits of system improvement 
This section illustrates the benefits of system improvement to clients and to the broader society and 
economy.  
Benefits to clients 
The social services system ultimately exists to improve the wellbeing of New Zealanders. There is good 
reason to believe that improvements in the social services system can have a positive impact on client 
wellbeing. Studies on wellbeing have repeatedly shown: 
 the highly negative impact of unemployment on a person’s life satisfaction (Winkelman & Winkelman, 
1998; Lucas et al., 2004; Blanchflower & Oswald, 2011; Brown, Woolf & Smith, 2012); 
 the positive impacts of good physical and psychological health on overall life satisfaction (Diener et al., 
1999; Dolan, Peasgood & White, 2008; Diener & Chan, 2011; Shields & Wheatley, 2005; Brown, et al., 
2012); 
 the strong association between social connections and life satisfaction (Kahneman & Kruger, 2006; 
Helliwell, 2008; Helliwell & Wang, 2011); 
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 the detrimental impact of living in an unsafe or deprived area on life satisfaction (Ferrer-i-Carbonell & 
Gowdy, 2007; Lelkes, 2006; Shields & Wheatley Price, 2005). 
Benefits to society and the economy 
Benefits to clients commonly spill over into society. For example, take the case of a young person who 
receives services that enable them to stay in school. Empirical studies have shown that, on average, an 
additional year of education increases an individual’s wages by around 5% to 15% (New Zealand Treasury, 
2004). So the young person receives personal benefits in the form of a better job and higher wages. Yet 
studies have also shown a strong correlation between education levels and broader social benefits such as 
lower crime rates.  
Henry et al. (1999) found that the longer male students stay in school past the minimum leaving age of 15 
the lower their chances of criminal behaviour in young adulthood. A more recent study in Sweden found 
that one additional year of schooling decreases the likelihood of men being convicted of a crime by 6.7% 
and incarceration by 15.5% (Hjalmarsson, Holmund & Lindquist, 2014). In the United Kingdom, Machin, 
Marie and Vujić (2010) estimated that a 10% increase in the age at which people leave school would lower 
the number of convictions for property-related crimes (per 1000 people) by 2.1%. They further estimated 
the net social benefits from a 1% reduction in the number of people without education qualifications to be 
between £32 million and £87 million. 
Studies also illustrate a positive relationship between education and health (Wilson, 2001; Oreopoulos, 
2003; Lleras-Muney, 2002). New Zealand Treasury (2004) concluded: 
… the evidence from a wide range of longitudinal and cross-sectional studies in a number of countries, 
using different methods, different measures of health, and different control variables, indicates that 
better-educated people experience better health. This finding generally holds when the greater 
earnings of better-educated people are taken into account. (p. 20) 
In addition to the personal benefits from better health, there are social benefits such as less demand on 
health services and less stress and anxiety for friends and family. Even though these social benefits are 
difficult to quantify, they are significant and important.  
The reforms in this report also have the potential to bring significant economic benefits for all 
New Zealanders. These economic benefits broadly fall into two groups: 
 improvements in the efficiency of government expenditure; and 
 improvements in the stock and quality of human capital. 
Improving the efficiency of government expenditure 
Reform of the social services system can help increase the value derived from each dollar the government 
spends on social services.  
MSD’s Work and Income services are a good example of the gains that are possible from adopting an 
“investment approach” to social services. Research indicated there are significant gains from targeted early 
intervention of specific client groups.  
 Around 75% of total liability in the benefit system relates to people who received a benefit before the 
age of 20. These people also remain the most vulnerable to remaining on a benefit throughout their 
life.  
 Almost 90% of all people receiving youth benefits were supported by a parent also on a benefit. For 
older clients who were not on a youth benefit (ie, aged 18 to 25), almost three quarters were supported 
by a parent on a benefit (Edwards & Judd, 2014). 95 
95 “Youth services for youth payments” or “young parent payments”. 
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Similarly, the Christchurch Health and Development Study found that youth are twice as likely to be welfare 
dependent at age 21 if they are raised in a semi-skilled or unskilled family. And they are three times as likely 
to be welfare dependent if they leave school without qualifications. 
A well-functioning system would see government funding targeted at areas with a high return on 
investment, improving both the wellbeing of clients and the efficiency of government spending. 
Improvements in human capital  
Many social services have a direct impact on the accumulation of skills, knowledge and capabilities of 
New Zealand’s workforce; that is, an impact on the level of human capital within the economy. Human 
capital is an important driver of labour productivity, which in turn is a key driver of long-run economic 
growth and societal wellbeing. 
Health and education are two of the most important aspects of human capital. In general, the healthier and 
better educated people are, the greater their participation in the workforce and the more productive they 
will be at their jobs. It is worth noting that over the past two decades New Zealand has experienced slow 
labour productivity growth compared to other OECD countries (NZPC, 2013b). 
There is evidence too that increasing human capital for people at the lower end of the income distribution 
will have a positive effect on economic growth and wellbeing. For example, the London School of 
Economics (2013) described the United Kingdom’s “long tail of poorly performing schools and pupils” as 
constituting a “waste of human resources on a grand scale”. Adding that the situation “holds back 
economic opportunities and is detrimental to growth” (p. 17). 
Similarly, New Zealand Treasury (2012) noted New Zealand’s “wide distribution of educational 
achievement” (p. 1) and that the socio-economic background of New Zealand students “exerts a much 
larger influence on their achievement than in most other OECD countries” (p. 2). They also estimated the 
benefits of lifting overall achievement:  
…if overall student achievement could be lifted by 25 PISA points (putting New Zealand with the top 
performers in the OECD), GDP would be expected to be higher than it otherwise would be by 3-15% 
by 2070. This is a large growth impact from a single contributing factor. (p. 2) 
Moving towards a well-functioning system can therefore help realise the economic benefits of increasing 
the number of people in jobs, the quality of those jobs and labour productivity. 
15.3 Conclusion 
The reforms outlined in this report have the potential to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
New Zealand’s social services system, in turn raising the wellbeing of clients and of citizens more generally. 
The complex nature of social services makes estimating the magnitude of these benefits difficult. The 
Commission’s judgement, supported by New Zealand and international research, is that there are 
significant economic and social gains to be had. Achieving reform will require political commitment and 
strong leadership, and a willingness of government to take on greater responsibility as a steward of the 
social services system.  
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Summary of questions 
Chapter 5 – Institutional architecture 
 
 
 Q5.1 
 
Which communities of interest would like to be part of greater devolution of service 
commissioning?   
 
Chapter 6 – Commissioning 
 
 
 Q6.1 
 
What mechanisms are appropriate to determine whether prices for “fully funded” 
services are set at a level that allows an efficient provider to make sustainable returns on 
the resources they deploy? Should there be an independent body to resolve disputes? 
If so, should it take the form of an arbitrator or a regulator? 
 
 
Chapter 7 – A system that learns and innovates 
 
 
 Q7.1 
 
How can government agencies manage contracting processes in a way that best leads 
to the development and dissemination of innovative approaches to service design and 
delivery? 
 
 
Chapter 8 – Leveraging data and analytics 
 
 
 Q8.1 
 
What difficult-to-solve social problems would be amenable to new solutions developed 
by data-sharing partnerships between the Government, non-government organisations 
and academics? 
 
 
Chapter 9 – Investment and insurance approaches 
 
 
 Q9.1 
 
What non-government organisations have the potential to become social insurers for 
enrolled populations? What are the potential advantages and problems of a multiple-
insurer approach? 
 
 
Chapter 10 – Service integration 
 
 
 Q10.1 
 
Should the government seek to align the geographical boundaries used by its social 
delivery agencies for defining service responsibilities? What are the advantages and 
disadvantages of aligning boundaries? 
 
 
Chapter 11 – Client choice and empowerment 
 
 
 Q11.1 
 
The Commission is interested in hearing from people with first-hand experience 
working under Individualised Funding and Enabling Good Lives. Have any specific 
studies been undertaken into the impact of these two programmes on workers? 
 
 
 Summary of questions 309 
Chapter 13 – The Mäori dimension 
 
 
 Q13.1 
 
Has the Commission adequately understood the challenges of devolving funding on the 
basis of a population group or community of interest?  
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Findings and recommendations 
The full set of findings and recommendations from the report are below. 
Chapter 2 – Social services in New Zealand 
Findings 
 
 
 F2.1  As a percentage of GDP, public expenditure on social services is currently higher in 
New Zealand than the OECD average. Expenditure is also higher than common 
comparator countries such as Australia and Canada, but lower than the United 
Kingdom. 
 
 
 
 F2.2  From a client’s perspective, government processes for delivering social services can 
seem confusing, fragmented, overly directive and unhelpful.  
 
 
 F2.3  Existing social services are not well placed to deal with multiple and inter-dependent 
problems encountered by many of New Zealand’s most vulnerable individuals and 
families. 
 
 
 
 F2.4  The social services system fails to create and share information about which services 
and interventions work well and those that do not.   
 
 
 F2.5  Social services are often poorly coordinated, resulting in missed opportunities to 
improve service outcomes for clients.  
 
 
 F2.6  Opportunities exists to reduce the transaction costs of contracting out social services. 
From a provider’s perspective, onerous government processes can appear wasteful in 
that they draw resources away from providing services. 
 
 
 
 F2.7  Strong evidence exists that early intervention in social problems can significantly 
improve outcomes for individuals and the return on government expenditure. Yet, the 
social services system’s investments in early intervention are piecemeal and patchy. 
 
 
 
 F2.8  Ministers and government agencies tend to focus on the flow of new social services 
initiatives. Relatively little attention is given to actively managing the large stock of 
social service programmes that account for the majority of public expenditure.  
 
 
 
 F2.9  Over the past 20 years, numerous reports into the social services system have 
highlighted a consistent set of problems and proposed a set of similar solutions.   
 
Chapter 3 – New ideas in New Zealand and elsewhere 
Findings 
 
 
 F3.1  Social service programmes that give clients an entitlement to a level of support and 
choice over how that entitlement is spent promote innovation and responsiveness in 
provision. Yet such programmes create pressures to expand entitlements, increasing 
programme costs. Programme design needs mechanisms for keeping costs within 
budget. 
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 F3.2  Successful implementation of substantial new social services schemes is assisted by a 
clear vision of the destination, careful staging and trials of new approaches, continuing 
community consultation and independent evaluation to guide design and build 
support. 
 
 
 
 F3.3  Social bonds stimulate innovation by the Government sharing risk with investors and 
linking payments to outcomes without prescribing programmes in detail. They involve 
complex institutional arrangements and take time and skill to set up. They may be most 
useful in demonstrating the effectiveness of new approaches, rather than being applied 
widely across the social services. 
 
 
 
 F3.4  Philanthropic organisations like to take a lead in demonstrating the success of 
innovative approaches to the design and delivery of social services. They look to the 
government to pick up and fund those approaches that prove successful. 
 
 
Chapter 4 – An assessment of the social services system 
Findings 
 
 
 F4.1  Many government institutions were created in a different era of public administration 
and not set up to deal with the modern demands on state-funded social services. This 
is particularly so when clients have complex, inter-dependent needs that span the 
responsibilities of multiple agencies and ministers. 
 
 
  
 F4.2  Accountability and delivery structures within government agencies place a high 
emphasis on managing costs and political risks. This can result in a lack of focus on 
value, and in highly prescriptive contracts that work against innovation in services. 
 
 
 
 F4.3  Tightly prescribed government contracts reduce the flexibility of providers to tailor 
services to meet the needs of clients. This is problematic in cases where the tailoring of 
services would improve client outcomes.  
 
 
 
 F4.4  The lack of agreed measures of value has led to too little measurement and reporting 
of the outcomes achieved from social service programmes. Aversion to political risk has 
compounded this. The combined effect has often been performance reporting that, 
while costly, provides few insights into the impact and worth of programmes.  
 
 
 
 F4.5  Government agencies often do not subject their social service programmes to rigorous 
and transparent evaluation and learn from previous experience.   
 
 
 F4.6  There is useful information at all “levels” of the social services system, but decision 
makers frequently lack important relevant information to make good decisions. 
Overcoming this requires either moving relevant information to existing decision 
makers, or moving decisions to those with the relevant information. 
 
 
 
 F4.7  Government agencies have overlooked their potential to shape and manage the 
market for social services contracts. Consequently, the market is not performing as well 
as it could. 
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 F4.8  Contracting models that give a service provider a geographic monopoly for the 
duration of a contract deny clients a choice of services and providers, and create a poor 
incentive for providers to deliver good services to clients. 
 
 
 
 F4.9  Problems with contracting out are often symptoms of deeper causes such as the desire 
to exert top-down control to limit political risk. Letting go of central control will require 
agreed measures of the value created by social services, and a willingness to explore 
different institutional designs and approaches to commissioning. 
 
 
 
 F4.10  Previous attempts to reform social services have often struggled because of competing 
“worldviews” that inhibit agreement on problem definitions and the underlying causes 
of problems. 
 
 
 
 F4.11  The organisational cultures of providers and government agencies tend to be resistant 
to change and can be paternalistic towards clients.   
 
Chapter 5 – Institutional architecture 
Findings 
 
 
 F5.1  Top-down control has significant limitations. Expanded use of other architectures may 
achieve substantial improvements in the performance of social services.  
 
 
 F5.2  The case for large-scale devolution of responsibilities for social services to local 
government does not appear strong in New Zealand. It would not resolve some 
significant problems of the current architecture. 
 
 
 
 F5.3  Delegation of responsibility for social services to semi-autonomous government entities 
can improve on top-down control where such entities have better information, 
capability and incentives to make and implement decisions that maximise social 
returns.  
 
 
 
 F5.4  Multi-category appropriations and other mechanisms added in 2013 to the Public 
Finance Act 1989 are useful additions to the budget appropriation system. But these 
mechanisms are not sufficient on their own to provide flexibility at the interface 
between providers and clients.  
 
 
 
 F5.5  Improved measurement of service cost and impact on client outcomes – such as that 
being pursued with the Investment Approach – may support further delegation of 
authority to shift funding between budget appropriations.  
 
 
 
 F5.6  Institutional architecture and the enabling environment require active management if 
social services are to be effective. This active management should be the responsibility 
of a system steward. The current arrangements fall somewhat short of what is required 
of a system steward. 
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Recommendations 
 
 
 R5.1  The Government should make greater and smarter use of delegation and devolution in 
the social services system. These architectures often feature better incentives for 
encouraging innovation and improving social services outcomes. 
 
 
 
 R5.2  The Government should take account of the role and value of volunteers as an 
important part of social services in drafting new legislation to ensure that volunteers are 
not crowded out by new regulation. The Government should pay particular attention to 
this issue when finalising the Health and Safety Reform Bill.  
 
 
 
 R5.3  Government has a unique role in the social services system. It is the major funder of 
social services, and has statutory and regulatory powers unavailable to other 
participants. Government needs to take responsibility for system stewardship, and for 
making considered decisions that shape the system. This includes the overarching 
responsibility for monitoring, planning and managing resources in such a way as to 
maintain and improve system performance. 
 
 
Chapter 6 – Commissioning 
Findings 
 
 
 F6.1  Effective commissioning is fundamental to well-functioning social services. It is a 
challenging task. It is not generally undertaken in New Zealand in a structured, 
consistent and effective way. 
 
 
 
 F6.2  Managed markets – in which providers compete for market share – are likely to 
stimulate better performance and more innovation than where services are simply 
contracted out. They reduce the financial risks of providers, as they allow more time 
and opportunity to react to signals of poor performance (relative to loss of contract). 
However, managed markets are complex to set up and administer, and require 
ongoing adjustment. So they are best applied to relatively large-scale social services. 
 
 
 
 F6.3  Trust models capitalise on the intrinsic motivation and professional behaviour of 
providers. These models require careful design to ensure sufficient peer monitoring 
and regulatory oversight, and work best with hard budget limits and strong client voice.  
 
 
 
 F6.4  The shared goals service model reflects a view that complex social problems are best 
addressed by the organisations and social-services personnel closest to clients working 
together to share information, resources and expertise for the benefit of those clients. 
This service model promotes common ownership of problems and goals, and so 
encourages constructive and integrated problem solving and creative solutions.  
Organisations commissioning services using a shared goals model need to set high-
level goals within a broad performance-measurement framework that is acceptable to 
those participating in shared goal setting, and leave them room to develop their own 
compatible, but subsidiary goals and measures. 
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 F6.5  Consultation with service providers and users during service commissioning can 
discover information that can be used to clarify objectives and design a better service, 
and to build wider support for, and ownership in, a service design. But consultation can 
cause delay, and involves costs. 
 
 
 
 F6.6  Complaints mechanisms are part of a well-functioning learning system, and signal the 
commitment of an organisation to empower its clients.  
 
 
 F6.7  Service commissioning may need to adopt different service models (or significantly 
adapt their adopted model) to cover urban and rural populations respectively. A 
differentiated response is likely more effective than a one-size-fits-all model. 
 
 
 
 F6.8  Government faces incentives to underfund contracts with non-government providers 
for the delivery of social services, with probable adverse consequences for long-term 
service provision. These incentives are consistent with reports from many providers that 
they are underfunded. However, those reports are not definitive without clear criteria to 
determine a “correct” level of funding. This points to a need to be explicit about the 
basis of funding, the appropriate evaluation criteria, and the pricing processes applied 
by government. 
 
 
 
 F6.9  Providers capable and confident of delivering services in the way and to the standard 
specified by government are likely to welcome a commitment to fully fund such service 
contracts. Those providers who wish to pursue goals not necessarily aligned with those 
of government should not expect full funding. 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
 
 R6.1  Formal contracts between an agency and its in-house service delivery arm make costs 
and expectations explicit. They should be mandatory when that delivery arm competes 
with non-government providers, and are desirable in other cases. 
 
 
 
 R6.2  Commissioning organisations should ensure that in-house provision is treated on a 
neutral basis when compared to contracting out and other service models. This requires 
independence in decision-making processes. In-house provision should be subject to 
the same transparency, performance monitoring and reporting requirements as would 
apply to an external provider. 
 
 
 
 R6.3  Commissioning agencies should consider a wide range of service models, and carefully 
select a model that best matches the characteristics of the service being commissioned.  
 
 
 R6.4  Commissioning agencies should always consider client-directed service models, as they 
empower individuals and lead to more effective services. However, those models are 
not always applicable. Where other service models are chosen, client choice should be 
supported to the extent feasible. 
 
 
 
 R6.5  Commissioning agencies need to be clear why they are consulting and convey this 
clearly. Agencies should target those most affected by the service and match the 
amount of consultation to the size and complexity of the service, and to the value 
expected from consultation. 
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 R6.6  The government agencies responsible for commissioning social services should actively 
build staff skills and agency capacity to make effective commissioning decisions.  
 
 
 R6.7  Government should initiate some well-resourced demonstration projects designed to 
build awareness of and capability in commissioning.  
 
 
 R6.8  Government may reasonably choose the type of funding to match its priorities. It should 
always be explicit about the type of funding, the appropriate level of control that this 
funding brings, and the likely consequences of its funding decision. Legitimate types 
include full funding, contributory funding, tied and untied grants, and no funding. 
 
 
 
 R6.9  Full funding is appropriate when governments are paying non-government 
organisations to deliver the Government’s goals or commitment, and want full control 
over the service specification. 
 
 
 
 R6.10  “Fully funded” social service payments to non-government providers should be set at a 
level that allows an efficient provider to make a sustainable return on resources 
deployed. This funding level will support current providers to invest in training, systems 
and tools. It will also encourage entry by new providers.  
 
 
 
 R6.11  Agencies commissioning social services need to be prepared to understand the costs 
that providers face in supplying services. They should invest in the skills, tools and 
research necessary to develop costing models. The Treasury could provide useful cross-
government guidance. 
 
 
 
 R6.12  Government funding for community development should be through grants for that 
purpose, and co-funded in some form by the relevant community.  
 
 
 R6.13  When commissioning services, government agencies should be open-minded about the 
size or organisational form of current and potential social service providers. 
Preconceptions about provider size or form risk keeping out new entrants and reducing 
innovation. 
 
 
 
 R6.14  Provider subcontracting can be an efficient way to reduce the number of relationships 
managed by government agencies, and to improve the quality of relationships overall. 
Government agencies should be open to providers of social services subcontracting the 
delivery of services to other providers. 
 
 
Chapter 7 – A system that learns and innovates 
Findings 
 
 
 F7.1  Service models without overly centralised control encourage learning in the social 
services system. They foster diversity and encourage the selection and expansion of 
effective services and the curtailing of less effective ones. 
 
 
 
 F7.2  Social services providers have not, for the most part, been affected by the disruptive 
innovation that has transformed many market services. Services firms in other parts of 
the economy have adopted new productivity-enhancing business models enabled by 
information and communications technology. 
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 F7.3  Social service providers have many opportunities to use information and 
communications technology to transform the way they engage with clients and 
commissioning organisations, and the way they design, monitor, evaluate and adapt 
their services. 
 
 
 
 F7.4  The social services system appears to be too focused on central government as a 
source of new ideas, and as a gatekeeper of which ideas are trialled. This limits the size 
and diversity of the pool of new ideas available to commissioning organisations. The 
system needs to do more to permit and encourage trialling of new ideas from social 
entrepreneurs, philanthropists, non-government providers, service users and 
communities. 
 
 
 
 F7.5  Many social services currently involve risk-averse government agencies contracting for 
services from not-for-profits who are unable to take on the risk of innovation. The 
combination stifles innovation. 
 
 
 
 F7.6  Innovation is risky and sometimes costly. Not-for-profit organisations cannot easily raise 
funds for investments. As a result, access to capital and limited cashflow are significant 
barriers to innovation in parts of the social services.  
 
 
 
 F7.7  Many government contracts with social services providers are overly prescriptive. This 
stifles innovation.  
 
 
 F7.8  Good information that compares the performance of services using a common measure 
is crucial for building support for spreading successful innovation and eliminating 
poorly performing services 
 
 
 
 F7.9  Many not-for-profit organisations find it difficult to fund evaluation on top of service 
delivery and, in any case, lack the capability for good evaluation.   
 
 
 F7.10  Decision makers in the social services system lack good timely information on what is 
working, for whom and through which service providers. This undermines the ability of 
the system to learn and adapt. 
 
 
 
 F7.11  The standard programme-based approach to social services evaluation involves a 
trade-off between good evaluation practice, and cost and time. The standard 
evaluation approach may be best applied to larger programmes, or to experimental 
work that will likely lead on to larger-scale implementation. 
 
 
 
 F7.12  The current approach to evaluation in the social services fails to make cost-effective use 
of the wide range of information being generated by daily interaction between users 
and services. 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
 
 R7.1  Organisations commissioning social services should set payments at a level that allows 
an efficient provider to make a sustainable return on resources deployed. This will give 
providers the confidence and greater capacity to invest in innovation. 
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 R7.2  Organisations commissioning social services should look for opportunities to contract 
providers to design and try out innovative service designs. This will promote learning 
about what approaches are most effective in achieving desired outcomes. Where the 
Government specifies and directly funds the development of innovation, it should own 
the intellectual property rights. 
 
 
 
 R7.3  Social services commissioning organisations should shift more contracting towards 
contracting for outcomes and make greater use of decentralised service models. Doing 
both would give providers increased flexibility and incentives to innovate. 
 
 
 
 R7.4  Government social services commissioning agencies should respect the confidentiality 
of innovative ideas that providers submit as part of a tender or otherwise. Where 
government agencies wish to spread an innovation that a third party creates, they 
should negotiate for the rights to do so. 
 
 
 
 R7.5  Government agencies should explore a variety of additional initiatives to encourage 
innovation in the social services. These could include innovation funds, prizes and in-
house innovation labs. 
 
 
 
 R7.6  Superu should develop and adopt a set of principles for good evaluation and provide 
guidance to support those principles. When the Government funds social services 
evaluations, it should require adherence to those principles. 
 
 
 
 R7.7  Commissioning organisations and providers should monitor and evaluate in real time a 
much wider range of services than at present. This would enable commissioning 
organisations and providers to respond to trends as they emerge and offer significant 
improvements in efficiency and effectiveness 
 
 
Chapter 8 – Leveraging data and analytics 
Findings 
 
 
 F8.1  Cost-effectively collecting, sharing and analysing data across the social services system 
will greatly increase the capacity to design, commission and provide effective services. 
Better data and data analysis will help target resources to have a greater impact on 
improving outcomes. 
 
 
 
 F8.2  Social services have lagged behind many other service industries in adopting data-
driven innovation.  
 
 
 F8.3  Establishing standards for data sharing and developing a client-centred data 
infrastructure covering many dispersed social services providers requires a collective 
solution across government agencies and social services organisations. 
 
 
 
 F8.4  Modern data technology and analytics can support a devolved approach to guiding 
investments in social services, by collecting and analysing data on service costs and on 
client participation in services and subsequent outcomes.  
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 F8.5  Where individuals give consent, government agencies could give third parties, such as 
non-government organisations and academia, access to identifiable personal data to 
support the development and provision of innovative social services. 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
 
 R8.1  The Social Sector Board should initiate a project to coordinate client-level operational 
data sharing to increase the scope, power and accuracy of the Government’s 
investment approach to targeting social services. The work should follow the principles 
recommended by the New Zealand Data Futures Forum.  
 
 
 
 R8.2  Government social services agencies and social services providers should capture 
information on their clients and services in a consistent way. Doing so would allow 
commissioning organisations, providers and evaluators of services to track clients’ use 
of services across time, and so identify service outcomes and provider performance.  
 
 
 
 R8.3  The Government should require government social services agencies engaged in 
sharing personal data to adhere to the four guiding principles of value, inclusion, trust 
and control proposed by the New Zealand Data Futures Forum. 
 
 
 
 R8.4  The Government should set up governance arrangements that secure confidence and 
trust in the sharing of data across the social services, provide advice to government and 
data users on proposals for change, and develop best-practice guidance. 
 
 
 
 R8.5  The Social Sector Board should initiate a project on social sector data integration that 
includes the design of institutions and processes to develop a comprehensive, wide-
access, client-centred data infrastructure. This infrastructure should be accessible to 
commissioning organisations, providers, clients and researchers of social services. 
 
 
 
 R8.6  The Government should seek partnerships with non-government organisations and 
universities to use data sharing and analysis to create new solutions to difficult-to-solve 
social problems. This should, where individuals consent, include sharing identifiable 
personal data held by government agencies. 
 
 
Chapter 9 – Investment and insurance approaches 
Findings 
 
 
 F9.1  Decisions made using the Investment Approach are likely to be significantly correlated 
with what citizens care about, for those services and clients where the approach is 
applicable. Its wider adoption would likely lead to substantial improvements in the 
targeting of social services. 
 
 
 
 F9.2  Borrowing now to fund investments that will reduce future social welfare liability is 
good in principle, but has risks in practice. A higher burden of proof is required to 
justify such borrowing, relative to spending funded from current income. 
 
 
 
 F9.3  A social insurance model aligns the long-term incentives of insurers and their members. 
Because social insurers face the long-term costs of service decisions, they have the 
incentives to make sound decisions about early intervention and service quality. 
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 F9.4  A social insurance model with multiple non-government insurers has good 
opportunities and incentives for innovation, and may out-perform models with a single 
government insurer. Such models face difficult design and transition issues. 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
 
 R9.1  The Investment Approach could usefully be applied more widely. Future welfare liability 
– its underlying proxy for social return – should be further refined to better reflect the 
wider costs and benefits of interventions. 
 
 
 
 R9.2  The Investment Approach should be extended to operate at a cross-programme, cross-
agency level.  
 
Chapter 10 – Service integration 
Findings 
 
 
 F10.1  Coordinating the provision of multiple services to the same client is unlikely to work 
without agreement on what services the client is eligible for and which provider will 
take the lead. The lead can come from a service provider, a navigator, the service user 
or a service professional such as a lead maternity carer.  
 
 
 
 F10.2  The fragmentation of social services to the detriment of clients with complex needs is a 
long-standing issue that has proven difficult to resolve despite many attempts.   
 
 
 F10.3  Integrating services has costs as well as benefits. The challenge is to weigh these up so 
as to make a judgement about what type and how much integration is optimal.  
 
 
 F10.4  Integration is more likely to be beneficial where: 
 services are linked together as a chain of services; 
 clients, families or communities experience clusters of related problems; and  
 the people doing the integrating are willing to work together and trust each other. 
 
 
 
 F10.5  A common phenomenon is governments undertaking multiple and overlapping 
integration initiatives, resulting in confusion, frustration and strain on scarce resources.  
 
Recommendations 
 
 
 R10.1  Governments and service-commissioning agencies should consider whether service 
fragmentation is a symptom that could be most effectively dealt with by changing their 
institutional-design and commissioning choices.  
 
 
 
 R10.2  The Government should adopt a cautious approach to directing service integration 
from the centre, and should instead focus on ensuring that institutions and 
commissioning arrangements provide opportunities for bottom-up integration.  
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 R10.3  Efforts to integrate social services should be attentive to organisational cultures that 
promote or impede integration, and should address problems through remedies, 
including promoting a common language and values across the system and providing 
opportunities for formal and informal interaction between organisations. 
 
 
 
 R10.4  The Government should assist providers to access and use operational data to improve 
service integration as part of investing in a better data infrastructure and safe data 
sharing for social services. 
 
 
Chapter 11 – Client choice and empowerment 
Findings 
 
 
 F11.1   Contracting out and in-house provision are common service models in New Zealand. 
These models give clients few choices around the what, who, when, where and how of 
service delivery. 
 
 
 
 F11.2   In-house provision and contracting-out models can provide little reward for providers 
that are responsive to the needs of clients. Under some contract structures, providers 
may be disadvantaged by providing a better service. 
 
 
 
 F11.3  The allocation of decision rights under in-house provision and contracting-out models 
often casts clients as passive recipients of services, rather than active participants in 
decisions that impact their lives. 
 
 
 
 F11.4  In many instances clients, rather than government officials, have the best understanding 
of their individual needs and the combination of services they require. Clients are also 
often in the best position, with the support of family, friends and whänau, to integrate 
the services they receive. 
 
 
 
 F11.5  Giving clients choice and control over the what, who, when, where and how of service 
delivery leads to a better fit between client needs and the services they receive. A 
better fit means that more public money is spent on services that clients value, and less 
on those they do not. 
 
 
 
 F11.6  Giving clients choice and control over the what, who, when, where and how of service 
delivery provides a mechanism through which both providers and clients can 
experiment with, and learn from, trying different approaches to service delivery. 
 
 
 
 F11.7  At a system level, giving clients choice and control over the what, who, when, where 
and how of service delivery creates an incentive for providers to be responsive to client 
needs and to lift the quality of the services they offer.  
 
 
 
 
 F11.8  International evidence suggests most clients experience an increased level of 
satisfaction after moving from agency-directed to client-directed models of social 
services provision. 
 
 
 
 F11.9  Some studies have reported positive health outcomes when clients shift from agency-
directed to client-directed service models. However, in general the evidence for such 
health improvements is weak. 
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 F11.10  If good practices are used, most clients of social services programmes can and do 
exercise choice when given the opportunity.  
 
 
 F11.11  There is little evidence to support the claim that client direction leads to a decline in 
the quality of services that clients receive.   
 
 
 F11.12  There is little evidence to support the claim that client direction is any more or less 
open to fraud or misuse than agency-directed models of social service delivery.  
 
 
 F11.13  Available evidence indicates that client-directed models can be more expensive than 
agency-directed models, especially if they are not well planned and executed.   
 
 
 F11.14  There is limited evidence on the impact that client-directed budgets have on workers. 
Available evidence suggests that impacts will be highly dependent on the design of the 
programme and on the level of government funding available. 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
 
 R11.1  When commissioning services, the Government should look to empower clients where 
such empowerment would not be detrimental to the client or the broader interests of 
society. Disability support services, home-based support of older people, respite 
services, family services, and drug and rehabilitation services are good prospects. 
 
 
Chapter 12 – Better purchasing and contracting 
Recommendations 
 
 
 R12.1  The Government should give an agency the task of developing a single set of up-to-
date guidelines for agencies entering into contracts with non-government providers of 
social services. That agency should provide training on these guidelines to other 
agencies and providers. 
To encourage agencies to use the guidelines, the Government should: 
 provide training about the revised guidelines to relevant agencies and providers; 
 require agencies entering a contract to sign a declaration that they have used the 
guidelines; and 
 assess agencies’ management of contracts with non-government providers in the 
Performance Improvement Framework reviews of agencies. 
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 R12.2  To improve tendering practice, government agencies should face new requirements to: 
 undertake reasonable consultation with providers and clients during the pre-
contract phase;  
 report yearly their compliance with tendering timelines; 
 take account of the past performance of bidders when assessing bids. If agencies 
intend to ignore past performance, they should publish at the start of the tendering 
process the reasons why they are doing so; 
 consider standardising tendering requirements, but standardisation should not be 
mandatory; 
 develop, in consultation with providers, a risk management framework that 
identifies risks and how best to allocate them; and 
 set contract duration in the context of their overall risk management framework, and 
taking into account factors such as providers’ incentives to invest in relevant 
capabilities and equipment.  
Government agencies should publish their reasons for selecting a particular contract 
duration. 
  
 
 
 R12.3  Departments, agencies and non-government providers should expand the use of 
contracting for outcomes where it is efficient to do so.  
 
 
 R12.4  The Government should improve the capabilities of agencies to contract for outcomes, 
ideally with payments for outcomes achieved in those contracts.  
 
 
 R12.5  Government agencies should: 
 adopt a risk-based approach to monitoring contracts as part of their risk 
management framework; and 
 publish the reasons for their chosen monitoring arrangements, including an analysis 
of the costs and benefits to all parties. 
 
 
 
 R12.6  The State Services Commission should develop a set of minimum expectations around 
the promotion of contract management capability, and require the statements of intent 
of relevant agencies to demonstrate how they will meet those expectations. 
 
 
Chapter 13 – The Mäori dimension 
Findings 
 
 
 F13.1  Where the Treaty places duties on the Crown to take particular actions in social services 
in relation to Mäori, these duties are in addition to, rather than a substitute for, ordinary 
good process. 
 
 
 
 F13.2  The Treaty settlement process is not well suited to exploring opportunities for Mäori 
groups to have greater involvement in social service commissioning, especially as New 
Zealand moves into a post-settlement era. 
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Recommendations 
 
 
 R13.1  The Government should create a standing opportunity for Mäori groups to initiate 
negotiations to increase participation in commissioning social services, outside the 
Treaty settlement process. 
 
 
Chapter 14 – Implementation 
Recommendations 
 
 
 R14.1  A small and cohesive committee of ministers drawn from relevant service delivery and 
central portfolios should be responsible for leading the Government’s reform of the 
social services system. 
 
 
 
 R14.2  The Government should establish an Office for Social Services, preferably within a 
central agency, to: 
  help ministers to develop the overall reform strategy and oversee its 
implementation; 
 develop whole-of-system data and analysis – both performance data and 
diagnostics identifying priorities; 
 undertake research on system-wide issues and provide advice to the Social Sector 
Board of chief executives and to the relevant ministers; 
 undertake evaluations of the performance of the social services system; 
 provide advice and design guidance for agencies engaged in commissioning; and 
 promote continuous improvement and the development of capability across the 
system. 
The Office would need clear terms of reference that steer it towards favouring 
customer-centred, devolved and data-rich approaches and whole-of-system thinking. 
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 R14.3  To strengthen the incentives for reforming the social services system, the Government 
should: 
 establish a Ministerial Advisory Board to report publicly on the Government’s 
progress in reforming the social services system;  
 remove unnecessary barriers to reform; 
 provide positive incentives for improvement; 
 expand the measurement and public reporting of the return on investment in social 
services programmes; 
 establish a programme for reviewing social service programmes against specified 
criteria; and 
 seek beneficial opportunities to undertake joint benchmarking of social services, 
such as through participating in the Australian Report on Government Services. 
The government agencies responsible for social services programmes should 
commission the reviews. Reviews should be overseen by independent steering 
committees, published and subject to assessment by the Ministerial Advisory Board; 
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Appendix A Public consultation 
Submissions 
INDIVIDUAL OR ORGANISATION SUBMISSION NUMBER 
Accident Compensation Corporation 030 
Age Concern New Zealand 100 
Alcohol Healthwatch 084 
Alliance Health Plus Trust 119 
Alzheimers New Zealand 027 
Anonymous  062 
Aotearoa New Zealand Association of Social Workers 078 
Aotearoa New Zealand Evaluation Association 037 
Association of Blind Citizens of New Zealand  134 
Association of Salaried Medical Specialists  085 
Auckland District Council of Social Services 055 
Auckland North Community and Development  022 
Barnardos  012 
Birthright New Zealand  128 
Blind Foundation 016 
Bay of Plenty Community Response Forum 053 
Careerforce  050 
CareNZ 099 
Carers New Zealand 071 
Carole Gordon 105 
CCS Disability Action 065 
Charlie Devenish 026 
City of Dunedin New Zealand 034 
Co-leaders of the Mäori Party 118 
Communities and Neighbours 066 
Community Care Trust 096 
Community Law Centres of Aotearoa 115 
Community Networks Aotearoa  031 
Community Networks Wellington 033 
ComVoices 117 
Counselling Services Centre 059 
Counties Manukau District Health Board 064 
Deaf Aotearoa 069 
Delta Community Support Trust 013 
Department of Corrections 021 
Disabled Persons Assembly NZ  054 
Dunedin Community Law Centre 048 
Early Childhood Council 015 
Ecosynergy Group Limited 131 
Footsteps Education Limited 042 
Graham Aitken 107 
Graham Howell 017 
Healthcare of New Zealand Holdings Limited 051 
326 DRAFT | More effective social services 
Hokianga Health Enterprise Trust 044 
Home and Community Health Association 114 
Homebuilders Family Services North Rodney  038 
IHC New Zealand 080 
Inclusive NZ 032 
Inspiring Communities and Partners 058 
Jane Lee 060 
Jenny Campbell 092 
John Angus 109 
Kay Brereton 009 
Laura Fergusson Rehabilitation 010 
Lifewise 046 
Local Government New Zealand 124 
Lorna Dyall 116 
Manawanui  008 
Methodist Social Services 014 
Ministry of Social Development 072 
Ministry of Social Development – Cross Government 
Accreditation Working Group 
132 
Myra Harpham and Jennifer Coote 106 
National Collective of Independent Women's Refuges 123 
National Committee of Addiction Treatment 098 
National Council of Women of New Zealand 020 
National Services Purchasing, National Health Board, 
Ministry of Health 
111 
New Zealand Council of Christian Social Services  035 
New Zealand Council of Trade Unions – Te Kauae Kaimahi 103 
New Zealand Disability Support Network 047 
New Zealand Educational Institute Te Riu Roa 040 
New Zealand Kindergartens  052 
New Zealand Medical Association  039 
New Zealand Nurses Organisation 133 
New Zealand Organisation for Rare Disorders 089 
New Zealand Post Primary Teachers’ Association 088 
New Zealand Public Service Association  108 
New Zealand Red Cross 094 
New Zealand Society on Alcohol and Drug Dependence 113 
NGO Health & Disability Network 070 
Noelene Buckland 061 
Office of the Children's Commissioner 077 
Otago Youth Wellness Trust 073 
Owen Carter 001 
Pact Supporting People 095 
Palmerston North Community Services Council 125 
Pat Harrison 019 
Peter Matthewson 025 
Pharmacy Guild of New Zealand 011 
Platform Charitable Trust 045 
Presbyterian Support New Zealand 076 
Problem Gambling Foundation 091 
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Public Health Association of New Zealand 122 
Relationships Aotearoa 056 
Restorative Justice Aotearoa 028 
Richard Wood 018 
Salvation Army 104 
Sandra Grey and Charles Sedgwick 068 
Social Sector Innovation (WBOP) Trust 081 
Social Sector Trial Leads 126 
Social Service Providers Aotearoa  129 
South Waikato Social Services Collective 007 
Southland Interagency Forum 029 
Space NZ Trust 063 
Spectrum Care Trust Board 090 
Stand Children's Services Tü Mäia Whänau 127 
START 121 
Steve Thomas 087 
Sue Johnston 003 
Superu 082 
Supporting Families in Mental Illness NZ  049 
Tangata o le Moana Network 093 
Tauranga Budget Advisory Service 057 
Te Roopu Waiora 097 
Te Rünaka o Ötäkou 110 
The Human Rights Commission 101 
The Impact Collective  130 
The Mäori Reference Group for Action on Violence within 
Families 
120 
The Methodist Mission 004 
The Raglan House 024 
UNICEF NZ 036 
Victory Community Health 005 
Volunteering New Zealand 086 
Waikato Community Response Forum 079 
Waimakariri District Council 075 
WAVES Trust and Community Waitakere 083 
Wellbeing North Canterbury Community Trust 112 
Wellington City Council 043 
Wesley Community Action 006 
Whakaata Tohu Tohu/Mirror Services 023 
Wise Group 041 
Workbridge 102 
Youth Horizons 067 
 
Engagement meetings 
INDIVIDUAL OR ORGANISATION 
Accident Compensation Corporation 
Age Concern New Zealand 
Alliance Health Plus Trust 
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ANGOA (Association of Non-Government Organisations Aotearoa) 
ASB Community Trust 
Auckland City Mission 
Barnardos 
Birthright New Zealand  
Canterbury District Health Board 
Capital and Coast District Health Board 
Careerforce 
CCS Disability Action Upper South Region  
Children's Action Plan 
Citizens Advice Bureau 
Compass Health 
Department of Internal Affairs 
Dr Jenny Keightley 
Ferndale School 
He Oranga Pounamu 
He Puna Marama Trust 
Healthy Families New Zealand 
Home and Community Health Association 
Horowhenua Children’s Action Team 
Horowhenua District Council 
IHC New Zealand  
Women's Refuge 
IPANZ (Institute of Public Administration of New Zealand) 
James Mansell 
Jane Allison 
John Baker, Ernst & Young  
LifeLinks 
Make It Happen Te Hiku Taskforce 
Manawanui 
Maxim Institute 
Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment 
Ministry of Education 
Ministry of Health 
Ministry of Justice 
Ministry of Social Development 
National Beneficiaries Advocacy Group 
New Zealand Aged Care Association 
New Zealand Council of Christian Social Services 
New Zealand Council of Trade Unions 
New Zealand Data Futures Forum – John Whitehead, Evelyn Wareham 
New Zealand Educational Institute 
New Zealand Medical Association 
New Zealand Police 
New Zealand Public Service Association 
New Zealand Treasury 
Ngäpuhi Iwi Social Services 
Office of the Children's Commissioner 
Pact Group 
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Pasifika Futures 
Paula Rebstock 
Peter Hughes 
Philanthropy New Zealand 
Platform Charitable Trust 
Prof. Jackie Cumming, Victoria University of Wellington 
Salvation Army 
Shine 
Sir Mason Durie 
SkillWise 
Social Sector Joint Venture – Social Sector Trials 
Stand Children’s Services Tü Mäia Whänau 
State Sector Reform Action Group 
State Services Commission 
Stepping into Employment 
Strive Community Trust 
Superu 
Suzanne Snively 
Te Aroha Noa Community Services 
Te Hiku Iwi Development Trust  
Te Kahui Atawhai O Te Motu Incorporated 
Te Pou Matakana 
Te Pu o Te Wheke Whänau Ora Collective 
Te Puni Kōkiri 
Te Pütahitanga o Te Waipounamu 
Te Rünanga o Ngäti Awa 
Te Tai Tokerau Whänau Ora Collective 
Te Whare Ruruhau o Meri Trust 
The Impact Collective 
The Mäori Reference Group for Action on Violence within Families 
The Tindall Foundation 
The Todd Foundation 
TOAH-NNEST 
Tom Love, Sapere Research Group 
Webb Henderson 
Wesley Community Action 
West Coast District Health Board 
Whänau Märama-Parenting 
Wise Group 
Youth Horizons 
 
AUSTRALIA 
Gary Sturgess  
Australian Productivity Commission 
Competition Policy Review Panel 
Competition Policy Review Secretariat  
Department of Employment 
Department of Premier and Cabinet – New South Wales 
Department of Social Services 
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Mission Australia 
National Disability Insurance Agency  
National Disability Services 
National Employment Services Association  
The Treasury – New South Wales 
 
Conferences 
INDIVIDUAL OR ORGANISATION 
Aotearoa New Zealand Evaluation Association Conference 2014 
Australia New Zealand Third Sector Research – Resilience, Change and the Third Sector 
Collective Impact 2014 
Community is the Answer 
Cooperative Research Conference 2014 
Rotary Forum: supporting NGOs to survive and thrive 
Social Justice In Communities 
Social Services Providers Aotearoa Conference 2014 
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Appendices B-F Additional material on the 
Commission’s website 
Appendices B to F are available from www.productivity.govt.nz/inquiry-content/social-services   
Appendix Title Contents 
B Employment services Case study of New Zealand and Australian systems for delivering 
employment services. The systems differ: in New Zealand a 
government in-house provider delivers them; the Australian 
Government out-sources them using a managed market. 
New Zealand uses data and analytics in a sophisticated way to 
improve service effectiveness.  
C Whänau Ora Case study of Whänau Ora as a relatively new approach to the 
commissioning and delivery of services, particularly to Mäori and 
Pasifika families. Of interest is the emphasis on families 
determining their own goals and the means to achieve them, 
assisted by “navigators”. Another feature is the use of non-
government commissioning agencies. 
D Services for people with 
disabilities 
Case study of the ways that the government commissions and 
delivers services for people with disabilities. The study examines 
the Enabling Good Lives trial and the Ministry of Health’s 
Individualised Funding initiative as examples of client-directed 
budgets. 
E Home-based support of older 
people  
Case study of services and support for home-based care of the 
aged, how well they work, the issue of service integration, and the 
lessons that can be drawn (eg, how home-based services can 
reduce the need for hospital admissions and residential care). 
F The economics of social 
services 
Reviews the microeconomics literature and picks out those parts 
that throw light on the economics of social services. The parts 
include contracting under uncertainty and how different types of 
incentives affect service performance. While drawing on various 
perspectives and frameworks, the inquiry aims to be grounded in 
sound microeconomics.  
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